AF447 wreckage found
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It is not A vs B but PF vs PNF
The chronology below clearly shows that the crash has nothing to do with the pitots tubes, nor the stall warning, nor the sidestick : the LS and the Capt. were fully aware of the stall and of the solution to the stall. It is prooved by the fact that only 21s after the pilot in the RS took control of the plane, the pilot in the LS was urging him to go down and was asking for the Captain because of the RS attitude.
Untill the end, the LS and the captain tell the RS to go down and keep the wing horizontal.
But the RS' brain was unable to do it, even when he said that he will obey and go down !
In fact, the chronology shows a real fight between two pilots, the "devil" in the right seat (RS) and the "good" in the leftseat.(LS)
The crash occurs because the LS could never took the priority over the RS. When he did, either the RS re taked immediatily the control either there were dual inputs !
Had the RS or the Captain a solution to stop the RS for giving inputs ?
It seems that a "knock down" would have been the right solution.
But, how can the designer or the AF management predict in which seat is the good or the bad ?
IMO, there is NO solution to the case in a commercial plane if a pilot don't obey to the Captain.
Even in an Army, a martial Court is necessary to decide this kind of debate.
And NOBODY can predict if the Capt or the copilot is the devil.
I really think this crash has nothing to do with A vs B or AF vs any other flagship.
____________________________________________________________ ___
In the following:
· LS using the Captain sideslick: left seat is PNF except if he is mentioned as PF
· RS using the copilot sideslick: right seat is the PF except if he is mentioned as NF
2 h 10 min 06 The flight control law changes from normal to alternate. RS : “I have the controls”
2 h 10 min 25: Wing anti-ice
2 h 10 min 26: The FD 1 and 2 become available again (HDG and V/S modes).
2 h 10 min 27 to 2 h 10 min 31 : LS “Watch your speed Watch your speed” RS “Okay, okay okay I’m going back down” LS “Stabilise” RS “Yeah Go back down”
[Only 21 s after RS took the control, the LS understood that the RS is not flying properly BUT has to wait for the Capt.]
2 h 10 min 49: LS “(…) where is he er?”
2 h 10 min 51: SV : “Stall, stall” + cricket continuously
2 h 11: LS “Above all try to touch the lateral controls as little as possible eh”
2 h 11 min 06 : LS : “(…) is he coming or not?”
2 h 11 min 32 (…) I don’t have control of the airplane any more now I don’t have control of the airplane at all
2 h 11 min 38 : LS “Controls to the left”
[ 1 mn and 32s after RS took control, LS takes control, BUT only for 2 s because the RS re takes control without announcement : a huge fault !]
2 h 11 min 40 : RS takes over the controls. The RS sidestick is positioned:- left in stop position - nose-up to two thirds of the stop position.
2 h 11 min 43: Capt “Er what are you (doing)?” LS “What’s happening? I don’t know I don’t know what’s happening”
[ The RS has been flying like a fool for 1mn and 37s BUT the LS doesn’t dare to tell to the Capt. that the problem is actually the RS]
2 h 11 min 45 : End of “Stall, stall” warning + cricket
2 h 12 min 04 2 h 12 min 07 : The airbrakes are controlled and deployed.
2 h 12 min 07 : LS “No above all don’t extend (the) “
2 h 12 min 17: SV : “Priority right”
[ It looks like the RS and the LS were fighting for the control, unfortunately the RS took the priority]
2 h 12 min 19 : Capt “The wings to flat - horizon the standby - horizon -The horizon (second)”
2 h 12 min 27: LS “You’re climbing” SV : “Stall, stall”
2 h 12 min 30: RS “Am I going down now?” LS “Go down”
2 h 12 min 32 : Capt :”No you climb there”
2 h 12 min 33: I’m climbing okay so we’re going down
2 h 12 min 45 : RS “On alti what do we have?”- LS “What do you mean on altitude?” – RS “Yeah yeah yeah I’m going down, no?” – LS “You’re going down yes” Capt. “Hey you’re in … get the wings horizontal Get the wings horizontal”
2 h 12 min 59: Capt “The rudder bar”
At 2 h 13 min 23: SV : “Dual input”
[ From now, a series of dual input shows that the fight between the two PF is going on until the end with the Capt. Giving (good) advices]
2 h 13 min 25: RS : “What is… how come we’re continuing to go right down now?”
2 h 13 min 38: Capt : “Careful with the rudder bar there”
2 h 13 min 41 : SV : “Dual input”
2 h 13 min 43 : SV : “Dual input”
2 h 13 min 45 : SV : “Dual input”
2 h 13 min 47 : SV : “Dual input”
2 h 13 min 40 RS: “But I’ve been at maxi nose-up for a while” – Capt “No no no don’t climb” – LS “So go down”
2 h 13 min 45 LS : “So give me the controls the controls to me” RS : “Go ahead you have the controls we are still in TOGA eh”
2 h 14 min 05 Capt “Watch out you’re pitching up there” LS “I’m pitching up?” RS “Well we need to we are at four thousand feet”
2 h 14 min 21: The RS seat takes over the controls.
2 h 14 min 26 : The LS sidestick is positioned nose-down and right. The RS sidestick is in stop position nose-up and around neutral in lateral.
2 h 14 min 28,4: End of recordings
Untill the end, the LS and the captain tell the RS to go down and keep the wing horizontal.
But the RS' brain was unable to do it, even when he said that he will obey and go down !
In fact, the chronology shows a real fight between two pilots, the "devil" in the right seat (RS) and the "good" in the leftseat.(LS)
The crash occurs because the LS could never took the priority over the RS. When he did, either the RS re taked immediatily the control either there were dual inputs !
Had the RS or the Captain a solution to stop the RS for giving inputs ?
It seems that a "knock down" would have been the right solution.
But, how can the designer or the AF management predict in which seat is the good or the bad ?
IMO, there is NO solution to the case in a commercial plane if a pilot don't obey to the Captain.
Even in an Army, a martial Court is necessary to decide this kind of debate.
And NOBODY can predict if the Capt or the copilot is the devil.
I really think this crash has nothing to do with A vs B or AF vs any other flagship.
____________________________________________________________ ___
In the following:
· LS using the Captain sideslick: left seat is PNF except if he is mentioned as PF
· RS using the copilot sideslick: right seat is the PF except if he is mentioned as NF
2 h 10 min 06 The flight control law changes from normal to alternate. RS : “I have the controls”
2 h 10 min 25: Wing anti-ice
2 h 10 min 26: The FD 1 and 2 become available again (HDG and V/S modes).
2 h 10 min 27 to 2 h 10 min 31 : LS “Watch your speed Watch your speed” RS “Okay, okay okay I’m going back down” LS “Stabilise” RS “Yeah Go back down”
[Only 21 s after RS took the control, the LS understood that the RS is not flying properly BUT has to wait for the Capt.]
2 h 10 min 49: LS “(…) where is he er?”
2 h 10 min 51: SV : “Stall, stall” + cricket continuously
2 h 11: LS “Above all try to touch the lateral controls as little as possible eh”
2 h 11 min 06 : LS : “(…) is he coming or not?”
2 h 11 min 32 (…) I don’t have control of the airplane any more now I don’t have control of the airplane at all
2 h 11 min 38 : LS “Controls to the left”
[ 1 mn and 32s after RS took control, LS takes control, BUT only for 2 s because the RS re takes control without announcement : a huge fault !]
2 h 11 min 40 : RS takes over the controls. The RS sidestick is positioned:- left in stop position - nose-up to two thirds of the stop position.
2 h 11 min 43: Capt “Er what are you (doing)?” LS “What’s happening? I don’t know I don’t know what’s happening”
[ The RS has been flying like a fool for 1mn and 37s BUT the LS doesn’t dare to tell to the Capt. that the problem is actually the RS]
2 h 11 min 45 : End of “Stall, stall” warning + cricket
2 h 12 min 04 2 h 12 min 07 : The airbrakes are controlled and deployed.
2 h 12 min 07 : LS “No above all don’t extend (the) “
2 h 12 min 17: SV : “Priority right”
[ It looks like the RS and the LS were fighting for the control, unfortunately the RS took the priority]
2 h 12 min 19 : Capt “The wings to flat - horizon the standby - horizon -The horizon (second)”
2 h 12 min 27: LS “You’re climbing” SV : “Stall, stall”
2 h 12 min 30: RS “Am I going down now?” LS “Go down”
2 h 12 min 32 : Capt :”No you climb there”
2 h 12 min 33: I’m climbing okay so we’re going down
2 h 12 min 45 : RS “On alti what do we have?”- LS “What do you mean on altitude?” – RS “Yeah yeah yeah I’m going down, no?” – LS “You’re going down yes” Capt. “Hey you’re in … get the wings horizontal Get the wings horizontal”
2 h 12 min 59: Capt “The rudder bar”
At 2 h 13 min 23: SV : “Dual input”
[ From now, a series of dual input shows that the fight between the two PF is going on until the end with the Capt. Giving (good) advices]
2 h 13 min 25: RS : “What is… how come we’re continuing to go right down now?”
2 h 13 min 38: Capt : “Careful with the rudder bar there”
2 h 13 min 41 : SV : “Dual input”
2 h 13 min 43 : SV : “Dual input”
2 h 13 min 45 : SV : “Dual input”
2 h 13 min 47 : SV : “Dual input”
2 h 13 min 40 RS: “But I’ve been at maxi nose-up for a while” – Capt “No no no don’t climb” – LS “So go down”
2 h 13 min 45 LS : “So give me the controls the controls to me” RS : “Go ahead you have the controls we are still in TOGA eh”
2 h 14 min 05 Capt “Watch out you’re pitching up there” LS “I’m pitching up?” RS “Well we need to we are at four thousand feet”
2 h 14 min 21: The RS seat takes over the controls.
2 h 14 min 26 : The LS sidestick is positioned nose-down and right. The RS sidestick is in stop position nose-up and around neutral in lateral.
2 h 14 min 28,4: End of recordings
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Hi Karsten
my point is that egalitarian CRM proceedures miss the glaring fact that in an incipient major aircraft upset, your most experienced pilot will, on average, give your aircraft berween 25 - and 225 percent increased risk of survival.This is a resource not used by the crew . In this accident the least experienced pilot retained (ineffective)control of the aircraft from autopilot failure zoom climbing to 38000 ft , stalling, then down to 4000 ft .
The Aircraft was hand flown from a stable configuration into a stall situation, albeit unwittingly complicated by the autotrim..... leaving the best aviation experience/resource in the non control role , or absent from the cockpit and not decisively involved throughout.
The problem was being in a thunderstorm at is worst locus of intensity and widest diameter, thence a skill, perceptual (including spatial disorientation) and CRM one on the pilot/company side, worsened by design faults with the aircraft ( pitots, autotrim, stall warning parameters useless in a mjaor attitude upset, no A of A display, digital readouts vs analogue readouts worsening performance in emergency environment, unobserved sidestick)
my point is that egalitarian CRM proceedures miss the glaring fact that in an incipient major aircraft upset, your most experienced pilot will, on average, give your aircraft berween 25 - and 225 percent increased risk of survival.This is a resource not used by the crew . In this accident the least experienced pilot retained (ineffective)control of the aircraft from autopilot failure zoom climbing to 38000 ft , stalling, then down to 4000 ft .
The Aircraft was hand flown from a stable configuration into a stall situation, albeit unwittingly complicated by the autotrim..... leaving the best aviation experience/resource in the non control role , or absent from the cockpit and not decisively involved throughout.
The problem was being in a thunderstorm at is worst locus of intensity and widest diameter, thence a skill, perceptual (including spatial disorientation) and CRM one on the pilot/company side, worsened by design faults with the aircraft ( pitots, autotrim, stall warning parameters useless in a mjaor attitude upset, no A of A display, digital readouts vs analogue readouts worsening performance in emergency environment, unobserved sidestick)
Last edited by Mimpe; 9th Aug 2011 at 02:38.
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takata,
I simply viewed this from the perspective of equivalent models. My perception is driven by my belief that modern airline design is systematically driving the aviator from aviation. I'm sure others will disagree but overall I feel that the overall quality of professional pilots is in serious decline.
I recognize that profound differences exist between the private (student, sport, recreation, PPL) and professional ratings (commercial up). However the world can be easily divided into two categories...those who have soloed and those who haven't. Overall safety specific to this are constant. There are very few accidents specific to student pilots....in fact I believe we have more accidents involving low time PPL holders who prematurely graduate to complex singles or fly in conditions for which they are not fully qualified (or both).
The harsh reality at the commercial level is that the continuing development of automated systems is financially driven. When you contemplate that the average pilot now spends more then 85% (closer to 95% in many cases) observing and often has only 300 hrs of total time prior to type rating on a commercial airliner a pilot with 3,000 total hours may have less then 200 hours of actual lifetime flying experience when you factor on the amount of automated flying involved in the initial 300 hours. The PF had roughly 2,900 hours total and much less in an A330. I bet he had less then 10 hours of actual hand flying experience in the A330 in the year prior to the accident.
I simply viewed this from the perspective of equivalent models. My perception is driven by my belief that modern airline design is systematically driving the aviator from aviation. I'm sure others will disagree but overall I feel that the overall quality of professional pilots is in serious decline.
I recognize that profound differences exist between the private (student, sport, recreation, PPL) and professional ratings (commercial up). However the world can be easily divided into two categories...those who have soloed and those who haven't. Overall safety specific to this are constant. There are very few accidents specific to student pilots....in fact I believe we have more accidents involving low time PPL holders who prematurely graduate to complex singles or fly in conditions for which they are not fully qualified (or both).
The harsh reality at the commercial level is that the continuing development of automated systems is financially driven. When you contemplate that the average pilot now spends more then 85% (closer to 95% in many cases) observing and often has only 300 hrs of total time prior to type rating on a commercial airliner a pilot with 3,000 total hours may have less then 200 hours of actual lifetime flying experience when you factor on the amount of automated flying involved in the initial 300 hours. The PF had roughly 2,900 hours total and much less in an A330. I bet he had less then 10 hours of actual hand flying experience in the A330 in the year prior to the accident.
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Hi,
JJFCC
Thank you 
You nail it very well (incompetency)
Some may ask how this pilot (PF) obtained his license and if any test flights (and in what conditions) has been performed for verify if he was able to replace and take duties of a captain ...
That's all for the human side
Now we can concentrate on other matters .. if any
JJFCC
It is not A vs B but PF vs PNF
You nail it very well (incompetency)
Some may ask how this pilot (PF) obtained his license and if any test flights (and in what conditions) has been performed for verify if he was able to replace and take duties of a captain ...
That's all for the human side
Now we can concentrate on other matters .. if any
Last edited by jcjeant; 8th Aug 2011 at 00:02.
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Code:
It is not A vs B but PF vs PNF Thank you You nail it very well (incompetency) Some may ask how this pilot (PF) obtained his license and if any test flights (and in what conditions) has been performed for verify if he was able to replace and take duties of a captain ... That's all for the human side Now we can concentrate on other matters .. if any
The PNF should have taken over when the RS pilot panicked and pulled up but didn't. When I was flying 8 years ago this would have never happened. We could all hand fly at any altitude it didn't matter if the FO or Captain flew.
Now we train systems managers to fly a computer so things are a lot different. I loved the way it was when pilots could physically fly the airplane. My airline still has only old school capable pilots not needing a keyboard to fly. 90% of my flying is with a competent crew with us.
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It is not A vs B but PF vs PNF
Thank you
You nail it very well (incompetency)
Some may ask how this pilot (PF) obtained his license and if any test flights (and in what conditions) has been performed for verify if he was able to replace and take duties of a captain ...
That's all for the human side
Now we can concentrate on other matters .. if any
Thank you
You nail it very well (incompetency)
Some may ask how this pilot (PF) obtained his license and if any test flights (and in what conditions) has been performed for verify if he was able to replace and take duties of a captain ...
That's all for the human side
Now we can concentrate on other matters .. if any
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The chronology below clearly shows that the crash has nothing to do with the pitots tubes, nor the stall warning, nor the sidestick
People keep talking about pilot error as if that's the conclusion of the matter. Pilot error is just the beginning. Every single major advance in flight safety over the last hundred years has happened because "pilot error" was not an acceptable answer. The fact that the pilots in AF447 screwed up is as obvious as it is irrelevant. The pilot is just one cog in the system. If the system cannot compensate for errors in the system then it isn't a robust system.
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If the system cannot compensate for errors in the system then it isn't a robust system.
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If the technology can't correct for pilot error then it's rubbish technology.
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once upon a time there were aircraft flown by gentlemen and heroes. They were heroes cos the aircraft always got into some sort of a fix and technology was unreliable. Too many accidents though.
Slowly but surely the technology improved but accidents were still there. In fact the highest accident rate was CFIT. So this was worked on and accidents did reduce. However accidents still remained.
Then it was discovered that those gentlemen and heroes were in fact just normal human beings who made normal human being type mistakes. So engineers went about designing out those human mistakes.
This resulted in FBW and computers replacing the flight engineer. It was a brilliant move. Accidents have reached an all time low because the technology allows for pilot mistakes to remain undetected by correcting them. Pilots still think they are in control yet the bulk of the work is accomplished inside those black boxes.
Its true that very occasionally the pilot/black box interface gets it wrong and there is a smoking hole. Fortunately this is extremely rare.
There will always be the 1 in a google case where the pilot should have had full control but implementation of this is now widely accepted as ridiculous not least because pilot full control would significantly increase the day to day accident rate.
Unfortunately too many pilots have been way behind on this working reality and it shows here on pprune. It is not intended to be rude or dismissive but pilots you were part of the accident statistic problem and this has been improved upon by automation.
I believe it is in the pilots best interests to work with and embrace the very technology that works silently in the background protecting them. AF447 is yet another unfortunate reminder that the human brain is an extremely complex and unpredictable organ and doesn't always do as we would wish or expect.
Accident statistics prove that the technology is robust. Robust but not perfect. Technology is flawed just as humans are flawed. The statistics however highlight that if we wish to eliminate accidents, then there is only one path to follow, the technology path.
Slowly but surely the technology improved but accidents were still there. In fact the highest accident rate was CFIT. So this was worked on and accidents did reduce. However accidents still remained.
Then it was discovered that those gentlemen and heroes were in fact just normal human beings who made normal human being type mistakes. So engineers went about designing out those human mistakes.
This resulted in FBW and computers replacing the flight engineer. It was a brilliant move. Accidents have reached an all time low because the technology allows for pilot mistakes to remain undetected by correcting them. Pilots still think they are in control yet the bulk of the work is accomplished inside those black boxes.
Its true that very occasionally the pilot/black box interface gets it wrong and there is a smoking hole. Fortunately this is extremely rare.
There will always be the 1 in a google case where the pilot should have had full control but implementation of this is now widely accepted as ridiculous not least because pilot full control would significantly increase the day to day accident rate.
Unfortunately too many pilots have been way behind on this working reality and it shows here on pprune. It is not intended to be rude or dismissive but pilots you were part of the accident statistic problem and this has been improved upon by automation.
I believe it is in the pilots best interests to work with and embrace the very technology that works silently in the background protecting them. AF447 is yet another unfortunate reminder that the human brain is an extremely complex and unpredictable organ and doesn't always do as we would wish or expect.
Accident statistics prove that the technology is robust. Robust but not perfect. Technology is flawed just as humans are flawed. The statistics however highlight that if we wish to eliminate accidents, then there is only one path to follow, the technology path.
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All aircraft are developed and certified so as to ensure that their control is easy and well-behaved throughout their operating envelope. Testing to ensure these good handling characteristics assumes that pilots are utilizing typical piloting techniques during routine line operations.
The advancement of technology in today’s modern airplanes has brought us flight directors, autopilots, autothrottles, and flight management systems. All of these devices are designed to reduce the flight crew workload. When used properly, this technology has made significant contributions to flight safety. But technology can include complexity and lead to trust and eventual complacency.
The systems can sometimes do things that the flight crew did not intend for them to do. Industry experts and regulators continue to work together to find the optimal blend of hardware, software, and pilot training to ensure the highest possible level of system performance
Aircraft are designed, tested, and certified based on accepted assumptions of how pilots will operate them, together with various environmental and technical constraints (e.g., gusts, engine failure dynamics). These assumptions drive the regulatory certification requirements and are validated through in-service experience. The certification flight test process examines the entire flight envelope of the aircraft, including that area beyond which the airline pilot normally operates. Examples would be a fully stalled aircraft or airspeed exceeding Vmo. The process even explores how the aircraft could possibly be inappropriately operated; however, the testing assumes fundamental flying skills are known and understood. A primary assumption regarding pilot inputs is that they are based on control inputs that are measured (the result of experience), analyzed, then fine-tuned to achieve a desired result. Exaggerated rates and amounts of control deflection (overcontrolling) may cause an accelerating divergence of flight path control until the input is countered.
Pilots are expected to make control inputs based on desired aircraft reaction. Control deflections at one point in the flight envelope might not be appropriate in another part of the flight envelope. Pilots must have a fundamental understanding of flight dynamics in order to correctly make these choices. They should not make mechanical control deflections and rote reactions to dynamic situations that require an understanding of these flight fundamentals.
The advancement of technology in today’s modern airplanes has brought us flight directors, autopilots, autothrottles, and flight management systems. All of these devices are designed to reduce the flight crew workload. When used properly, this technology has made significant contributions to flight safety. But technology can include complexity and lead to trust and eventual complacency.
The systems can sometimes do things that the flight crew did not intend for them to do. Industry experts and regulators continue to work together to find the optimal blend of hardware, software, and pilot training to ensure the highest possible level of system performance
Aircraft are designed, tested, and certified based on accepted assumptions of how pilots will operate them, together with various environmental and technical constraints (e.g., gusts, engine failure dynamics). These assumptions drive the regulatory certification requirements and are validated through in-service experience. The certification flight test process examines the entire flight envelope of the aircraft, including that area beyond which the airline pilot normally operates. Examples would be a fully stalled aircraft or airspeed exceeding Vmo. The process even explores how the aircraft could possibly be inappropriately operated; however, the testing assumes fundamental flying skills are known and understood. A primary assumption regarding pilot inputs is that they are based on control inputs that are measured (the result of experience), analyzed, then fine-tuned to achieve a desired result. Exaggerated rates and amounts of control deflection (overcontrolling) may cause an accelerating divergence of flight path control until the input is countered.
Pilots are expected to make control inputs based on desired aircraft reaction. Control deflections at one point in the flight envelope might not be appropriate in another part of the flight envelope. Pilots must have a fundamental understanding of flight dynamics in order to correctly make these choices. They should not make mechanical control deflections and rote reactions to dynamic situations that require an understanding of these flight fundamentals.
Last edited by Owain Glyndwr; 8th Aug 2011 at 08:54.
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The missing clue in all this may be what the flight directors were demanding.
There are just two seconds between the autopilot disconnect and the F/Ds becoming unavailable but during that time the change in measured pressure saw an indicated loss of altitude - 300 feet. The F/D bar may well have shown a fly up indication before it disappeared completely and the PF may have "blindly" followed it.
Later the F/D is restored in HDG/ALT* modes and HDG/VS modes which may have briefly confirmed to both pilots that their actions were correct.
It was only later that the PNF saw that the aircraft was climbing.
Also very telling is the autothrust disconnect, the realisation that climb thrust has been inadvertantly applied and then the subsequent reduction in thrust.
The PF didn't want to climb otherwise he would have remained in climb thrust.
By then he is really confused and doesn't really know what pitch attitude to set without F/D guidance.
There are just two seconds between the autopilot disconnect and the F/Ds becoming unavailable but during that time the change in measured pressure saw an indicated loss of altitude - 300 feet. The F/D bar may well have shown a fly up indication before it disappeared completely and the PF may have "blindly" followed it.
Later the F/D is restored in HDG/ALT* modes and HDG/VS modes which may have briefly confirmed to both pilots that their actions were correct.
It was only later that the PNF saw that the aircraft was climbing.
Also very telling is the autothrust disconnect, the realisation that climb thrust has been inadvertantly applied and then the subsequent reduction in thrust.
The PF didn't want to climb otherwise he would have remained in climb thrust.
By then he is really confused and doesn't really know what pitch attitude to set without F/D guidance.
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Mountain Bear wrote:
While I agree with the general sentiment of your post and that pilot error is just the beginning, you are, in this case, going too far.
Yes: the system should compensate for errors from the pilot but you can't blame the engineers for thinking that a pilot who made it to the right seat of a heavy had mastered stall recovery about 5 hours into his basic flight training.
This isn't a "pilot error" accident. Maintaining nose-up for four minutes in a stall from 37000' is not an ERROR!
If the technology can't correct for pilot error then it's rubbish technology. That's what FBW is all about. What part of the word "protection" in "flight envelope protections" doesn't you understand. The software is to protect the pilot from screwing up. It didn't. It failed.
People keep talking about pilot error as if that's the conclusion of the matter. Pilot error is just the beginning. Every single major advance in flight safety over the last hundred years has happened because "pilot error" was not an acceptable answer. The fact that the pilots in AF447 screwed up is as obvious as it is irrelevant. The pilot is just one cog in the system. If the system cannot compensate for errors in the system then it isn't a robust system.
People keep talking about pilot error as if that's the conclusion of the matter. Pilot error is just the beginning. Every single major advance in flight safety over the last hundred years has happened because "pilot error" was not an acceptable answer. The fact that the pilots in AF447 screwed up is as obvious as it is irrelevant. The pilot is just one cog in the system. If the system cannot compensate for errors in the system then it isn't a robust system.
Yes: the system should compensate for errors from the pilot but you can't blame the engineers for thinking that a pilot who made it to the right seat of a heavy had mastered stall recovery about 5 hours into his basic flight training.
This isn't a "pilot error" accident. Maintaining nose-up for four minutes in a stall from 37000' is not an ERROR!
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The statistics however highlight that if we wish to eliminate accidents, then there is only one path to follow, the technology path
How many times have we heard that "only one path" thesis in history?
It always lead to disaster.
" The statistics however highlight that if we wish to eliminate accidents, then there is only one path to follow, the technology path "
Depends on how you read it 
I agree with its message but interpreted it as;
reduce accidents (we can't seem to elimnate anything to zero)
and
There is far more room in technology improvements per year than reducing human error per year.
and
Since a human is likely to still be involved for the direction that they provide to using the technology, we still have to keep them in the loop or they will cancel out the technology improvements.
We should strive to make human error less critical.
This line could have been a direct quote out of "Brave New World".
How many times have we heard that "only one path" thesis in history?
It always lead to disaster.
How many times have we heard that "only one path" thesis in history?
It always lead to disaster.
I agree with its message but interpreted it as;
reduce accidents (we can't seem to elimnate anything to zero)
and
There is far more room in technology improvements per year than reducing human error per year.
and
Since a human is likely to still be involved for the direction that they provide to using the technology, we still have to keep them in the loop or they will cancel out the technology improvements.
We should strive to make human error less critical.
Join Date: Jun 2010
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It is actually really sad to see so much ab apologists. Ab philosophy is clearly that of reducing costs, pilots costs included, and if that has so much flaws seems it doesnt matter, there are still a lot of short sighted people believing everything the bea says and shouting pilot error anytime they can