QANTAS A380 Uncontained failure.
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Was a bit on "idle" for a while. Now I have a problem to cope with all the scientific and engineering entries. But what now I have clearly in mind is, all that is necessary to make a new engine running as planned and predicted and sold to a customer is at place, ready to be adopted and used. Or not ??
Like to quote DERG first.
quote:
Whatever was the cause there was a HELL of a breakdown in communications and respect between the different parts of RR. and Airbus. They spent 15 months flight testing alone.
Very correct !! But what makes you believe they also tested engine vibration in flight ??? What would you say if that wasnīt done probably since the very early RB 211īs or the Trent 500īs ?? What if there already some results came to be known and set aside because they didnīt "fit" the economical targets ? Probably also the pride of some desighners or engineers ??
I know, these are very hypothetical remarks and questions. But imagine if my blind shots turn out to be point hits !!
If that would be true, no silly oil stubb problem or bearing chamber vent or support structure enforcement would help. It ends in something that we might see in about 15 - 18 month, if everyone works as expected.
Like to quote DERG first.
quote:
Whatever was the cause there was a HELL of a breakdown in communications and respect between the different parts of RR. and Airbus. They spent 15 months flight testing alone.
Very correct !! But what makes you believe they also tested engine vibration in flight ??? What would you say if that wasnīt done probably since the very early RB 211īs or the Trent 500īs ?? What if there already some results came to be known and set aside because they didnīt "fit" the economical targets ? Probably also the pride of some desighners or engineers ??
I know, these are very hypothetical remarks and questions. But imagine if my blind shots turn out to be point hits !!
If that would be true, no silly oil stubb problem or bearing chamber vent or support structure enforcement would help. It ends in something that we might see in about 15 - 18 month, if everyone works as expected.
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Perhaps if the hyperbole, conjecture, accusations and outright drama could be toned down or even dispensed with, this might become an interesting thread. As it is there's a whiff of Jerry Springer about it.
That certain participants set out from a conclusion rather than attempting to arrive at one, doesn't do much for quality either.
That certain participants set out from a conclusion rather than attempting to arrive at one, doesn't do much for quality either.
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computer modelling
There is always the possibility of modelling a complete engine, but in my experience in another field total modelling is not always helpful and indeed can be misleading. I found computer models to be very helpful when applied in smaller ways that permitted understanding of the results, in the same way that simple maths provides a better understanding than a complete math model. The models are always to some extent idealised and I doubt whether vibrations could be effectively modelled because there are so many random elements to include. And random is difficult for computers because they suppose that random is actually random whereas in reality it is not, a Monte Carlo type programme is drastically over-pessimistic when compared with other engineering techniques such as rss, which allows for the statistical improbability of everything being on the very worst limit in any one product.
With apologies for uk english spelling.
With apologies for uk english spelling.
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DERG wrote under the header First Failure as follows, today at 12:38:
This is a 15-page document. Four pages in at paragraph 2.3.c there seems to me to be a failure to comply, in the matter of the spline damages. The AD's concerning this problem seem to identify it as having the potential to cause uncontained failure of major components of the turbine engine. The AD's further prescribe a program of extensive and frequent inspections, which at one time were down to every second cycle. What is the margin of safety in an every second cycle inspection program? Or for that matter, in an every 20-cycle inspection program-- is this the current revised inspection frequency possible under that program? (I'm having a little trouble keeping up, the changes come so fast.)
In any case, this handling of this spline problem appears to be either an "Engine design or operating restriction(s) that allow(s) and manage(s) accumulation of high-cycle fatigue damage for [a] component, [which is] not acceptable if the failure of that component would cause a hazardous engine effect. ..."
This would appear to preclude the operation of the Quantas 380's as now configured into LAX. I note that Qantas' appears to have no intent of doing so.
Have I missed something?
OE
The accident T972 did not comply with this for starters
http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Gu.../AC33.63_1.pdf
http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Gu.../AC33.63_1.pdf
In any case, this handling of this spline problem appears to be either an "Engine design or operating restriction(s) that allow(s) and manage(s) accumulation of high-cycle fatigue damage for [a] component, [which is] not acceptable if the failure of that component would cause a hazardous engine effect. ..."
This would appear to preclude the operation of the Quantas 380's as now configured into LAX. I note that Qantas' appears to have no intent of doing so.
Have I missed something?
OE
Last edited by Old Engineer; 29th Jan 2011 at 21:57. Reason: Missed the correct spelling of Qantas.
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OE,
As I understand it, Qantas cannot fully utilise the A380 out of LAX as it did before the failure. RR is only allowing a derated engine at the present.
Mike
As I understand it, Qantas cannot fully utilise the A380 out of LAX as it did before the failure. RR is only allowing a derated engine at the present.
Mike
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"Very correct !! But what makes you believe they also tested engine vibration in flight ??? What would you say if that wasnīt done probably since the very early RB 211īs or the Trent 500īs ?? What if there already some results came to be known and set aside because they didnīt "fit" the economical targets ? Probably also the pride of some desighners or engineers ??"
Oh I think they tested vibration OK during the 15 months. But I bet the test engines were EAs or 970s not 972s. Humanity is far from perfect I agree.
"This would appear to preclude the operation of the Quantas 380's as now configured into LAX. I note that Qantas' appears to have no intent of doing so."
Qantas depended on getting an A388 that was fit for the purpose. They have to operate the A388. The B74 fleet is being over worked as it is trying to fill the gap. Qantas is not the culprit.
"Perhaps if the hyperbole, conjecture, accusations and outright drama could be toned down or even dispensed with, this might become an interesting thread. As it is there's a whiff of Jerry Springer about it."
You hit the nail on the head. Confrontation with the truth and dealing with issue. Nothing more dramatic than a plane with 469 people on it circling around while the pilots try and work out why the engine exploded.
This thread seems interesting enough for the many visitors who come here. Rolls Royce were incompetent in so many ways way above the level of Jerry Springer, a documentary media program more akin to the Discovey Channel would be appropriate.
Ther is always Al Jahzeera, they did a good job digging out the B737 build fiasco.
Oh I think they tested vibration OK during the 15 months. But I bet the test engines were EAs or 970s not 972s. Humanity is far from perfect I agree.
"This would appear to preclude the operation of the Quantas 380's as now configured into LAX. I note that Qantas' appears to have no intent of doing so."
Qantas depended on getting an A388 that was fit for the purpose. They have to operate the A388. The B74 fleet is being over worked as it is trying to fill the gap. Qantas is not the culprit.
"Perhaps if the hyperbole, conjecture, accusations and outright drama could be toned down or even dispensed with, this might become an interesting thread. As it is there's a whiff of Jerry Springer about it."
You hit the nail on the head. Confrontation with the truth and dealing with issue. Nothing more dramatic than a plane with 469 people on it circling around while the pilots try and work out why the engine exploded.
This thread seems interesting enough for the many visitors who come here. Rolls Royce were incompetent in so many ways way above the level of Jerry Springer, a documentary media program more akin to the Discovey Channel would be appropriate.
Ther is always Al Jahzeera, they did a good job digging out the B737 build fiasco.
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Old Engineer
Good to have you back! It has been awhile since your last post, must be the winter weather...
I thought it would be interesting to post the certification requirements as presented in the US FAA regulations. You have noted a particular item that stands out and DERG did the same. I am sure there are more that seem applicable. As I see it, the OEM (original engine manufacturer) meets with the government regulator and submits a process for certifying a subject engine. During that meeting or subsequent meetings, it is decided exactly what the requirements will be for certification. Is it a totally new engine? If so, it requires all of the steps outlined for approval. Is it a derivative engine or growth engine from an existing family? Well, maybe this will be required but this will be waived based on history. And then the certification process begins and proceeds to engine type certification. Keep in mind that even if you go through a flight demonstration program on a different aircraft and a 150 hour endurance demonstration in a test cell, not all the potential problems may have surfaced or have been wrung out. So then, the engine receives its type certification, deemed to be flight worthy, and is ready for the real application, lets say on the A-380 aircraft.
The aircraft certification program is focused on the aircraft, although the same regulatory agency is in charge, just a different set of people and expertise are highly involved. So then, if during this aircraft certification program there are engine abnormalities along the way, how are they handled? What if there are, during the course of flight testing (1-2 yrs.), an abnormal number of engines removed off wing for various unnamed problems, beyond planned engine removals? Assume a significant number. Where do responsibilities rest, with the OEM, with Airbus, with the governmental regulatory agency? How was it handled? In my mind, this is where the breakdown occurred on the 900 and A-380. It wasn't during the original engine certification process, except for possible should have done but didn't possibilities. There was a lot of pressure by the producers to deliver the goods to the customers as the program was significantly behind schedule, viability of businesses rode on a favorable outcome of the flight test and aircraft certification program, so how were technical problems with the engines handled by the regulatory agency during the aircraft certification phase? I will let this up to the individual's imagination, I have mine.
Turbine D
Good to have you back! It has been awhile since your last post, must be the winter weather...
I thought it would be interesting to post the certification requirements as presented in the US FAA regulations. You have noted a particular item that stands out and DERG did the same. I am sure there are more that seem applicable. As I see it, the OEM (original engine manufacturer) meets with the government regulator and submits a process for certifying a subject engine. During that meeting or subsequent meetings, it is decided exactly what the requirements will be for certification. Is it a totally new engine? If so, it requires all of the steps outlined for approval. Is it a derivative engine or growth engine from an existing family? Well, maybe this will be required but this will be waived based on history. And then the certification process begins and proceeds to engine type certification. Keep in mind that even if you go through a flight demonstration program on a different aircraft and a 150 hour endurance demonstration in a test cell, not all the potential problems may have surfaced or have been wrung out. So then, the engine receives its type certification, deemed to be flight worthy, and is ready for the real application, lets say on the A-380 aircraft.
The aircraft certification program is focused on the aircraft, although the same regulatory agency is in charge, just a different set of people and expertise are highly involved. So then, if during this aircraft certification program there are engine abnormalities along the way, how are they handled? What if there are, during the course of flight testing (1-2 yrs.), an abnormal number of engines removed off wing for various unnamed problems, beyond planned engine removals? Assume a significant number. Where do responsibilities rest, with the OEM, with Airbus, with the governmental regulatory agency? How was it handled? In my mind, this is where the breakdown occurred on the 900 and A-380. It wasn't during the original engine certification process, except for possible should have done but didn't possibilities. There was a lot of pressure by the producers to deliver the goods to the customers as the program was significantly behind schedule, viability of businesses rode on a favorable outcome of the flight test and aircraft certification program, so how were technical problems with the engines handled by the regulatory agency during the aircraft certification phase? I will let this up to the individual's imagination, I have mine.
Turbine D
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The Key Document Faa A.c. 33.63-1
http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Gu.../AC33.63_1.pdf
OLD ENGINEER
Much appreciate your help here. The link you posted up in #357 did not connect so I reposted it.
The clue to the failure of the T1000 test on Aug 4 2010 is in this document.
U.S. Department of Transportion FAA ADVISORY CIRCULAR of July 25 2007 initiated by ANE-10. Adivisory Circular # 33.63-1
OLD ENGINEER
Much appreciate your help here. The link you posted up in #357 did not connect so I reposted it.
The clue to the failure of the T1000 test on Aug 4 2010 is in this document.
U.S. Department of Transportion FAA ADVISORY CIRCULAR of July 25 2007 initiated by ANE-10. Adivisory Circular # 33.63-1
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DERG, If you wish to selectively quote from
The Key Document Faa A.c. 33.63-1, then perhaps you should also give consideration to paragraph 2b. on the first page. ie.
b. This material is neither mandatory nor regulatory in nature and does not constitute a regulation. It describes acceptable means, but not the only means, for demonstrating compliance with the applicable regulations. We, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), will consider other methods of demonstrating compliance that an applicant may elect to present.
I should think that TCDS NUMBER E00075EN is the FAA's position on the Trent 970/972 engine.
However , if it happens that you are on the FAA board, then please accept my apologies.
The Key Document Faa A.c. 33.63-1, then perhaps you should also give consideration to paragraph 2b. on the first page. ie.
2. Who does this AC apply to?
.....
.....
b. This material is neither mandatory nor regulatory in nature and does not constitute a regulation. It describes acceptable means, but not the only means, for demonstrating compliance with the applicable regulations. We, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), will consider other methods of demonstrating compliance that an applicant may elect to present.
However , if it happens that you are on the FAA board, then please accept my apologies.
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mmciau,30 Jan 2011.
Wrong. The majority of QFA 380's are cleared for Full Power Take-offs out of KLAX or anywhere. This I know, from 1st hand experience.
As I understand it, Qantas cannot fully utilise the A380 out of LAX as it did before the failure. RR is only allowing a derated engine at the present.
Mike
Mike
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TRENT972
Keep reading your referenced selection. 2b is a rough reiteration of the Authority the FAA exerts on compliance issues. It is essentially a "Heads Up" to the applicant.
It is a statement for clarification, and as such leaves purposeful and narrow openings for latitude in following the process. If you know dogs: Not a "Collar", per se, but a "choke chain".
Advisory? Absolutely. Also a SUPERVISORY. The FAA hasn't the equipment or the talent the manufacturer does, so the FAA allows the Company to do all the research and development. Also, of course, the manufacturing of components.
If you know flying: "Pull Up, Terrain".
TRENT Cleared by whom?
Keep reading your referenced selection. 2b is a rough reiteration of the Authority the FAA exerts on compliance issues. It is essentially a "Heads Up" to the applicant.
It is a statement for clarification, and as such leaves purposeful and narrow openings for latitude in following the process. If you know dogs: Not a "Collar", per se, but a "choke chain".
Advisory? Absolutely. Also a SUPERVISORY. The FAA hasn't the equipment or the talent the manufacturer does, so the FAA allows the Company to do all the research and development. Also, of course, the manufacturing of components.
If you know flying: "Pull Up, Terrain".
TRENT Cleared by whom?
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Trent 972
Thanks for that. I am not on the FAA board. I think the engineering is relatively simple when you compare it to the social structures that gate keep the blaming and shaming.
Why are some flights on QFA12 done with B74s?
Why are some flights on QFA12 done with B74s?
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Bearfoil, you will note that the TCDS NUMBER E00075EN predates Faa A.c. 33.63-1
What applicant? Certification was already accepted. That horse had already bolted.
To argue that the development of the engine could comply with an advisory standard (that may have already been completed to an acceptable alternative) after FAA acceptance of the Trent certification, is an unworthy argument.
1.Rolls Royce
2. QANTAS
3. The Aircraft Flight Manual
4. Airbus FCOM
5. Me, as I pushed the Thrust Levers to TOGA on take-off out of LA, recently.
If you know flying "Pull your head in" - but I doubt you will.
It is essentially a "Heads Up" to the applicant.
To argue that the development of the engine could comply with an advisory standard (that may have already been completed to an acceptable alternative) after FAA acceptance of the Trent certification, is an unworthy argument.
TRENT Cleared by whom?
1.Rolls Royce
2. QANTAS
3. The Aircraft Flight Manual
4. Airbus FCOM
5. Me, as I pushed the Thrust Levers to TOGA on take-off out of LA, recently.
If you know flying "Pull your head in" - but I doubt you will.
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DERG, I'm not a scheduler, so I can't answer that question. My best guess is that it takes about 40 hours for a 380 to do a SYD or MEL - LAX return flight and we don't have enough 380's to operate 2 daily by 7 days a week, services to LAX, as yet. (and keep them on the SIN/LHR flights as well)
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Trent972
Much Respect, Captain, F/O. I have to assume then that all the Authorities are satisfied. I don't see any listed as to compliance with The Certificate as regards unlimited operation. AD? Certainly you missed the most important ones, the FAA 337 or waiver? Share with us the Mechanicals?? Loads?? Calcs?? Limits??
Head withdrawn into Carapace.
bear
Much Respect, Captain, F/O. I have to assume then that all the Authorities are satisfied. I don't see any listed as to compliance with The Certificate as regards unlimited operation. AD? Certainly you missed the most important ones, the FAA 337 or waiver? Share with us the Mechanicals?? Loads?? Calcs?? Limits??
Head withdrawn into Carapace.
bear
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Bear, The ol' FAA 337 - wherein one must
Now which A380 sports an American N registration? Bueller, Bueller ....Anyone?
The answer to your last question is commonly known as MOD C (all 4 engines)- no restrictions to use of.
Complete the form as instructed in this AC, excluding item 3, and ensure that items 6 and 7 have been properly executed. Give a copy of the form to the aircraft owner/operator and send a duplicate copy to the FAA Aircraft Registration Branch within 48 hours after the airframe, aircraft engine, propeller, or appliance is installed on an aircraft and approved for return to service.
The answer to your last question is commonly known as MOD C (all 4 engines)- no restrictions to use of.
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Cosy Relationships
Bear...going back to your theory of group think. It seems the FAA and the EASA rubber stamp each others work. The FAA relies on the data produced by RR because it has been approved by the EASA.
As TURBINE D asks
"Where do responsibilities rest, with the OEM, with Airbus, with the governmental regulatory agency? How was it handled? In my mind, this is where the breakdown occurred on the 900 and A-380".
and
"viability of businesses rode on a favorable outcome of the flight test and aircraft certification program"
No business had more to loose than Qantas. The SIA CEO has made noises last week wanting an answer from RR, he is a very patient man in my opinion.
I don't think the ATSB has the resources to nail down if this was a design fault in the T900 series itself but I do expect the ATSB to report, without any regard to the happy relationship the FAA has with EASA or RR or anybody else.
It could well be that RR cannot balance this T900 and the misbored pipe did it us a big favour.
As TURBINE D states:
"so how were technical problems with the engines handled by the regulatory agency during the aircraft certification phase? I will let this up to the individual's imagination, I have mine."
If the failure was due to a faulty oil pipe..then fine.
Shell Management
What oil do you recommend for the 180C mean temps in this T972?
Maybe you have an additive?
As TURBINE D asks
"Where do responsibilities rest, with the OEM, with Airbus, with the governmental regulatory agency? How was it handled? In my mind, this is where the breakdown occurred on the 900 and A-380".
and
"viability of businesses rode on a favorable outcome of the flight test and aircraft certification program"
No business had more to loose than Qantas. The SIA CEO has made noises last week wanting an answer from RR, he is a very patient man in my opinion.
I don't think the ATSB has the resources to nail down if this was a design fault in the T900 series itself but I do expect the ATSB to report, without any regard to the happy relationship the FAA has with EASA or RR or anybody else.
It could well be that RR cannot balance this T900 and the misbored pipe did it us a big favour.
As TURBINE D states:
"so how were technical problems with the engines handled by the regulatory agency during the aircraft certification phase? I will let this up to the individual's imagination, I have mine."
If the failure was due to a faulty oil pipe..then fine.
Shell Management
What oil do you recommend for the 180C mean temps in this T972?
Maybe you have an additive?