AF447 final crew conversation - Thread No. 2
Join Date: Jun 2011
Location: france
Posts: 760
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
well explained
jcjeant explained this french confusion very well.
Don't forget the BEA is alone to have the science, the art, the technology, for such an investigation, and the best experts, ... and the pieces of the aircraft !
And the "juge d'instruction" is waiting the final report of the BEA, like us to know what has happened !
I know one of his expert who does not know very much about the A330...
We have to say also that it is a penal trial and not a civil trial. The fault definition is not the same, and the relation whith the fault defined in the Warsawa convention is different, and the consequence of limitation of responsibility for the airline is not clear in the penal trial.
Don't forget the BEA is alone to have the science, the art, the technology, for such an investigation, and the best experts, ... and the pieces of the aircraft !
And the "juge d'instruction" is waiting the final report of the BEA, like us to know what has happened !
I know one of his expert who does not know very much about the A330...
We have to say also that it is a penal trial and not a civil trial. The fault definition is not the same, and the relation whith the fault defined in the Warsawa convention is different, and the consequence of limitation of responsibility for the airline is not clear in the penal trial.
Join Date: Dec 2010
Location: Middle America
Age: 84
Posts: 1,167
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
jcjeant & roulishhollandias,
Thanks to both of you for the explanations.
I knew the French law was significantly different from English and US law. One thing, when you say "penal", what does that mean? Is it the same as what I would call "criminal"?
This French system is known as inquisitorial, as opposed to the adversarial system used in Common Law legal systems. In this instance, the judge who is appointed to the case is in charge of preparing the case and assessing whether it should come to court. In the US, this would be decided by a Grand Jury of citizens where the prosecution presents enough evidence to ask the Jury to indict the defendant/defendants. The Jury decides if the evidence presented is adequate to send the case to a trial.
Does the judge consider this? "There is no felony or misdemeanour in the absence of an intent to commit it.
However, the deliberate endangering of others is a misdemeanour where the law so provides.
A misdemeanour also exists, where the law so provides, in cases of recklessness, negligence, or failure to observe."
In the case as referred to in the above paragraph, natural persons who have not directly contributed to causing the damage, but who have created or contributed to create the situation which allowed the damage to happen who failed to take steps enabling it to be avoided, are criminally liable where it is shown that they have broken a duty of care or precaution laid down by statute or regulation in a manifestly deliberate manner, or have committed a specified piece of misconduct which exposed another person to a particularly serious risk of which they must have been aware. (From French Law)
It will certainly be interesting to see how this all unfolds. It is different than the Concorde case in several ways...
Thanks to both of you for the explanations.
I knew the French law was significantly different from English and US law. One thing, when you say "penal", what does that mean? Is it the same as what I would call "criminal"?This French system is known as inquisitorial, as opposed to the adversarial system used in Common Law legal systems. In this instance, the judge who is appointed to the case is in charge of preparing the case and assessing whether it should come to court. In the US, this would be decided by a Grand Jury of citizens where the prosecution presents enough evidence to ask the Jury to indict the defendant/defendants. The Jury decides if the evidence presented is adequate to send the case to a trial.
Does the judge consider this? "There is no felony or misdemeanour in the absence of an intent to commit it.
However, the deliberate endangering of others is a misdemeanour where the law so provides.
A misdemeanour also exists, where the law so provides, in cases of recklessness, negligence, or failure to observe."
In the case as referred to in the above paragraph, natural persons who have not directly contributed to causing the damage, but who have created or contributed to create the situation which allowed the damage to happen who failed to take steps enabling it to be avoided, are criminally liable where it is shown that they have broken a duty of care or precaution laid down by statute or regulation in a manifestly deliberate manner, or have committed a specified piece of misconduct which exposed another person to a particularly serious risk of which they must have been aware. (From French Law)
It will certainly be interesting to see how this all unfolds. It is different than the Concorde case in several ways...
Join Date: Jun 2011
Location: france
Posts: 760
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
french law
@Turbine_D
You are right, "penal" is "criminal". You will find the french law (in french) in this link.
Accueil | Legifrance - Le service public de l'accès au droit
(legifrance.com)
and then ask "les codes en vigueur" in the "lois et règlements"
Then as "nom du code" you may choose ... want you want, for exemple
- code de l'aviation civile
- code penal
- code de procedure penale
The "juge d'instruction" is very independant in France, but as generally he don't know nothing about aviation, he has to ask for everything.
Experts will come running to explain at the manner they want.
For example in the Ste Odile crash (january 20.1992, Air Inter) the experts did not give to the "juge d'instruction" the french reglementation PANS-OPS in french (about VOR-DME approach), but the ICAO common text in english (despite this text exists in french too), which has not the force of the law, but is only a work text that the differents states member of ICAO use to build their own law.
When the french law is different, for the main rules, the state has to declare the difference, or to do "reserve" (in the sense of the international public law) (according to the Chicago convention).
In this trial, I buyed the french law and brought it to the "juge d'instruction", who said me "thanks, english is not my tea-cup, I learned latin-greek, and said me he had only the ICAO text in english...
The "Juge d'instruction" decides who may be guilty, often many persons.
At the Court, a Prosecuter, who is not independant
from the Government, plaids for the french law. He has the same difficulties as the "Juge d'instruction".
For the families and surviver there is no class action. Their lawers have still very much to learn in aviation law
The greatest difference I see is that years and years are necessary in France to have a definitive Judgment.
(Law lesson is enough for today ! it is not finished).
jcjeant seems to have followed french aeronautical trials too, and he will give you other many indications !
You are right, "penal" is "criminal". You will find the french law (in french) in this link.
Accueil | Legifrance - Le service public de l'accès au droit
(legifrance.com)
and then ask "les codes en vigueur" in the "lois et règlements"
Then as "nom du code" you may choose ... want you want, for exemple
- code de l'aviation civile
- code penal
- code de procedure penale
The "juge d'instruction" is very independant in France, but as generally he don't know nothing about aviation, he has to ask for everything.
Experts will come running to explain at the manner they want.
For example in the Ste Odile crash (january 20.1992, Air Inter) the experts did not give to the "juge d'instruction" the french reglementation PANS-OPS in french (about VOR-DME approach), but the ICAO common text in english (despite this text exists in french too), which has not the force of the law, but is only a work text that the differents states member of ICAO use to build their own law.
When the french law is different, for the main rules, the state has to declare the difference, or to do "reserve" (in the sense of the international public law) (according to the Chicago convention).
In this trial, I buyed the french law and brought it to the "juge d'instruction", who said me "thanks, english is not my tea-cup, I learned latin-greek, and said me he had only the ICAO text in english...
The "Juge d'instruction" decides who may be guilty, often many persons.
At the Court, a Prosecuter, who is not independant
from the Government, plaids for the french law. He has the same difficulties as the "Juge d'instruction". For the families and surviver there is no class action. Their lawers have still very much to learn in aviation law
The greatest difference I see is that years and years are necessary in France to have a definitive Judgment.
(Law lesson is enough for today ! it is not finished).
jcjeant seems to have followed french aeronautical trials too, and he will give you other many indications !
Last edited by roulishollandais; 5th Apr 2012 at 15:47. Reason: url legifrance, and victims lawers
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: Germany
Age: 67
Posts: 1,777
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hi,
RH,
Nothing to add ... you explain it very well
Trying to follow the Concord appeal trial .. but no many publicity made about (less than the first trial ...)
I guess the trial has come about AF447 be held as previous .. that is to say in an atmosphere of suspicion and with the consequences of the defects in the French courts for the treatment of such cases
Each trial about aircraft accident in France is always source of controversial comments and critics about a system so many want to be changed ....
RH,
Nothing to add ... you explain it very well
Trying to follow the Concord appeal trial .. but no many publicity made about (less than the first trial ...)
I guess the trial has come about AF447 be held as previous .. that is to say in an atmosphere of suspicion and with the consequences of the defects in the French courts for the treatment of such cases
Each trial about aircraft accident in France is always source of controversial comments and critics about a system so many want to be changed ....
Join Date: Jun 2011
Location: france
Posts: 760
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by jcjeant
Each trial about aircraft accident in France is always source of controversial comments and critics about a system so many want to be changed ....
Many lawers do not correctly use the french law in these trials, and hope too much from a criminal procedure. The Warsawa convention (convention de Varsovie modified Montreal) is a very bad system, to old and no more adapted.
But Public wonder that all the parties know another, are smiling and are very polite together... (the cockpit discipline is present).
Last edited by roulishollandais; 10th Apr 2012 at 15:42. Reason: !!jetdriver bug ?
Join Date: Jun 2011
Location: france
Posts: 760
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Important turn in positive French and international law
The star french lawyer DANIEL SOULEZ LARIVIERE who already argued such modifications during the Ste-Odile crash criminal trial,
defending the civil aviation (M. FRANTZEN who is also the husband of M.LABURTHE's daughter) has been heard yesterday by the general Prosecutor of the Cassation Court !
Me Soulez-Lariviere asks also introduction of "european law" (which one ??) in the civil part of the trial !
If such a modification is done for the AF447 criminal trial, that would mean that families requests would be throwed off, as the AF447 fell in international waters, and no french Court could judge ! (nor french nor other country's Court !).
It would be a major dissent about public and private international law !!!
http://www.rue89.com/rue89-planete/2...230903surprise ! 06/04/2012 à 07h31
Marée noire de l’Erika : toute la procédure pourrait être annulée
Le 24 mai, la Cour de cassation se prononcera sur les conclusions de son parquet général, qui demande l’annulation pure et simple des douze années de procédure ayant abouti à la condamnation de Total et de trois autres prévenus.
Selon Libération et Ouest France, l’avis de l’avocat général et le texte du rapporteur concluent que la loi nationale n’aurait pas dû s’appliquer lors des procès du naufrage, en décembre 1999, du pétrolier qui avait souillé 400 km de côtes bretonnes avec 30 000 tonnes de fioul.
Plus de « préjudice écologique », et plus de condamnation pour l’affréteur Total, la société de certification italienne Rina, l’armateur italien Giuseppe Savarese et le gestionnaire du navire, Antonio Pollara : le naufrage ayant eu lieu en « zone économique exclusive » (ZEE), c’est-à-dire hors des eaux territoriales françaises, la loi de la France ne pouvait s’appliquer.
Cassation totale, sans nouveau procès
Le ministère public demande donc la cassation totale, sans renvoi – donc sans nouveau procès –, de l’arrêt de la cour d’appel rendu en 2009. Les quatre prévenus avaient été condamnés aux amendes maximales pour délit de pollution maritime, et à verser des indemnité pour préjudices « matériel, écologique et moral », rappelle Libération. Voilà ce qui pourrait être annulé en mai.
Comme le souligne Ouest France à propos de la décision attendue le 24 mai, « les avis des deux rapporteurs ne lient pas les conseillers de la Cour, mais il est toutefois rare que leur avis ne soit pas suivi ».
Dans Libération, plusieurs juristes cités anonymement font part de leur sidération
, que résume bien cette déclaration de l’un d’eux :
defending the civil aviation (M. FRANTZEN who is also the husband of M.LABURTHE's daughter) has been heard yesterday by the general Prosecutor of the Cassation Court !
Me Soulez-Lariviere asks also introduction of "european law" (which one ??) in the civil part of the trial !
If such a modification is done for the AF447 criminal trial, that would mean that families requests would be throwed off, as the AF447 fell in international waters, and no french Court could judge ! (nor french nor other country's Court !).
It would be a major dissent about public and private international law !!!
http://www.rue89.com/rue89-planete/2...230903surprise ! 06/04/2012 à 07h31
Marée noire de l’Erika : toute la procédure pourrait être annulée
Le 24 mai, la Cour de cassation se prononcera sur les conclusions de son parquet général, qui demande l’annulation pure et simple des douze années de procédure ayant abouti à la condamnation de Total et de trois autres prévenus.
Selon Libération et Ouest France, l’avis de l’avocat général et le texte du rapporteur concluent que la loi nationale n’aurait pas dû s’appliquer lors des procès du naufrage, en décembre 1999, du pétrolier qui avait souillé 400 km de côtes bretonnes avec 30 000 tonnes de fioul.
Plus de « préjudice écologique », et plus de condamnation pour l’affréteur Total, la société de certification italienne Rina, l’armateur italien Giuseppe Savarese et le gestionnaire du navire, Antonio Pollara : le naufrage ayant eu lieu en « zone économique exclusive » (ZEE), c’est-à-dire hors des eaux territoriales françaises, la loi de la France ne pouvait s’appliquer.
Cassation totale, sans nouveau procès
Le ministère public demande donc la cassation totale, sans renvoi – donc sans nouveau procès –, de l’arrêt de la cour d’appel rendu en 2009. Les quatre prévenus avaient été condamnés aux amendes maximales pour délit de pollution maritime, et à verser des indemnité pour préjudices « matériel, écologique et moral », rappelle Libération. Voilà ce qui pourrait être annulé en mai.
Comme le souligne Ouest France à propos de la décision attendue le 24 mai, « les avis des deux rapporteurs ne lient pas les conseillers de la Cour, mais il est toutefois rare que leur avis ne soit pas suivi ».
Dans Libération, plusieurs juristes cités anonymement font part de leur sidération
, que résume bien cette déclaration de l’un d’eux : « Toute une jurisprudence gênante pour les acteurs du transport 
maritime sera anéantie. On se retrouvera alors sans responsable pour l’une des plus importantes pollutions du littoral français ! »
L’avocat de Total, Me Daniel Soulez-Larivière, est satisfait : maritime sera anéantie. On se retrouvera alors sans responsable pour l’une des plus importantes pollutions du littoral français ! »« Toutes les questions de droit international public que nous soulevons depuis le début ont été prises en compte. »
Last edited by roulishollandais; 9th Apr 2012 at 21:59. Reason: spelling, english
Join Date: Feb 2011
Location: Nearby SBBR and SDAM
Posts: 875
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Independent investigation?
Hi,
IGh:
If in a "simple" issue (a door part) this occurred, what could happen when investigating a System (effective aircraft: System + crew) even the designers don't understand completely? AF447 was failing (a closed loop feedback System presenting failures since the beginning: 02:10:05 or even before per ACARS analysis) with the crew applying (surprising ones) inputs based on System outputs we may never know. (RHS was not recorded).
It seems the misleading (may) yet occurred. ("plane operated as designed, etc."). Public (also detected in PPRuNe) was being prepared (induced?) to: "crew error" in the end. If crew error was the cause (if), the media would emphasize (in the headlines just after Final Report publication) Why they made (errors)?
IMO they never could say plane was OK at that "investigation timing". Subtle bias?
Mac
Timing: Paris air show
PS
The plane was really, OK? The crew received (required) System "outputs" to proceed safely? System "helped" the crew or mislead them?
IGh:
After UA811 [Fwd Cargo Door electrically-unlocked during flight] the manufacturer misinformed the NTSB:
"... .. Based on what Boeing has told them, investigators say four independent systems would have had to have failed for the door to open in flight...." [Wall Street Journal, 27Feb1990].
This misleading information, from that manufacturer, led to the incorrect P.C. published by NTSB in their initial AAR.
"... .. Based on what Boeing has told them, investigators say four independent systems would have had to have failed for the door to open in flight...." [Wall Street Journal, 27Feb1990].
This misleading information, from that manufacturer, led to the incorrect P.C. published by NTSB in their initial AAR.
If in a "simple" issue (a door part) this occurred, what could happen when investigating a System (effective aircraft: System + crew) even the designers don't understand completely? AF447 was failing (a closed loop feedback System presenting failures since the beginning: 02:10:05 or even before per ACARS analysis) with the crew applying (surprising ones) inputs based on System outputs we may never know. (RHS was not recorded).
It seems the misleading (may) yet occurred. ("plane operated as designed, etc."). Public (also detected in PPRuNe) was being prepared (induced?) to: "crew error" in the end. If crew error was the cause (if), the media would emphasize (in the headlines just after Final Report publication) Why they made (errors)?
IMO they never could say plane was OK at that "investigation timing". Subtle bias?
Mac
Timing: Paris air show
PS
The plane was really, OK? The crew received (required) System "outputs" to proceed safely? System "helped" the crew or mislead them?
Last edited by RR_NDB; 8th Apr 2012 at 18:11. Reason: Add link, put " on simple
Join Date: Oct 2011
Location: Lower Skunk Cabbageland, WA
Age: 74
Posts: 354
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
@RR_NDB &
Sorry, even though it's OT, I can't let this stand. I don't know what Boeing told them, but this door was damaged by improper closure pre-flight, as well as having a design problem that allowed this to occur in the first place. There was nothing "simple" about it. Regardless of any deception that IGh implies, this issue was identified and understood, and properly fixed by Boeing.
--Keepin' It Real
IGh:
Quote:
After UA811 [Fwd Cargo Door electrically-unlocked during flight] the manufacturer misinformed the NTSB:
"... .. Based on what Boeing has told them, investigators say four independent systems would have had to have failed for the door to open in flight...." [Wall Street Journal, 27Feb1990].
This misleading information, from that manufacturer, led to the incorrect P.C. published by NTSB in their initial AAR.
If in a simple issue (a door part) this occurred......
Quote:
After UA811 [Fwd Cargo Door electrically-unlocked during flight] the manufacturer misinformed the NTSB:
"... .. Based on what Boeing has told them, investigators say four independent systems would have had to have failed for the door to open in flight...." [Wall Street Journal, 27Feb1990].
This misleading information, from that manufacturer, led to the incorrect P.C. published by NTSB in their initial AAR.
If in a simple issue (a door part) this occurred......
--Keepin' It Real
Join Date: Feb 2011
Location: Nearby SBBR and SDAM
Posts: 875
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"Insider information" and crew Confidence in the A/C
Hi,
Airbus it seems (based on we have) consider UAS an information (not necessarily) to be shared immediately with crew.
Instead, requires (the crew) to scan and assess (then, decide)
And, worse (IMO):
Don't (immediately) inform when UAS ends.
IMO a VERY IMPORTANT FACT to be taken into account immediately.
In order to (the crew) reestablish immediately (necessary) confidence in the System.
That (confidence) seems to be had compromised in F-GZCP last flight.
Mac
"Confidence is the greatest asset of any successful enterprise. Nothing useful survives without it" (Albert Schweitzer)
Airbus it seems (based on we have) consider UAS an information (not necessarily) to be shared immediately with crew.
Instead, requires (the crew) to scan and assess (then, decide)
And, worse (IMO):
Don't (immediately) inform when UAS ends.
IMO a VERY IMPORTANT FACT to be taken into account immediately.
In order to (the crew) reestablish immediately (necessary) confidence in the System.
That (confidence) seems to be had compromised in F-GZCP last flight.
Mac
"Confidence is the greatest asset of any successful enterprise. Nothing useful survives without it" (Albert Schweitzer)
Join Date: Feb 2011
Location: Nearby SBBR and SDAM
Posts: 875
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"Simple" when comparing with AF447
Hi,
Organfreak:
"Simple" compared with AF447 (complexity)
I edited post including quotes around the word simple. ?
Organfreak:
"Simple" compared with AF447 (complexity)
I edited post including quotes around the word simple.
?
Last edited by RR_NDB; 8th Apr 2012 at 18:26.
Hi Organfreak;
I'm on "break", but reading occasionally. Re, "I don't know what Boeing told them, but this door was damaged by improper closure pre-flight, as well as having a design problem that allowed this to occur in the first place. There was nothing "simple" about it. Regardless of any deception that IGh implies, this issue was identified and understood, and properly fixed by Boeing.", I found the following which might clarify the issue that it was indeed an electrical actuation of a correctly-closed door:
Accident Investigations - NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board
The NTSB Report is here.
I'm on "break", but reading occasionally. Re, "I don't know what Boeing told them, but this door was damaged by improper closure pre-flight, as well as having a design problem that allowed this to occur in the first place. There was nothing "simple" about it. Regardless of any deception that IGh implies, this issue was identified and understood, and properly fixed by Boeing.", I found the following which might clarify the issue that it was indeed an electrical actuation of a correctly-closed door:
Accident Investigations - NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board
The NTSB Report is here.
Last edited by PJ2; 9th Apr 2012 at 06:46.
Join Date: Feb 2011
Location: Nearby SBBR and SDAM
Posts: 875
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Plane also was operating as designed*
Hi,
PJ2:
Thanks
* No tapes (Aeroperu), no wasps (Birgenair).
Kapton was being used in the (aging) B741?
PJ2:
it was indeed an electrical actuation of a correctly-closed door:
Thanks
* No tapes (Aeroperu), no wasps (Birgenair).
Kapton was being used in the (aging) B741?
Last edited by Jetdriver; 9th Apr 2012 at 16:59.
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: canada
Posts: 147
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Burt Rutan on Airbus. (By Bubbers 44) #47
I find it so rude and inappropriate for people like Burt Rutan to make a statement such as one published by Bubbers 44, post #47. The airplane that has killed more people than any other is the DC10. This happens to be an American made 'plane the seemed to have been certified under the table due to the RB211/L1011 problem. It had so many flaws that it should never have been certified until those design faults were rectified. The AA crash in Chicago was blamed on the method used by AA to hang the engine. This was grossly misleading. The real problem was the fact that the loss of hydraulics (due to the loss of the departed engine) resulted in the LE slats (on that side) retracting. Why? because they were NOT locked down (as on the B727). The resultant roll caused the loss of the 'plane. What about all those cargo doors that opened in flight causing the loss of the planes?
There are many of us who fly and have flown the A320/330/340 without any serious problems. The AF447 A-330 ( a perfectly good 'plane) was flown into a CB when close to the "coffin corner." The supercooled water encountered caused the pitot tubes to ice over, resulting in the loss of many systems. Unfortunately the actions of the confused pilots resulted in an unrecognized stall and subsequent loss. How is that the fault of the manufacturer?
Did a B737 not crash going into Schiphol airport in Holland recently? Should we blame that on Airbus also?
It would be greatly appreciated if the folks who comment on these and other posts kept to the facts and not point fingers simply because the unit involved was not made in the great USofA.
There are many of us who fly and have flown the A320/330/340 without any serious problems. The AF447 A-330 ( a perfectly good 'plane) was flown into a CB when close to the "coffin corner." The supercooled water encountered caused the pitot tubes to ice over, resulting in the loss of many systems. Unfortunately the actions of the confused pilots resulted in an unrecognized stall and subsequent loss. How is that the fault of the manufacturer?
Did a B737 not crash going into Schiphol airport in Holland recently? Should we blame that on Airbus also?
It would be greatly appreciated if the folks who comment on these and other posts kept to the facts and not point fingers simply because the unit involved was not made in the great USofA.
Join Date: Oct 2011
Location: Lower Skunk Cabbageland, WA
Age: 74
Posts: 354
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
@PJ2 et al,
I stand corrected on UA811 and do humbly apologize for my bad information and corrective tone. I must have seen and retained the first, wrong report. I will now (make every effort to) shut the hell up! And go back to what I am good at, which is.....uh......
I stand corrected on UA811 and do humbly apologize for my bad information and corrective tone. I must have seen and retained the first, wrong report. I will now (make every effort to) shut the hell up! And go back to what I am good at, which is.....uh......
This damn "we" and "them" is not productive to accident imvestigation and how it is suppose to work.
Of course it needs to be a team approach with the same objectives of preventing the next accident, rather than finding fault or protecting someones reprutation.
All investigators know this (wherever their institution), but those on the sidelines continue with their presumptions of guilt.
Sure Boeing and the NTSB investigators (add others at will) make mistakes in assumptions and investigative findings, but not from a devious plan to obfuscate, We leave that to press releases
It's easy to say that it would have taken 4 separate combinations of faults for such and such to happen. After all, that assumption was already verified in the product certification. The objective of the accident investigation was to find "How' and then "why" followed by the lesson learned. From my viewpoint the only criticism would be that an investigation didn't meet that objective.
Of course it needs to be a team approach with the same objectives of preventing the next accident, rather than finding fault or protecting someones reprutation.
All investigators know this (wherever their institution), but those on the sidelines continue with their presumptions of guilt.
Sure Boeing and the NTSB investigators (add others at will) make mistakes in assumptions and investigative findings, but not from a devious plan to obfuscate, We leave that to press releases
It's easy to say that it would have taken 4 separate combinations of faults for such and such to happen. After all, that assumption was already verified in the product certification. The objective of the accident investigation was to find "How' and then "why" followed by the lesson learned. From my viewpoint the only criticism would be that an investigation didn't meet that objective.
Join Date: Feb 2001
Location: right here inside my head
Age: 65
Posts: 178
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
@ Thermostat
It would be greatly appreciated if the folks who comment on these and other posts kept to the facts and not point fingers
In keeping with that notion could you perhaps provide a source for your assertion that "The airplane that has killed more people than any other is the DC10."?
IOW.... I believe that to be an incorrect/non-factual statement.
Join Date: Dec 2010
Location: Middle America
Age: 84
Posts: 1,167
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thermostat
First, indeed, the primary cause was blamed on uncommanded slat retraction on the outboard left wing. But there were many other causes and issues identified in the NTSB report.
Why did the slats retract uncommanded? Because the engine and pylon both went over the top of the wing causing hydraulic and electrical damage and failures.
Why were the slats not lock down? Because this was not a requirement at the time.
Why did both the pylon and engine go over the top of the wing? Because the pylon/engine assembly was damaged during installation at American Airline's maintenance facility.
Why was it damaged? Because the forklift being used ran out of fuel and a resulting hydraulic check valve leak permitted the assembly to drop resulting in the initiation of a large stress induced crack in the rear of the pylon.
Why was a forklift being used to remove/install both engine and pylon instead of removing/installing separate units? Because it saved time and money.
Some more details in the NTSB report you failed to mention:
1. Based on a study performed by J.H. Wiggins Company at the time, the probability of an uncommanded slat retraction during takeoff was somewhere between one in one hundred million to two chances in a billion.
2. The forklift being used was written up as defective because it drifted down under load. The engine + pylon assembly weighed over 13,000 pounds. No corrective action was taken until 3 months had elapsed from the time it was used on the assembly in question.
3. The revised Damage/Tolerance concept was not in effect at the time the DC-10 was designed and what was being used at that time did not contain newer requirements on the certification of structural design (the pylon is a structure). Had the requirement for accidental damage evaluation been in effect when the DC-10 was designed, one might expect that such consideration would have been given to accidental damage to the upper flange of the pylon aft bulkhead.
4. The certification of the DC-10 was carried out in accordance with the rules in effect at the time. The premises applied to satisfy the rules were in accordance with then accepted engineering and aeronautical knowledge and standards. However, in retrospect. the regulations may have been inadequate in that they did not require the manufacturer to account for multiple malfunctions resulting from a single failure, even though that failure was considered to be extremely improbable.
5. The uncommanded slat retraction in itself did not cause the plane to crash. Had the dc power been active, the pilots would have received warning of this condition and would have determined the roll to the left was a response to an impending stall situation based on a stall warning devise that was also not operational. They could not see the wing, slats or the missing pylon/engine from the flight deck.
IMHO, using "selective data" from a 30 year old accident to offset an equally flawed (Rutan's opinion) does little to clarify the more recent accident. Hopefully, the BEA final report on AF447 will provide not only probable cause but positive change recommendations, based on their findings, to once again improve aviation safety, just as the NTSB report did 30 years ago…
The AA crash in Chicago was blamed on the method used by AA to hang the engine. This was grossly misleading. The real problem was the fact that the loss of hydraulics (due to the loss of the departed engine) resulted in the LE slats (on that side) retracting. Why? because they were NOT locked down (as on the B727). The resultant roll caused the loss of the 'plane.
Why did the slats retract uncommanded? Because the engine and pylon both went over the top of the wing causing hydraulic and electrical damage and failures.
Why were the slats not lock down? Because this was not a requirement at the time.
Why did both the pylon and engine go over the top of the wing? Because the pylon/engine assembly was damaged during installation at American Airline's maintenance facility.
Why was it damaged? Because the forklift being used ran out of fuel and a resulting hydraulic check valve leak permitted the assembly to drop resulting in the initiation of a large stress induced crack in the rear of the pylon.
Why was a forklift being used to remove/install both engine and pylon instead of removing/installing separate units? Because it saved time and money.
Some more details in the NTSB report you failed to mention:
1. Based on a study performed by J.H. Wiggins Company at the time, the probability of an uncommanded slat retraction during takeoff was somewhere between one in one hundred million to two chances in a billion.
2. The forklift being used was written up as defective because it drifted down under load. The engine + pylon assembly weighed over 13,000 pounds. No corrective action was taken until 3 months had elapsed from the time it was used on the assembly in question.
3. The revised Damage/Tolerance concept was not in effect at the time the DC-10 was designed and what was being used at that time did not contain newer requirements on the certification of structural design (the pylon is a structure). Had the requirement for accidental damage evaluation been in effect when the DC-10 was designed, one might expect that such consideration would have been given to accidental damage to the upper flange of the pylon aft bulkhead.
4. The certification of the DC-10 was carried out in accordance with the rules in effect at the time. The premises applied to satisfy the rules were in accordance with then accepted engineering and aeronautical knowledge and standards. However, in retrospect. the regulations may have been inadequate in that they did not require the manufacturer to account for multiple malfunctions resulting from a single failure, even though that failure was considered to be extremely improbable.
5. The uncommanded slat retraction in itself did not cause the plane to crash. Had the dc power been active, the pilots would have received warning of this condition and would have determined the roll to the left was a response to an impending stall situation based on a stall warning devise that was also not operational. They could not see the wing, slats or the missing pylon/engine from the flight deck.
IMHO, using "selective data" from a 30 year old accident to offset an equally flawed (Rutan's opinion) does little to clarify the more recent accident. Hopefully, the BEA final report on AF447 will provide not only probable cause but positive change recommendations, based on their findings, to once again improve aviation safety, just as the NTSB report did 30 years ago…
Join Date: Aug 2011
Location: Grassy Valley
Posts: 2,074
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
In additon, I believe a power reduction (Starboard) could have saved the rollover. I think it was in the report, along with speculation that the pilots in handing over ( the F/O took off), back to Captain, the firewalled Right Rudder command was interrupted, causing Yaw left, and Left wing STALL.
TurbineD. Wasn't the Pylon Saddle crack determined to be the result of chronic incorrect hoist? As you say, the Pylon was to have been mounted first, then the engine. It was the AFT Pin join that let go, yes?
TurbineD. Wasn't the Pylon Saddle crack determined to be the result of chronic incorrect hoist? As you say, the Pylon was to have been mounted first, then the engine. It was the AFT Pin join that let go, yes?