AF447 wreckage found
Safety Concern
I cannot and will not accept the constant uneducated, ill informed, negative comments about one manufacturer's approach based upon emotion and not fact.
I cannot and will not accept the constant uneducated, ill informed, negative comments about one manufacturer's approach based upon emotion and not fact.
Honestly i´m tired with this A v. B talk (and i think others too) and it is hindering reasonable discussions. I think you have higher qualities and can contribute more for future safety when letting A v. B. and stone age v. future at rest. If it gets that bad at you that you mix up the pilot (a human being) with the human interface (technical system asociated with the necessary training), then it is time to disregard those posts.
No harm intended.
Franzl;
Jim Reason's Swiss Cheese model, extremely useful, has provided a good insight into human factors but is being challenged in the way any theory is challenged - through increased research and new knowledge, some of it made possible by a powerful computing capability which did not exist at the time the model was introduced.
Alongside (and not in place of!), Reason's notions are those of some superbly-insightful writers such as Sidney Dekker, John Stoop, Charles Perrow, Nancy Leveson, certainly PBL (Why-Because Analysis), who has contributed here in the past and others who are taking "systems theoretical" approaches (to describe it broadly...they may disagree!). Each are worth the trouble in looking up and reading, just as Reason is, for an understanding of this approach. Such an approach is (again!), entirely blame-free; - rather, it attempts to find things out.
Let us examine two notions. This isn't unique and is said in my own words. Others will have expressed these notions differently.
One way to think of an accident is a series of elements or things, which then interact (or don't interact). The focus is upon "things" as (philosophically) solid items with a fixed nature, which then interact with other "things" with their fixed natures which are then portrayed as "causes", which have "outcomes". It is perhaps a mirror of the way the western world approaches most things...in a Cartesian manner, or a mental model that looks at the world as "mechanically linked" in terms of cause and effect, (note the singular form of these words!).
Because human factors deals naturally with the way humans see their world, another way to examine an accident sequence (and view the world!), is in terms of relationships...that which occurs "in-between" things. It no longer sees "things-in-isolation" but instead sees primarily relationships...what goes on in-between things and how relationships change those things. So, an organizational system, which can be printed out as the usual "org-chart" isn't a "thing", it is a living organism which materially affects the behaviour of people within such a system. Therefore, the notions of "cause" and "effect" are significantly changed. So much so, that analyzing a series of events from a "Cartesian" view, (as one might do a physics experiment), cannot work and a better model is needed. Charles Perrow first broached this notion in 1984 in a ground-breaking book entitled, "Normal Accidents". Perrow is emminently worth reading and listening to.
Diane Vaughan (sociologist), wrote about the Challenger accident in a way that analyzes the organizational structure of NASA - the relationships between engineers and managers - there was very little analysis of "things" in Vaughan's work.
Many of us here understand this stuff intuitively but many others do not, and are perhaps a bit stuck in a Cartesian world view in which the notions of local cause/effect = blame are legitimately/automatically attached to any understanding of what happened in the accident and why. Concepts like blame and accountability are legal terms and the legal discourse is quite different than the discourse of the safety process, which is being discussed by Safety Concerns.
This applies to AF447 in ways that have already been very well described and written about here by those who know this aspect of flight safety work. The importance of the sociologists' work in this cannot be over-emphasized, but nor can the engineers' work be set aside. The two need to work closely and this is where the field is tending - a systems theoretical approach.
In the July - September 2011 issue of ISASI Forum has an excellent article on this approach - it is the paper presented by Sidney Dekker and John Stoop at the 2010 ISASI conference entitled, "Limitations of 'Swiss Cheese' Models and the Need for a Systems Approach". I tried the link to that issue of the magazine and it doesn't work yet, but it does work for the entire Seminar Proceedings Vol 14, and you can find their presentation there.
I believe we will learn far more about AF447 using this approach and indeed this has already been put into practise in many of the posts here, but there is always more learning! The benefit of such robust process is it provides a solid basis upon which pet theories and recurring themes may be judged in terms of relevance and consistency as well as their contributory value towards understanding, and where indicated, safely set aside.
Jim Reason's Swiss Cheese model, extremely useful, has provided a good insight into human factors but is being challenged in the way any theory is challenged - through increased research and new knowledge, some of it made possible by a powerful computing capability which did not exist at the time the model was introduced.
Alongside (and not in place of!), Reason's notions are those of some superbly-insightful writers such as Sidney Dekker, John Stoop, Charles Perrow, Nancy Leveson, certainly PBL (Why-Because Analysis), who has contributed here in the past and others who are taking "systems theoretical" approaches (to describe it broadly...they may disagree!). Each are worth the trouble in looking up and reading, just as Reason is, for an understanding of this approach. Such an approach is (again!), entirely blame-free; - rather, it attempts to find things out.
Let us examine two notions. This isn't unique and is said in my own words. Others will have expressed these notions differently.
One way to think of an accident is a series of elements or things, which then interact (or don't interact). The focus is upon "things" as (philosophically) solid items with a fixed nature, which then interact with other "things" with their fixed natures which are then portrayed as "causes", which have "outcomes". It is perhaps a mirror of the way the western world approaches most things...in a Cartesian manner, or a mental model that looks at the world as "mechanically linked" in terms of cause and effect, (note the singular form of these words!).
Because human factors deals naturally with the way humans see their world, another way to examine an accident sequence (and view the world!), is in terms of relationships...that which occurs "in-between" things. It no longer sees "things-in-isolation" but instead sees primarily relationships...what goes on in-between things and how relationships change those things. So, an organizational system, which can be printed out as the usual "org-chart" isn't a "thing", it is a living organism which materially affects the behaviour of people within such a system. Therefore, the notions of "cause" and "effect" are significantly changed. So much so, that analyzing a series of events from a "Cartesian" view, (as one might do a physics experiment), cannot work and a better model is needed. Charles Perrow first broached this notion in 1984 in a ground-breaking book entitled, "Normal Accidents". Perrow is emminently worth reading and listening to.
Diane Vaughan (sociologist), wrote about the Challenger accident in a way that analyzes the organizational structure of NASA - the relationships between engineers and managers - there was very little analysis of "things" in Vaughan's work.
Many of us here understand this stuff intuitively but many others do not, and are perhaps a bit stuck in a Cartesian world view in which the notions of local cause/effect = blame are legitimately/automatically attached to any understanding of what happened in the accident and why. Concepts like blame and accountability are legal terms and the legal discourse is quite different than the discourse of the safety process, which is being discussed by Safety Concerns.
This applies to AF447 in ways that have already been very well described and written about here by those who know this aspect of flight safety work. The importance of the sociologists' work in this cannot be over-emphasized, but nor can the engineers' work be set aside. The two need to work closely and this is where the field is tending - a systems theoretical approach.
In the July - September 2011 issue of ISASI Forum has an excellent article on this approach - it is the paper presented by Sidney Dekker and John Stoop at the 2010 ISASI conference entitled, "Limitations of 'Swiss Cheese' Models and the Need for a Systems Approach". I tried the link to that issue of the magazine and it doesn't work yet, but it does work for the entire Seminar Proceedings Vol 14, and you can find their presentation there.
I believe we will learn far more about AF447 using this approach and indeed this has already been put into practise in many of the posts here, but there is always more learning! The benefit of such robust process is it provides a solid basis upon which pet theories and recurring themes may be judged in terms of relevance and consistency as well as their contributory value towards understanding, and where indicated, safely set aside.
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Originally Posted by Dozy
Then that's another fundamental misunderstanding of how the ABS system works
New sheets, nurse! When is the next BEA report if there is to be one?
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BOAC
Final report publication is planned by BEA in first half of 2012.
So, we've got many more months to quarrel on A vs B, pilots vs engineers, conspiracy theorists vs rational guys, blame vs safety...
So, we've got many more months to quarrel on A vs B, pilots vs engineers, conspiracy theorists vs rational guys, blame vs safety...
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@LW_50 (and again, you make me break my personal limits on daily post count - curse you! 
)
I followed that thread closely at the time, and in essence I agree whole-heartedly with what NSF said, with the proviso that I would have included the A300, A310, MD-11, B747-400, B757 and B767 (and to some extent, the B737 Classic and NG) in that list. Something that has rarely been clearly delineated is the distinction between FBW technology (which applies to the aircraft he lists, along with Concorde, albeit using analogue technology in that case), and FMS technology (which applies to that list as well as any Western airliner that came off the drawing board post-1972). My contention is that the former does not necessarily impact negatively on currency in hand-flying expertise, while the argument that dependence on the latter makes it possible to do do definitely has merit.
If you look at how some people respond to my posts, as opposed to what I've actually been saying, you would think that I must be some kind of blinkered supporter of automation ueber alles, which I categorically am not - and have gone out of my way to make that clear several times. While I agree with some of what people like SC and JD-EE say in terms of the reality of the systems (and respect their expertise), I do not share their confidence in the ability of these systems to operate successfully and safely without the need for human intervention, particularly when the situation begins to degrade from normal to FUBAR.
So all I can do is reiterate the gist of some of my most recent posts - you have two clear cases of recent accidents where a lack of proper training and a lack of understanding as to just how important it is that pilots be fit for duty have clearly contributed significantly. You've got Airbus (of all manufacturers!) expressing concern that manual handling skills have been allowed to deteriorate and that action must be taken to resolve this. There will probably not be another opportunity to take the fight to airline management across the industry for a very long time, so please understand that I am four-square behind any effort on the part of pilot unions and associations to do so. I get weary of all the old Airbus canards being brought up over this accident because it is a distraction from the real problem - a new breed of airline management and executives that don't know anything about the sharp end of the industry that they are supposed to be managing, nor do they understand why the cost-cutting measures that they were taught and are routinely applied in other industries are simply inappropriate for airline operation.
@BOAC - I was referring to the misunderstanding on the part of the driver who expected ABS to save his bodywork and spare his blushes - clearly he believed that ABS was a "magic" braking system that would contravene the laws of physics and make everything alright. Right now, we don't know why the AF447 crew (and the PF in particular) did what they did, whether it was overconfidence in the system through lack of understanding and/or training, whether it was a sustained panic reaction which would have led to the same result in any other airliner, or whether it was a simple case of pulling back on the stick while attempting roll corrections without realising it - to name but three possibilities. It is likely that we will never be 100% sure, so we must work with the information that we do have.
)I followed that thread closely at the time, and in essence I agree whole-heartedly with what NSF said, with the proviso that I would have included the A300, A310, MD-11, B747-400, B757 and B767 (and to some extent, the B737 Classic and NG) in that list. Something that has rarely been clearly delineated is the distinction between FBW technology (which applies to the aircraft he lists, along with Concorde, albeit using analogue technology in that case), and FMS technology (which applies to that list as well as any Western airliner that came off the drawing board post-1972). My contention is that the former does not necessarily impact negatively on currency in hand-flying expertise, while the argument that dependence on the latter makes it possible to do do definitely has merit.
If you look at how some people respond to my posts, as opposed to what I've actually been saying, you would think that I must be some kind of blinkered supporter of automation ueber alles, which I categorically am not - and have gone out of my way to make that clear several times. While I agree with some of what people like SC and JD-EE say in terms of the reality of the systems (and respect their expertise), I do not share their confidence in the ability of these systems to operate successfully and safely without the need for human intervention, particularly when the situation begins to degrade from normal to FUBAR.
So all I can do is reiterate the gist of some of my most recent posts - you have two clear cases of recent accidents where a lack of proper training and a lack of understanding as to just how important it is that pilots be fit for duty have clearly contributed significantly. You've got Airbus (of all manufacturers!) expressing concern that manual handling skills have been allowed to deteriorate and that action must be taken to resolve this. There will probably not be another opportunity to take the fight to airline management across the industry for a very long time, so please understand that I am four-square behind any effort on the part of pilot unions and associations to do so. I get weary of all the old Airbus canards being brought up over this accident because it is a distraction from the real problem - a new breed of airline management and executives that don't know anything about the sharp end of the industry that they are supposed to be managing, nor do they understand why the cost-cutting measures that they were taught and are routinely applied in other industries are simply inappropriate for airline operation.
@BOAC - I was referring to the misunderstanding on the part of the driver who expected ABS to save his bodywork and spare his blushes - clearly he believed that ABS was a "magic" braking system that would contravene the laws of physics and make everything alright. Right now, we don't know why the AF447 crew (and the PF in particular) did what they did, whether it was overconfidence in the system through lack of understanding and/or training, whether it was a sustained panic reaction which would have led to the same result in any other airliner, or whether it was a simple case of pulling back on the stick while attempting roll corrections without realising it - to name but three possibilities. It is likely that we will never be 100% sure, so we must work with the information that we do have.
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 24th Aug 2011 at 23:46. Reason: Clarifumucation...
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I don't blame AB for the lack of piloting skill which 447s' crew exhibited.
It could have easily happened in another type.
The fault was the pilots', plain and simple. They let the a/c get away from them while effectively flying 'partial panel'.
If they had been better trained, or even spent more hours actually flying (by hand) their aircraft then this accident could easily have been avoided.
Probably ( although the wx may have been a factor) all they had to do was leave things as they were and hang on until their airspeed problem went away- as it was bound to.
Straight and level was beyond them. So used were they to the automatics that the concept of actually flying the aircraft was too much.
Autos- and the way they degrade those hard earned flying skills- are the new killer.
It could have easily happened in another type.
The fault was the pilots', plain and simple. They let the a/c get away from them while effectively flying 'partial panel'.
If they had been better trained, or even spent more hours actually flying (by hand) their aircraft then this accident could easily have been avoided.
Probably ( although the wx may have been a factor) all they had to do was leave things as they were and hang on until their airspeed problem went away- as it was bound to.
Straight and level was beyond them. So used were they to the automatics that the concept of actually flying the aircraft was too much.
Autos- and the way they degrade those hard earned flying skills- are the new killer.
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@exeng (below) - Actually, I seem to recall reading on the EgyptAir 990 accident that if the yokes on the 767 are pulled and pushed opposite each other that the design caused one elevator to deflect up and the other to deflect down (which I think was later changed). Ultimately the Airbus FBW design depends on co-ordinated flight deck roles to a greater degree, but I don't think it's demonstrably less safe. One can argue that if the PNF had the courage of his convictions he should have held down the priority button and stated "I have control" in no uncertain terms, which would be a variation on the procedure practiced in Airbus training, which makes the reasonable assumption that the pilot relieved of control should relinquish their sidestick. The overriding impression I get from the AF447 interim reports is that the lack of clearly-delineated flight deck roles, for which the ultimate responsibility lies with the Captain, led to confusion as to which F/O should be doing what and may have contributed to the PNF's uncertainty as to whether he had the right to relieve the PF of control.
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 25th Aug 2011 at 00:19.
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I agree with Barbies
An awful situation to find oneself in, but nevertheless basic attitude + power should have seen them through the airspeed issue.
The stall warning should have alerted the PF to the situation. Even in low level stall training ( I understand the PF had this) then a reduction in pitch should have been almost automatic I would have thought.
Where I have sympathy for the Pilots is in the extreme angles of attack following the stall when the stall warning disappears - and yet when nose down inputs are made the stall warning re-appears. I know others have made the point but I felt it worth re-stating.
The pitch angles on the ADI are abnormal for the stage of flight (i.e. cruise + stall) but not abnormal for take-off and initial climb. 'So what' some may say - but the PF may have thought that such a pitch angle was not so out of the ordinary. (importance of training aginn)
Interesting to note that the PNF took control quite late in the proceedings (probably too late to effect a recovery) and I believe he made a nose down input. I also understand that the PF almost immediately took control agian (or overode the NPF's input) with a nose up input.
Whilst I don't want to start an A/B versus Boeing scrap again I feel that the sidestick logic is flawed in this respect amongst others. On a Boeing it obvious which way the elevator is moving (and in some cases therefore the THS) and on the A/B it is not obvious. I've flown both by the way (including the 320 and the 777 but not the A330).
Both types of aircraft are well designed - some have advantages or deficiencies when compared against each other.
The clue is in training - and what we have in this terrible accident is a crew that has been poorly prepared for the situation they find themselves in. Complex aircraft need rigorous training - but the airlines won't pay for it - and A/B don't recommend it's necessity.
I hope that some changes in attitude from the various CAA's will follow the final report - I won't hold my breath.
The stall warning should have alerted the PF to the situation. Even in low level stall training ( I understand the PF had this) then a reduction in pitch should have been almost automatic I would have thought.
Where I have sympathy for the Pilots is in the extreme angles of attack following the stall when the stall warning disappears - and yet when nose down inputs are made the stall warning re-appears. I know others have made the point but I felt it worth re-stating.
The pitch angles on the ADI are abnormal for the stage of flight (i.e. cruise + stall) but not abnormal for take-off and initial climb. 'So what' some may say - but the PF may have thought that such a pitch angle was not so out of the ordinary. (importance of training aginn)
Interesting to note that the PNF took control quite late in the proceedings (probably too late to effect a recovery) and I believe he made a nose down input. I also understand that the PF almost immediately took control agian (or overode the NPF's input) with a nose up input.
Whilst I don't want to start an A/B versus Boeing scrap again I feel that the sidestick logic is flawed in this respect amongst others. On a Boeing it obvious which way the elevator is moving (and in some cases therefore the THS) and on the A/B it is not obvious. I've flown both by the way (including the 320 and the 777 but not the A330).
Both types of aircraft are well designed - some have advantages or deficiencies when compared against each other.
The clue is in training - and what we have in this terrible accident is a crew that has been poorly prepared for the situation they find themselves in. Complex aircraft need rigorous training - but the airlines won't pay for it - and A/B don't recommend it's necessity.
I hope that some changes in attitude from the various CAA's will follow the final report - I won't hold my breath.
Procedure that required setting 5°/CLB by heart was in force at the time of the accident. Page 59 of interim 3 report in English refers.
I see there's fear that it's unsafe and leads to zoom climbs ending in stalls.
It is not and it does not.
You will climb out of cruise condition but if your significant cockpit other fumbles with QRH for a half an hour, you will simply and gently level off at altitude where power required meets power available at 5° AoA. There's no aeroplane that can not sustain 5° AoA below Macrit, from Sopwith Camel, to Belanca Airbus, to CitationJet, to B747, to whatever and with thrust to weight ratios and of modern passenger jets, you will be far fom Macrit at 5° AoA. Do you understand that, for all practical purposes*, your AoA is difference between pitch and flightpath and in level flight AoA=pitch?
Does anyone have anything to add to this except his feelings and suspicions? Like arguments?
Granted, there's no need to go climbing but procedure is not about maintaining altitude. Speedwise, it gives you safe pitch and power for any weight, until actual settings are taken from the table. 5/CLB is just temporary measure and IMHO can be skipped if one knows his cruise power settings and attitudes for different weights by heart or if he was in stable cruise condition and just maintains last pitch and power. However, this would be overriding the prescribed emergency procedure and one must be better sure he knows what he is exactly doing.
*disregarding wing incidence and vertical air currents
I see there's fear that it's unsafe and leads to zoom climbs ending in stalls.
It is not and it does not.
You will climb out of cruise condition but if your significant cockpit other fumbles with QRH for a half an hour, you will simply and gently level off at altitude where power required meets power available at 5° AoA. There's no aeroplane that can not sustain 5° AoA below Macrit, from Sopwith Camel, to Belanca Airbus, to CitationJet, to B747, to whatever and with thrust to weight ratios and of modern passenger jets, you will be far fom Macrit at 5° AoA. Do you understand that, for all practical purposes*, your AoA is difference between pitch and flightpath and in level flight AoA=pitch?
Does anyone have anything to add to this except his feelings and suspicions? Like arguments?
Granted, there's no need to go climbing but procedure is not about maintaining altitude. Speedwise, it gives you safe pitch and power for any weight, until actual settings are taken from the table. 5/CLB is just temporary measure and IMHO can be skipped if one knows his cruise power settings and attitudes for different weights by heart or if he was in stable cruise condition and just maintains last pitch and power. However, this would be overriding the prescribed emergency procedure and one must be better sure he knows what he is exactly doing.
*disregarding wing incidence and vertical air currents
Clandestino, a couple of threads back, HazelNuts39 posted a chart that compared stall AoA to mach and altitude, and it appears that you either get stall warning, or stall ( can't recall which thread to look in) at about 4. (Big diff, obviously,, between warning and stall). Something disturbs me about your choosing to champion "rote rote and more rote" as a solution.
What is the point in climbing an aircraft to trouble shoot a problem when you have fewer parameters to mess with by trouble shooting it while straight and level?
Why add a needless performance parameter when trouble shooting a malfunction?
I am at a loss.
Look at what happens with the advocacy of "keep it at five degrees until infinity." (Or the bloody PNF finally gets the QRH out and opened to the correct page).
Pitch up to 5 deg, and leave it there.
OK, while trouble shooting UAS, you get a stall warning. (See above, if I can find that table, I'll repost it).
Now what?
Well, lower the damned nose, you just got a stall warning.
OK, warning goes away, but where should you now assign the nose? What pitch angle.
Doesn't it bother you that you got a stall warning for no good reason by keeping the nose up in a pitch climb for no good reason?
Result is that you just gave yourself a multiple malfunction, so rather than dealing with one, you are now dealing with two.
Ever heard of anyone doing that?
(The "you" here isn't Clandestino, it's a generic "you" pilot in the audience going through this drill).
What is the point in climbing an aircraft to trouble shoot a problem when you have fewer parameters to mess with by trouble shooting it while straight and level?
Why add a needless performance parameter when trouble shooting a malfunction?
I am at a loss.
Look at what happens with the advocacy of "keep it at five degrees until infinity." (Or the bloody PNF finally gets the QRH out and opened to the correct page).
Pitch up to 5 deg, and leave it there.
OK, while trouble shooting UAS, you get a stall warning. (See above, if I can find that table, I'll repost it).
Now what?
Well, lower the damned nose, you just got a stall warning.
OK, warning goes away, but where should you now assign the nose? What pitch angle.
Doesn't it bother you that you got a stall warning for no good reason by keeping the nose up in a pitch climb for no good reason?
Result is that you just gave yourself a multiple malfunction, so rather than dealing with one, you are now dealing with two.
Ever heard of anyone doing that?
(The "you" here isn't Clandestino, it's a generic "you" pilot in the audience going through this drill).
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Jcjeant,
You brought it up about the inadequate search. Sometime in the last year, it was published that the french nuclear submarine was listening for the ping of the black boxes incorrectly with their sonar. The ping of the black boxes is at 37.5 khz, which, of course, is beyond the range of human hearing. A 5th grade science student would have known that! Just wanted to give an example of how pathetic the search effort was.
A great deal of money was spent to just go through the motions (sending a "nuclear" sub sounds impressive). It was not in France's best interest for the black boxes to be found sooner rather than later. The people were already dead, and Air France lawyers, Airbus lawyers, and the BEA were all on the same page. I remember a bunch of Airbus military tankers were about to be sold. Sure, everyone wanted to know what happened to AF447, but not just yet, and a couple of years for emotions to cool could help minimize lawsuit payouts as well.
Hate to be such a cynic, but it's life in the real world.
Thankfully, the BEA, Airbus, and Air France may not be on the same page any longer, and the industry can learn from this tradegy.
You brought it up about the inadequate search. Sometime in the last year, it was published that the french nuclear submarine was listening for the ping of the black boxes incorrectly with their sonar. The ping of the black boxes is at 37.5 khz, which, of course, is beyond the range of human hearing. A 5th grade science student would have known that! Just wanted to give an example of how pathetic the search effort was.
A great deal of money was spent to just go through the motions (sending a "nuclear" sub sounds impressive). It was not in France's best interest for the black boxes to be found sooner rather than later. The people were already dead, and Air France lawyers, Airbus lawyers, and the BEA were all on the same page. I remember a bunch of Airbus military tankers were about to be sold. Sure, everyone wanted to know what happened to AF447, but not just yet, and a couple of years for emotions to cool could help minimize lawsuit payouts as well.
Hate to be such a cynic, but it's life in the real world.
Thankfully, the BEA, Airbus, and Air France may not be on the same page any longer, and the industry can learn from this tradegy.
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@Coagie:
In 1988, the USS Vincennes incorrectly identified an Iran Air A300 as an Iranian Air Force F-14 and shot it down. In 1985, the joint US/French Titanic expedition incorrectly identified an immediately strong sonar reading at the beginning of their search pattern as an equipment malfunction and spent weeks headed in the opposite direction of the wreck, and it was only when - in a last-ditch effort - they threw all the video imaging equipment at the area a short distance from their point of origin that the wreck was actually found.
All I intend to illustrate with this is that neither military operations nor deep-ocean exploration are immune from mistakes, and before throwing accusations of conspiracy around, Hanlon's Razor should apply:
Or even miscommunication and bad luck.
In 1988, the USS Vincennes incorrectly identified an Iran Air A300 as an Iranian Air Force F-14 and shot it down. In 1985, the joint US/French Titanic expedition incorrectly identified an immediately strong sonar reading at the beginning of their search pattern as an equipment malfunction and spent weeks headed in the opposite direction of the wreck, and it was only when - in a last-ditch effort - they threw all the video imaging equipment at the area a short distance from their point of origin that the wreck was actually found.
All I intend to illustrate with this is that neither military operations nor deep-ocean exploration are immune from mistakes, and before throwing accusations of conspiracy around, Hanlon's Razor should apply:
Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity.
Coagie, what I read was that Emeraude's sonar wasn't initially optimized for 37.5 KHZ, not that it was completely deaf at that frequency. Just because you can hear the pinging in a WWII movie it doesn't necessarily follow that modern sonar is limited to the range of human hearing.
Clandestino;
Let's start from a different point, as something of a counterexample.
Let's say the A330's cruise pitch attitude is a nominal 5deg and a UAS event occurs and the crew executes the memorized items. I think then, you and those here who disagree with the views that I have expressed concerning this procedure would find agreement, as nothing would occur - the airplane would remain essentially level, (given the vagaries of turbulent flight).
So why isn't there broad agreement on keeping level flight? What is the actual Airbus justification for pitching the aircraft up to 5deg? I've heard the justifications but I haven't seen the sources. I have provided sources for everything stated in favour of the argument that the drill is confusing at best and incorrect or executed incorrectly, at worst.
Your comment in your post to which I originally responded does make the point that these drills are created by test pilots and disagreement with same is not something to take lightly. As a general rule I think that is a good principle - who are we to argue - generally?
But as you know very well from CRM principles, in this business if one is uncomfortable with something, regardless of who said it, who did it, or who wrote it, one speaks up and sorts it out and if one is wrong, so be it, no harm done. The airplane only respects the laws of physics. This accident is ample demonstration of that fact.
Given the example at the beginning of this post, I think it can be said that the issue isn't the pitch, (and I think you know this) - the issue for me is the destabilization factor. The point I am focussing upon isn't the idea of not being able to control all this and sort the climb and the recovery to stabilized flight. By pitching up, one adds to one's problems exponentially while one is trying to sort the problem instead of having a stable platform from which to execute the remainder of the checklist.
It simply makes no sense to alter anything because, given everything else equal nothing has occurred to the airplane which requires an immediate "correction". I commented years ago that I cannot imagine any pilot actually doing this and nothing I've read, seen or heard has altered this view because there is no good reason to do this in a transport aircraft - it simply leaves one in no-man's land.
One doesn't even have to know what one's airspeed and thrust setting were before the loss of speed indications...one just keeps the same attitude and when happy, just pulls the thrust levers out of the CLB detent and back to the thrust setting that was being indicated while the thrust was in the THR LOCK mode.
There are no examples that we can reference in the 30+ UAS events listed in BEA Report 1, in which the crew pulled the aircraft up in response to a loss of all airspeed indications.
As I have worked on this I have come around to understanding what the drill and the FCTM says and by all indications, the memorized items apply first, then the level-off, (which I think is crazy and wrong, but I nevertheless wish to argue against it on its lack of merit), but I have posted the relevant sections which govern how this drill is to be done (as stated in two airlines' FCTMs, probably not all airlines and probably not from Airbus...CONF iture responded very early in this discussion with this point, and it will be of interest to learn how AF taught this drill and what guidance is offered in the AF FCTM on the point).
The relevant sections from the two FCTMs I posted indicate that while the memorized items are to be done "immediately", the airplane is to be returned to stabilized flight as quickly as possible and troubleshooting begun before a speed limit is exceeded. Now...I am wondering why a drill should put an airplane in such a situation? Doesn't this have the potential for creating a bigger problem than it is designed to solve?
Hope this is takes the discussion forward, and thank you for commenting.
I see there's fear that it's unsafe and leads to zoom climbs ending in stalls.
Let's say the A330's cruise pitch attitude is a nominal 5deg and a UAS event occurs and the crew executes the memorized items. I think then, you and those here who disagree with the views that I have expressed concerning this procedure would find agreement, as nothing would occur - the airplane would remain essentially level, (given the vagaries of turbulent flight).
So why isn't there broad agreement on keeping level flight? What is the actual Airbus justification for pitching the aircraft up to 5deg? I've heard the justifications but I haven't seen the sources. I have provided sources for everything stated in favour of the argument that the drill is confusing at best and incorrect or executed incorrectly, at worst.
Your comment in your post to which I originally responded does make the point that these drills are created by test pilots and disagreement with same is not something to take lightly. As a general rule I think that is a good principle - who are we to argue - generally?
But as you know very well from CRM principles, in this business if one is uncomfortable with something, regardless of who said it, who did it, or who wrote it, one speaks up and sorts it out and if one is wrong, so be it, no harm done. The airplane only respects the laws of physics. This accident is ample demonstration of that fact.
Given the example at the beginning of this post, I think it can be said that the issue isn't the pitch, (and I think you know this) - the issue for me is the destabilization factor. The point I am focussing upon isn't the idea of not being able to control all this and sort the climb and the recovery to stabilized flight. By pitching up, one adds to one's problems exponentially while one is trying to sort the problem instead of having a stable platform from which to execute the remainder of the checklist.
It simply makes no sense to alter anything because, given everything else equal nothing has occurred to the airplane which requires an immediate "correction". I commented years ago that I cannot imagine any pilot actually doing this and nothing I've read, seen or heard has altered this view because there is no good reason to do this in a transport aircraft - it simply leaves one in no-man's land.
One doesn't even have to know what one's airspeed and thrust setting were before the loss of speed indications...one just keeps the same attitude and when happy, just pulls the thrust levers out of the CLB detent and back to the thrust setting that was being indicated while the thrust was in the THR LOCK mode.
There are no examples that we can reference in the 30+ UAS events listed in BEA Report 1, in which the crew pulled the aircraft up in response to a loss of all airspeed indications.
As I have worked on this I have come around to understanding what the drill and the FCTM says and by all indications, the memorized items apply first, then the level-off, (which I think is crazy and wrong, but I nevertheless wish to argue against it on its lack of merit), but I have posted the relevant sections which govern how this drill is to be done (as stated in two airlines' FCTMs, probably not all airlines and probably not from Airbus...CONF iture responded very early in this discussion with this point, and it will be of interest to learn how AF taught this drill and what guidance is offered in the AF FCTM on the point).
The relevant sections from the two FCTMs I posted indicate that while the memorized items are to be done "immediately", the airplane is to be returned to stabilized flight as quickly as possible and troubleshooting begun before a speed limit is exceeded. Now...I am wondering why a drill should put an airplane in such a situation? Doesn't this have the potential for creating a bigger problem than it is designed to solve?
Hope this is takes the discussion forward, and thank you for commenting.
Last edited by PJ2; 27th Aug 2011 at 05:53.
For Clandestino and PJ2: some bits of old ground that may enhance current discussion.
Some posts Hazelnuts and a few others made germane to handling and stalling at cruise altitude.
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/45283...ml#post6479432
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/45283...ml#post6480513
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/45283...ml#post6481326 (This is a table of AoA and time in the event)
(A comment on control response and time to unstalled a stall jet. )
HN39:
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/45283...ml#post6485709
Mieklour
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/45283...ml#post6486989
It certainly was investigated! Aug 1995 and resulted in the fitting of pitot heads with increased heating and a software change to increase the time line before ALT2 was latched. A/P and ATHR initially lost but were restored once out of icing conditions however the lateral twitchy aileron response was very evident for the landing.
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/45283...ml#post6487728
Here is the picture that I think will help, courtesy of Hazel Nuts.
https://docs.google.com/leaf?id=0B0C...thkey=CILGt_QN
BBF has a chilling summary. It may be hyperbole, given Mieklour's experience with flying it back in Alt 2 latched from cruise altitude. :
Some posts Hazelnuts and a few others made germane to handling and stalling at cruise altitude.
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/45283...ml#post6479432
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/45283...ml#post6480513
"In level flight at FL350 and M.82 the pitch attitude (=AoA in level flight - HN) was 2.5 degrees".
AoA=4 degrees is approx. the stall warning threshold at M.8 and results in a normal load factor of 1.39.
AoA=4 degrees is approx. the stall warning threshold at M.8 and results in a normal load factor of 1.39.
jcarlosgon
Recovery was done by pushing forward. ... The surprise was how so long it took.
Recovery was done by pushing forward. ... The surprise was how so long it took.
HN39:
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/45283...ml#post6485709
At M=0.8 stall warning is set to occur (see 2nd Interim Report) at approx. AoA=4°, alpha-max = 5°, and the real stall is probably between 6° and 7°.
The second stall warning occurred "around 6°" at M=0.68, where alpha-max=7.3° and stall probably beyond 9°.
An intermittent warning such as may occur due to AoA- and hence g-variations due to turbulence may be considered 'inappropriate' since it doesn't require recovery action from the crew, but that doesn't mean it is false.
It means that the AoA has temporarily exceeded the stall warning threshold.
The second stall warning occurred "around 6°" at M=0.68, where alpha-max=7.3° and stall probably beyond 9°.
An intermittent warning such as may occur due to AoA- and hence g-variations due to turbulence may be considered 'inappropriate' since it doesn't require recovery action from the crew, but that doesn't mean it is false.
It means that the AoA has temporarily exceeded the stall warning threshold.
If I can make a small contribution to this thread.
I have flown the A330 in ALT 2 LAW after a twin ADR incident due to icing conditions.
What surprised me was how "twitchy" the aircraft was, especially in roll.
The handling was much harder than I had experienced in the simulator during training.
We however continued to have valid ADI indications with which to fly attitude + power whilst trying to sort out the very numerous ECAM warnings plus alternating "Stall, stall" + overspeed warnings (spurious of course)
Why the crew should have applied pitch up inputs is a mystery to me unless it was a response to a perceived large overspeed but then why leave the power up?
As mentioned by other posters - the need to manually trim the THS forward is an area that is often seen to be missed by crew undertaking unusual attitude recovery training, especially from very high nose up attitudes and is, in my opinion, one of the few `real gotchas` about the aeroplane.
I have flown the A330 in ALT 2 LAW after a twin ADR incident due to icing conditions.
What surprised me was how "twitchy" the aircraft was, especially in roll.
The handling was much harder than I had experienced in the simulator during training.
We however continued to have valid ADI indications with which to fly attitude + power whilst trying to sort out the very numerous ECAM warnings plus alternating "Stall, stall" + overspeed warnings (spurious of course)
Why the crew should have applied pitch up inputs is a mystery to me unless it was a response to a perceived large overspeed but then why leave the power up?
As mentioned by other posters - the need to manually trim the THS forward is an area that is often seen to be missed by crew undertaking unusual attitude recovery training, especially from very high nose up attitudes and is, in my opinion, one of the few `real gotchas` about the aeroplane.
It certainly was investigated! Aug 1995 and resulted in the fitting of pitot heads with increased heating and a software change to increase the time line before ALT2 was latched. A/P and ATHR initially lost but were restored once out of icing conditions however the lateral twitchy aileron response was very evident for the landing.
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/45283...ml#post6487728
Here is the picture that I think will help, courtesy of Hazel Nuts.
https://docs.google.com/leaf?id=0B0C...thkey=CILGt_QN
BBF has a chilling summary. It may be hyperbole, given Mieklour's experience with flying it back in Alt 2 latched from cruise altitude. :
Straight and level was beyond them. So used were they to the automatics that the concept of actually flying the aircraft was too much.
Autos- and the way they degrade those hard earned flying skills- are the new killer.
Autos- and the way they degrade those hard earned flying skills- are the new killer.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 25th Aug 2011 at 02:14.
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Dozywannabe,
Not suggesting conspiracy. Just suggesting 3 entities that hoped that each other didn't get too clever or creative, too soon, as long as they all had plausible deniability. "How were we supposed to know the sub didn't know to detect 37.5 khz specifically. After all, a 5th grade science student would have known it"
I agree that malice shouldn't be assumed if stupidity will suffice, but it took France long enough to ask for help.
Chu Chu,
True. Sonar was not optimized for 37.5 khz, but if it were, it's range would have been multiplied tremendously. There's no comparison in sensitivity when tuned specifically to it, rather than listening to a broad dynamic range. Could have used a hetrodyne setup. One of those Albert Michaelson type things.
Not suggesting conspiracy. Just suggesting 3 entities that hoped that each other didn't get too clever or creative, too soon, as long as they all had plausible deniability. "How were we supposed to know the sub didn't know to detect 37.5 khz specifically. After all, a 5th grade science student would have known it"
I agree that malice shouldn't be assumed if stupidity will suffice, but it took France long enough to ask for help.
Chu Chu,
True. Sonar was not optimized for 37.5 khz, but if it were, it's range would have been multiplied tremendously. There's no comparison in sensitivity when tuned specifically to it, rather than listening to a broad dynamic range. Could have used a hetrodyne setup. One of those Albert Michaelson type things.
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Denouement
Denouement
As in most such accidents, the final revelations prove to be the disclosure of a previously un-encountered but (in the aftermath) easily explicable phenomenon - and an ensuing chain of complicating and (pilot) confounding circumstances..... some of which are related to design and envelope test-flying deficiencies (but more on that later). Is it a computer-created chain of events? Judge for yourself, from the discussion below, what part the automation (or even weather) played.
After autopilot disconnect due to pitot ice-up and ADR disagree, and some ensuing pilot surprise "disconnect" (from priorities), max power was applied at or near the aircraft's cruise ceiling, the underslung engines provided a pitch-up moment that caused the aircraft to quickly climb into a stall in what's colloquially called "coffin corner". Unfortunately and simultaneously, the autotrim caused the trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) to motor (quite unnoticeably) to its maximum "nose-up" sustaining position. This combination of power and "back-trimmed" trim-state created a configuration that was to thereafter (i.e. during their high-rate descent) sustain a deep-stall condition that could only be entered via such a powered speed-to-height "inadvertently zoomed" scenario. Why did they add power? It's a natural pilot response to do something similar when the airspeed winds back off the clock (even though in most such circumstances it only serves to "upset the applecart" of stability).
To explain, the translatable inertia of an aircraft at height has always amazed me. When you zoom climb (even quite shallowly) at very high altitude, you are translating, into a rapidly expiring upwards vector, the very considerable energy that's there solely courtesy of its TAS - (i.e. at cruise height the True Air Speed - i.e the actual speed through the air - is roughly double the indicated airspeed ). When that kinetic energy excess is exhausted (the height increment becoming potential energy), the out of kilter aerodynamics then must dictate what follows. The resulting flight-path down from a stall in that rarefied atmosphere is a "locked-in" function of attitude and power and residual trim-state. The trim state they ended up with was the deadly legacy of the auto-trimming THS rapidly reaching max "nose-up"... as the speed decayed in the thrust-induced zoom. The power of that tilted THS slab was now enough to keep that A330 pitched up into the stall, particularly whilst under engine power. The deep-stall condition is quite a stable flight regime - and that has been known since the first BAC-111 accident almost 50 years ago (only a tail-chute deployment could have saved it). Back prior to automation it was thought to be a phenomenon only associated with T-tailed aircraft (wing-wash swamping the all-flying tail and negating its control). But since AF447 we've discovered that the A330's THS has the power to emulate this lethal configuration... but with deceptively smooth passivity.
Lacking an AoA attention-getting read-out or aural/visual alert, the pilot can only "go for" an ADI pitch attitude (and one that approximates the level flight attitude would seem reasonable to most - and it's what's been generally, but quite mistakenly, advocated here). Unfortunately in a deep-stall condition the relative airflow is not from "ahead" (but from "well below" and ahead), so maintaining (or just abiding) a notional 5 degrees nose-up "cruising" pitch is to fatally elect to live within that deep-stall's boundaries. Deep-stall is a non-alarming condition because of the lack of tail-plane buffeting. In a normal stall the empennage is being "bathed" in wing-created boundary layer separation turbulence - and it's an airframe and control feedback situation that pilots everywhere can recognize as indicative of a stalled condition. Without it you are plummeting down in an eerily smooth and silent (but non-apparent) steep trajectory.
Of course having a stall warning that only momentarily cautions an initial approach to a stall is a design that (for its pilot's alerting function) actually conceals the deep stall. Once embedded in such a stall, the aural alert ceases ("how can I be stalled, there's no stall warning?"). Any stick forward initiative (i.e. angle of attack reduction into the lower AoA numbers) only cooks off (quite perversely) that aural stall warning and increases the perplexed pilot's misunderstanding and non-recognition of his predicament ("now we're stalling with stick forward, how can this be?"). He's never seen this profile on any simulator ride. Even the Airbus test-pilots just "haven't been there" beyond the flight envelope, to test this "post departure" phase. Whatever assumptions about it were ever made? I'd suggest absolutely none. It was an area that, like max achievable Mach and IAS, is best theorized about (only). Much of what is specified for air-testing is about safe boundaries (beyond which there be dragons best left undisturbed). Airbus fails to shine torches (or even look) into dark corners of their beastly envelopes and automation perturbations.
It's no surprise to me that, once locked into their deep-stall smooth-flying regime, the AF447 pilots failed to recognize the nature of their predicament. They momentarily acknowledged their high-rate descent but due their 3-way interaction, their confusion, the smoothness of flight, the silence of low IAS, the distraction of myriad alerts, the darkness of night and lack of any other visual cues, all available cues failed to trigger awareness of any imminent catastrophe. Even the PF's side-stick grip and applied input was concealed from the captain's view. If they'd had a distinctive AoA alarm, experience of it and a laid down memory recall procedure for affirmative action (i.e. positively lower the nose until the stall-approach warning recurs (then ceases) or at least to 20 degrees nose-down), well we'd not now be agonizing over their needless deaths. It's a recognition "consciousness" trigger that's generally lacking here in our automation. As pilots of automated airplanes, we need a climactic bathos (or Eureka moment) whenever we're required to spring into an alert and cognitive state. Other interim pilot-level "fixes" (such as not TOGA'ing the power and prioritizing the lowering of the nose and using manual trim) have already been addressed in Airbus pilot bulletins.
I'd be interested in any rebuttals..... technical or otherwise. Do I think that any fixes implemented will be effective? Partially but not wholly is my suspicion. No Airbus or Air France or BEA bod is going to want to acknowledge the totality of the AF447 conundrum. AF447 will reside in the Pilot Error Hall of Infamy forever. But to allow this, without demur, would be a calumny against the profession of the professional aviator. And that's why I'm penning this. Put this out for the public and journalists to see and understand. That's how you might avert the way I see the final report going.
As in most such accidents, the final revelations prove to be the disclosure of a previously un-encountered but (in the aftermath) easily explicable phenomenon - and an ensuing chain of complicating and (pilot) confounding circumstances..... some of which are related to design and envelope test-flying deficiencies (but more on that later). Is it a computer-created chain of events? Judge for yourself, from the discussion below, what part the automation (or even weather) played.
After autopilot disconnect due to pitot ice-up and ADR disagree, and some ensuing pilot surprise "disconnect" (from priorities), max power was applied at or near the aircraft's cruise ceiling, the underslung engines provided a pitch-up moment that caused the aircraft to quickly climb into a stall in what's colloquially called "coffin corner". Unfortunately and simultaneously, the autotrim caused the trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) to motor (quite unnoticeably) to its maximum "nose-up" sustaining position. This combination of power and "back-trimmed" trim-state created a configuration that was to thereafter (i.e. during their high-rate descent) sustain a deep-stall condition that could only be entered via such a powered speed-to-height "inadvertently zoomed" scenario. Why did they add power? It's a natural pilot response to do something similar when the airspeed winds back off the clock (even though in most such circumstances it only serves to "upset the applecart" of stability).
To explain, the translatable inertia of an aircraft at height has always amazed me. When you zoom climb (even quite shallowly) at very high altitude, you are translating, into a rapidly expiring upwards vector, the very considerable energy that's there solely courtesy of its TAS - (i.e. at cruise height the True Air Speed - i.e the actual speed through the air - is roughly double the indicated airspeed ). When that kinetic energy excess is exhausted (the height increment becoming potential energy), the out of kilter aerodynamics then must dictate what follows. The resulting flight-path down from a stall in that rarefied atmosphere is a "locked-in" function of attitude and power and residual trim-state. The trim state they ended up with was the deadly legacy of the auto-trimming THS rapidly reaching max "nose-up"... as the speed decayed in the thrust-induced zoom. The power of that tilted THS slab was now enough to keep that A330 pitched up into the stall, particularly whilst under engine power. The deep-stall condition is quite a stable flight regime - and that has been known since the first BAC-111 accident almost 50 years ago (only a tail-chute deployment could have saved it). Back prior to automation it was thought to be a phenomenon only associated with T-tailed aircraft (wing-wash swamping the all-flying tail and negating its control). But since AF447 we've discovered that the A330's THS has the power to emulate this lethal configuration... but with deceptively smooth passivity.
Lacking an AoA attention-getting read-out or aural/visual alert, the pilot can only "go for" an ADI pitch attitude (and one that approximates the level flight attitude would seem reasonable to most - and it's what's been generally, but quite mistakenly, advocated here). Unfortunately in a deep-stall condition the relative airflow is not from "ahead" (but from "well below" and ahead), so maintaining (or just abiding) a notional 5 degrees nose-up "cruising" pitch is to fatally elect to live within that deep-stall's boundaries. Deep-stall is a non-alarming condition because of the lack of tail-plane buffeting. In a normal stall the empennage is being "bathed" in wing-created boundary layer separation turbulence - and it's an airframe and control feedback situation that pilots everywhere can recognize as indicative of a stalled condition. Without it you are plummeting down in an eerily smooth and silent (but non-apparent) steep trajectory.
Of course having a stall warning that only momentarily cautions an initial approach to a stall is a design that (for its pilot's alerting function) actually conceals the deep stall. Once embedded in such a stall, the aural alert ceases ("how can I be stalled, there's no stall warning?"). Any stick forward initiative (i.e. angle of attack reduction into the lower AoA numbers) only cooks off (quite perversely) that aural stall warning and increases the perplexed pilot's misunderstanding and non-recognition of his predicament ("now we're stalling with stick forward, how can this be?"). He's never seen this profile on any simulator ride. Even the Airbus test-pilots just "haven't been there" beyond the flight envelope, to test this "post departure" phase. Whatever assumptions about it were ever made? I'd suggest absolutely none. It was an area that, like max achievable Mach and IAS, is best theorized about (only). Much of what is specified for air-testing is about safe boundaries (beyond which there be dragons best left undisturbed). Airbus fails to shine torches (or even look) into dark corners of their beastly envelopes and automation perturbations.
It's no surprise to me that, once locked into their deep-stall smooth-flying regime, the AF447 pilots failed to recognize the nature of their predicament. They momentarily acknowledged their high-rate descent but due their 3-way interaction, their confusion, the smoothness of flight, the silence of low IAS, the distraction of myriad alerts, the darkness of night and lack of any other visual cues, all available cues failed to trigger awareness of any imminent catastrophe. Even the PF's side-stick grip and applied input was concealed from the captain's view. If they'd had a distinctive AoA alarm, experience of it and a laid down memory recall procedure for affirmative action (i.e. positively lower the nose until the stall-approach warning recurs (then ceases) or at least to 20 degrees nose-down), well we'd not now be agonizing over their needless deaths. It's a recognition "consciousness" trigger that's generally lacking here in our automation. As pilots of automated airplanes, we need a climactic bathos (or Eureka moment) whenever we're required to spring into an alert and cognitive state. Other interim pilot-level "fixes" (such as not TOGA'ing the power and prioritizing the lowering of the nose and using manual trim) have already been addressed in Airbus pilot bulletins.
I'd be interested in any rebuttals..... technical or otherwise. Do I think that any fixes implemented will be effective? Partially but not wholly is my suspicion. No Airbus or Air France or BEA bod is going to want to acknowledge the totality of the AF447 conundrum. AF447 will reside in the Pilot Error Hall of Infamy forever. But to allow this, without demur, would be a calumny against the profession of the professional aviator. And that's why I'm penning this. Put this out for the public and journalists to see and understand. That's how you might avert the way I see the final report going.
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Hi,
DW
It does not imply any conspiracy .. this is simply to show that some people of BEA and other bodies (in good faith ?) lacked common sense and also remained deaf to certain warnings from other experts (as some has think about 447 pilots who remain deaf at the stall warning)
The results of this lack of good sens are not meaningless when you know the money trowed in and the delay for the families and also the delay for any recommendations to be issued ...
If you find that your house keys are no longer in your pocket .. will you start to look in your attic (where you go 3 times a year and last visit was a month ago) or are you going to start looking in the room you are in most cases.
And if it's dark .. do not you turn all the lights to help you see them?
DW
All I intend to illustrate with this is that neither military operations nor deep-ocean exploration are immune from mistakes, and before throwing accusations of conspiracy around
The results of this lack of good sens are not meaningless when you know the money trowed in and the delay for the families and also the delay for any recommendations to be issued ...
If you find that your house keys are no longer in your pocket .. will you start to look in your attic (where you go 3 times a year and last visit was a month ago) or are you going to start looking in the room you are in most cases.
And if it's dark .. do not you turn all the lights to help you see them?