AF447
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just a few (silly) questions
VS broke in a forward motion : so why the bottom part of the rudder is missing?
Assuming that the horizontal stabilizer is made of the same composites as the VS it should have broken in the same manner as the VS,for the same reason and float similarly, never mentionned anywhere.
From the photos of the brazilian marine the VS was alone (no other debris nearby) as it seems to me that some parts with the same buoyancy should have been found in its vicinity as their course after hitting the sea would only be determined by the currents.
No other debris around the VS would probably mean that it attained the water already separate from the main part of the a/c...
Assuming that the horizontal stabilizer is made of the same composites as the VS it should have broken in the same manner as the VS,for the same reason and float similarly, never mentionned anywhere.
From the photos of the brazilian marine the VS was alone (no other debris nearby) as it seems to me that some parts with the same buoyancy should have been found in its vicinity as their course after hitting the sea would only be determined by the currents.
No other debris around the VS would probably mean that it attained the water already separate from the main part of the a/c...
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Damaged rudder
A chunk of the bottom part of the rudder was lost during the recovery process.
Compare the following two images.
1) When they found the VS
foto_3.jpg picture by DorianBanks - Photobucket
2) During recovery
6.jpg picture by DorianBanks - Photobucket
Compare the following two images.
1) When they found the VS
foto_3.jpg picture by DorianBanks - Photobucket
2) During recovery
6.jpg picture by DorianBanks - Photobucket
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Language
I see a lot of questions and theories based on English terms in the preliminary report.
"leur examen visuel montre que l’avion n’a pas été détruit en vol ; il paraît
avoir heurté la surface de l’eau en ligne de vol, avec une forte accélération
verticale."
is translated as
"visual examination showed that the airplane was not destroyed in flight ; it appears to have struck the surface of the sea in a straight line with high vertical acceleration."
The expression that is underlined (by me) is interpreted by some as meaning that the airplane fell almost vertically from the sky (like a brick would do), or that it dove nearly vertically into the sea.
The literal translation is "in the dircetion of flight", meaning, not sideways or backwards.
The "vertical acceleration" is treated by some as a sort of indication of speed of the entire aircraft. However, it is merely a description of the line along which the acceleration took place (and because the acceleration was in such direction that the movement of the parts was brought to a stop, a laymen would call it a deceleration). The deformation observed so far points to hitting the water with the velocity of the aircraft mainly along the longitudinal axis and downwards - that's all.
As to the terminology pertaining to the bodies: "relatively well preserved" is accurately translated, perhaps it means, besides "relatively in one piece" also "not yet decomposed" (sorry, not meant to insult any sensitive soul).
"leur examen visuel montre que l’avion n’a pas été détruit en vol ; il paraît
avoir heurté la surface de l’eau en ligne de vol, avec une forte accélération
verticale."
is translated as
"visual examination showed that the airplane was not destroyed in flight ; it appears to have struck the surface of the sea in a straight line with high vertical acceleration."
The expression that is underlined (by me) is interpreted by some as meaning that the airplane fell almost vertically from the sky (like a brick would do), or that it dove nearly vertically into the sea.
The literal translation is "in the dircetion of flight", meaning, not sideways or backwards.
The "vertical acceleration" is treated by some as a sort of indication of speed of the entire aircraft. However, it is merely a description of the line along which the acceleration took place (and because the acceleration was in such direction that the movement of the parts was brought to a stop, a laymen would call it a deceleration). The deformation observed so far points to hitting the water with the velocity of the aircraft mainly along the longitudinal axis and downwards - that's all.
As to the terminology pertaining to the bodies: "relatively well preserved" is accurately translated, perhaps it means, besides "relatively in one piece" also "not yet decomposed" (sorry, not meant to insult any sensitive soul).
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The impact's description is confusing. It may or may not be purposely so. Vertical impact without forward movement extinguishes the need to even mention a 'direction', any direction would be irrelevent. If they meant 'in the direction of flight' I challenge them to support their conclusion. How in God's name can a heading be determined at impact? Even if it was 'important'. To prove the a/c fell 7 miles not experiencing a heading deviation? There is something more here than 'misunderstanding'.
What would BEA (and AB) have to gain by a statement that the 'direction of flight' (or even a 'straight line') was determined at impact? the intimation that the a/c was 'under control' to the 'end'. Non? Similarly, why the absence of pathologies? There is no excuse for not including the medical data. Do the discrepancies in condition of the passengers challenge your visual conclusion that the a/c "hit in one piece?"
The a/c hit intact. No scrutiny of the data, just 'intact'. These a/c don't 'disintegrate', you see. Likewise, 'From visual inspection', the Vertical Stabilizer' was attached until the a/c hit. Wait, we thought you said there was no forward momentum and the a/c landed (sic) flat? But it failed 'forward'. Quite the trick. Also, if there was a 'left twisting force' wouldn't that infer a rotation at impact, and not 'in a straight line'? Is anyone else having these problems with the report.
If the a/c was intact at impact, wouldn't it obviously hit along its longitudinal axis?
What would BEA (and AB) have to gain by a statement that the 'direction of flight' (or even a 'straight line') was determined at impact? the intimation that the a/c was 'under control' to the 'end'. Non? Similarly, why the absence of pathologies? There is no excuse for not including the medical data. Do the discrepancies in condition of the passengers challenge your visual conclusion that the a/c "hit in one piece?"
The a/c hit intact. No scrutiny of the data, just 'intact'. These a/c don't 'disintegrate', you see. Likewise, 'From visual inspection', the Vertical Stabilizer' was attached until the a/c hit. Wait, we thought you said there was no forward momentum and the a/c landed (sic) flat? But it failed 'forward'. Quite the trick. Also, if there was a 'left twisting force' wouldn't that infer a rotation at impact, and not 'in a straight line'? Is anyone else having these problems with the report.
If the a/c was intact at impact, wouldn't it obviously hit along its longitudinal axis?
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Commonality of hypothesis:-
The question remains, the mode of upset?, and the descent to the surface (with or without flight crew intervention)?
re: attempted ditching, what would they have needed?
1) An intact or at least flyable airframe; AND
2) Attitude reference (visual or synthetic); AND
3) Airspeed indication and thrust for [N1 and pitch] procedure until through the air data anomalies; AND/OR
4) Descent into thicker air where thrust/underspeed would become less critical (increased handling margin); AND/OR;
5) Following thrust loss (no indication that happened) a glide descent.
It follows that:-
A. If the aircraft had descended, or flew through a rare WX generated air data collection systems problem (still hypothesis only) and eventually exit (in a recoverable/flyable state with thrust available):-
1) - If no other damage had occurred, the lost air data would eventually return (as per similar events) and the crew could fly out presumably (as per similar events) and recover/return to normal flight (including ACARS output); OR
2) - If the aircraft suffered engine failure, it could be recovered to a glide for troubleshooting (would it still output ACARS?), relight/restart and return to normal flight, or ditch; OR
3) - The aircraft suffered structural failure due to airframe overloading (commanded or aerodynamic loads/or both) + possible engine failure resulting in terminal descent in one of the ‘uncontrolled/uncontrollable modes’ discussed at length in this thread; AND/OR
3a) - The aircraft may have been in a situation with (any of the following) combinations of unusual attitude, O/speed, Stall, Spin, Thrust loss, Asymmetric thrust, insufficient or incomplete control authority (surfaces/systems) with insufficient airframe AND/OR control authority AND/or altitude remaining to affect a recovery to normal flight
B. Clearly, unfortunately it did not recover normal flight. Why? Possibilities:-
- Loss of flight instrumentation systems (continued)
- Loss of other systems after 02h13+
- Loss of thrust; and/or
- Loss of airframe components critical to controlled flight; and/or
- Stalled flight, unrecoverable
Outcome:-
Water impact flat at high (vertical) speed is going to be similar to the BOAC 707 at Fuji.
For those that have not seen them, the photos from above of the wreckage of the 707, latitudinal parts layed out pretty much as expected with a vertical profile (FLAT), main gear legs, wing roots, fuse parts, unsurprisingly where they were expected to be, flat as a lizard drinking!. The compression on impact reduced most components to less than 1m in vertical dimensions. That is the fuse, wings and all else;-
A water impact flat (at high speed) is little different to a hard surface!
BEA says (they think) a horizontal fuse (or near enough), vertical impact with the water??
Q1. Would a galley wall with packs installed not compress to a foot tall or so with that sort of vertical inertia impact?
Q2. Would the other visible (photo) items recovered such as medical kit be as ‘uncompressed’ as shown in a fuselage high g flat impact?
Q4. would an attached VS look as pristine along its vertical proflie if it had hit the hard deck at high G?
Q3. Why would most of the debris sink (not much on the surface to recover)?
Some of you have narrowed in on the ‘likely’ failure scenario. Is that important? Only if, there is an inherent weakness in the airframe! Do I think there is an inherent weakness in the airframe? NO
Do I wonder about the flight management/C of G/protections that will ensure the airframe is not put in an ‘outside of reasonable/design envelope’ mode, YES!
WHY?
You all are close me thinks!!
The question remains, the mode of upset?, and the descent to the surface (with or without flight crew intervention)?
re: attempted ditching, what would they have needed?
1) An intact or at least flyable airframe; AND
2) Attitude reference (visual or synthetic); AND
3) Airspeed indication and thrust for [N1 and pitch] procedure until through the air data anomalies; AND/OR
4) Descent into thicker air where thrust/underspeed would become less critical (increased handling margin); AND/OR;
5) Following thrust loss (no indication that happened) a glide descent.
It follows that:-
A. If the aircraft had descended, or flew through a rare WX generated air data collection systems problem (still hypothesis only) and eventually exit (in a recoverable/flyable state with thrust available):-
1) - If no other damage had occurred, the lost air data would eventually return (as per similar events) and the crew could fly out presumably (as per similar events) and recover/return to normal flight (including ACARS output); OR
2) - If the aircraft suffered engine failure, it could be recovered to a glide for troubleshooting (would it still output ACARS?), relight/restart and return to normal flight, or ditch; OR
3) - The aircraft suffered structural failure due to airframe overloading (commanded or aerodynamic loads/or both) + possible engine failure resulting in terminal descent in one of the ‘uncontrolled/uncontrollable modes’ discussed at length in this thread; AND/OR
3a) - The aircraft may have been in a situation with (any of the following) combinations of unusual attitude, O/speed, Stall, Spin, Thrust loss, Asymmetric thrust, insufficient or incomplete control authority (surfaces/systems) with insufficient airframe AND/OR control authority AND/or altitude remaining to affect a recovery to normal flight
B. Clearly, unfortunately it did not recover normal flight. Why? Possibilities:-
- Loss of flight instrumentation systems (continued)
- Loss of other systems after 02h13+
- Loss of thrust; and/or
- Loss of airframe components critical to controlled flight; and/or
- Stalled flight, unrecoverable
Outcome:-
Water impact flat at high (vertical) speed is going to be similar to the BOAC 707 at Fuji.
For those that have not seen them, the photos from above of the wreckage of the 707, latitudinal parts layed out pretty much as expected with a vertical profile (FLAT), main gear legs, wing roots, fuse parts, unsurprisingly where they were expected to be, flat as a lizard drinking!. The compression on impact reduced most components to less than 1m in vertical dimensions. That is the fuse, wings and all else;-
A water impact flat (at high speed) is little different to a hard surface!
BEA says (they think) a horizontal fuse (or near enough), vertical impact with the water??
Q1. Would a galley wall with packs installed not compress to a foot tall or so with that sort of vertical inertia impact?
Q2. Would the other visible (photo) items recovered such as medical kit be as ‘uncompressed’ as shown in a fuselage high g flat impact?
Q4. would an attached VS look as pristine along its vertical proflie if it had hit the hard deck at high G?
Q3. Why would most of the debris sink (not much on the surface to recover)?
Some of you have narrowed in on the ‘likely’ failure scenario. Is that important? Only if, there is an inherent weakness in the airframe! Do I think there is an inherent weakness in the airframe? NO
Do I wonder about the flight management/C of G/protections that will ensure the airframe is not put in an ‘outside of reasonable/design envelope’ mode, YES!
WHY?
You all are close me thinks!!
Last edited by ARFOR; 7th Jul 2009 at 00:29. Reason: typo, remove "YUP" & the cheeky last line (mods) :-)
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Compare the following two images.
1) When they found the VS
foto_3.jpg picture by DorianBanks - Photobucket
2) During recovery
6.jpg picture by DorianBanks - Photobucket
1) When they found the VS
foto_3.jpg picture by DorianBanks - Photobucket
2) During recovery
6.jpg picture by DorianBanks - Photobucket
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Preliminary report - description of bodies
I wonder if the description of the bodies as being '...relatively well preserved. All of them were handed over to the Brazilian Navy to be transferred to the Recife morgue. At this stage of the investigation, the BEA has not yet had access to the autopsy data.', is to forestall any claim by the Brazilians that the bodies were not in a good enough condition for the autopsies to reveal useful information?
It seems extraordinary to me that the autopsy information has not been shared with the BEA. The injuries to the bodies must be one of the biggest clues about what happened on the plane.
I know the BEA had scheduled their preliminary incident report for end June. Is there not a similar deadline for a preliminary autopsy report?
It seems extraordinary to me that the autopsy information has not been shared with the BEA. The injuries to the bodies must be one of the biggest clues about what happened on the plane.
I know the BEA had scheduled their preliminary incident report for end June. Is there not a similar deadline for a preliminary autopsy report?
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"it is a glaring error"
Will Fraser:
Again, I think it likely some failure of the tail and/or aft pressure bulkhead occurred at high speed, post ACARS. Even if the tail failed during ACARS tx, is it not possible evidence was 'backed up'? Also, ACARS is mx, it doesn't troubleshoot? Rudder Travel Limiter loss could be its 'understanding' of a catastrophic empennage failure? Though the VS was gone, the ACARS may sense it as 'there goes the RTL'. With a loss of hydraulic pressure consistent with separation, its tx might be what ? If the VS loss happened when the ACARS was 'busy' or after 0214?
Again, I think it likely some failure of the tail and/or aft pressure bulkhead occurred at high speed, post ACARS. Even if the tail failed during ACARS tx, is it not possible evidence was 'backed up'? Also, ACARS is mx, it doesn't troubleshoot? Rudder Travel Limiter loss could be its 'understanding' of a catastrophic empennage failure? Though the VS was gone, the ACARS may sense it as 'there goes the RTL'. With a loss of hydraulic pressure consistent with separation, its tx might be what ? If the VS loss happened when the ACARS was 'busy' or after 0214?
But one may decide that both CMS (Central Maintenance System) is unreliable and is displaying by ACARS some erratic faults unrelated to the right system in order to bend the facts to theory. Then, instead of displaying 29. Hydraulics faults on the three hydraulic circuits linked to the rudder (Blue (B), Yellow (Y), Green (G)), the faulty CMSs will use Flight Controls warnings instead.
With the possibility of statics problems and/or pressure loss in cabin, the warning may be doing its task as designed, 'faster than 1800'/min.' is consistent with a complete loss of pressure in the cabin, is it not?
The cabin vertical speed advisory (cockpit signal) is related to the controller ability to monitor the DeltaP (external and cabin differential pressure) changing in excess of 1,800 ft/mn. A change of aircraft indicated altitude (real or instrumental) would trigger such an advisory if the differential pressure is in excess of the function.
But one may follow the same logic as for the RTL and consider that as a major failure of the whole pressurization system, because the tail (fin) separated in flight... consequently, "you will know it was deliberate and political".
S~
Olivier
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Even Though It Is Likely That We Will Never Know, What Can A Prudent Pilot Learn?
Nice as it would be to know exactly what happened and why, we can still learn a great deal from this accident by examining what might have happened.
It is quite likely that they flew unintentionally into a CB.
1. Do we interpret Wx Radar correctly at high altitude?
2. In areas of probable turbulence, is our seat harness secure enough to make us part of the airframe and thus able to concentrate on flying the aircraft?
3. Do we understand the forces involved within a CB?
4. Unreliable airspeed as trained in the Simulator is normally an academic exercise to fly some sort of approach. It does not address the problem of it occurring in turbulence. Can we maintain an attitude on the standby AI irrespective of what else is happening?
5. As Commanders with a heavy crew, when do we choose to take our rest?
6. Engaging the AP at 200’ and then disengaging at 500’ gives the passengers a very smooth ride but it degrades our motor skills eventually. Are our handling skills what they were or what they should be?
7. Most importantly, do we think and plan ahead or do we just react when there is a problem?
The phrase used in almost every airline is that “Safety is our highest priority!!” We all know this is only true within financial limitations. WE ARE THE SAFETY ENFORCERS.
What have I learnt and what will I do different in the future?
In answer to my points above.
1. In the vicinity of CBs at high level, modern digital radar Green is not good. In VMC conditions, in the vicinity of CBs, I will look at the lovely clouds but also concentrate on what I can get out of the radar picture by manipulating the radar controls so that in the middle of the night I will know what the picture may mean.
2. I will use the top straps in anticipation rather than when it happens, I always use the bottom one..
3. I’ve never had a problem with this, CBs scare me. On 3 occasions close to them I’ve suffered the effects of engine icing at TATs below -40°. (warmer than this I would have had the EAI on anyway)
4. I’m fortunate enough to have been trained in the old days, I can remember well enough but these days we don’t train how to cope with limited panel and disorientation. In any case, no matter how good a Sim is, the seat of the pants feelings in there are not real. This is the crux of the matter, something occurred that put them into a CB, they lost control and the main instruments. Having got in there, I doubt may of us would have survived.
5. I have never left the flightdeck when passing the ITCZ unless there has been another Captain in the left seat.
6. I understand that airline managements are accepting that the pendulum has swung too far, we should all be encouraged soon to occasionally, when circumstances are right, fly manually. Even a few minutes of handling will reconnect eyes, hands and brain but we must be conscientious, don’t just fly manually in CAVOK.
7. I’m Old, I’m not Bold but, I’m always thinking, “WHAT IF”.
Possibly this post will be ridiculed, more experienced pilots will understand it, I hope some less experienced pilots will just think, without jumping down my throat.
It is quite likely that they flew unintentionally into a CB.
1. Do we interpret Wx Radar correctly at high altitude?
2. In areas of probable turbulence, is our seat harness secure enough to make us part of the airframe and thus able to concentrate on flying the aircraft?
3. Do we understand the forces involved within a CB?
4. Unreliable airspeed as trained in the Simulator is normally an academic exercise to fly some sort of approach. It does not address the problem of it occurring in turbulence. Can we maintain an attitude on the standby AI irrespective of what else is happening?
5. As Commanders with a heavy crew, when do we choose to take our rest?
6. Engaging the AP at 200’ and then disengaging at 500’ gives the passengers a very smooth ride but it degrades our motor skills eventually. Are our handling skills what they were or what they should be?
7. Most importantly, do we think and plan ahead or do we just react when there is a problem?
The phrase used in almost every airline is that “Safety is our highest priority!!” We all know this is only true within financial limitations. WE ARE THE SAFETY ENFORCERS.
What have I learnt and what will I do different in the future?
In answer to my points above.
1. In the vicinity of CBs at high level, modern digital radar Green is not good. In VMC conditions, in the vicinity of CBs, I will look at the lovely clouds but also concentrate on what I can get out of the radar picture by manipulating the radar controls so that in the middle of the night I will know what the picture may mean.
2. I will use the top straps in anticipation rather than when it happens, I always use the bottom one..
3. I’ve never had a problem with this, CBs scare me. On 3 occasions close to them I’ve suffered the effects of engine icing at TATs below -40°. (warmer than this I would have had the EAI on anyway)
4. I’m fortunate enough to have been trained in the old days, I can remember well enough but these days we don’t train how to cope with limited panel and disorientation. In any case, no matter how good a Sim is, the seat of the pants feelings in there are not real. This is the crux of the matter, something occurred that put them into a CB, they lost control and the main instruments. Having got in there, I doubt may of us would have survived.
5. I have never left the flightdeck when passing the ITCZ unless there has been another Captain in the left seat.
6. I understand that airline managements are accepting that the pendulum has swung too far, we should all be encouraged soon to occasionally, when circumstances are right, fly manually. Even a few minutes of handling will reconnect eyes, hands and brain but we must be conscientious, don’t just fly manually in CAVOK.
7. I’m Old, I’m not Bold but, I’m always thinking, “WHAT IF”.
Possibly this post will be ridiculed, more experienced pilots will understand it, I hope some less experienced pilots will just think, without jumping down my throat.
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woodville,
Yes, your post probably won't last long. Being an old pilot too and also trying not to lose my basic skills before auto everything took over I hand fly some on each flight. Most of my posts get deleted if I question how well the automatic airplane pilots can hand fly if the automatics and primary instruments fail. But a few readers see it before it goes away. Good luck.
Yes, your post probably won't last long. Being an old pilot too and also trying not to lose my basic skills before auto everything took over I hand fly some on each flight. Most of my posts get deleted if I question how well the automatic airplane pilots can hand fly if the automatics and primary instruments fail. But a few readers see it before it goes away. Good luck.
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ARFOR:
Commonality of hypothesis:
[...]
2) - If the aircraft suffered engine failure, it could be recovered to a glide for troubleshooting (would it still output ACARS?, YUP!)
Commonality of hypothesis:
[...]
2) - If the aircraft suffered engine failure, it could be recovered to a glide for troubleshooting (would it still output ACARS?, YUP!)
woodvale:
3. I’ve never had a problem with this, CBs scare me. On 3 occasions close to them I’ve suffered the effects of engine icing at TATs below -40°. (warmer than this I would have had the EAI on anyway)
3. I’ve never had a problem with this, CBs scare me. On 3 occasions close to them I’ve suffered the effects of engine icing at TATs below -40°. (warmer than this I would have had the EAI on anyway)
Here is a document about such kind of issue from the 44th AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting and Exhibit, 9 - 12 January 2006, Reno, Nevada:
The Ice Particle Threat to Engines in Flight
http://airs-icing.org/AIRS_II/AIAARe...06-206-739.pdf
Authors:
*Jeanne G. Mason - Boeing Commercial Airplanes , Seattle WA, USA, 98124
*J. Walter Strapp - Environment Canada, 4905 Dufferin St., Downsview, ON, M3H 5T4, Canada
*Philip Chow - Honeywell International, 111 S. 34 St., Phoenix, Arizona, USA, 85034
Abstract:
This paper discusses jet engine powerloss and damage due to ingestion of ice particles. In the mid-90s several commercial airplane jet engines experienced more frequent powerloss in ice particle conditions, resulting in a focused investigation, and a greater awareness that led to recognition of similar events on other aircraft. Since the mid-90s, events have been more numerous, and costly, and have generated greater industry interest. These events have been predominately associated with flight at high altitude near deep convective systems, often in tropical regions. Data are presented from flight-testing and an event data base to support the contention that the events are caused by ingestion of high concentrations of ice particles, and that supercooled liquid water is either of secondary importance or not required. The basic theory of how ice accretes in the engine by this process is described. Complex issues facing industry to mitigate the problem, and simulation of the ice particle environment are discussed.
Everyone should read it and comment.
S~
Olivier
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takata Re: Resumption of ACARS output (following dual ENG FAIL and EMER ELEC) :-
If the RAT deployed, no ACARS dice eh?
Controlled flight prior to ENG FAIL? ACARS?
Irrespective, are you suggesting they might have entered a 'controlled' glide?
If the RAT deployed, no ACARS dice eh?
Controlled flight prior to ENG FAIL? ACARS?
Irrespective, are you suggesting they might have entered a 'controlled' glide?
woodvale;
Your response will only be ridiculed by those who don't fly or don't know the 330 yet want instant answers anyway. You know exactly what you're talking about.
To you, to p51guy and others who fly but have essentially left this thread to the guessers, we know the lessons are there for the patient and wise who are starting out in this career and that is where to seek best value from this thread. Pro-active decision-making and avoidance are the keys.
I suspect here very strongly but am not allowed to say so because I have no "evidence", that this crew likely went from benign flight conditions with some moderate turbulence to a rapidly degrading airplane in both the technical and controllability senses in less time than it takes to read this post.
At 0210Z, it was already too late. Those who wonder why no distress call was made do not comprehend such circumstances or the rapidity with which such things occur or the ensuing chaos and strange motions, sounds, sensations and behaviours of a once-familiar aircraft and operating environment.
Someone said a transport category aircraft loses control "gracefully" - very true, simply due to it's mass, and this is the very aspect which makes any actions and any recovery at high altitude, (as testified by those who have done high altitude stalls), dubious, especially in the circumstances this crew found themselves.
It's all been said in a hundred different ways, and the focus on minutae about how such a mass behaves in a stall, one's definition of "flat" spins etc etc, is all post facto.
Woodvale, your "up front during weather" notion is part of that kind of preventative thinking. Everything after 0215Z or so is after the fact.
takata;
I will take time to read the suggested document thank you. I understand your reasons to suggest a controlled glide.
In response to present posts,... I suggested a dual engine flameout last week but the notion was never responded to.
I consider this outcome a distinct possibility if what the BEA said actually happened the angle of attack would be such that the airflow would no longer be "through" the engines but perpendicular to their axis and as such would flame out.
Such a scenario has significant outcomes for hydraulics, electrics and pressurization. The RAT, which, (going from memory) would deploy with the loss of either hydraulic pressure or AC1 & AC2 busses, would not be able to develop hydraulic presssure and there for power the emergency generator, for the same reason. That would mean that only VHF1 would be powered, and that, only by the batteries.
Possibly this post will be ridiculed, more experienced pilots will understand it, I hope some less experienced pilots will just think, without jumping down my throat.
To you, to p51guy and others who fly but have essentially left this thread to the guessers, we know the lessons are there for the patient and wise who are starting out in this career and that is where to seek best value from this thread. Pro-active decision-making and avoidance are the keys.
I suspect here very strongly but am not allowed to say so because I have no "evidence", that this crew likely went from benign flight conditions with some moderate turbulence to a rapidly degrading airplane in both the technical and controllability senses in less time than it takes to read this post.
At 0210Z, it was already too late. Those who wonder why no distress call was made do not comprehend such circumstances or the rapidity with which such things occur or the ensuing chaos and strange motions, sounds, sensations and behaviours of a once-familiar aircraft and operating environment.
Someone said a transport category aircraft loses control "gracefully" - very true, simply due to it's mass, and this is the very aspect which makes any actions and any recovery at high altitude, (as testified by those who have done high altitude stalls), dubious, especially in the circumstances this crew found themselves.
It's all been said in a hundred different ways, and the focus on minutae about how such a mass behaves in a stall, one's definition of "flat" spins etc etc, is all post facto.
Woodvale, your "up front during weather" notion is part of that kind of preventative thinking. Everything after 0215Z or so is after the fact.
takata;
I will take time to read the suggested document thank you. I understand your reasons to suggest a controlled glide.
In response to present posts,... I suggested a dual engine flameout last week but the notion was never responded to.
I consider this outcome a distinct possibility if what the BEA said actually happened the angle of attack would be such that the airflow would no longer be "through" the engines but perpendicular to their axis and as such would flame out.
Such a scenario has significant outcomes for hydraulics, electrics and pressurization. The RAT, which, (going from memory) would deploy with the loss of either hydraulic pressure or AC1 & AC2 busses, would not be able to develop hydraulic presssure and there for power the emergency generator, for the same reason. That would mean that only VHF1 would be powered, and that, only by the batteries.
Last edited by PJ2; 6th Jul 2009 at 18:57.
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ARFOR:
takata Re: Resumption of ACARS output (following dual ENG FAIL and EMER ELEC) :
- If the RAT deployed, no ACARS dice eh?
- Controlled flight prior to ENG FAIL? ACARS?
Irrespective, are you suggesting they might have entered a 'controlled' glide?
takata Re: Resumption of ACARS output (following dual ENG FAIL and EMER ELEC) :
- If the RAT deployed, no ACARS dice eh?
- Controlled flight prior to ENG FAIL? ACARS?
Irrespective, are you suggesting they might have entered a 'controlled' glide?
2. If I'm suggesting they entered "controlled glide"? => YES.
Why?
a) see my post here: http://www.pprune.org/5011256-post2085.html
The drift doesn't fit with a 0210-0214 close crash. This was a pure constatation, no theory (agenda) behind, based only on the BEA genuine documents, not on various unreliable press reports, not on rumors, and I still stand correct following this actual Interim report.
b) the area searched for the CVR/FDR, until yet, is unsuccessfull but doesn't cover enough to the southern area (20-30 NM farther). This is ruling out the fast crash (0214 or close) hypothesis and it is the best case to have a chance of discovering the wreckage.... OR, the pingers were destroyed (worst case).
S~
Olivier
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PJ Have you a view on the SATCOM in EMER ELEC (RAT or NOT) config?
takata Re: Your glide (complete airframe) theory:-
That depends on where the Brazilians found occupants (position, Lat long), verses the occupants found by the French (position, Lat long).
Do you agree that the two groups were miles apart (minus drift) and could not reasonably have arrived on the surface in the same location?; and then (in the days following) drifted apart (in such dissimilar directions) in two distinctly separate groups?
Following on, which group position (minus drift) are you basing your [pinger/ aft fuse wreckage] assumptions on?
takata Re: Your glide (complete airframe) theory:-
That depends on where the Brazilians found occupants (position, Lat long), verses the occupants found by the French (position, Lat long).
Do you agree that the two groups were miles apart (minus drift) and could not reasonably have arrived on the surface in the same location?; and then (in the days following) drifted apart (in such dissimilar directions) in two distinctly separate groups?
Following on, which group position (minus drift) are you basing your [pinger/ aft fuse wreckage] assumptions on?
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Woodvale, PJ2 and all the many posters (especially including the non-pilot experts on Satcoms etc) who have enlightened us all, thank you!
Woodvale, I sincerely hope that every young pilot who thinks he's untouchable reads your post but somehow I doubt it. So it's up to those of us who have survived to still fly, to ensure they're made fully aware of the dangers of not keeping their handling skills up to scratch and of the limitations of weather radar at high altitudes especially in tropical areas.
Now which airline in the middle east has forbidden their pilots to handfly the a/c?
Woodvale, I sincerely hope that every young pilot who thinks he's untouchable reads your post but somehow I doubt it. So it's up to those of us who have survived to still fly, to ensure they're made fully aware of the dangers of not keeping their handling skills up to scratch and of the limitations of weather radar at high altitudes especially in tropical areas.
Now which airline in the middle east has forbidden their pilots to handfly the a/c?