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RTO with right seat PF

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RTO with right seat PF

Old 26th May 2010, 17:42
  #21 (permalink)  
 
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Hi FullWings,

Apparently the average pilot only experiences one engine failure every 40 years.
where will all the reasoning and skills miraculously come from?
Probably from simulator training.
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Old 26th May 2010, 17:52
  #22 (permalink)  

Dutch Roller
 
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Our company (737NG) just changed the SOP's for T/O and RTO to Boeing standard (Captains call to reject, F/O only states the failure).

Before the change the F/O could start engines, taxi, reject T/O, land at short runways and C-cat airports.

All these things are now captain only. Besides that we now operate with one navkit that is on the F/O's side wich means they are slowly becoming a cheaper alternative to the electronic flightbag. Not a very good trend if you ask me (and I am in the left seat).

I don't see why with proper guidelines and briefing (!) an F/O shouldn't be allowed to keep his hands on the thrustlevers during T/O.

In my company F/O's are not students but highly trained professionals (always a good line...) that can handle the responsibility. If I had any doubts about someone's capability or the situation at hand then I would just do the T/O myself.

But if the training gurus think the Boeing way is the right way that's fine with me.
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Old 26th May 2010, 19:08
  #23 (permalink)  
 
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...follow the manufactures (Boeing and Airbus) recommendation...
I respect what Boeing and Airbus say about their aeroplanes - after all, they built them. However, and it's a big however, they have little experience of actually operating them in a commercial environment - that's where the knowledge of the airlines comes in.

I have a great deal of sympathy for the manufacturers as they almost have to assume that it's a single pilot operation and write the usage instructions down to that level: "Put can right side up, apply tin opener, put contents onto plate, eat contents, dispose of tin, etc." The constant fear of lawyers when Air Oogadooga's Afghani franchise has yet another prang on a 737NG/A320 with a frozen pilot on the controls and the other one praying.

That's one way to run an airline (works for some) - another is to use all the resources available to you, share the workload in critical situations and develop the skills of those who will be looking after your valuable assets in the future... Takes time, money, hard work and trust.
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Old 27th May 2010, 02:28
  #24 (permalink)  
 
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Fullwings,

That's all well and good in theory, but why would anybody in their right mind entrust an aircraft and it's occupants to a very junior (maybe less than 1000hr) FO when there is a multi-thousand hour captain sitting beside him? There is no amount of initial training that will raise the FO's standard to anywhere near that of the experience of the captain, who would have many many more rejects in the SIM, as well as seen many many more takeoffs, eg birds flying across in front and therefore is in a far better position to decide what to do and to execute the subsequent manoeuvre correctly.

"Sharing the workload" at V1 minus 5 is a furphy. Action must be taken immediately, and that should be done by the captain. V1 is the one time things have to be got right, and as I am responsible for the aircraft, then I want to be the one that makes the decision and do the stop.

What might be a long-term problem is (as a company) treating your first officers as lower forms of life who are incapable of making important decisions or handling the aircraft properly.
Only an egotistical maniac would, as an FO, consider themselves a "lower form of life" when starting out life in the right hand seat; just the sort of person who should not be making go-stop decisions.

When they eventually become a captain, where will all the reasoning and skills miraculously come from? One day not worthy, the next standing in judgement...
All the other training stuff, SIM exposure and exposure to line ops will prepare the FO for the left hand seat. Haven't you ever noticed, over the course of a couple of years, how FOs develop from a green-behind-the-ears novice who stays "close to the centreline" to a skilled, capable, assertive crewmember who is prepared and experienced enough to go to the limits and who would easily slip into the left hand seat?
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Old 28th May 2010, 12:18
  #25 (permalink)  
 
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Hi Cap'n B,

"Sharing the workload" at V1 minus 5 is a furphy. Action must be taken immediately, and that should be done by the captain. V1 is the one time things have to be got right, and as I am responsible for the aircraft, then I want to be the one that makes the decision and do the stop.
I think attitudes towards this subject vary enormously with background, experience and current SOPs. Would an engine failure during the takeoff and climb be dealt with in the same way if the FO was handling? If an engine needs shutting down (something that has to be "got right", especially on a twin) would you involve the FO in this?

It depends on where you're coming from: with appropriate training and assessment, many "critical" tasks can be delegated. I'm sure my company is not alone in having all FOs qualify to P1 standard - and that includes RTOs. As long as everyone knows in advance what their roles and possible actions are, which can be confirmed in briefings, the problem is not as big as it might seem.

I'm not saying that this way of operating is appropriate to every airline, or that it is any more valid than than having the captain do it all - I'm just pointing out that the 2-crew inclusive environment works for us...

Only an egotistical maniac would, as an FO, consider themselves a "lower form of life" when starting out life in the right hand seat; just the sort of person who should not be making go-stop decisions.
It's more about institutionalised restrictions. If the company treats 10,000hr ATPs like 200hr cadets, then there might be future issues. As I keep asking, how do you gain experience of handling and decision making if you're prevented (by rules) from doing this? If, as others say, you can fix that in a couple of sim details during command training, why not do those sessions at the start of your career and function as a more effective crew member from the beginning?

Haven't you ever noticed, over the course of a couple of years, how FOs develop from a green-behind-the-ears novice who stays "close to the centreline" to a skilled, capable, assertive crewmember who is prepared and experienced enough to go to the limits and who would easily slip into the left hand seat?
Yes, but that may be because I work for an airline which encourages full role-reversal for P1 U/S apart from signing the tech. log and a few things like CAT2/3. That doesn't mean the captain or FO is obliged to do all or any of this on a particular sector - just the opportunity is there for the development of skills, which may not happen to the same extent if there are too many restrictions on what you can practice.

I think there's quite a wide range of SOPs, relative to FO involvement, which seem to produce a satisfactory outcome. I don't pretend for one minute that my company has got it more "right" than any other. I would question, however, the edge cases where the FO role is diminished to virtually that of "pilot's assistant".
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Old 28th May 2010, 14:11
  #26 (permalink)  
 
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Hi Fullwings,

If, as others say, you can fix that in a couple of sim details during command training, why not do those sessions at the start of your career and function as a more effective crew member from the beginning?
In that case, why don't you let your FOs do the CatII/III Landings?
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Old 28th May 2010, 14:41
  #27 (permalink)  
 
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In that case, why don't you let your FOs do the CatII/III Landings?
I don't know - it wouldn't take much extra sim time. It's also an SOP for an FO to continue a Cat2/3 approach or landing in the event of an incapacity. Some of our aircraft are missing PVD guidance in the RHS - but that's not an excuse. It's probably historical, like most of these things and will be modified in time.

I am at pains to point out that I don't think my employer is perfect in this regard but they have moved on from: "What does an FO do? Oh yes, moves my CofG quarter of an inch forward." There has been an incredible change for the better since the times of the Atlantic Baron (not that long ago, really).

I'm also not trying to suggest that captains or FOs should be forced into operating outside their experience or comfort zone, just to satisfy some "right" to do everything. The captain is in charge and decides how the operation should proceed, whilst taking input from other crew members - but if he thinks that his opposite number is capable of performing a useful task, then he should be able to delegate that without being stymied by rather narrow rulesets.
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Old 10th Jun 2010, 20:22
  #28 (permalink)  
Fil
 
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Maybe I can expand Fullwings as I think we work for the same.

An FO can call STOP but only for the events which a Captain is also obliged to also call STOP. Although fleet specific, they are typically (but not wholely universally) say:

Airbus

Fire
Engine failure with 2+ parameters at least one internal
ECAM Red Warning

Boeing

Fire
Failure (as above)
Config Warning
Windshear Ahead
Monitor Radar Display

These are events that the Captain MUST call STOP for so the take-off HAS to be rejected. It is only in these circumstances that the FO can call STOP. The discretion to call STOP in any other circumstances remains with the Captain and the FO(s) is/are to bring the failure to his/her attention.

We don't have the full discretion over the decision to reject as I think was being implied by some here (not you FW).
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Old 10th Jun 2010, 21:46
  #29 (permalink)  
 
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Hi FIL,

Sorry to go of topic, however

I noticed you state as one of the conditions to reject above 80 kts the monitor radar display?

As the predictive windshear is a new system on our fleet, there is some confusion on this.

The RTO section says to reject for predictive windshear, however the windshear section states for monitor radar display to maneuver clear of the windshear area while it says for winshear ahead to abort.

There is some confusion as to wheter to reject for a monitor radar display. Is it your companies policy to reject for that caution or is it your companies interpretation of the boeing procedure?

Thanks in advance
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Old 10th Jun 2010, 22:30
  #30 (permalink)  
Fil
 
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flyburg

I noticed you state as one of the conditions to reject above 80 kts the monitor radar display?

As the predictive windshear is a new system on our fleet, there is some confusion on this....

.. Is it your companies policy to reject for that caution or is it your companies interpretation of the boeing procedure?
.
To be honest I was trying to generalise into typically when an FO can call STOP, essentially only those items that the Captain must do too, so I tried to stay away from above/below 80kts etc.

On the 777 Monitor Radar Display is inhibited from 80kts-400radio and Windshear Ahead from 100kts-50radio. So to try to specifically answer your question, YES we would abort for a MRD caution, however it would be a low speed rejection. Above 80kts then NO....unless the Captain decides the weather ahead is too bad to continue and calls STOP.

As to whether it is my companies interpretation of/or Boeings SOP I don't know.
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Old 10th Jun 2010, 22:49
  #31 (permalink)  
 
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Ok, thanks for the response.

On the 737 there is no inhibit, so the story continues..
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Old 10th Jun 2010, 23:55
  #32 (permalink)  
 
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Exclamation RTO call...

Hi everyone...
My company is fairly young, "only" a little over 10 years in age, but we never had a discussion about RTO's and FO's. We don't even allow FO's to Taxi...

In both Wide body and Narrow body fleets that we operate it is the same policy, the only person to make the decision is the Left Seat Captain. When two Capts fly together, the Operations Manager through the Dispatcher/ Crew Scheduler decides who is in command, normally by seniority, not by age or flight experience. The other Captain may not be Pilot Handling/Flying from the right seat.

Due to expansion the last few months we have hired so many new pilots, and the standard is shot. We have everything ranging from Astronauts to Bush Pilots, Captains who have 200hrs in command and FO's with 18000 hours total time, with ICAO English Levels going from Level 6 down to Level 2. I just upgraded to the Left Seat after flying almost 8 and a half years as an FO and I need to tell some of you that there are some moments were I would not even give the FO the Microphone if I did not have to, it gets THAT bad... Most companies, especially contract firms, have very little or almost no more psychological screenings, recommendations are not required anymore to enter my company either. It is very difficult to see what FO will be able to perform correctly in a situation like and RTO and who will not, so I, as much I hate to admit, I support the policy in my company that it is the Captain only who makes the decision to reject or to go even if the Person on the right seat has a lot more Flight or Command time than I might have.

We follow the following Procedure: On Ground, Left Seat is Pilot Handling, ALWAYS! On Take off, if it is the FO's Leg, he gains controls AFTER the thrust is set by the Captain and after the call "you have control", NOT earlier. Max. Performance, Low visibility and Max. Weight Take-offs are Captain ONLY. On Landing the FO relinquishes controls by reaching 60 Knots and WILL NOT stow Reverse thrust to more than Reverse Idle.

Local laws almost always dictate that the Captain is ultimately responsible for what goes on on board of the aircraft and he/she will be going to jail for it...

It's a pity how SwissAir thought that the FO doesn't take off, because tomorrow he/she is Captain and the ADM that is developed over years of practice is what makes good Captain in the future who will make good decisions when bad times come...
Anyways, happy Landings everyone...
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Old 11th Jun 2010, 00:41
  #33 (permalink)  
 
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@flyburg: not entirely true. Again it might be option dependent, but at least the version of an FCOM (we use a company tailored boeing provided one) i have available (effective date april 27 2010) states regarding the predictive windshear system:

Predictive Windshear Inhibits

During takeoff and landing, new predictive windshear caution alerts are inhibited between 80 knots and 400 feet RA, and new warning alerts between 100 knots and 50 feet RA. These inhibits do not remove existing predictive windshear alerts. If a warning/caution event occurs before those boundaries, it will remain on the display and the complete aural callout will be annunciated.
That sounds pretty much the same as the 777 information posted by Fil.
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Old 11th Jun 2010, 10:06
  #34 (permalink)  
 
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What's the hurry for all you anxious F/Os to be able to make RTOs? Are you worried about not ever making it into the left seat . . . ?
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Old 11th Jun 2010, 10:51
  #35 (permalink)  
 
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While I appreciate that some FO's are very experienced and just short of upgrade to Capt, the fact remains that many are not.
SOP is designed to improve safety and standardise operations ie covering for the weakest link in the chain, the 200h FO.

As has been pointed out in this thread before, Captains have gone through simulator training some probably performed 100's of rejects during the course of their career while in the sweat box. Certainly during command training.

The above in mind or until that or a drastic change to SOP's, I will keep my sticky fingers on the thrust levers.
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Old 11th Jun 2010, 12:06
  #36 (permalink)  
 
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Genuinely quite disturbed by some things I'm reading here. I thought we were in an era of more 'enlightened' thinking?
"Sharing the workload" at V1 minus 5 is a furphy. Action must be taken immediately, and that should be done by the captain.
I have possibly misunderstood, however, with the captain handling the T/O, and close to V1, if he/she heard a bang and felt a swing, what would he/she do?

Would they 'assume' an engine failure and simply stop?

Would they wait for the co to call 'eng fail' and only then call stop,

Or would they look inside (at high speed and possibly assymetric) and make their own decision?

Isn't it just quicker for the NHP (Who's primary job is to monitor the engines!) simply to call 'stop', or 'tyre failure'?? If your 'co' can't read the eng instruments, he/she is in the wrong job!

Bizzare!

I'm also disturbed by attitudes such as:
why would anybody in their right mind entrust an aircraft and it's occupants to a very junior (maybe less than 1000hr) FO when there is a multi-thousand hour captain sitting beside him?
So what are you going to do if the FO is handling, and the eng failure occurs at V1??

Is the "multi-thousand hour captain" going to have to take control to continue the T/O, rather than "entrust an aircraft and it's occupants to a very junior (maybe less than 1000hr) FO?

IMHO the most dangerous situations occur when one pilot (usually the captain) is trying to do everything, leaving the other (usually the copilot) doing nothing!

As far as F/Os not even being allowed to taxi!! On a/c with 2 tillers, that's just staggering!

I'm extremely happy with the way my employer chooses to operate a/c. To change, would seem to me like a massively retrograde step, and a total failure of either recruitment or training !

Edited to add: For an old git like me, and much as I would like to think it, in my opinion 'experience' does not equate to 'ability'! In fact sometimes quite the opposite! In any event, many airlines promote on 'seniority' and neither experience nor ability!

Last edited by 4468; 11th Jun 2010 at 15:30.
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Old 11th Jun 2010, 16:10
  #37 (permalink)  
 
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SOPs where I work: HP on TLs < V1, either pilot can call "STOP". HP closes TLs, monitors/overrides autobrakes; NHP selects reverse (and speedbrake if required). PIC takes control (if not HP) sometime between initial actions complete and aircraft coming to a halt.
I hate to be critical but what an astonishing SOP with hands all over the place and a recipe for confusion and potential for a big [email protected]@k up. Why would you override the RTO selection of autobrakes when it already gives you max braking. Fair enough if the auto-brake disarm caution light comes on without any obvious reason - in which case the first officer is supposed to see that and call.

But for the first officer as PF to make the command decision to reject the take off AND leave the reverse thrust to the captain is completely at odds with the Boeing recommendation. On a slippery runway with a crosswind the FCTM advises that reverse might have to be reduced to idle to prevent further yaw into wind then re-applied once the aircraft is straight.

Imagine the frantic mess in the cockpit when the first officer does the take off, calls STOP at high speed because he is allowed to by SOP, leaving the captain open-mouthed in horror and too late to prevent the F/O from taking what may be an irrevocable action. The abort proceeds on the slippery runway with the F/o calling for reverse to go to idle as the 73 goes sideways under the crosswind. Then someone (capt or F/O) disengages the RTO in order to meet the Boeing advice at FCTM page 6.31 which states in part: "to correct back to centreline, reduce reverse thrust to reverse idle and release the brakes. . When re-established near the runway centreline, apply max braking and symmetrical reverse to stop the airplane.

A rejected take off on a slippery surface and a crosswind takes very careful handling if you follow the Boeing procedure above. Once the aircraft starts to drift sideways at an angle due weather-cocking on a wet/slippery runway then unless immediate action is taken to correct the situation, control of the aborted take off may be lost because things happen so quickly. To have two pilots "sharing" the various controls on an abort is asking for confusion.

The rejected take off decision is the captains responsibility entirely and he should have full control of all the flight deck systems that are required during an abort. That means the brakes, thrust levers, speed brake and reverse thrust levers. He then coordinates his actions on each of the systems to achieve a safe result.
Note: Personal opinion only but backed up by reference to the manufacturers recommendations
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Old 11th Jun 2010, 16:17
  #38 (permalink)  
 
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The rejected take off decision is the captains responsibility entirely and he should have full control of all the flight deck systems that are required during an abort. That means the brakes, thrust levers, speed brake and reverse thrust levers. He then coordinates his actions on each of the systems to achieve a safe result.
And what is the captain's very best resource doing during all of this?

Just sitting in awe and admiration presumably?
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Old 11th Jun 2010, 17:12
  #39 (permalink)  
 
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Imagine the frantic mess in the cockpit when the first officer does the take off, calls STOP at high speed because he is allowed to by SOP, leaving the captain open-mouthed in horror and too late to prevent the F/O from taking what may be an irrevocable action.
Swap the terms captain and F/O and you have an equally likely scenario. Perhaps nobody should be allowed to call stop, just to be on the safe side?

The rejected take off decision is the captains responsibility entirely and he should have full control of all the flight deck systems that are required during an abort. That means the brakes, thrust levers, speed brake and reverse thrust levers. He then coordinates his actions on each of the systems to achieve a safe result.
You're starting from the false premise that the RTO decision is the captains responsibility entirely. It's already been made clear that that is most certainly not the case in all airlines, and Boeing have stated they've no technical objection.

Originally Posted by 747JJ
As has been pointed out in this thread before, Captains have gone through simulator training some probably performed 100's of rejects during the course of their career while in the sweat box. Certainly during command training.
Indeed, and yet I still see them mess it up in the simulator more often than not, so what can we conclude from that?
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Old 11th Jun 2010, 17:43
  #40 (permalink)  
 
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Centaurus,

I think this just goes to show what a wide range of SOPs there are in different airlines and that there are many ways of achieving the same end.

On a slippery runway with a crosswind the FCTM advises that reverse might have to be reduced to idle to prevent further yaw into wind then re-applied once the aircraft is straight.
Faced with a slippery runway and a significant crosswind, I, for one would retire to the bar and watch others' efforts through the window with great interest.

IMHO, with very low braking action, the critical part of the takeoff is actually the slow-speed end, just above taxi speed, where there is little to no aerodynamic control. If you don't get rid of thrust asymmetry rapidly, you're off the paved surface.

If you've decided that you *are* going to launch from a slippery runway with the breeze off to one side, then I would sincerely hope that the briefing had covered these sort of eventualities and everyone involved was sure of what their action(s) might be. Under our SOPs, it would be a call of "Reverse idle" from the HP, or, in extremis the HP would do it themselves. Just because normal operation is to split these duties doesn't make it "forbidden" to do it another way if it seems the safest course of action at the time.

The rejected take off decision is the captains responsibility entirely and he should have full control of all the flight deck systems that are required during an abort. That means the brakes, thrust levers, speed brake and reverse thrust levers. He then coordinates his actions on each of the systems to achieve a safe result.

Note: Personal opinion only but backed up by reference to the manufacturers recommendations
As I pointed out before, manufacturers' SOPs are written with the lowest common denominator in mind - and that's pretty low, if fact more of a single-pilot operation. When you have a well experienced, trained and checked aviator sitting next to you, it would be counter-productive not to involve them in the operation, just in terms of resource management. As Hand Solo intimates, when RTOs get cocked up in the sim it doesn't seem to bear much relation to how many stripes the pilot had on their shoulders at the time...

Why would you override the RTO selection of autobrakes when it already gives you max braking.
I included that option for completeness - of course you'd leave them in but there are situations where the autobrake may disconnect or perform poorly. Below certain speeds on most aircraft, the AB isn't armed, so you could go quite a way down a contaminated runway before realising there wasn't any braking at all! We include this item in our pre-takeoff briefings just so we remain alert to the possibility of malfunction and the fairly urgent need to do something about it - it certainly isn't SOP to disconnect them.
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