AF 447 Thread No. 8

[alf5071h]

OC re #1169. You appear to assume that because knowledge exits it can be recalled for use at any time, or that all situations will be understood (as you would understand them). Hindsight bias is within these assumptions.
Without detailed evidence we do not know what the crew thought – what was or was not recalled from memory, or how it was used in their assessment; similarly what they deduced about the situation and events.

The human mind has a natural tendency to ‘join-up the dots’ to create a familiar picture; – our understanding of the world as we would wish it to be. In order to learn from difficult accidents such as AF447 we have to restrain this tendency and only work with what we know factually.

There is much which we might learn from hypothetical speculation, by attempting to understand what the crew might have seen, thought, or decided. In this it is essential that our thinking is tightly controlled and that we do not form erroneous conclusions due to hindsight.
We might identify what physically happened; and with considered judgement it may be possible to identify contributing factors which could have influenced the crew, but without any assurance of proof.
In these circumstances the safety lessons to be learned come from questioning how we might see, think, or decide when faced by the contributing factors, e.g. as a start, would we have identified the situation as requiring reference to the UAS drill – why? Ask why 5 times, without knowledge of AF447 outcome.


Chris N, whilst it might be reasonable for MPs and the public (SLF) to have their expectations, those of the regulator and industry should be kerbed by the facts, and knowledge and application of human factors.
If, or when public judgement is required, then hopefully legal judgement would caution about hindsight bias. However, this is becoming a very disturbing area of aviation which requires both public (media) and industry restraint, supported with simple education of human factors to dampen expectations.