I had already asked you this earlier, but now that we have a much more detailed record of 447s final minutes maybe you're ready to answer - at which point didn't "the software" give them what they asked for?
Although this question wasn't addressed to me I'm going to answer it.
The question you ask is disingenuous. The complaint is not that the software didn't do what it was supposed to do but that what the software was doing was not communicated to the crew in an intelligible way.
It's simple.
(a) When the airplane is within the flight envelope the stall warning provides an aural communication to the pilots: SILENCE.
(b) when the software decides the airplane is outside established parameters it provide an aural communication to the pilots: STALL STALL STALL
(c) when the software decides that the airplane has so drastically exceeded established parameters that the data should be considered invalid it provides an aural communication to the pilots: SILENCE.
Now, if you think that the pilots were confused and failed to recognize the stall for what it was then you have to ask yourself how the above represents good software design. Because it does not. It's horrible software design. It's horrible software design for the software to communicate the exact same aural message (and silence is an aural message) to the pilots both when things are 100% good and when things have gone totally to hell.