Clandestino;
I see there's fear that it's unsafe and leads to zoom climbs ending in stalls.
Let's start from a different point, as something of a counterexample.
Let's say the A330's cruise pitch attitude is a nominal 5deg and a UAS event occurs and the crew executes the memorized items. I think then, you and those here who disagree with the views that I have expressed concerning this procedure would find agreement, as nothing would occur - the airplane would remain essentially level, (given the vagaries of turbulent flight).
So why isn't there broad agreement on keeping level flight? What is the actual Airbus justification for pitching the aircraft up to 5deg? I've heard the justifications but I haven't seen the sources. I have provided sources for everything stated in favour of the argument that the drill is confusing at best and incorrect or executed incorrectly, at worst.
Your comment in your post to which I originally responded does make the point that these drills are created by test pilots and disagreement with same is not something to take lightly. As a general rule I think that is a good principle - who are we to argue - generally?
But as you know very well from CRM principles, in this business if one is uncomfortable with something, regardless of who said it, who did it, or who wrote it, one speaks up and sorts it out and if one is wrong, so be it, no harm done. The airplane only respects the laws of physics. This accident is ample demonstration of that fact.
Given the example at the beginning of this post, I think it can be said that the issue isn't the pitch, (and I think you know this) - the issue for me is the destabilization factor. The point I am focussing upon isn't the idea of not being able to control all this and sort the climb and the recovery to stabilized flight. By pitching up, one adds to one's problems exponentially while one is trying to sort the problem instead of having a stable platform from which to execute the remainder of the checklist.
It simply makes no sense to alter anything because, given everything else equal nothing has occurred to the airplane which requires an immediate "correction". I commented years ago that I cannot imagine any pilot actually doing this and nothing I've read, seen or heard has altered this view because there is no good reason to do this in a transport aircraft - it simply leaves one in no-man's land.
One doesn't even have to know what one's airspeed and thrust setting were before the loss of speed indications...one just keeps the same attitude and when happy, just pulls the thrust levers out of the CLB detent and back to the thrust setting that was being indicated while the thrust was in the THR LOCK mode.
There are no examples that we can reference in the 30+ UAS events listed in BEA Report 1, in which the crew pulled the aircraft up in response to a loss of all airspeed indications.
As I have worked on this I have come around to understanding what the drill and the FCTM says and by all indications, the memorized items apply first, then the level-off, (which I think is crazy and wrong, but I nevertheless wish to argue against it on its lack of merit), but I have posted the relevant sections which govern how this drill is to be done (as stated in two airlines' FCTMs, probably not all airlines and probably not from Airbus...
CONF iture responded very early in this discussion with this point, and it will be of interest to learn how AF taught this drill and what guidance is offered in the AF FCTM on the point).
The relevant sections from the two FCTMs I posted indicate that while the memorized items are to be done "immediately", the airplane is to be returned to stabilized flight as quickly as possible and troubleshooting begun before a speed limit is exceeded. Now...I am wondering why a drill should put an airplane in such a situation? Doesn't this have the potential for creating a bigger problem than it is designed to solve?
Hope this is takes the discussion forward, and thank you for commenting.