woodvale;
Possibly this post will be ridiculed, more experienced pilots will understand it, I hope some less experienced pilots will just think, without jumping down my throat.
Your response will only be ridiculed by those who don't fly or don't know the 330 yet want instant answers anyway. You know exactly what you're talking about.
To you, to p51guy and others who fly but have essentially left this thread to the guessers, we know the lessons are there for the patient and wise who are starting out in this career and that is where to seek best value from this thread. Pro-active decision-making and avoidance are the keys.
I suspect here very strongly but am not allowed to say so because I have no "evidence", that this crew likely went from benign flight conditions with some moderate turbulence to a rapidly degrading airplane in both the technical and controllability senses in less time than it takes to read this post.
At 0210Z, it was already too late. Those who wonder why no distress call was made do not comprehend such circumstances or the rapidity with which such things occur or the ensuing chaos and strange motions, sounds, sensations and behaviours of a once-familiar aircraft and operating environment.
Someone said a transport category aircraft loses control "gracefully" - very true, simply due to it's mass, and this is the very aspect which makes any actions and any recovery at high altitude, (as testified by those who have done high altitude stalls), dubious, especially in the circumstances this crew found themselves.
It's all been said in a hundred different ways, and the focus on minutae about how such a mass behaves in a stall, one's definition of "flat" spins etc etc, is all post facto.
Woodvale, your "up front during weather" notion is part of that kind of preventative thinking. Everything after 0215Z or so is after the fact.
takata;
I will take time to read the suggested document thank you. I understand your reasons to suggest a controlled glide.
In response to present posts,... I suggested a dual engine flameout last week but the notion was never responded to.
I consider this outcome a distinct possibility if what the BEA said actually happened the angle of attack would be such that the airflow would no longer be "through" the engines but perpendicular to their axis and as such would flame out.
Such a scenario has significant outcomes for hydraulics, electrics and pressurization. The RAT, which, (going from memory) would deploy with the loss of either hydraulic pressure or AC1 & AC2 busses, would not be able to develop hydraulic presssure and there for power the emergency generator, for the same reason. That would mean that only VHF1 would be powered, and that, only by the batteries.