AF447 wreckage found
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Most of the time you're at cruise - i.e. at an altitude where this becomes noticeable - in an A320 which exhibits this quirk (or indeed any other modern airliner for that matter) will be spent under FMC (autopilot) control with altitude hold engaged anyway, so it rarely comes up.
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Hi,
I think the answers to your questions are in the BEA N°3 report ...
The PF made a announcement to the cabin personnal about turbulences to come
The PF was not belted on his seat (nothing .. completely free)
Are this a normal or professional behavior of a responsible pilot ?
My answer is no
What you can expect from such seriousness pilot in case of an emergency situation ?
The AF447 tragedy
The central question is : Why on earth did they get themselves into this and how ?
BEA has pretty much nailed it : the least experience pilot pitched a whopping 10 deg up without applying power !!! and the most experienced, instead of keeping his eyes on attitude and whatever was left, chose to turn his gaze elsewhere to call the captain to the flight deck.
The failure was never recognized, therefore the adequate checklist never called for.
How could anyone of these 2 ever realize they had stalled when awareness was at its rock bottom from the start ?
BEA has pretty much nailed it : the least experience pilot pitched a whopping 10 deg up without applying power !!! and the most experienced, instead of keeping his eyes on attitude and whatever was left, chose to turn his gaze elsewhere to call the captain to the flight deck.
The failure was never recognized, therefore the adequate checklist never called for.
How could anyone of these 2 ever realize they had stalled when awareness was at its rock bottom from the start ?
The PF made a announcement to the cabin personnal about turbulences to come
The PF was not belted on his seat (nothing .. completely free)
Are this a normal or professional behavior of a responsible pilot ?
My answer is no
What you can expect from such seriousness pilot in case of an emergency situation ?
The AF447 tragedy
Plastic PPRuNer
Apologies, me again.
"There's no indication that any of four horizon references toppled during final minutes of flight."
So why didn't they look at the attitude indicator/s, which would have shown them to be steeply pitched up?
Isn't that a primary flight instrument when you have no external horizon reference?
"There's no indication that any of four horizon references toppled during final minutes of flight."
So why didn't they look at the attitude indicator/s, which would have shown them to be steeply pitched up?
Isn't that a primary flight instrument when you have no external horizon reference?
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Speaking of Laws....
I think a little humor is needed right about now.
1. A flight computer may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.
2. A flight computer must obey any orders given to it by human beings, except where such orders would conflict with the First Law.
3. A flight computer must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law.
1. A flight computer may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.
2. A flight computer must obey any orders given to it by human beings, except where such orders would conflict with the First Law.
3. A flight computer must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law.
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Nice to see somebody else here likes Asimov and has been reading "I Robot".
But no, the Airbus FBW flight control systems are not 'robots' and don't 'think'. They were an evolution of the basic AFCS (automatic flight control systems) that existed well before the A320.
Whether the designers should not have taken more authority away from the pilots (as they did), is an interesting question.
I can't remember the "Three Laws" being pinned up in our design office... maybe they should have been.
But even Asimov's robots were not programmed to deal with every aspect of human stupidity, and neither is the Airbus system (Habsheim comes to mind, again....)
But no, the Airbus FBW flight control systems are not 'robots' and don't 'think'. They were an evolution of the basic AFCS (automatic flight control systems) that existed well before the A320.
Whether the designers should not have taken more authority away from the pilots (as they did), is an interesting question.
I can't remember the "Three Laws" being pinned up in our design office... maybe they should have been.
But even Asimov's robots were not programmed to deal with every aspect of human stupidity, and neither is the Airbus system (Habsheim comes to mind, again....)
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For the record, I am certain no one is inferring that one or more of the 447 drivers were stupid. For if so, it would be a blanket condemnation of Aviation as it exists today. Something's wrong, but I would hope no one is trying to polarize........ Condemnation prior to investigation is truly.....stupid.
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Would any of you B drivers care to comment?
My Boeing aircraft experience ended in the early ninety's. Since then I have flown A310/320's/330 and A340.
Must tell you that I still miss the yoke and the (artificial feeling) feed-back that I used to receive from it, as well as from the Auto-Throttles.
Let me ask you this:
If the PF co-pilot was "feeling" a sluggish yoke, would he ask his crew mates:
"I have the impression that we have a crazy speed, what do you think about that?"
Must tell you that I still miss the yoke and the (artificial feeling) feed-back that I used to receive from it, as well as from the Auto-Throttles.
Let me ask you this:
If the PF co-pilot was "feeling" a sluggish yoke, would he ask his crew mates:
J’ai l’impression qu’on
a une vitesse de fou
non qu’est-ce que vous
en pensez ?
a une vitesse de fou
non qu’est-ce que vous
en pensez ?
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Hi,
This is the reaction of Air France on the report No. 3 of BEA
I remain astounded by the words of the spokesman for Air France
This is a position of denial concerning the recommendations of the BEA
In french of course ........
This is the reaction of Air France on the report No. 3 of BEA
I remain astounded by the words of the spokesman for Air France
This is a position of denial concerning the recommendations of the BEA
In french of course ........
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Rob21
However, the landing is a different matter. For the A330, max crosswind for Autoland is 20 kts. For a manual landing it is 32 gusting 40.
If computers are able to fly a crosswind ILS, with gusts
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I think a little humor is needed right about now.
1. A flight computer may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.
2. A flight computer must obey any orders given to it by human beings, except where such orders would conflict with the First Law.
3. A flight computer must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law.
1. A flight computer may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.
2. A flight computer must obey any orders given to it by human beings, except where such orders would conflict with the First Law.
3. A flight computer must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law.
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I had already asked you this earlier, but now that we have a much more detailed record of 447s final minutes maybe you're ready to answer - at which point didn't "the software" give them what they asked for?
The question you ask is disingenuous. The complaint is not that the software didn't do what it was supposed to do but that what the software was doing was not communicated to the crew in an intelligible way.
It's simple.
(a) When the airplane is within the flight envelope the stall warning provides an aural communication to the pilots: SILENCE.
(b) when the software decides the airplane is outside established parameters it provide an aural communication to the pilots: STALL STALL STALL
(c) when the software decides that the airplane has so drastically exceeded established parameters that the data should be considered invalid it provides an aural communication to the pilots: SILENCE.
Now, if you think that the pilots were confused and failed to recognize the stall for what it was then you have to ask yourself how the above represents good software design. Because it does not. It's horrible software design. It's horrible software design for the software to communicate the exact same aural message (and silence is an aural message) to the pilots both when things are 100% good and when things have gone totally to hell.
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I believe the whole discussion about the stall warning inhibited below 60 kts is a red herring. The stall warning on AF447 sounded continuously for 54 seconds without any indication that the crew acted on it. In my opinion it would have made no difference if it had sounded 30 seconds longer.
Once the aircraft was falling down with an airspeed less than 60 kts they probably had no way to unstall the plane anyway, they were miles away from any reasonable flight envelope for a commercial airliner, even miles away from test pilot territory. Terra incognita.
(As far as I know the stall warning is inhibited because the AoA vanes do not work below 60 kts. You cannot sound a stall warning when you have no working sensor to detect a stall.)
Once the aircraft was falling down with an airspeed less than 60 kts they probably had no way to unstall the plane anyway, they were miles away from any reasonable flight envelope for a commercial airliner, even miles away from test pilot territory. Terra incognita.
(As far as I know the stall warning is inhibited because the AoA vanes do not work below 60 kts. You cannot sound a stall warning when you have no working sensor to detect a stall.)
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This WRG issue was associated with an avionics bus communication between two computers.
The voltages on such a bus are in the order of about 10V, and the electronics are incapable of producing an electric arc (short-circuit currents inthe order of milli-amps)
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keep in mind AF has their own checklists, own language (french) and all book are in french.
which is not in the Airbus philosophy.
example: the cockpit is in english, ECAM, FMGS are in english, and at airfrance they think , talk, and eat in french.
"vitesse de fou!!", did he mean high speed or low speed?instaed of "woow, we are fast", or "damn, why are we so slow?"
pure mistake from the begining for one of the best airline.
they should review their pilot training, it seems to me they have a bunch of incompetents pilot who think a stall is a "crazy speed".
any aeroclub pilot, know what to do when they have the little red warning light flashing...plus on the 330, it s printed 'STALL' on the PFD.
golden rule:
1:nose down
2:full power, or TOGA
if you can not get out of stall, there is nothing you can do!
only idiot keep nose up during a stall, flat stall, deep stall, whatever you call....by chance they won't kill more people!
wait for the next crash done by a low trained LCC P2F pilot... we will have a good laugh when one these planes will crash on a school or hospital in the middle of LONDON killing thousands..
which is not in the Airbus philosophy.
example: the cockpit is in english, ECAM, FMGS are in english, and at airfrance they think , talk, and eat in french.
"vitesse de fou!!", did he mean high speed or low speed?instaed of "woow, we are fast", or "damn, why are we so slow?"
pure mistake from the begining for one of the best airline.
they should review their pilot training, it seems to me they have a bunch of incompetents pilot who think a stall is a "crazy speed".
any aeroclub pilot, know what to do when they have the little red warning light flashing...plus on the 330, it s printed 'STALL' on the PFD.
golden rule:
1:nose down
2:full power, or TOGA
if you can not get out of stall, there is nothing you can do!
only idiot keep nose up during a stall, flat stall, deep stall, whatever you call....by chance they won't kill more people!
wait for the next crash done by a low trained LCC P2F pilot... we will have a good laugh when one these planes will crash on a school or hospital in the middle of LONDON killing thousands..
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MountainBear, Jando:
I think you both have good points. I've questioned the stall warning logic before.
Irrespective of whether or not it would have made any difference to the outcome of this accident, it seems bad and wrong to me.
I don't think anyone could reasonably have foreseen that it might be necessary or helpful to warn the crew of a civil aircraft that they were so far outside the envelope the AOA sensors were no longer giving useful data.
Until this accident.
MountainBear, with the benefit of hindsight the aural progression should perhaps be SILENCE -> STALL STALL STALL -> FLY THE F**KING AIRCRAFT
It's not something that was considered before, but if you're below 60kts and in the air, those computers should be screaming at you, under (Asimov) Laws 1, 2, and 3.
I think you both have good points. I've questioned the stall warning logic before.
Irrespective of whether or not it would have made any difference to the outcome of this accident, it seems bad and wrong to me.
I don't think anyone could reasonably have foreseen that it might be necessary or helpful to warn the crew of a civil aircraft that they were so far outside the envelope the AOA sensors were no longer giving useful data.
Until this accident.
MountainBear, with the benefit of hindsight the aural progression should perhaps be SILENCE -> STALL STALL STALL -> FLY THE F**KING AIRCRAFT
It's not something that was considered before, but if you're below 60kts and in the air, those computers should be screaming at you, under (Asimov) Laws 1, 2, and 3.