AF 447 Search to resume
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However, both 587VS and 447VS retained the Rudder through water impact. 587's Rudder separated while in the water, suggesting it had endured greater Yaw induced damage of the Rudder hinge. Remember, in a separation at altitude, in a Yaw sufficient to cause separation, the relative strength of the Rudder hinge in both cases is patent.
It is reasonable to assume some retained lateral velocity, if what is suggested is separation at water impact, yet the VS/Rudder is almost pristine. I suggest this is indicative of a quick failure at high speed, leaving the VS/Rudder to find its own aerodynamic descent method. In most cases, its shape ends up "leafing" down, rather than edge on at higher speed. This would be consistent with the lack of wrinkling or folding of the assembly when found. Conversely, the spoiler would have endured its massive destruction while attached; after separation, its descent would have been gentle, consistent with the large surface area/weight like the VS.
bear
It is reasonable to assume some retained lateral velocity, if what is suggested is separation at water impact, yet the VS/Rudder is almost pristine. I suggest this is indicative of a quick failure at high speed, leaving the VS/Rudder to find its own aerodynamic descent method. In most cases, its shape ends up "leafing" down, rather than edge on at higher speed. This would be consistent with the lack of wrinkling or folding of the assembly when found. Conversely, the spoiler would have endured its massive destruction while attached; after separation, its descent would have been gentle, consistent with the large surface area/weight like the VS.
bear
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Early on, the article revealed its own value:
Quote:
...more and more ice was hurled at the aircraft...
Quote:
...more and more ice was hurled at the aircraft...
Graybeard,
Don't let this mistranslation from the German colour your judgment of this article.
The original German, Immer mehr Eis wird in den Gewitterwolken über den Atlantik emporgeschleudert, is more properly translated as More and more ice is being blown [hurled, flung, catapulted] upward in the thunderclouds over the Atlantic . "Empor[up, upward]geschleudert" is an intransitive verb in this case and the writer is presumably referring to motion in a convective cell.
Rockhound
Don't let this mistranslation from the German colour your judgment of this article.
The original German, Immer mehr Eis wird in den Gewitterwolken über den Atlantik emporgeschleudert, is more properly translated as More and more ice is being blown [hurled, flung, catapulted] upward in the thunderclouds over the Atlantic . "Empor[up, upward]geschleudert" is an intransitive verb in this case and the writer is presumably referring to motion in a convective cell.
Rockhound
GB
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Noted.
No comm with ACARS. Hands full? Sudden onset of emergency? Or was tha a/c out of range?
In a short period of time, 447 went from controlled cruise to Sea Impact.
Almost certainly the upset was coincident with what had been seen multiple times in the preceding months.
Radar. What you see from space is almost never what you confront in flight. Looking through weather is quite different than looking down through it. What is trouble is the big cylinders of developing or developed energy. These must be avoided. To say something did or didn't happen, and this way or that, is called conjecture, and no harm no foul.
With a demonstrated vulnerability (Thales), and evidence of the very thing, this would seem to be the foundation for any attempt at further explanation.
The autopilot disconnected, indirectly and without (?) warning, followed by Alternate Law II. Once the pitots packed up, certainly in this case, other anomalies were hitchhikers, not causative. No outside cues, too much kinesthetic cueing in the cockpit, noise discrepancies that added to the puzzle, etc. Add to that the fact (?) that relief pilot was aviating, and had probably less than an edgy SA, etc. Possible.
From the outset, autopilot is suspected. If the a/c had encountered sufficient turbulence prior to a/p disconnect, one assumes the pilots are instantly alert, and in the process of disconnecting autoflight, since the challenge to its limits are at hand. To say other would mean that the "problem" was encountered instantly, and instantly caused auto drop, the limits having been reached. Further, if the ASI was skittering, this too would mean the pilots would have started handflying, so the onset was instant, and immediately overwhelmed the PF. (!). Although to be honest, at cruise, it's more like Two Pilots Monitoring.
A reasonable conclusion is that whoever was flying, whether with anticipation or necessity (a/p drop), the a/c was beyond recovery.
Also, relative to the spoiler, had it remained stowed, and not deployed, it would not have exhibited such profound damage. The piece of Elevator recovered, (some claim it is aileron), seems in fairly good shape. If the VS/Rudder separated with resultant sparse damage, it is reasonable to say the Elevator (aileron) separated from the airframe prior to impact as well.
Which is to say that it is at least possible that more of the empennage was lost at altitude than just the Vertical assembly. This of course would again challenge the "conclusion" of the BEA as to the completeness of the a/c at impact.
I note the authority has not continued to include "flight" or line of "flight".
Absent a reason for this, I assume they still hold to that finding.
Otherwise, they spoke too quickly? I don't accept that "En ligne de Vol" is not subject to understanding by non French speakers. I have researched this, with a phD in French linguistics, and a French pilot. Both say the expression is "In Line of Flight". It is not in any way idiomatic, and is clear on its face. There is the possibility that the French have a quirky conclusion as to what the word Flight may mean, but I think not.
bear
No comm with ACARS. Hands full? Sudden onset of emergency? Or was tha a/c out of range?
In a short period of time, 447 went from controlled cruise to Sea Impact.
Almost certainly the upset was coincident with what had been seen multiple times in the preceding months.
Radar. What you see from space is almost never what you confront in flight. Looking through weather is quite different than looking down through it. What is trouble is the big cylinders of developing or developed energy. These must be avoided. To say something did or didn't happen, and this way or that, is called conjecture, and no harm no foul.
With a demonstrated vulnerability (Thales), and evidence of the very thing, this would seem to be the foundation for any attempt at further explanation.
The autopilot disconnected, indirectly and without (?) warning, followed by Alternate Law II. Once the pitots packed up, certainly in this case, other anomalies were hitchhikers, not causative. No outside cues, too much kinesthetic cueing in the cockpit, noise discrepancies that added to the puzzle, etc. Add to that the fact (?) that relief pilot was aviating, and had probably less than an edgy SA, etc. Possible.
From the outset, autopilot is suspected. If the a/c had encountered sufficient turbulence prior to a/p disconnect, one assumes the pilots are instantly alert, and in the process of disconnecting autoflight, since the challenge to its limits are at hand. To say other would mean that the "problem" was encountered instantly, and instantly caused auto drop, the limits having been reached. Further, if the ASI was skittering, this too would mean the pilots would have started handflying, so the onset was instant, and immediately overwhelmed the PF. (!). Although to be honest, at cruise, it's more like Two Pilots Monitoring.
A reasonable conclusion is that whoever was flying, whether with anticipation or necessity (a/p drop), the a/c was beyond recovery.
Also, relative to the spoiler, had it remained stowed, and not deployed, it would not have exhibited such profound damage. The piece of Elevator recovered, (some claim it is aileron), seems in fairly good shape. If the VS/Rudder separated with resultant sparse damage, it is reasonable to say the Elevator (aileron) separated from the airframe prior to impact as well.
Which is to say that it is at least possible that more of the empennage was lost at altitude than just the Vertical assembly. This of course would again challenge the "conclusion" of the BEA as to the completeness of the a/c at impact.
I note the authority has not continued to include "flight" or line of "flight".
Absent a reason for this, I assume they still hold to that finding.
Otherwise, they spoke too quickly? I don't accept that "En ligne de Vol" is not subject to understanding by non French speakers. I have researched this, with a phD in French linguistics, and a French pilot. Both say the expression is "In Line of Flight". It is not in any way idiomatic, and is clear on its face. There is the possibility that the French have a quirky conclusion as to what the word Flight may mean, but I think not.
bear
Last edited by bearfoil; 27th Feb 2010 at 17:59.
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bearfoil,
Your theory does not explain the pattern of failure on the mounting points for the vertical stabilizer.
The tail or a portion of it encountering the water and literally prying the tail cone upwards lifting the VS off the tail assembly and breaking the mounts fits the pattern of damage somewhat better. It seems others, like infrequentflyer789, have the same idea.
{^_^}
Your theory does not explain the pattern of failure on the mounting points for the vertical stabilizer.
The tail or a portion of it encountering the water and literally prying the tail cone upwards lifting the VS off the tail assembly and breaking the mounts fits the pattern of damage somewhat better. It seems others, like infrequentflyer789, have the same idea.
{^_^}
spend your money most effectively
rather than spend a fortune setting up continuous data streams, wouldn't it be better to use a lot less to devise more robust pitot tubes ?
Also, what about the earlier question about ACARS position reporting: I thought the early search phase was a bit slow to home in - how was this so if position is known.
Also, what about the earlier question about ACARS position reporting: I thought the early search phase was a bit slow to home in - how was this so if position is known.
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Hi JD-EE. I am not following the "prying" portion of your explanation.
Essentially, tha a/c did a "tail plant" (although a 'shallow one'), per the BEA's initial report. Five degrees is acceptable for a normal landing, and if you saw Sully's landing, that comes fairly close to my picture of 447's entry. However, one must subtract all but a little Horizontal motion, The large Vertical vector was responsible for the damage almost totally, if one is reading the report correctly. Again, if the VS/Rudder were attached at this point, the momentum of the unit would force the parts into the mounting bed of the tail, not "pull it away". If the Horiz was stopped abruptly, the a/c (or Fuselage, such as it was) would pitch forward at some value, while mostly sinking well into the water. The 'tail cone' would have been crushed by the weight of the VS, whilst the joins (hoops) would have been deformed downward. I don't see a "rebound" sufficient in force to impart the energy needed for the VS to tear away from the mounts and fly forward. Keep in mind the hoops show serious damage, while the skin (Unfaired, the fairings were not present) is reasonably whole and intact, There is no damage consistent with a violent water entry on the VS.
Remember too, the VS is not attached to the tail cone, it is mounted on the dorsal longerons of the fuselage, embedded in truss work and brackets that span the medial longerons as well. The aft bulkhead is a part of the forward mount of the Vertical tail, a structure that is immensely robust, for obvious reasons.
Having seen 587's VS, the mode of failure seems reasonably consistent with the appearance of 447's assembly, that is, Radial separation from its joins from side loading that exceeded it's limits.
In short, I feel in comparing 447 with previous tail entry (Hudson) and side loaded failure, (587), there is ample room to entertain an early loss of VS/Rudder here.
What of the 5 degree pitch up at impact? If the wings were fully stalled, the vertical velocity would suggest a slight nose down instead, as the CG would be forward of the center of drag from the wings. (More wing area behind the CG than in front of). What does the Pitch suggest? It is possible that some of the Horizontal Stabilizer and elevator was missing. This would allow the tail to "droop" in a vertical descent, perhaps.
Position when found. The VS was by itself when spotted, how far from fuselage debris was it? The FA seats, crew rest, radome. etc.? Where was the left tip of the port elevator found?, The spoiler? Finding the spoiler in its condition suggests the question, "Where is the other wing debris?"
With its damage, the spolier, had it remained attached, would certainly have been found with wing flap, skin, wing fairing, etc.? So again, the spoiler may have been deployed (To slow down a very oversped airframe?), and been shorn off by the airstream. Finding cabin liner with port cutouts, and no "glass", along with interior parts in the same field implies a very violent disintegration, yet the galley stack and FA seats are in good condition. Much of the debris is inconsistent with "Intact at Impact". Analyze the Turkish 737's 'vertical' arrival on the ground. Tail Plant, Fuselage failure, and a serious impact of the nose, due to the tail drag and Pitch at first contact (High).
None of this writing is to be taken as "conclusions", it is just a supposition, based on very little, but based on evidence nonetheless.
bear
Essentially, tha a/c did a "tail plant" (although a 'shallow one'), per the BEA's initial report. Five degrees is acceptable for a normal landing, and if you saw Sully's landing, that comes fairly close to my picture of 447's entry. However, one must subtract all but a little Horizontal motion, The large Vertical vector was responsible for the damage almost totally, if one is reading the report correctly. Again, if the VS/Rudder were attached at this point, the momentum of the unit would force the parts into the mounting bed of the tail, not "pull it away". If the Horiz was stopped abruptly, the a/c (or Fuselage, such as it was) would pitch forward at some value, while mostly sinking well into the water. The 'tail cone' would have been crushed by the weight of the VS, whilst the joins (hoops) would have been deformed downward. I don't see a "rebound" sufficient in force to impart the energy needed for the VS to tear away from the mounts and fly forward. Keep in mind the hoops show serious damage, while the skin (Unfaired, the fairings were not present) is reasonably whole and intact, There is no damage consistent with a violent water entry on the VS.
Remember too, the VS is not attached to the tail cone, it is mounted on the dorsal longerons of the fuselage, embedded in truss work and brackets that span the medial longerons as well. The aft bulkhead is a part of the forward mount of the Vertical tail, a structure that is immensely robust, for obvious reasons.
Having seen 587's VS, the mode of failure seems reasonably consistent with the appearance of 447's assembly, that is, Radial separation from its joins from side loading that exceeded it's limits.
In short, I feel in comparing 447 with previous tail entry (Hudson) and side loaded failure, (587), there is ample room to entertain an early loss of VS/Rudder here.
What of the 5 degree pitch up at impact? If the wings were fully stalled, the vertical velocity would suggest a slight nose down instead, as the CG would be forward of the center of drag from the wings. (More wing area behind the CG than in front of). What does the Pitch suggest? It is possible that some of the Horizontal Stabilizer and elevator was missing. This would allow the tail to "droop" in a vertical descent, perhaps.
Position when found. The VS was by itself when spotted, how far from fuselage debris was it? The FA seats, crew rest, radome. etc.? Where was the left tip of the port elevator found?, The spoiler? Finding the spoiler in its condition suggests the question, "Where is the other wing debris?"
With its damage, the spolier, had it remained attached, would certainly have been found with wing flap, skin, wing fairing, etc.? So again, the spoiler may have been deployed (To slow down a very oversped airframe?), and been shorn off by the airstream. Finding cabin liner with port cutouts, and no "glass", along with interior parts in the same field implies a very violent disintegration, yet the galley stack and FA seats are in good condition. Much of the debris is inconsistent with "Intact at Impact". Analyze the Turkish 737's 'vertical' arrival on the ground. Tail Plant, Fuselage failure, and a serious impact of the nose, due to the tail drag and Pitch at first contact (High).
None of this writing is to be taken as "conclusions", it is just a supposition, based on very little, but based on evidence nonetheless.
bear
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Mr Optimistic
.... what about the earlier question about ACARS position reporting: I thought the early search phase was a bit slow to home in - how was this so if position is known.
.... what about the earlier question about ACARS position reporting: I thought the early search phase was a bit slow to home in - how was this so if position is known.
However, and it is a point that Bearfoil is making, the kinetic energy (m*v2)/2 has somehow been swatted out when you consider on the evidence that we have been presented, i.e. the aircraft descended almost vertically with a small but positive pitch attitude and little or no bank angle over the last minute at a terminal velocity of around 90KTS (9,000 ft/min). In other words, that part of the flight was not "controlled" and indications are that the tail was rotating to port on impact, which could translate into a "flat spin" where the spin motion along with the lost lift (now a drag vortex) combined to provide the attitudes at which it impacted with the water.
If that is anywhere near right, then what was the descent profile between FL350 and FL090. Furthermore, how did it "burn off" over 400KTS in 3 minutes?
Something violent and far beyond the ordinary happened in the air before the water entered the picture.
Your other point regarding why it took so long to locate anything. The usual felons, "false leads" sent everyone off at a tangent, and by the time they did get back to a proper grid search, the floating evidence had moved on.
mm43
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Bearfoil
The Port Outer Spoiler was located North of TASIL and a graphic showing it in relation to other debris follows:-
I have the actual recovery position and time, and it should be noted that the spoiler was floating flush with the surface and well anchored in the water by the attached framing.
I surmise that if an overspeed event had occurred, then the spoiler attached frame "fail signature" would not have been similar to that found round the V/S anchor points.
Of interest, is the debris item just NW of the Last Known Position and marked "07". I have no information as to what it is, but it was found on 7 June 2009 and I suspect that it has broken loose from the bottom. It could have just surfaced, but there is no way of telling when. The items to the East and circled, do not appear in later debris field charts published by the BEA and I suspect they are not related to AF447.
mm43
The Port Outer Spoiler was located North of TASIL and a graphic showing it in relation to other debris follows:-
I have the actual recovery position and time, and it should be noted that the spoiler was floating flush with the surface and well anchored in the water by the attached framing.
I surmise that if an overspeed event had occurred, then the spoiler attached frame "fail signature" would not have been similar to that found round the V/S anchor points.
Of interest, is the debris item just NW of the Last Known Position and marked "07". I have no information as to what it is, but it was found on 7 June 2009 and I suspect that it has broken loose from the bottom. It could have just surfaced, but there is no way of telling when. The items to the East and circled, do not appear in later debris field charts published by the BEA and I suspect they are not related to AF447.
mm43
Of interest, is the debris item just NW of the Last Known Position and marked "07". I have no information as to what it is, but it was found on 7 June 2009 and I suspect that it has broken loose from the bottom. It could have just surfaced, but there is no way of telling when.
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Considering the reported depths, I think that it is doubtful that anything that made it to the bottom would have any flotation left. The squeeze pressures would flatten every air pore.
mm43
Think about the fire extinguishers, oxygen bottles and similar items. There is a possibility they could withstand that pressure, and on their own have positive buoyancy. In fact, something that was only just buoyant could well have broken away from the wreckage on the way to the bottom, and its slow rate of ascent could account for its arrival back on the surface at a later time. Needs to be explored further.
I once took an 8 oz styrafoam coffee cup and wrote some words of prose on it and sent it down 15000 ft on a dive. When it came back up still attached to the submersible it was the size of a perfect sewing thimble with words that had to be read with a magnifying glass. Of course it would sink like a rock after that.
Of course any thing with the scale factor of a 4 inch thick titanium 8 ft dia sphere would survive. As far as hover rates at part depths, that's another story as long as you have an idea of the various depth currents in a computer plot over several months
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lomapaseo ...
I once took an 8 oz styrafoam coffee cup and wrote some words of prose on it and sent it down 15000 ft on a dive. When it came back up still attached to the submersible it was the size of a perfect sewing thimble with words that had to be read with a magnifying glass. Of course it would sink like a rock after that.
I once took an 8 oz styrafoam coffee cup and wrote some words of prose on it and sent it down 15000 ft on a dive. When it came back up still attached to the submersible it was the size of a perfect sewing thimble with words that had to be read with a magnifying glass. Of course it would sink like a rock after that.
mm43
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Iomapaseo
Total respect sir, total respect.
Controlling circa 3 miles of string with a Styrofoam cup on the end is simply awesome ..........
CW
Total respect sir, total respect.
Controlling circa 3 miles of string with a Styrofoam cup on the end is simply awesome ..........
CW
Last edited by chris weston; 1st Mar 2010 at 16:22.
FWIW.......
About the only thing which might be capable of resurfacing after a trip to the bottom would be something in the fuel system which hadn't been ruptured by the impact. However. it's fairly unlikely that anything forming an envelope filled with fuel would survive an impact without damage to the seal integrity.
Although a vessel which is 100% liquid filled would not be crushed (as much) as the remainder of the debris, it would need to form an unbrella shape to trap the less dense & relatively incompressible fuel at the top of the shape & keep its centre of gravity below the centre of the volume of fuel (centre of bouyancy).
I doubt any of the big tanks would fit the bill in this case as they'd be too full of fuel & too heavy this early into the flight to be sufficiently robust or flexible enough. At best maybe a fuel filter or something similar might be a possibility but it'd be remote.
About the only thing which might be capable of resurfacing after a trip to the bottom would be something in the fuel system which hadn't been ruptured by the impact. However. it's fairly unlikely that anything forming an envelope filled with fuel would survive an impact without damage to the seal integrity.
Although a vessel which is 100% liquid filled would not be crushed (as much) as the remainder of the debris, it would need to form an unbrella shape to trap the less dense & relatively incompressible fuel at the top of the shape & keep its centre of gravity below the centre of the volume of fuel (centre of bouyancy).
I doubt any of the big tanks would fit the bill in this case as they'd be too full of fuel & too heavy this early into the flight to be sufficiently robust or flexible enough. At best maybe a fuel filter or something similar might be a possibility but it'd be remote.
About the only thing which might be capable of resurfacing after a trip to the bottom would be something in the fuel system which hadn't been ruptured by the impact. However. it's fairly unlikely that anything forming an envelope filled with fuel would survive an impact without damage to the seal integrity.
Although a vessel which is 100% liquid filled would not be crushed (as much) as the remainder of the debris, it would need to form an unbrella shape to trap the less dense & relatively incompressible fuel at the top of the shape & keep its centre of gravity below the centre of the volume of fuel (centre of bouyancy).
Although a vessel which is 100% liquid filled would not be crushed (as much) as the remainder of the debris, it would need to form an unbrella shape to trap the less dense & relatively incompressible fuel at the top of the shape & keep its centre of gravity below the centre of the volume of fuel (centre of bouyancy).
Make a mistake like that and you remember it forever. So a little air in a tank is a very very bad thing in the very deep
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bearfoil, I don't wish to belabor this. On the AF447 thread if you slog through all 4589 posts you'll find the description of the what some of us think happened. The plane came down with some forward motion. The tail struck first. This forced the tail assembly upwards as well as ripped it to the rear. The plane then belly flopped pivoting to a flatter position before the belly of the plane struck the water.
This may or may not be accurate. But there's an interesting simple experiment you can perform. Take a bog standard 3" by 5" index card (or euro equivalent). Cut one edge of the card to look a little like -\_/---\_/---\_/---. That is to say cut away all but three tabs about half again as wide as your handy paper hole punch. Use that hole punch to punch three holes, one in each tab. Stick some dowels that fit the holes moderately snugly through the card and secure them so that they won't move. Now, pull the index card up and forward. Study the tears where the paper separates. Repeat this for several different movements of the "vertical stabilizer" relative to the mounting points.
Lastly, it is observed that the leading edge of the VS where it meets the body of the plane is damaged, missing. The trailing edge is also damaged. This is consistent with the full tail-cone assembly being forced upwards pivoting around the nose of the VS. You'll find that you cannot duplicate the tears in the VS mounting tabs including the one tab that had portions of the mount still attached, with any form of sideways rip. You can with a forward rip.
Your challenge is to explain that. I simply propose the tail plant with the drag of the tail providing a force converting forward motion into downward motion as well as providing the "prying" action via horizontal stabilizer and tail cone assembly. It's the only scenario my limited mind can find that produces the tears in the VS mounting tabs and leaves part of the mount attached to one of them, the front one if my memory serves.
Try the simple experiment. It's very enlightening.
This may or may not be accurate. But there's an interesting simple experiment you can perform. Take a bog standard 3" by 5" index card (or euro equivalent). Cut one edge of the card to look a little like -\_/---\_/---\_/---. That is to say cut away all but three tabs about half again as wide as your handy paper hole punch. Use that hole punch to punch three holes, one in each tab. Stick some dowels that fit the holes moderately snugly through the card and secure them so that they won't move. Now, pull the index card up and forward. Study the tears where the paper separates. Repeat this for several different movements of the "vertical stabilizer" relative to the mounting points.
Lastly, it is observed that the leading edge of the VS where it meets the body of the plane is damaged, missing. The trailing edge is also damaged. This is consistent with the full tail-cone assembly being forced upwards pivoting around the nose of the VS. You'll find that you cannot duplicate the tears in the VS mounting tabs including the one tab that had portions of the mount still attached, with any form of sideways rip. You can with a forward rip.
Your challenge is to explain that. I simply propose the tail plant with the drag of the tail providing a force converting forward motion into downward motion as well as providing the "prying" action via horizontal stabilizer and tail cone assembly. It's the only scenario my limited mind can find that produces the tears in the VS mounting tabs and leaves part of the mount attached to one of them, the front one if my memory serves.
Try the simple experiment. It's very enlightening.
mm43
Thanks. Are you sure the aircraft descended vertically ? May have impacted tidily ('in line of flight') but there is a lot of in between which can only be surmised.
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mm43 - with regards to burning off 476 knots, at about 1 g acceleration that takes about 25 seconds. At a little under half a g it takes a minute. Maybe that will help thinking processes a little.
Burning it off is possible. But the location where the plane seems to have gone down would require God step in and swat the plane out of the air with a multi-g deceleration.
So was the plane trying to turn back for some reason? Without the CVR it's all guess work.
Burning it off is possible. But the location where the plane seems to have gone down would require God step in and swat the plane out of the air with a multi-g deceleration.
So was the plane trying to turn back for some reason? Without the CVR it's all guess work.
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JD-EE
Let me attempt a different approach. The Vertical Stabiliser is mounted to the Fuselage in cantilever fashion. Pilots will tell you that it is certainly strong, but also an elegant method for attachment of A/C bits, one to the other. Before the engineering and materials were developed, there would have been "struts" on either side of such a long component, to attenuate some of the leverage encountered in Ruddered flight. It is this leverage that is the "design consideration", for there is no threat that the VS can be pulled out by its "Roots" by some Brobdignagian Gardener, as he would a weed, or you would pull a leaf out of your three ring binder. There is not a vertical component at rest, on T/O LNDG, or stable flight. A very short stop into a wall at considerable velocity (at 90 degrees) would impart a radial stress, I propose that is not a possibility in the engineering specifications. Likewise, the wings and Horizontal Stabilizers are cantilevered.
Your challenge is to posit a situation where at low velocity, the VS was rooted out with a minimal forward velocity, at which it is its strongest relative to failure. My challenge is to propose a designed for failure in its weakest strength at very high speed.
Kinetic energy. One G. Sounds innocuous enough, but be careful. The a/c is designed for structural limit load at 1.51 (stress limit).
What is the device that brakes 200 tonnes at precisely one G in continuous fashion? There isn't one. Straw man, anyway. At 475 miles per hour, it takes very little "sideways" to create extremely high loads on this a/c. You are saying that somehow the a/c decelerated by 350 mph in thirty seconds, then fell like a speedy leaf into the sea?
I think the spoiler tells a tale of desperate deceleration (attempted); with its loss, there would be unbalanced drag, making things worse, if in fact there was a pilot making the attempt.
My tentative conclusion is this.
Airbus has allowed the 330's autopilot way too long a leash. At cruise, trusting a/p with roll excursions, pitch, and yaw, of the value prescribed, means that when it is overwhelmed, it whimpers and leaves, leaving the a/c at the edge of every parameter, with an airplane on the verge of loss of control.
The Pitot Tubes have two Heat selections, neither capable of its defined errand. It is too cool or it is too hot. (Don't touch).
The a/c itself is/was developed with masterful solutions to problems. These are automatic solutions, however, and when the PF gets the a/c at cruise in the dark with red white and blue on the panel similar to fireworks, the manual system is unfairly and impossibly challenged. I propose that the weather may not have been a factor, but that the loss of airdata fooled an otherwise competent platform to:
1. Make corrections that weren't needed, or desirable
2. Left the cockpit to the control of two people who had been hypnotised by it, and were deprived of Situational Awareness, to an extent that they never caught up with a workload that was 75 percent incorrect, by observation.
Let me attempt a different approach. The Vertical Stabiliser is mounted to the Fuselage in cantilever fashion. Pilots will tell you that it is certainly strong, but also an elegant method for attachment of A/C bits, one to the other. Before the engineering and materials were developed, there would have been "struts" on either side of such a long component, to attenuate some of the leverage encountered in Ruddered flight. It is this leverage that is the "design consideration", for there is no threat that the VS can be pulled out by its "Roots" by some Brobdignagian Gardener, as he would a weed, or you would pull a leaf out of your three ring binder. There is not a vertical component at rest, on T/O LNDG, or stable flight. A very short stop into a wall at considerable velocity (at 90 degrees) would impart a radial stress, I propose that is not a possibility in the engineering specifications. Likewise, the wings and Horizontal Stabilizers are cantilevered.
Your challenge is to posit a situation where at low velocity, the VS was rooted out with a minimal forward velocity, at which it is its strongest relative to failure. My challenge is to propose a designed for failure in its weakest strength at very high speed.
Kinetic energy. One G. Sounds innocuous enough, but be careful. The a/c is designed for structural limit load at 1.51 (stress limit).
What is the device that brakes 200 tonnes at precisely one G in continuous fashion? There isn't one. Straw man, anyway. At 475 miles per hour, it takes very little "sideways" to create extremely high loads on this a/c. You are saying that somehow the a/c decelerated by 350 mph in thirty seconds, then fell like a speedy leaf into the sea?
I think the spoiler tells a tale of desperate deceleration (attempted); with its loss, there would be unbalanced drag, making things worse, if in fact there was a pilot making the attempt.
My tentative conclusion is this.
Airbus has allowed the 330's autopilot way too long a leash. At cruise, trusting a/p with roll excursions, pitch, and yaw, of the value prescribed, means that when it is overwhelmed, it whimpers and leaves, leaving the a/c at the edge of every parameter, with an airplane on the verge of loss of control.
The Pitot Tubes have two Heat selections, neither capable of its defined errand. It is too cool or it is too hot. (Don't touch).
The a/c itself is/was developed with masterful solutions to problems. These are automatic solutions, however, and when the PF gets the a/c at cruise in the dark with red white and blue on the panel similar to fireworks, the manual system is unfairly and impossibly challenged. I propose that the weather may not have been a factor, but that the loss of airdata fooled an otherwise competent platform to:
1. Make corrections that weren't needed, or desirable
2. Left the cockpit to the control of two people who had been hypnotised by it, and were deprived of Situational Awareness, to an extent that they never caught up with a workload that was 75 percent incorrect, by observation.
Last edited by bearfoil; 1st Mar 2010 at 21:17. Reason: clarify "load"