I have more or less assumed that the crew rejected the STALLWARN as an anomaly in the procedure (mechanical), and that they came by that info through the Airline, via meter, Bulletin, or other......perhaps even the grapevine. Was AF so in the weeds they launched hundreds of flights with a cobbled together procedure that amounted to nothing more than "Scuttlebutt"?
Which of course explains clearly why the STALLWARN was ignored....
In the document, it specifically states the a/c can relay to the instruments
"NOSEUP/HIGH airspeeds" NOSELOW/SLOW airspeed, etc. IF Bonin was in NOSEHIGH, HIGH AIRSPEED (he obviously thought so, crazy speed) then NOSEHIGH/LOW SPEED (HE WAS), what does he do? Reject IAS? That makes the re-STALLSTALL partcularly poignant, just at the point when things were going the right way, etc.....His cues were there for NU/high speed, and did he accept them due the Bulletin as false? They seemed real....So, how to recover? Reference to VSI? It's pinned, how can he trust that, has anyone ever descended that way?
Any upset, a/c or pilotage, may interrupt the flight path, and once interrupted, it cannot be regained if systems become unreadable, and no trained response works to realign it. No going back, once lost. No trail of corn, no experience.
If true, it certainly explains things in a different light.
Worse, though, is what it says about the guesswork and negligence present around UAS in its 30plus iterations.
Were the crews and pax to be 'observers" on dozens (hundreds) of "test flights" whilst each occurrence involved "ad lib" recovery? Or no recovery (447)?
Challenge. Given the presence of STALL warnings, and unreadable/unreliable airspeeds, more information from the CVR is required. I cannot believe in the midst of this problem, the only conversation we see is what BEA have trickled out...
Last edited by Lyman; 10th May 2012 at 18:46.