AF 447 Search to resume (part2)

[jcjeant]

Hi,

Jig-Peter

About the "Leaker) - He was interviewed on TV recently, partly to boost a book he has written whose main theme seems to be to attack Air France as being a creaky organisation with a lot of "old school" people on board, resistant to change and anything which might possibly weaken their own position.

Confusion there ...
It's not the "Leaker" .. it's only the messenger.
The"Leaker" is somebody from BEA or Airbus or french govt.

[jcjeant]

Hi,

AirFrance provides each pilot with a foldable chamber pot so that they stay at all times in the flight deck.
Of course, not much attention to the flight instruments is given at these times when one is on his /her paper throne as etiquette requires the other pilot to look to the side window.

Can you post official AF SOP please .. thank you.

[jcjeant]

Hi,

Another "leak" from BEA .........

Sur LCI.fr

La première lecture des boîtes noires du vol Rio-Paris ne montre pas "de dysfonctionnement majeur" sur l'avion Airbus ce qui ne veut pas dire qu'il n'y a pas eu "des dysfonctionnements moins importants", a déclaré mercredi à l'AFP Alain Bouillard, directeur de l'enquête technique. "A la première lecture, on n'a pas mis en évidence de dysfonctionnement majeur", comme une panne électrique totale, de moteurs ou des alarmes incompréhensibles dans le cockpit, a expliqué M. Bouillard, du Bureau d'enquêtes et d'analyses (BEA).

On LCI.fr

The first reading of the black box flight from Rio to Paris does not show "major malfunction" on the Airbus plane that does not mean that there was no "malfunctions less important," he said Wednesday AFP Alain Bouillard, director of technical investigation. "On first reading, it did not reveal any major malfunction," as a complete electrical failure of motors or incomprehensible alarms in the cockpit, said Bouillard Bureau of Investigation and Analysis (BEA).

Source:
Info et Actualité en direct - Toutes les actualités et infos - TF1 News

[promani]

HazelNuts39

I'm afraid "not before summer" means after summer - october?

My knowledge of the English language tells me that there is 'before Summer', 'during Summer', and 'after Summer'.
So I would expect that the BEA will produce an interim report not before Summer starts, but during the Summer months, maybe July/August. No doubt there will leaks before then, or even a press release.

[Turbine D]

Bear,

scepticism is the fuel that fires objectivity.

Really???

Now I will agree that a certain amount of skepticism may test the validity of findings based on data at hand, but, more often than not, it morphs into imagined theories, essays and blog sites on the internet by skeptics who are more interested in promoting themselves and seeing their name in print than the reality of the situation. If you don't believe me, Google TWA800 and count the skeptic sites before you get to the 4th page where the NTSB information is found (my laptop @ 10 posts per page), many more following. I suppose Googling AF447 will look the same in another 10 years, the way it is going.

[HazelNuts39]

Promani;

It's not based on my knowledge of the English language, but on that of the summer holiday season in France.

[BOAC]

Lonewolf - we are I believe, in danger of going off on another wild goose chase here.

1) There is no such thing as 'partial panel' in modern aircraft. There are standby attitude indicators, but 'p p' refers to the old 'turn and slip' which can be used to fly in IMC, but is not fitted on modern a/c

2) I thought we had eliminated attitude indication problems way back?

a) I don't think a laser-ring gyro can 'exceed' any limits and 'tumble'
b) I don't believe there is ANY indication of IRS problems in the ACARS, nor would the pitot problem cause such
c) There would be a separate IRS based standby attitude indicator.

Now, back to conspiracy theories and paper poo-pots It certainly is an advantage to be mad here.

[Shadoko]

Hi,

First, thanks to JD-EE for his answer in post #1671. Hope all these procedures always fullfilled (but not sure IMHPO).

And (one more...) question: in the first BEA interim report (1st June 2009), we can read both co-pilots have to wear corective lenses ("Medical certificate .../... with compulsory wearing of corrective lenses.", p.15 and 16). Have those corective lenses to be contact lenses or glasses? Could he (they) have lost them if a sudden movement happen?
What are the minimum visual performances for AF pilots without corrective lenses?

This question is NOT to charge pilots. But it HAVE TO happen something very crazy for downing this probably million flying hours a/c model.

[RR_NDB]

MurphyWasRight,

Not sure I see the point in trying to detect water/moisture inside the module when it is very low risk to open it and have a look.

Things other than water such as a cracked PCB that can also cause problems.

MurphyWasRight, as you know "Murphy´s law" never fail. My idea is:

1) More you know about the internal condition of the "pressure vessel" safer and faster will be the job of the investigators. And this IMHO is very important. Not just for the lengthy bureaucratic processes but to ASAP understand what happened (the global picture)
2) The PCB´s inside the well designed CSMU certainly are not prone to crack.

There is a picture i guess i posted earlier with the internal view of a "non cylindrical shape" of a similar CSMU for the SSFDR 4700, the one of F-GZCP.

Probably the cylindrical shaped is even better than the one showed in mfr. website.

[pax2908]

CG position: would it be possible now, using the full data from the FDR (since t/o), i.e. using the dynamic behaviour of the a/c, to calculate the CG more accurately and independently from the load sheet?

[takata]

Originally Posted by Shadoko

Have those corective lenses to be contact lenses or glasses? Could he (they) have lost them if a sudden movement happen?

Come-on, both pilots were fully straped in their seats. It would take many times the G-Forces that an aiframe could sustain without first breaking off.

Originally Posted by jcjeant

Can you post official AF SOP please .. thank you.

I'll bet you can read them in detail in Lemurian's last book: "How to understand sarcasms for dummies", page 666.
:-)

[bearfoil]

TurbineD

Thanks for the 'heads up'. What we have been bequeathed by less than forthcoming ancestors is a playground that is regrettably "Polarized". It is difficult to express an opinion without being dismissed as "One or the Other".

In writing in favor of severe scepticism, one is taken for a cynic. A definition contrasting both words would frustrate most people. On the one hand are the apologists who see no evil, or have an agenda, and on the other folks with vivid imaginations who have a tendency to build on said imagination.

The data is in, readable, and being sussed. I suppose those who take to heart the goodness of the world will be patient and wait to be told what happened.

On a linguistics note and in danger of being accused of tinhattedness I will leave you with a final thought. This was not an accident. BLIMEY. WHAT??

Regardless the story that is told, I will bet the ranch that what did in 447 was not mysterious, not even unexpected. Flight is not without loads of sophistications and anticipations of danger.

There should be a third term to include with incident and accident.



pardon my......french

All those whom have given all....rest.

[takata]

Originally Posted by jcjeant

Another "leak" from BEA

Bouillard and Troadec both gave interviews following Figaroleaks questions but have said very few (as they still know about zlitch). How does this qualify as a leak as they are the main investigators, the only ones habilited to talk about their work?
Do you really think that any people in governmental circles (possible "source" of those leaks) are really that skilled in aeronautics in order to fully understand what the BEA is really working at without being provided with a full and detailed report?
We already had the Transport minister declaration about "we will recover all the bodies" later.... "oops!... we won't!"

Make your own calculation:
There is about 1,200 parameters monitored, some are sampled by the DFDR many times per second. The last ten minutes of flight (600 seconds) would be above 1,400,000 figures, each one having to be verified for its coherence inside the whole dataset in order to discard and reprocess what would be wrong data recorded (like airspeed, etc.).
And that is the easy part of it as they should already have all the tools developped to do it.
This won't take a couple of day.

[Lonewolf_50]

BOAC, yes, we sort of went through this before, but in that iteration degradation of attitude reference was written out ... and this may be another misunderstanding on my part that, sorry to wander off the reservation. L@zerdog's pointing to something amiss at the :12 minute point with that system might or might not be of significance. Even if degraded.

I may not be using the best terms. By partial panel I refer to flying on instruments without reference to the primary attitude reference instrument. (Nose and wing). You use cross check (heading, air speed, ascent/descent) to infer actual aircraft attitude and use performance to determine how to make corrections based on second order input to set an estimated attitude that yields the airspeed, turn or non turn, and speed that you desire to maintain, rather than the usual set your attitude and adjust performance based around that primary reference. It isn't just "turn needle and ball" reference.

Regarding stand by attitude reference, roger. That was explained before, and I think snowfalcon2 said better what I was trying to get at.

Your scenario then seems to suggest initially an in-flight attitude upset beyond the gyro's limits, which then caused a "tumbling gyro" malfunction.

Yes, which may not be a possible failure mode, as you (IIRC it was you) suggested previously. The standby attitude reference system would have limits as well, would it not?

Assuming that the attitude reference system, primary or back up, remains reliable enough to refer to and keep in one's scan, one is still likely dealing with an on instrument scan upset/dynamic upset/unusual attitude recovery problem in turbulent air, possibly in violently turbulent air, so l@zerdog's second question remains a valid pilot concern.

Not sure how many "spins under the bag" (instrument training hood, if you like) you got to do, or how common it is any more in any sort of pilot training. The first time I did it, full panel, was an eye opener. It's a skill that a bit of practice improves immensely. (The first few times I tried it partial panel (gyro failed) it was a double handful. Took quite a few tries to get it right.)

If full panel recovery, versus prevention, it isn't trained for, how well prepared is any crew to deal with it when facing the situation, with a full instrument panel?

[JPI33600]

Shadoko

What are the minimum visual performances for AF pilots without corrective lenses?

To say it in simple terms, in France, an optical correction above 5 dioptres on one single eye is a no-go for obtaining a *french* professional pilot license (more precisely, these 5 dioptres are not really a correction measured on your lenses, they result from a combined spherical/cylindrical measurement performed on your eyes with a special instrument using refractometry). However, once you are a happy PP, even if your visual capability degrades, you won't lose your license until the optical correction you need exceeds 8.0 dioptres. Other countries have more relaxed requirements (AFAIK, in the US, you just need to have a 10/10 visual acuity with your corrective lenses). Regarding usage of contact lenses vs. standard glasses, it seems this is left to the individual's appreciation.

[RR_NDB]

Watertight CSMU

Hi, IO540

Having been doing electronics design since the 1970s I am impressed by the survival of the data.

Look this

IMHO, either the memory chips are in a separate sealed module (which can itself withstand great pressure) or the cylindrical capsule did not leak.

And also this

The SSFDR CSMU (4700 model) used in F-GZCP was the cylindrical, steel armoured.

If however the PCB was encapsulated in a suitable epoxy, and this was done under a vacuum to avoid any air-filled voids (which would collapse under the 4km pressure and destroy the module) then the PCB could have survived the total immersion.

I guess they implemented a "double or even a triple barrier". Why not to do so?

It would be interesting to know how these things are made.

I am looking for and will come back on this subject

It's awfully hard to make a watertight package which can hold 4km pressure for 2 years and which uses just o-rings...

I have some "war surplus" and other newer parts with connectors integrated to the mechanical modules. I don´t see why to have an o ring in a CSMU.

When you was starting to design i was starting my EE graduation, so please consider my comments as a way to learn from you.

[wes_wall]

Lonewolf 50

I am long time retired from the cockpit, thus equally removed from recurrent sim sessions. However, from my experience, at altitude upset was more focused on the cause, and how to recognize them prior to onset, thus how to avoid the situation from occurring, and or get out of hand. Once PT got out of the airplane and into the sim, any stall replication was easy to handle – quite different from being in a 707 when stalls (leading up to one) were practiced while in the air. Thus, not knowing the answer to your question, I would bet the how to avoid is taking precedent over the how to recover.

[SaturnV]

M. Bouillard also went to say that after future readings of the recorder, come tomorrow, or the day ater tomorrow, or next week, [or next month] the BEA might discover something that requires Airbus to send another advisory telex to its customers etc.

So for now, I interpret his phrasing to mean there are no hardware or software flags based on several days of reading the data.
______________

On a related note, the gendarmerie announced through a spokesperson (no secret leaker) that they will be able to use DNA to identify the two recovered bodies.

[CogSim]

What prevented regaining control?

Training?
Simple mechanical failure?
Robot gone made or become counterproductive?
Simple human error?
Man Machine Interface issues?
Complex human error?

I'll reserve judgement/comment on what the crew may or may not have done until the final report is released. I'd however, like to say this. In my limited experience of flying non-jet a/c, I have come to believe that good airmanship is all about staying ahead of the a/c. Here I have to agree with the sentiment expressed by deSitter earlier in the thread. If I had a choice, I'd prefer to fly a/c without automatisms. Alas! thats not a choice we have anymore. Why the lament you ask?

In the a/c that I've flown with even a semblance of automation, the implementation is too-often half-assed (from a pilots standpoint that is). To be clear, the automation is perfectly logical and always does the right thing, but it is not designed to involve the pilot. And for a good reason. The man-machine interface will quickly get complicated, if it did. Nevertheless, the end result is that, once the pilot falls behind the a/c, it become difficult for him/her to catch up. And my guess would be that the more complex the automation, the more unlikely the pilots will ever be able to catch up.

Lets take the subject at hand. How would I have designed the man-machine interface in a situation like this. The a/c would "recognize" that there is a significant weather system ahead and alert me (the pilot) about it. At this stage, I'd be more aware of the situation (if I already wasn't) and be in anticipation of some of the issues that may come up. (Just to be clear, I'd choose to manually fly the a/c)

For this the a/c would need an auto-scan radar at a minimum. Ironically, if I were to trust the aircraft with handling a situation like this, I'd have to have enough confidence in the automation to anticipate. i.e. more automation not less. We are bordering on AI here, so I'll leave it at that.

But, the interesting question is, lets say the pilots (for whatever reason) failed to recognize that they were going to fly into the storm and were caught with their pants down, can you blame the a/c for doing the same?

It seems to me the only way out of this conundrum is for the a/c and pilot to work together, and a man+machine interface that makes it possible. Its the a/c and the pilot, not a/c or the pilot.

As my professor used to say, two brains is better than half a brain...

[jcjeant]

Hi,

takata

we will recover all the bodies" later.... "oops!... we won't!"

They just take the decision to recover all possible bodies ... DNA analysis are positives on the already recovered bodies.
Source TF1 News Paris 20H

Come-on, both pilots were fully straped in their seats.

How you know this ?