AF 447 Thread No. 8
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Quote:
Originally posted by NeoFit ...
'AIRBUS incite les pilotes .... ne pas tenir compte des alarmes STALL'
Where was that quoted?
[AIRBUS encourages pilots to ignore the STALL warning]
Originally posted by NeoFit ...
'AIRBUS incite les pilotes .... ne pas tenir compte des alarmes STALL'
Where was that quoted?
[AIRBUS encourages pilots to ignore the STALL warning]
AIRBUS encourages pilots to ignore the STALL warning
This is the procedure in force at the day AF447 crash
At the end ... under TRAIN
Respecter les alarmes décrochage
Respect (take in account) the stall alarms
Hello mm43;
I've seen words to that effect in past documents and I'm still searching through my archive. I found one item that hints that the stall warning may be false, but all other documents I've viewed thus far, (2002 to the present) having to do with UAS, state that the stall warning should be respected. But I know I have read somewhere that the warning could be false. The following may hint that the stall warning is/could be false but nothing in the document, (1997 & 2005) states that the warning should be ignored:
On a related matter, the link to this Airbus presentation may have been posted previously but it is worth taking a look at it. The presentation was created in September, 2006.
Unreliable Speed - Latest Improvements
I've seen words to that effect in past documents and I'm still searching through my archive. I found one item that hints that the stall warning may be false, but all other documents I've viewed thus far, (2002 to the present) having to do with UAS, state that the stall warning should be respected. But I know I have read somewhere that the warning could be false. The following may hint that the stall warning is/could be false but nothing in the document, (1997 & 2005) states that the warning should be ignored:
Any erroneous speed/altitude indication will always be associated with one or
more of the following cues:
ˇ Fluctuations in airspeed indications
ˇ Abnormal correlation of basic flight parameters (IAS, pitch, attitude, thrust,
climb rate); e.g IAS increasing with large nose-up pitch attitude, IAS
decreasing with large nose down pitch attitude, IAS decreasing, with nose
down pitch attitude and aircraft descending
ˇ Abnormal AP/FD/A/THR behavior
ˇ Stall or overspeed warnings
ˇ Reduction in aerodynamic noise, with increasing IAS
ˇ Increase in aerodynamic noise, with decreasing IAS
more of the following cues:
ˇ Fluctuations in airspeed indications
ˇ Abnormal correlation of basic flight parameters (IAS, pitch, attitude, thrust,
climb rate); e.g IAS increasing with large nose-up pitch attitude, IAS
decreasing with large nose down pitch attitude, IAS decreasing, with nose
down pitch attitude and aircraft descending
ˇ Abnormal AP/FD/A/THR behavior
ˇ Stall or overspeed warnings
ˇ Reduction in aerodynamic noise, with increasing IAS
ˇ Increase in aerodynamic noise, with decreasing IAS
Unreliable Speed - Latest Improvements
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Hi jcjeant, PJ2;
Thanks for your responses.
Well I've done a Google search and found the culprit article for which a Google page translation can be found here.
It is on an Airbus 'bashing' blog dated 20 August 2011, and I believe that it has previously been commented on in the PPRuNe threads, though I can't find a particular reference to it. The name Henri Marnet-Cornus is associated with it!
Now I've found it back in the AF447 Thread. Tilting at shadows?
Thanks for your responses.
Well I've done a Google search and found the culprit article for which a Google page translation can be found here.
It is on an Airbus 'bashing' blog dated 20 August 2011, and I believe that it has previously been commented on in the PPRuNe threads, though I can't find a particular reference to it. The name Henri Marnet-Cornus is associated with it!
Now I've found it back in the AF447 Thread. Tilting at shadows?
Last edited by mm43; 10th May 2012 at 02:45.
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Legal experts?
@mm43
At the site that you cited, I found an interesting blog:
Il appartient aux seuls experts judiciaires* de faire enfin éclater la vérité (ce nest pas la peine de compter sur le BEA) qui est :
Le 31 mai 2009lorsque le vol AF 447 décolle de Rio pour Paris, lA330 F-GZCP navait pas un niveau de sécurité acceptable ŕ cause du défaut des sondes Pitot Thales AA qui équipaient cet avion. La condition compromettant la sécurité qui en résultait, entretenue par l'absence d'une alarme spécifique "BLOCAGE PITOT" et par un systčme d'alarme décrochage non conforme au JAR 25, réduisait la capacité des pilotes ŕ gérer une situation dégradée et a provoqué la destruction de lavion et la mort de 228 personnes.
Alain de Valence, Hubert Arnould, Charles Magne, Eric Brodbeck, Michel Beyris.
Hope, I did not forget my French completely:
It is only up to legal experts* to finally reveal the truth (it's not worth counting on BEA), which is:
May 31st, 2009, when AF447 took off from Rio to Paris, the A330 F-GZCP did not have an acceptable level of safety because of the problems with
the Thales AA Pitot probes that equipped the aircraft. The resulting unsafe condition, sustained by the absence of a specific "BLOCKED PITOT" alert and by a
STALL WARNING SYSTEM not complying with JAR-25, reduced the pilot's ability to handle an abnormal situation and caused the destruction of the aircraft and the deaths of 228 people.
* Alain de Valence, Hubert Arnould, Charles Magne, Eric Brodbeck, Michel Beyris
Looks like a very bold statement "...NOT COMPLYING FAR-25", but on the other side, who knows....
Here is the link:
[URL="http://henrimarnetcornus.20minutes-blogs.fr/"]Les dossiers noirs du transport aérien
At the site that you cited, I found an interesting blog:
Il appartient aux seuls experts judiciaires* de faire enfin éclater la vérité (ce nest pas la peine de compter sur le BEA) qui est :
Le 31 mai 2009lorsque le vol AF 447 décolle de Rio pour Paris, lA330 F-GZCP navait pas un niveau de sécurité acceptable ŕ cause du défaut des sondes Pitot Thales AA qui équipaient cet avion. La condition compromettant la sécurité qui en résultait, entretenue par l'absence d'une alarme spécifique "BLOCAGE PITOT" et par un systčme d'alarme décrochage non conforme au JAR 25, réduisait la capacité des pilotes ŕ gérer une situation dégradée et a provoqué la destruction de lavion et la mort de 228 personnes.
Alain de Valence, Hubert Arnould, Charles Magne, Eric Brodbeck, Michel Beyris.
Hope, I did not forget my French completely:
It is only up to legal experts* to finally reveal the truth (it's not worth counting on BEA), which is:
May 31st, 2009, when AF447 took off from Rio to Paris, the A330 F-GZCP did not have an acceptable level of safety because of the problems with
the Thales AA Pitot probes that equipped the aircraft. The resulting unsafe condition, sustained by the absence of a specific "BLOCKED PITOT" alert and by a
STALL WARNING SYSTEM not complying with JAR-25, reduced the pilot's ability to handle an abnormal situation and caused the destruction of the aircraft and the deaths of 228 people.
* Alain de Valence, Hubert Arnould, Charles Magne, Eric Brodbeck, Michel Beyris
Looks like a very bold statement "...NOT COMPLYING FAR-25", but on the other side, who knows....
Here is the link:
[URL="http://henrimarnetcornus.20minutes-blogs.fr/"]Les dossiers noirs du transport aérien
Last edited by Flyinheavy; 10th May 2012 at 14:27.
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Originally Posted by PJ2
But I know I have read somewhere that the warning could be false.
Also that information is important regarding the stall warning and the way to deal with it.
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@Flyinheavy:
I'd take *anything* that site has to say with a shovelful of salt. It is not remotely objective in any sense of the word and simply a repository for a disgruntled ex-AF captain to vent about his dislike for Airbus.
@CONF iture:
This might be a long shot, but is it not even slightly possible that the BEA factored that into the tests and found it to be irrelevant?
I'd take *anything* that site has to say with a shovelful of salt. It is not remotely objective in any sense of the word and simply a repository for a disgruntled ex-AF captain to vent about his dislike for Airbus.
@CONF iture:
This might be a long shot, but is it not even slightly possible that the BEA factored that into the tests and found it to be irrelevant?
Thank you CONF iture, yes, have seen this caution in various places both historical and recent. Also, I do recall coming across the OSV document more than a year ago and thought it prescient. The puzzle is, with so much information available prior to the accident, why did the accident occur at all? Getting information out to crews is always a challenge and doesn't happen in a few days or even weeks, and the sense of urgency is always contextual, so something perceived to not be an immediate threat receives less emphasis and dedication of what has become today, minimal resources, than other, "more immediate" concerns.
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I have more or less assumed that the crew rejected the STALLWARN as an anomaly in the procedure (mechanical), and that they came by that info through the Airline, via meter, Bulletin, or other......perhaps even the grapevine. Was AF so in the weeds they launched hundreds of flights with a cobbled together procedure that amounted to nothing more than "Scuttlebutt"?
Which of course explains clearly why the STALLWARN was ignored....
In the document, it specifically states the a/c can relay to the instruments
"NOSEUP/HIGH airspeeds" NOSELOW/SLOW airspeed, etc. IF Bonin was in NOSEHIGH, HIGH AIRSPEED (he obviously thought so, crazy speed) then NOSEHIGH/LOW SPEED (HE WAS), what does he do? Reject IAS? That makes the re-STALLSTALL partcularly poignant, just at the point when things were going the right way, etc.....His cues were there for NU/high speed, and did he accept them due the Bulletin as false? They seemed real....So, how to recover? Reference to VSI? It's pinned, how can he trust that, has anyone ever descended that way?
Any upset, a/c or pilotage, may interrupt the flight path, and once interrupted, it cannot be regained if systems become unreadable, and no trained response works to realign it. No going back, once lost. No trail of corn, no experience.
If true, it certainly explains things in a different light.
Worse, though, is what it says about the guesswork and negligence present around UAS in its 30plus iterations.
Were the crews and pax to be 'observers" on dozens (hundreds) of "test flights" whilst each occurrence involved "ad lib" recovery? Or no recovery (447)?
Challenge. Given the presence of STALL warnings, and unreadable/unreliable airspeeds, more information from the CVR is required. I cannot believe in the midst of this problem, the only conversation we see is what BEA have trickled out...
Which of course explains clearly why the STALLWARN was ignored....
In the document, it specifically states the a/c can relay to the instruments
"NOSEUP/HIGH airspeeds" NOSELOW/SLOW airspeed, etc. IF Bonin was in NOSEHIGH, HIGH AIRSPEED (he obviously thought so, crazy speed) then NOSEHIGH/LOW SPEED (HE WAS), what does he do? Reject IAS? That makes the re-STALLSTALL partcularly poignant, just at the point when things were going the right way, etc.....His cues were there for NU/high speed, and did he accept them due the Bulletin as false? They seemed real....So, how to recover? Reference to VSI? It's pinned, how can he trust that, has anyone ever descended that way?
Any upset, a/c or pilotage, may interrupt the flight path, and once interrupted, it cannot be regained if systems become unreadable, and no trained response works to realign it. No going back, once lost. No trail of corn, no experience.
If true, it certainly explains things in a different light.
Worse, though, is what it says about the guesswork and negligence present around UAS in its 30plus iterations.
Were the crews and pax to be 'observers" on dozens (hundreds) of "test flights" whilst each occurrence involved "ad lib" recovery? Or no recovery (447)?
Challenge. Given the presence of STALL warnings, and unreadable/unreliable airspeeds, more information from the CVR is required. I cannot believe in the midst of this problem, the only conversation we see is what BEA have trickled out...
Last edited by Lyman; 10th May 2012 at 18:46.
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@PJ2
If you read the AirCaraibe report, there they mention exactly the discrepancy of respecting S/W or not to.
ECAM status page stating:
"RISK OF UNDUE STALL WARNING" and
"UNDUE STALL WARNING MAY MAINLY OCCUR IN CASE OF AN AOA
DISCREPANCY"
Could it be, that the AF447 PF thought of Air Caraibe crew ignoring the S/W? Still would not justify pitching up to >10° at FL350.
What if he simply mixed up values of memory items below and above FL100 as he did UAS in the simulator not long before the accident.
Anyway, PNF would have had to at least call out "PITCH" and they probably would have broken the chain of events. Were they both so stunned, that neither of them thought of calling for the QRH?
May be BEA report to come will give more insight.........
If you read the AirCaraibe report, there they mention exactly the discrepancy of respecting S/W or not to.
ECAM status page stating:
"RISK OF UNDUE STALL WARNING" and
"UNDUE STALL WARNING MAY MAINLY OCCUR IN CASE OF AN AOA
DISCREPANCY"
Could it be, that the AF447 PF thought of Air Caraibe crew ignoring the S/W? Still would not justify pitching up to >10° at FL350.
What if he simply mixed up values of memory items below and above FL100 as he did UAS in the simulator not long before the accident.
Anyway, PNF would have had to at least call out "PITCH" and they probably would have broken the chain of events. Were they both so stunned, that neither of them thought of calling for the QRH?
May be BEA report to come will give more insight.........
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HazelNuts39
My only response can be that in his confusion, he was randomly selective about his response/not to STALLWARN. I apologize if I seemed narrow in my post, but his behaviour to me, shows a lack of recognition, as the others displayed, and emanated from an event that was not well known, had never been trained, and was a mere part of the LOC chain.....
how about.... "was variously ignored, and taken as fact..."
My only response can be that in his confusion, he was randomly selective about his response/not to STALLWARN. I apologize if I seemed narrow in my post, but his behaviour to me, shows a lack of recognition, as the others displayed, and emanated from an event that was not well known, had never been trained, and was a mere part of the LOC chain.....
how about.... "was variously ignored, and taken as fact..."
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Klopfstein Head-Up Display
Originally Posted by gums
AoA and HUD on commercial jets
Glad to hear from Cland that a few carriers are using a HUD.
Glad to hear from Cland that a few carriers are using a HUD.
and showed it in USA with MIT's congratulations. The French Armée de l'Air nor Zieglers (Aerospatiale, Airbus) did not like nor trust Klopstein and his HUD as he was Jewish. Klopfstein's HUD has been used on many aircrafts, i.e. F16, F18, Space Shuttle, etc. 
I have seen a HUD in a IT flying A310 (Air Inter, today included in AIR FRANCE !) around 30 years ago .
Something is sure, AF had that HUD and don't use it
not a question of price ! Would AF put it in the AF447, ... and crew trained, could you explain what would had been different ?
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Isn't HUD simply a panel "annex" with the most important cues displayed so all the pilot has to do is change focus (if even that) not field, with his scan? So the AoA would assuredly be displayed. "Eyes out" doesn't mean alot in 447's situation?
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Originally Posted by PJ2
The puzzle is, with so much information available prior to the accident, why did the accident occur at all?
Following the Air Caraibes events and the subsequent Memo, it was a known and accepted fact by Airbus that unreliable airspeed indication in cruise do happen and could be tricky. Airbus had to publish a clear and unambiguous note to all crews how to properly deal with such scenario that triggers a load of ECAMs but can be easily mastered if you do this this and that.
They knew that something was coming, hopefully not as bad as AF447, but something has to be done to inform crews before they face the situation.
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Originally Posted by DozyWannabe
I'd take *anything* that site has to say with a shovelful of salt. It is not remotely objective in any sense of the word and simply a repository for a disgruntled ex-AF captain to vent about his dislike for Airbus.
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Originally Posted by Lyman
Challenge. Given the presence of STALL warnings, and unreadable/unreliable airspeeds, more information from the CVR is required. I cannot believe in the midst of this problem, the only conversation we see is what BEA have trickled out...
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The Truth requires no Seasoning.
And it may taste foul, granted. The Pilots are not Gods, and they don't have much to say about the operation of the business that provides their livelihood.
If the argument devolves to what did they know, and when did they know it? the personal histories of the various messages is irrelevant. Without a guideline for procedure, who would wager on the outcome of a situation that one time out of 30 was fatal? No one. Did Airbus, POST 447, issue a primer to pilots re: Stall? YES, Also, High speed handling? also YES.
If that is a finding, to my way of thinking, the pilots might not have responsibility for this accident at all.....
And it may taste foul, granted. The Pilots are not Gods, and they don't have much to say about the operation of the business that provides their livelihood.
If the argument devolves to what did they know, and when did they know it? the personal histories of the various messages is irrelevant. Without a guideline for procedure, who would wager on the outcome of a situation that one time out of 30 was fatal? No one. Did Airbus, POST 447, issue a primer to pilots re: Stall? YES, Also, High speed handling? also YES.
If that is a finding, to my way of thinking, the pilots might not have responsibility for this accident at all.....
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RetiredF4:
I totally agree with you RetiredF4.
Further to the need of an AoA display unit, I believe this would be better than nothing but, unfortunately, that feature only addresses the stall issue. The question is wider than that IMHO. It has to do with the need (or not) for the PNF to "know" exactly what the other pilot is doing in all phases of flight and circumstances. How can I "see" if my copilot is over-controlling the aircraft? (Especially in the final stages of the approach?) How can I confirm that he is using all available performance of the aircraft to (lets say) perform an EGPWS terrain avoidance maneuver?
The actual (side-stick) system seems to leave one of the pilots out of the loop, throwing him into a situation in-which he is just watching the unfolding of events, once he can only take part, after his (delayed) interpretation of what was already "done" by PF. How can we interpret a "reaction" without knowing the "action" that led to it? What we "see" on instruments is the reaction of the aircraft to certain actions/inputs (whether done manually or via automation) but, as you say, there is an expectation created upon those inputs. We manage expectations along our flights. Long term (strategic/FMC/FMGC), medium term (FG/FCU) and short term (manual). Just like the 3 levels of automation... And when in doubt: click click...click click.
Well, last try. It works both ways, also in IMC and dark night and especially there. Your words, ....."You rely on the instruments to tell you what the aircraft is doing"..... and i fully agree and never ever said anything else. But flying does not stop there. A pilot will be and has to be in constant monitoring modus to compare the "what is the aircraft doing" to the "what should the aircraft be doing, which i call the expectation state. To be able to get this comparison you need the input value into the system . If you are flying manual in your 152 and you didn´t deflect any flight controls, because you didn´t want any change of the flightpath, but you observe a sudden bank, you know it is not your input, because you have your hands on the yoke and didn´t move any control surface. There must be another reason causing the input and that again might cause a diferent action from yourself.
Same if you are flying as PF, wether you made the flightcontrols change by manual input or by programming the automatics, you will know that it was your input. Will the PNF know ? He observes the change on the instruments and in a yoke aircraft observes the yoke movement in his lap, but in a non interconected SS aircraft? He has to guess.
Well, that works most of the time, because transport aircraft are and should be operated in a safe and preplanned mannor, so due to CRM it is common knowledge when something should happen in regard to flightpath or performance parameters change, because it is announced by PF, briefed before, or ordered by ATC. Therefore the expectation (we will now start descent, climb, turn..... ) shows as reality on the instruments.
When the sh**t hits the fan really bad like in AF447, the reality on the instruments is no longer nearing the expectation, the aircraft does not behave like expected (i´m in TOGA hehe..........I pulled back for quite a while....) and even both PF and PNF have now different understandig of things and the awareness, what the other guy is doing is lost. The corelation of the aircraft behaviour to the flight control inputs is lost, no valid feedback loop any more and therefore complete loss of situational awareness.
By the way, as far as i understand FBW systems it would be the same. If the system would loose the ability to recognize and measure its own input into the system, it would not be able to maintain normal control, like the dampers then counteracting the flightcontrol deflections.
Same if you are flying as PF, wether you made the flightcontrols change by manual input or by programming the automatics, you will know that it was your input. Will the PNF know ? He observes the change on the instruments and in a yoke aircraft observes the yoke movement in his lap, but in a non interconected SS aircraft? He has to guess.
Well, that works most of the time, because transport aircraft are and should be operated in a safe and preplanned mannor, so due to CRM it is common knowledge when something should happen in regard to flightpath or performance parameters change, because it is announced by PF, briefed before, or ordered by ATC. Therefore the expectation (we will now start descent, climb, turn..... ) shows as reality on the instruments.
When the sh**t hits the fan really bad like in AF447, the reality on the instruments is no longer nearing the expectation, the aircraft does not behave like expected (i´m in TOGA hehe..........I pulled back for quite a while....) and even both PF and PNF have now different understandig of things and the awareness, what the other guy is doing is lost. The corelation of the aircraft behaviour to the flight control inputs is lost, no valid feedback loop any more and therefore complete loss of situational awareness.
By the way, as far as i understand FBW systems it would be the same. If the system would loose the ability to recognize and measure its own input into the system, it would not be able to maintain normal control, like the dampers then counteracting the flightcontrol deflections.
Further to the need of an AoA display unit, I believe this would be better than nothing but, unfortunately, that feature only addresses the stall issue. The question is wider than that IMHO. It has to do with the need (or not) for the PNF to "know" exactly what the other pilot is doing in all phases of flight and circumstances. How can I "see" if my copilot is over-controlling the aircraft? (Especially in the final stages of the approach?) How can I confirm that he is using all available performance of the aircraft to (lets say) perform an EGPWS terrain avoidance maneuver?
The actual (side-stick) system seems to leave one of the pilots out of the loop, throwing him into a situation in-which he is just watching the unfolding of events, once he can only take part, after his (delayed) interpretation of what was already "done" by PF. How can we interpret a "reaction" without knowing the "action" that led to it? What we "see" on instruments is the reaction of the aircraft to certain actions/inputs (whether done manually or via automation) but, as you say, there is an expectation created upon those inputs. We manage expectations along our flights. Long term (strategic/FMC/FMGC), medium term (FG/FCU) and short term (manual). Just like the 3 levels of automation... And when in doubt: click click...click click.
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But, like Dozy says, the Yoke has faults. There were accidents where the Yoke did not save? So SS has faults?
So with the Yoke shown to be fallible, the examination of the SS is:
1. Not necessary
2. Not relevant to this accident
3. Not sufficiently alarming so as to warrant a Grounding
4. All of the above.
5. None of the above.
Likewise, though the A0A would seem to have been helpful, (and it was on the a/c, but INVISIBLE), should the AoA be eliminated from the discussion? After all, how many accidents were not prevented by the presence of the AoA indicator?
Inquiring minds want to know.
So with the Yoke shown to be fallible, the examination of the SS is:
1. Not necessary
2. Not relevant to this accident
3. Not sufficiently alarming so as to warrant a Grounding
4. All of the above.
5. None of the above.
Likewise, though the A0A would seem to have been helpful, (and it was on the a/c, but INVISIBLE), should the AoA be eliminated from the discussion? After all, how many accidents were not prevented by the presence of the AoA indicator?
Inquiring minds want to know.
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With the inexperienced new hires coming to the right seat I think of my instructing days and how the instructor had to use his eyes to see if the student was going to be able to land without breaking anything until he approached soloing. It would be very difficult in a side stick airplane.
I think having the yoke as a reference in your sight made it easy to monitor. Even in the 757 I had an FO yank and bank to touchdown every landing and he said it was turbulence. Watching the yoke twitching I knew it wasn't. SS's might weigh less but they sure take you out of the real loop on what is going on.
I think having the yoke as a reference in your sight made it easy to monitor. Even in the 757 I had an FO yank and bank to touchdown every landing and he said it was turbulence. Watching the yoke twitching I knew it wasn't. SS's might weigh less but they sure take you out of the real loop on what is going on.