AF447 wreckage found
Thanks HN39, appreciate the work. 
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Jcjeant,
In supporting your argument that authorities may have dragged their feet on finding the wreckage, I point out that one major difference in finding AF447 and the Titanic, lost nuclear subs, needle in a haystack, etc, is that AF447 had a 37.5 khz beacon pinging for 30 days, and the others didn't. The searchers through oversite, incompetence, lack of proper direction, equipment, or personnel, didn't listen for it properly. Chu Chu pointed out that it was reported that the Nuclear sub that listened for the ping, wasn't optimized to 37.5 khz. As a cynical american, I interpret this to mean that they had submariners listening for the ping with headphones, without the 37.5 khz being downconverted to a frequency they could hear. As we know, humans can hear up to 18 khz if they are lucky, and certainly not 37.5 khz . To spell that out, would have drawn ridicule to the investigation, so the euphamism "not optimized to 37.5 khz" was reported. The United States loaned the investigators some proper equipment to listen for the ping that was towed by a tug, but the french were in charge of it, so I don't know what it's search area was or if it was used properly, if used at all.
Anyway, bottom line, there was a beacon to home in on, and they didn't take advantage of it. Sure, some might say, "Maybe the pinger didn't work?". Doubtful. Besides, the first thing the BEA would have done, if the pinger showed failure, when the black boxes were discovered, would have been to shout that fact to the mountain tops, so they'd have a good excuse for what took so long.
In supporting your argument that authorities may have dragged their feet on finding the wreckage, I point out that one major difference in finding AF447 and the Titanic, lost nuclear subs, needle in a haystack, etc, is that AF447 had a 37.5 khz beacon pinging for 30 days, and the others didn't. The searchers through oversite, incompetence, lack of proper direction, equipment, or personnel, didn't listen for it properly. Chu Chu pointed out that it was reported that the Nuclear sub that listened for the ping, wasn't optimized to 37.5 khz. As a cynical american, I interpret this to mean that they had submariners listening for the ping with headphones, without the 37.5 khz being downconverted to a frequency they could hear. As we know, humans can hear up to 18 khz if they are lucky, and certainly not 37.5 khz . To spell that out, would have drawn ridicule to the investigation, so the euphamism "not optimized to 37.5 khz" was reported. The United States loaned the investigators some proper equipment to listen for the ping that was towed by a tug, but the french were in charge of it, so I don't know what it's search area was or if it was used properly, if used at all.
Anyway, bottom line, there was a beacon to home in on, and they didn't take advantage of it. Sure, some might say, "Maybe the pinger didn't work?". Doubtful. Besides, the first thing the BEA would have done, if the pinger showed failure, when the black boxes were discovered, would have been to shout that fact to the mountain tops, so they'd have a good excuse for what took so long.
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You would have to use your yes and concentration on what you are really typing in order not to commit mistakes.
The same for the pilot, that doesn't have the feed-back on the stick. He his deprived from his tactile feed-back and has to look at the PFD to see the results of his commands, therefore loosing a precious useful tool...
Again - I *know* what the theoretical argument is for force-feedback and I acknowledge that. However I still have not seen evidence of a single accident in a FBW Airbus where force-feedback would have helped. In the case of AF447, the PNF *knew* the PF was overcontrolling and he told him not to. Eventually he tried to take over. How would feedback have helped?
Some things that do not seem to be common knowledge about the sidestick arrangement:
- Only one pilot is supposed to manipulate the flight controls at any one time by design (most people know that)
- Pressing the priority button transfers control from one stick to the other (most people know that)
- *Holding down* the priority button prevents the other side from making inputs, or taking priority back
- Holding down the priority button *for more than 40 seconds* deactivates the opposite sidestick completely
The PF in the RHS was not a complete rookie, he was a 32-year-old ATPL with an A330 type rating.
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 29th Aug 2011 at 19:09.
DozyWannabe
First, let me say you have no plan of actual piloting an aircraft. I know, you never said you would have, but you make statements which only flying expierienced pilots can make. Aquadalte has this expierience and flies this type of aircraft if i´m correct, but you don´t listen.
Get realistic. Practicing to that point you´dscribe is not going to happen anymore in aviation. That was done 20 years ago and with tactile feedback, now it is without that and especially on long range legs less than 2% of logged flight time. And sim-time will not help either.
Tell that a neurogist doctor. You are saying, a man with numb fingers can play guitar fretboard like an expert? Since an accident last year i have only limited feeling in my left thumb and first finger. Since then i smashed a plate in average per week by emptying the dishwasher (are not allowes to do it any more). But on the other hand, neither a guitar fretboard nor emtying a dishwasher comen anywhere near the task of flying an aircraft in a situation like AF447 was in.
What kind of statement is that? You are talking about blind school now? Yes i remember, we did a blindfold cockpit checkout, had to operate any switch with blindfolded eyes. Try that with the new systems and pushbuttons...
And you know that from wwhom and from what source?
I haven´t done typerating in an airbus simulator, but in the caravelle 20 years ago. But even there it was "procedures and emergencies, using automation as much as possible. You think it is different and there would be time to practice stick handling to the point you imply? Or that would happen in the future?
I would prefer an aircraft with everything available (including tactile feedback) and a crew who can make best use of this aircraft.
No, you do not. See your next sentence
Maybe, that is because in a lot of accidents you can´t talk to the pilots any more. And because in others it is not en vogue to talk about it. And because in a lot of incidents, where tactile feedback was missed there was nobody listening to the crew or a statement from one pilot would have consequences to the other pilot? There are a lot of reasons, even the simplest one, that nobody had an interest to make any statistic evaluation of such a factor.
He would have noticed it from the beginning, and he would have seen no improvement after his telling. And he would have taken over like i did as instructor in the backseat of my F4. Take both hands, grip the stick and put it where it is needed. And if necessary take two knees to assist. I could not use JD-EE´s 2-day-old-pizza-tool to get attention, the guy was sitting in front with the instrument panel and gun powder chair in between us. In an A or B cockpit it sure would be an option to get the attention by that or similar attention getters instead silly games like who can push the takeover button first and can press it longer.
That should be known by now, and it did not help the PNF at all. I´m not saying that tactile feedback would have helped, therefore we know too little about how much the PNF really was in the loop of the happenings. But if he was, tactile feedback would have helped him and not hindered him.
You are correct, then start thinking what contributed to the fact, that he now looks like a rookie.
I like your technical insight on software and engineering and i apreciate your contributions there. But you are also talking about stuff, which is IMHO totally out of your sandbox. I kept back with this statement for some time and tried to make it clear by other means, but in vain. It is not my task to tell you and if the mods judge this as a personal attack i assure, it is not intended to. But if they like to delete this post, so be it.
Originally Posted by aguadalte
You just brought the answer to your own question. Try to type in a stress environment at the same speed in an AZERTY keyboard than the one you can do on a QWERTY keyboard and see the difference for yourself...
You just brought the answer to your own question. Try to type in a stress environment at the same speed in an AZERTY keyboard than the one you can do on a QWERTY keyboard and see the difference for yourself...
DozyWannabe
I have, many times, and I know what you're talking about. However, muscle memory is not just about making a movement relative to what is felt, it's about practicing to the point where you instinctively know where to put it in the first place.
I have, many times, and I know what you're talking about. However, muscle memory is not just about making a movement relative to what is felt, it's about practicing to the point where you instinctively know where to put it in the first place.
Quote aquadalte:
You would have to use your eys and concentration on what you are really typing in order not to commit mistakes.
You would have to use your eys and concentration on what you are really typing in order not to commit mistakes.
DozyWannabe
At first, the same way you have to look at the guitar fretboard and/or feel the fret position underneath your fingers to do so at first. But later, as you master it, the muscle memory makes the feedback redundant. You don't need to look or feel where to put your fingers, you just do.
At first, the same way you have to look at the guitar fretboard and/or feel the fret position underneath your fingers to do so at first. But later, as you master it, the muscle memory makes the feedback redundant. You don't need to look or feel where to put your fingers, you just do.
Quote aquadalte:
The same for the pilot, that doesn't have the feed-back on the stick. He his deprived from his tactile feed-back and has to look at the PFD to see the results of his commands, therefore loosing a precious useful tool...
The same for the pilot, that doesn't have the feed-back on the stick. He his deprived from his tactile feed-back and has to look at the PFD to see the results of his commands, therefore loosing a precious useful tool...
DozyWannabe
Look, I'm not saying (and have never said) tactile feedback is not useful in its place. Trainers should always have as much feedback as possible, because the pilot is learning where to put his hands.
Look, I'm not saying (and have never said) tactile feedback is not useful in its place. Trainers should always have as much feedback as possible, because the pilot is learning where to put his hands.
DozyWannabe
Once training for an Airbus FBW type rating, those muscle moves will be practiced in the simulator at first, and then on the aircraft.
Once training for an Airbus FBW type rating, those muscle moves will be practiced in the simulator at first, and then on the aircraft.
I haven´t done typerating in an airbus simulator, but in the caravelle 20 years ago. But even there it was "procedures and emergencies, using automation as much as possible. You think it is different and there would be time to practice stick handling to the point you imply? Or that would happen in the future?
DozyWannabe
However, once type-rated and in the aircraft with us SLF down the back, pilots should not have to rely on such "training wheels" to control the aircraft.
However, once type-rated and in the aircraft with us SLF down the back, pilots should not have to rely on such "training wheels" to control the aircraft.
DozyWannabe
Again - I *know* what the theoretical argument is for force-feedback and I acknowledge that.
Again - I *know* what the theoretical argument is for force-feedback and I acknowledge that.
DozyWannabe
However I still have not seen evidence of a single accident in a FBW Airbus where force-feedback would have helped.
However I still have not seen evidence of a single accident in a FBW Airbus where force-feedback would have helped.
DozyWannabe
In the case of AF447, the PNF *knew* the PF was overcontrolling and he told him not to. Eventually he tried to take over. How would feedback have helped?
In the case of AF447, the PNF *knew* the PF was overcontrolling and he told him not to. Eventually he tried to take over. How would feedback have helped?
Some things that do not seem to be common knowledge about the sidestick arrangement:
Only one pilot is supposed to manipulate the flight controls at any one time by design (most people know that)
Pressing the priority button transfers control from one stick to the other (most people know that)
*Holding down* the priority button prevents the other side from making inputs, or taking priority back
Holding down the priority button *for more than 40 seconds* deactivates the opposite sidestick completely
Only one pilot is supposed to manipulate the flight controls at any one time by design (most people know that)
Pressing the priority button transfers control from one stick to the other (most people know that)
*Holding down* the priority button prevents the other side from making inputs, or taking priority back
Holding down the priority button *for more than 40 seconds* deactivates the opposite sidestick completely
DozyWannabe
The PF in the RHS was not a complete rookie, he was a 32-year-old ATPL with an A330 type rating.
The PF in the RHS was not a complete rookie, he was a 32-year-old ATPL with an A330 type rating.
I like your technical insight on software and engineering and i apreciate your contributions there. But you are also talking about stuff, which is IMHO totally out of your sandbox. I kept back with this statement for some time and tried to make it clear by other means, but in vain. It is not my task to tell you and if the mods judge this as a personal attack i assure, it is not intended to. But if they like to delete this post, so be it.
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Trainers should always have as much feedback as possible, because the pilot is learning where to put his hands. Once training for an Airbus FBW type rating, those muscle moves will be practiced in the simulator at first, and then on the aircraft. However, once type-rated and in the aircraft with us SLF down the back, pilots should not have to rely on such "training wheels" to control the aircraft.
Look Dozzy,
Its not a question of knowing where to put their hands. Its a question of "feeling" the aircraft responsiveness to the inputs. I understand this is very difficult to explain to non-pilots. But the thing is that when a pilot is flying a non-FBW A/C he his much more "engaged" in the task. If the aircraft is flying faster the stick is harder to move. If by the contrary, the aircraft slows down, the stick is much softer to move. When you accelerate (and if the the throttles move, you have a double feed-back on the response of the aircraft) you feel the "need" to move the stick forward. The opposite is truth for deceleration.
For instance, I don't need to look at the airspeed instrument to "know" the speed of my Pitts. I can look for outside references when practicing aerobatics. The feed-back on the stick gives me the "notion" of the behavior of my aircraft and how much G I can pull. When we (because we are actually 3 owners of that Pitts), first got a sponsor and decided to re-paint our aircraft, it was clear to me, on my first acceptance flight, that the performance of the aircraft had changed, due to the general behavior of the aircraft thereafter, but especially due to the stick feed-back. (We later found out that the painting material used, was not appropriate for wings made of wood and canvas).
On the contrary, I have once taken-off an heavy weighted (252.2 Ton.) A340 that had one spoiler fault. According to MEL not only that spoiler had to be locked but the opposite one had to be locked also. Unfortunately the maintenance left the faulty spoiler unlocked and we took-off a couple of minutes after flight controls check. (when spoilers are fault, we don't get any information of spoiler position - up or down - in the Flight Controls ECAM System Display, only yellow crosses instep of a green spoiler number). We took-off without knowing that right hand spoiler number 6 was out. The behavior of a FBW aircraft is to slightly deploy spoilers on the opposite wing to equilibrate for the down wing moment created in flight. For me, the only impression I got was that the aircraft was "much heavier" than it was supposed to be. If this had happened on an A310 or on a B767, one would had noticed immediately the "need for compensation". When cleaning from flaps 1 to zero, despite of doing it 10kts over S speed, we had an "Alpha Lock" advisory and the climb took us longer than expected also. We have ended up our flight with a consumption of 4 Tons more than expected. This is to say that although no arm came to us due to this event, it took a longer time to understand what was going on. If it happened in a non-FBW aircraft, we would have noticed as soon as airborne.
This are just small issues but that make my case for the need for feed-back on flight controls.
If we can improve, why not do so?
Take care,
I'm flying tomorrow.
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*sigh*
At the end of the day it's all down to personal preference as to whether you think it's important or not. Some do, some do not. Personally I don't give a crap whether the airliner I get on has force-feedback or not, nor - would it appear - do a significant number of pilots. All I care about is that the aircraft has been properly maintained and the pilots know what they're doing. A decent movie on the IFE is a nice bonus.
So please stop attacking the messenger here. For every pilot on here that is pro-feedback, there's another one that doesn't miss it. All I'm saying is that as long as there's no empirical evidence, only what individual pilots prefer, then there won't be a case for a design change. Flying a Pitts and an F4 are a world apart from airliner ops, as you well know, and if the worst that happened was a few extra tons of fuel burnt, then that's the airline's problem. How much more do you think would be burned cumulatively by filling the sidestick mounting areas with motors?
And Franzl - I *do* know what you're on about, I may have only flown twenty hours or so in a Chipmunk with an instructor present but I do understand the basics. And for what it's worth, I've had a fair bit of positive feedback from pilots via the PM channel too (I hope they don't mind me alluding to this), so while you're very much entitled to your opinion as to what I should and should not be talking about, please don't take it as a personal insult if I do not stick to my "sandbox".
At the end of the day it's all down to personal preference as to whether you think it's important or not. Some do, some do not. Personally I don't give a crap whether the airliner I get on has force-feedback or not, nor - would it appear - do a significant number of pilots. All I care about is that the aircraft has been properly maintained and the pilots know what they're doing. A decent movie on the IFE is a nice bonus.
So please stop attacking the messenger here. For every pilot on here that is pro-feedback, there's another one that doesn't miss it. All I'm saying is that as long as there's no empirical evidence, only what individual pilots prefer, then there won't be a case for a design change. Flying a Pitts and an F4 are a world apart from airliner ops, as you well know, and if the worst that happened was a few extra tons of fuel burnt, then that's the airline's problem. How much more do you think would be burned cumulatively by filling the sidestick mounting areas with motors?
And Franzl - I *do* know what you're on about, I may have only flown twenty hours or so in a Chipmunk with an instructor present but I do understand the basics. And for what it's worth, I've had a fair bit of positive feedback from pilots via the PM channel too (I hope they don't mind me alluding to this), so while you're very much entitled to your opinion as to what I should and should not be talking about, please don't take it as a personal insult if I do not stick to my "sandbox".
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 29th Aug 2011 at 23:20.
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RetiredF4
I think you should go back to your sandbox Franzl as you are now getting outside your area of knowledge. Some of us actually fly the A/C involved, have flown Boeing, helicopter, single and multi prop as well as military fast jet experience and do not have a problem with some of Dozy's comments. I have problems with the "luddites", who do not want to get to "know" the technology, just continually moan about it. If you do not know how to operate your A/C you should not be in it.
aguadalte
That is 
so were you doing your "heavy takeoff" on microsoft flight sim!
After 15+ years on Airbus A330 / A340 the lack feedback on the side stick is not a problem!
I think you should go back to your sandbox Franzl as you are now getting outside your area of knowledge. Some of us actually fly the A/C involved, have flown Boeing, helicopter, single and multi prop as well as military fast jet experience and do not have a problem with some of Dozy's comments. I have problems with the "luddites", who do not want to get to "know" the technology, just continually moan about it. If you do not know how to operate your A/C you should not be in it.
aguadalte
Unfortunately the maintenance left the faulty spoiler unlocked and we took-off a couple of minutes after flight controls check. (when spoilers are fault, we don't get any information of spoiler position - up or down - in the Flight Controls ECAM System Display, only yellow crosses instep of a green spoiler number). We took-off without knowing that right hand spoiler number 6 was out.
so were you doing your "heavy takeoff" on microsoft flight sim!After 15+ years on Airbus A330 / A340 the lack feedback on the side stick is not a problem!
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Originally Posted by Dozy
- *Holding down* the priority button prevents the other side from making inputs, or taking priority back
- Holding down the priority button *for more than 40 seconds* deactivates the opposite sidestick completely
Negative for #2 - To reactivate a deactivated sidestick is possible too.
Originally Posted by Dozy
Again, a lot of people who don't like the sidestick design are making that assumption, but if that is the case then why do we have the references to going up when they should be going down and to touch the lateral controls as gently as possible by the PNF?
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I have problems with the "luddites", who do not want to get to "know" the technology, just continually moan about it. If you do not know how to operate your A/C you should not be in it.
What you do here is to lead a general attack with nothing like an argument. If you're ready to criticize someone, be very specific, otherwise your point has value only in your own eyes.
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Page 78.
I corrected my posts to what was actually said, and the only people to argue are those that insist that feedback and connected sticks are a "must have", and were of that opinion before that flight left Rio! I'm still waiting for evidence that lack of connected sticks have caused an accident, and I'm also interested in your reply to the "handling skills" thread.
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I notice in the Fedex MD-11 Narita landing accident (3 bounces), comments have also been made about leaving the A/P in till 100 ft AGL, possibly contributing to mishandling, especially in rough conditions... once control is finally taken.
Hand-flying down the approach gives a degree of acclimatisation... better SA etc
Being handed back an aircraft at night, in a (somewhat) unknown trim condition, in turbulence, and as we have said many times, is more of problem initially, if out of practice with hand-flight in the cruise... definitely not handled with care and sensitivity commensurate with a 200 ton missile flying at M .8 in thin air, regardless of the 'law'
Why, why, why would a pilot not have even a semblance of sensitivity to feel their way into suitable control inputs...
That sidesticks suits some and not others, IMHO... regardless of the raging controversy about feedback, it wouldn't have happened to that PF with a conventional control column.
Because it would have been seen as absurd, not just by PNF but by PF himself, feeling the forces involved in such gross input at speed and having the thing back in his gut for minutes on end!
Hand-flying down the approach gives a degree of acclimatisation... better SA etc
Being handed back an aircraft at night, in a (somewhat) unknown trim condition, in turbulence, and as we have said many times, is more of problem initially, if out of practice with hand-flight in the cruise... definitely not handled with care and sensitivity commensurate with a 200 ton missile flying at M .8 in thin air, regardless of the 'law'
Why, why, why would a pilot not have even a semblance of sensitivity to feel their way into suitable control inputs...
That sidesticks suits some and not others, IMHO... regardless of the raging controversy about feedback, it wouldn't have happened to that PF with a conventional control column.
Because it would have been seen as absurd, not just by PNF but by PF himself, feeling the forces involved in such gross input at speed and having the thing back in his gut for minutes on end!
Last edited by HarryMann; 30th Aug 2011 at 14:02.
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Harry, with all due respect, the PF told the Captain that he'd had the stick against the back stop for a while - this doesn't look like a "I wonder if I should be making inputs this large?" situation, this is a "why aren't these large inputs solving the problem?" situation from the PF's point of view.
As has been pointed out by several others on here, including myself, there are plenty of incidents where a stall was misidentified in an airliner with conventional control column with the same result. I know we would all like to think "No pilot would do that", but sometimes they do.
As has been pointed out by several others on here, including myself, there are plenty of incidents where a stall was misidentified in an airliner with conventional control column with the same result. I know we would all like to think "No pilot would do that", but sometimes they do.
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CONF iture
In your eyes there is no argument. There is no need to be specific with names as there is a general attack on the Airbus by a majority who have never even flown it. They want to return to the 1950's, well it is not going to happen, learn the new ways and remember we are PILOTS we FLY the A/C either manually or through the A/C systems!
Do YOU fly Airbus?
In your eyes there is no argument. There is no need to be specific with names as there is a general attack on the Airbus by a majority who have never even flown it. They want to return to the 1950's, well it is not going to happen, learn the new ways and remember we are PILOTS we FLY the A/C either manually or through the A/C systems!
Do YOU fly Airbus?
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World's 10 safest airlines (in alphabetical order)
Air France-KLM
AMR Corporation (American Airlines, American Eagles)
British Airways
Continental Airlines
Delta Airlines
Japan Airlines
Lufthansa
Southwest Airlines
United Airlines
US Airways
Air France-KLM
AMR Corporation (American Airlines, American Eagles)
British Airways
Continental Airlines
Delta Airlines
Japan Airlines
Lufthansa
Southwest Airlines
United Airlines
US Airways
So 4 hull losses at AF - no problem
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iceman,
No need to be specific with names, but technical stuff.
Answering the technical stuff concerns will be good enough.
No one here has pretended to go back to the 50’s but remember how technology should be reserved at serving human, not the opposite.
More computers for more automation is not a solution, keeping things simple is, IMO.
Airbus would be much better with less complexity.
I DO … but even if I didn’t I could positively develop an argumentation as long as I don’t pretend explaining to others including former or current technicians and pilots how things work, and so using unofficial documentation : Dozy, SmartCockpit is an excellent site but is what it is and has never pretended to propose more :
No need to be specific with names, but technical stuff.
Answering the technical stuff concerns will be good enough.
No one here has pretended to go back to the 50’s but remember how technology should be reserved at serving human, not the opposite.
More computers for more automation is not a solution, keeping things simple is, IMO.
Airbus would be much better with less complexity.
I DO … but even if I didn’t I could positively develop an argumentation as long as I don’t pretend explaining to others including former or current technicians and pilots how things work, and so using unofficial documentation : Dozy, SmartCockpit is an excellent site but is what it is and has never pretended to propose more :
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Pilots have changed.I recognize nothing familiar in the new breed.I see kids with blackberrys and ipads that never cuss.Its a whole new "profession" and I am now an outsider.Im displaced.
-The pilot that once was would never have accepted to fly in an aircraft with such piss-poor pilot involvement.Its frankly as if the designer has said " You,you dont count,sit there and shut up"
-The pilot that once was would NEVER EVER have accepted to have the computer move the THS.Its a great big flt control surface and you want the computer moving it to its aerodynamic limit insidiously and during abnormals.Talk to the dead crew of Perpignan/Nagoya.Ask the TAROM/INTERFLUG/CAL/FINNAIR crew about how they feel about fighting for pitch control of their aircraft with a malcontent computer.
-The pilot that once was would never have put up with anything but a central stick with FULL TACTILE FEEDBACK and thrust levers that move.The Airbus SS disconnects the pilot from the machine(ADI is sole feedback) and also the pilots from each other.Mr Caesar was quite right.Why did the PNF of 447 intervene so late?He appears to have recognized that the wrong stall recovery procedure was being flown,yet did nothing until it was too late?Why couldnt the Captain see a clear picture when he returned to the flt deck?Because the plane told him very little.No visible stick.No shaker.Not even a stall warning.He was the Captain and he was rendered helpless!Imagine someone inventing a plane that can remain in a DEEP STALL with no warning to the pilot.NUTS.
-The pilot that once was would never have let automation dependency cripple his manual flying skills.Pride in one's own ability to fly the plane..where has it gone?Today,its click click at 500' and fly the last minute of the ILS with the dual cue FD.A video game.And thats what the airlines want and certainly what the AIrbus is designed for.Do the pilots of today utter one word of objection and bring their concerns to management?Pilots used to be in mangement,now theyre not.Maybe thats one reason.
I think I see now how we've got to this sorry state.It was the pilots all along.The pilots have got what they deserve.Rugged independence replaced by meek submission.Military replaced by civilian.Pilot replaced by flight manager.It started with the introduction of CRM and picked up speed with the arrival of Airbus in the mid 80's.I see the new order in spades on this forum from the likes of safety concerns and iceman who hail the brave new world as the conquering hero.Political correctness out of control with de-unionized pilots paying to fly and at the mercy of some omnipotent HAL in the cockpit.
"I'm sorry Dave but I cant let you do that...."
It came true.Go figure.
-The pilot that once was would never have accepted to fly in an aircraft with such piss-poor pilot involvement.Its frankly as if the designer has said "
You,you dont count,sit there and shut up"-The pilot that once was would NEVER EVER have accepted to have the computer move the THS.Its a great big flt control surface and you want the computer moving it to its aerodynamic limit insidiously and during abnormals.Talk to the dead crew of Perpignan/Nagoya.Ask the TAROM/INTERFLUG/CAL/FINNAIR crew about how they feel about fighting for pitch control of their aircraft with a malcontent computer.
-The pilot that once was would never have put up with anything but a central stick with FULL TACTILE FEEDBACK and thrust levers that
move.The Airbus SS disconnects the pilot from the machine(ADI is sole feedback) and also the pilots from each other.Mr Caesar was quite right.Why did the PNF of 447 intervene so late?He appears to have recognized that the wrong stall recovery procedure was being flown,yet did nothing until it was too late?Why couldnt the Captain see a clear picture when he returned to the flt deck?Because the plane told him very little.No visible stick.No shaker.Not even a stall warning.He was the Captain and he was rendered helpless!Imagine someone inventing a plane that can remain in a DEEP STALL with no warning to the pilot.NUTS.-The pilot that once was would never have let automation dependency cripple his manual flying skills.Pride in one's own ability to fly the plane..where has it gone?Today,its click click at 500' and fly the last minute of the ILS with the dual cue FD.A video game.And thats what the airlines want and certainly what the AIrbus is designed for.Do the pilots of today utter one word of objection and bring their concerns to management?Pilots used to be in mangement,now theyre not.Maybe thats one reason.
I think I see now how we've got to this sorry state.It was the pilots all along.The pilots have got what they deserve.Rugged independence replaced by meek submission.Military replaced by civilian.Pilot replaced by flight manager.It started with the introduction of CRM and picked up speed with the arrival of Airbus in the mid 80's.I see the new order in spades on this forum from the likes of safety concerns and iceman who hail the brave new world as the conquering hero.Political correctness out of control with de-unionized pilots paying to fly and at the mercy of some omnipotent HAL in the cockpit.
"I'm sorry Dave but I cant let you do that...."
It came true.Go figure.
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aguadalte
To further expand on my short reply before, I suggest you had your figures way wrong for the take off or retracted them too early, as to get an Alpha Lock you must have been below 154kts and at 252 tonnes I think your S speed would have been a LOT higher than 144kts!!!
CONF / Dozy
The reference for the sidestick priority
I think the only way to keep the stick deactivated would be to NOT release the button after the 40 seconds!
For me, the only impression I got was that the aircraft was "much heavier" than it was supposed to be. If this had happened on an A310 or on a B767, one would had noticed immediately the "need for compensation". When cleaning from flaps 1 to zero, despite of doing it 10kts over S speed, we had an "Alpha Lock" advisory and the climb took us longer than expected also. We have ended up our flight with a consumption of 4 Tons more than expected.
SLATS ALPHA / SPEED LOCK FUNCTION
This function inhibits slats retraction at high angle-of-attack and/or at low speed. The SFCCs use a corrected angle-of-attack (alpha), or air speed information from the ADIRUs to inhibit slat retraction.
If alpha exceeds 8.5 degrees, or the speed falls below 148 knots, the retraction from position 1 to 0 is inhibited.
The inhibition is removed when alpha falls below 7.5 degrees, or when the speed exceeds 154 knots. In this case, the slats automatically retract to 0.
The function is not active if:
— Alpha exceeds the above values after the lever has been set to 0.
— Aircraft is on the ground, with the speed below 60 knots.
This function inhibits slats retraction at high angle-of-attack and/or at low speed. The SFCCs use a corrected angle-of-attack (alpha), or air speed information from the ADIRUs to inhibit slat retraction.
If alpha exceeds 8.5 degrees, or the speed falls below 148 knots, the retraction from position 1 to 0 is inhibited.
The inhibition is removed when alpha falls below 7.5 degrees, or when the speed exceeds 154 knots. In this case, the slats automatically retract to 0.
The function is not active if:
— Alpha exceeds the above values after the lever has been set to 0.
— Aircraft is on the ground, with the speed below 60 knots.
The reference for the sidestick priority
Sidestick priority logic
— When only one pilot operates the sidestick his demand is sent to the computers.
— When the other pilot operates his sidestick in the same or opposite direction both pilots inputs are algebraically added. The addition is limited to single stick maximum deflection.
Note : In the event of simultaneous input on both sidesticks (2° deflection off the neutral position in any direction) the two green SIDE STICK PRIORITY lights on the glareshield come on. In addition on A330E, the "DUAL INPUT" voice message activates).
A pilot can deactivate the other stick and take full control by pressing and keeping pressed his takeover pushbutton.
For latching the priority condition, it is recommended to press the takeover pushbutton for more than 40 seconds. The takeover pushbutton can then be released without losing priority.
However, at any time, a deactivated stick can be reactivated by momentarily pressing either takeover pushbutton. If both pilots press their takeover push buttons, the last pilot to press will get the priority.
Note : If an autopilot is engaged, the first action on a take over pushbutton will disengage it.
— When only one pilot operates the sidestick his demand is sent to the computers.
— When the other pilot operates his sidestick in the same or opposite direction both pilots inputs are algebraically added. The addition is limited to single stick maximum deflection.
Note : In the event of simultaneous input on both sidesticks (2° deflection off the neutral position in any direction) the two green SIDE STICK PRIORITY lights on the glareshield come on. In addition on A330E, the "DUAL INPUT" voice message activates).
A pilot can deactivate the other stick and take full control by pressing and keeping pressed his takeover pushbutton.
For latching the priority condition, it is recommended to press the takeover pushbutton for more than 40 seconds. The takeover pushbutton can then be released without losing priority.
However, at any time, a deactivated stick can be reactivated by momentarily pressing either takeover pushbutton. If both pilots press their takeover push buttons, the last pilot to press will get the priority.
Note : If an autopilot is engaged, the first action on a take over pushbutton will disengage it.
Last edited by iceman50; 30th Aug 2011 at 11:22. Reason: Addition of sidestick info.
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Rugged independence replaced by meek submission.Military replaced by civilian.Pilot replaced by flight manager.It started with the introduction of CRM ..
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Unfortunately the real issue here is nothing other then an unqualified pilot put in the wrong place at the wrong time and a cockpit culture that prevented the more qualified PNF from immediately taking control of the situation.
At the end of the day this is not a SS vs yoke, A vs B or even an "automation" issue. In fact this appears to be one time that the automation actually worked correctly...handing off the plane to the pilot in a relatively stable configuration due to conflicting data. In effect as soon as the AP computers recognized "garbage in" they kicked the plane back to the PF in order to avoid "garbage out".
Sadly the "garbage out" was provided by the PF.....
At the end of the day this is not a SS vs yoke, A vs B or even an "automation" issue. In fact this appears to be one time that the automation actually worked correctly...handing off the plane to the pilot in a relatively stable configuration due to conflicting data. In effect as soon as the AP computers recognized "garbage in" they kicked the plane back to the PF in order to avoid "garbage out".
Sadly the "garbage out" was provided by the PF.....
How many Airbus a/c in operation?
According to the Wiki (slam it if you will) there are something like 5100 odd Airbus aircraft in service, of which in excess of 90% will be FBW using the 'standard' side-stick controller...
In the last 10 years Airbus has sold more aircraft than Boeing in 8 of those years...
Is the SS intrinsically flawed? Empirical evidence states not so. Accident figures do not support this. Academic study does not support this (NASA). What does support this? Evidentially not a lot, except an excess of hot air.
Artificial feel - there is not one single single or dual-aisle passenger aircraft that has anything other than power assisted controls - meaning what is felt through the control column has nothing other than some engineers idea as to the true control loading. Does that mean a control column has more connection to the control surfaces, versus a side-stick? I vote - No. It is simply different. The Airbus loading is spring-induced.
Left-seat/right-seat - pretty much everyone reading this post has a mouse sitting just to the right of their keyboard I'd bet. Switch the mouse to the left-side and leave it there for the rest of the day. For the first few minutes things are a little 'confused' - 4 hours later it will feel normal.
A lot of the discussion here seems to be reaching for some reasoning, beyond the evidence. The PF over-reacted at AP/AT drop, drove the aircraft into a stall, and then missed the recovery, with a fixation on pulling out of the fall, rather than flying out of the stall. Did the PNF understand the situation? Maybe, but whatever his convictions were, they were not definite enough to take command. Did the call-back of the captain help? No. Did it make any difference? No. Was this a sign that the PNF was not sufficiently confident - yes. Did this situation become one of "too many cooks? Perhaps so.
In the last 10 years Airbus has sold more aircraft than Boeing in 8 of those years...
Is the SS intrinsically flawed? Empirical evidence states not so. Accident figures do not support this. Academic study does not support this (NASA). What does support this? Evidentially not a lot, except an excess of hot air.
Artificial feel - there is not one single single or dual-aisle passenger aircraft that has anything other than power assisted controls - meaning what is felt through the control column has nothing other than some engineers idea as to the true control loading. Does that mean a control column has more connection to the control surfaces, versus a side-stick? I vote - No. It is simply different. The Airbus loading is spring-induced.
Left-seat/right-seat - pretty much everyone reading this post has a mouse sitting just to the right of their keyboard I'd bet. Switch the mouse to the left-side and leave it there for the rest of the day. For the first few minutes things are a little 'confused' - 4 hours later it will feel normal.
A lot of the discussion here seems to be reaching for some reasoning, beyond the evidence. The PF over-reacted at AP/AT drop, drove the aircraft into a stall, and then missed the recovery, with a fixation on pulling out of the fall, rather than flying out of the stall. Did the PNF understand the situation? Maybe, but whatever his convictions were, they were not definite enough to take command. Did the call-back of the captain help? No. Did it make any difference? No. Was this a sign that the PNF was not sufficiently confident - yes. Did this situation become one of "too many cooks? Perhaps so.