Airbus crash/training flight
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It isn't B vs. A. That argument is hangar crap talk. The bones of the discussion rest on the marble slab of straightforward piloting, and an aircraft that is bipolar. Asseline was a "good stick", before his brand spankin' new a/c went into the trees. All his fault? Perpignan? Why is BEA stingy on the cockpit polylogue and graphs? The difference is repose. When confronted with poor pilots, the debate is (or should be) on hold. What happens (indeed) when the occasional disparate challenge rears up? Trim is for comfort, but can kill everybody when it goes off on its own (clackety clack?). The Bus wants to fly with ease, (read "independently"), the Boeing is a team member. When no one knows their duty, bad things happen. At times when the AB needs a test-pilot, it gets (by design), a drum major. (No offense). "Let's try this", are you for chrissakes kidding me? Nice to hear from Cap'n Crunch, it's harsh, but accurate.
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I agree with everything capn crunch said so figured he would get hammered severly by the AB side. Still waiting.
The yoke is such a giveaway when the other pilot has turbulence on every approach and you don't. PIO's would be harder to detect with a side stick than a yoke. With a yoke you always know who is hand flying if a captain has to intervene or vice versa. With a yoke if you have the yoke all the way forward and the nose is still pitching up you know you have to reduce power initially to regain control or roll into a bank to get the nose down to sort things out. Both pilots know what is going on, not just one. Never having used a side stick I am just using posts on this forum and an A320 pilot friend to understand how it works.
The yoke is such a giveaway when the other pilot has turbulence on every approach and you don't. PIO's would be harder to detect with a side stick than a yoke. With a yoke you always know who is hand flying if a captain has to intervene or vice versa. With a yoke if you have the yoke all the way forward and the nose is still pitching up you know you have to reduce power initially to regain control or roll into a bank to get the nose down to sort things out. Both pilots know what is going on, not just one. Never having used a side stick I am just using posts on this forum and an A320 pilot friend to understand how it works.
Captain-Crunch
Absolutely.
Nothing more to be said, and thank you.
When in doubt - and it is obvious that occasionally button pushers don't even know when there is anything to doubt - Fly The Bl**dy Aeroplane.
The Wright Brothers didn't have any problem - the rest is " Progress " ??
(I hadn't even thought of the problem of drinking my coffee and operating a sidestick at the same time - but then - I've never even flown a Glass Cockpit )
Absolutely.
Nothing more to be said, and thank you.
When in doubt - and it is obvious that occasionally button pushers don't even know when there is anything to doubt - Fly The Bl**dy Aeroplane.
The Wright Brothers didn't have any problem - the rest is " Progress " ??
(I hadn't even thought of the problem of drinking my coffee and operating a sidestick at the same time - but then - I've never even flown a Glass Cockpit )
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@cpt crunch
dont know if you fly the bus, but you should know that in this nice aircraft there is no reason to grap the stick and to keep it hold until you see your handbones getting white 
this is because of autotrim. you just give inputs to adjust the desired pitch/bank values but then you should keep almost "stick free", also to avoid PIO.
And as already mentioned we all know about CRM, which means "your controls" to your fellow colleague - or switch on the autopilot - finally let me ask WHY DO YOU TRINK COFFEE DURING MANUAL FLYING
- I never did and I will never do.
And the seat is moved with small, easy electrical switches. - Its a great aircraft.
this is because of autotrim. you just give inputs to adjust the desired pitch/bank values but then you should keep almost "stick free", also to avoid PIO.
And as already mentioned we all know about CRM, which means "your controls" to your fellow colleague - or switch on the autopilot - finally let me ask WHY DO YOU TRINK COFFEE DURING MANUAL FLYING
- I never did and I will never do.And the seat is moved with small, easy electrical switches. - Its a great aircraft.
@CptCrunch & others
I'm a bit surprised about the bluntness of some statements.
All modern airliners are vastly complex machines, no matter if they are B or A.
Understanding how they work and behave is ESSENTIAL in all makes. These are not Cessna's which can be flown by pure gutt feeling. The technical dependencies are simply too complicated for that. There are logics and algorithms in a lot of important areas, many of them can kill you if you don't understand them and/or don't follow the books.
Yes the concepts vary in detail quite a bit between A and B but still everyone ridiculing about the button pushers is good fun but in reality quite off the mark.
And now : waiting for the Flak
I'm a bit surprised about the bluntness of some statements.
All modern airliners are vastly complex machines, no matter if they are B or A.
Understanding how they work and behave is ESSENTIAL in all makes. These are not Cessna's which can be flown by pure gutt feeling. The technical dependencies are simply too complicated for that. There are logics and algorithms in a lot of important areas, many of them can kill you if you don't understand them and/or don't follow the books.
Yes the concepts vary in detail quite a bit between A and B but still everyone ridiculing about the button pushers is good fun but in reality quite off the mark.
And now : waiting for the Flak
Last edited by henra; 17th Jul 2010 at 11:22.
a straightforward opinion
seems to me, as a none flier, that Capt C has given a straightforward statement of his experiences and concerns. How can that be contentious ? With my zero hours on the flight deck, even I understood it.
This news item just out in New Zealand media:
Pilots at fault in Air New Zealand crash - report | Stuff.co.nz
Can´t find the BEA report on their website yet, though.
France's BEA air accident investigation agency, in its final report, said the pilots were not competent to fly at such a low level and that ground crew had incorrectly washed the airliner, causing water to enter key detectors.
Once in flight, the water froze in the probes, which measure the plane's angle of flight and ought to have emitted a warning if the jet was stalling.
The pilots - who should not have been flying so slowly - lost control of the plane and crashed into the sea, the BEA report concluded.
While the pilots were permitted to conduct the unusual test flight, they lacked the technical competence to do so and "the decision to undertake the test at a low altitude" and at low speed contributed to the crash.
Once in flight, the water froze in the probes, which measure the plane's angle of flight and ought to have emitted a warning if the jet was stalling.
The pilots - who should not have been flying so slowly - lost control of the plane and crashed into the sea, the BEA report concluded.
While the pilots were permitted to conduct the unusual test flight, they lacked the technical competence to do so and "the decision to undertake the test at a low altitude" and at low speed contributed to the crash.
Can´t find the BEA report on their website yet, though.
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Link to the report Accident on approach to Perpignan (France)
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This is the link I was just given :
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2008/d-la...d-la081127.pdf
Haven't read it yet, I presume it's the same.
CJ
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2008/d-la...d-la081127.pdf
Haven't read it yet, I presume it's the same.
CJ
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During the approach, the crew decided, without preparation, and specifically without any callout of the theoretical minimum speeds indicated in the document at their disposal, to undertake the check on the angle of attack protections in normal law at an altitude of about 4,000 feet. However, the blockage of angle of attack sensors 1 and 2 at identical values had inhibited the functioning of these protections and led to an erroneous display of the characteristic speeds of these protections.
The crew waited for these protections to be triggered while allowing the speed to decrease. The first triggering of the stall warning in normal law, at an angle of attack close to the theoretical angle of attack in landing configuration, indicates that angle of attack sensor 3 was functioning at that moment. The Captain reacted in accordance with the technique for approach-to-stall by increasing engine thrust and reducing longitudinal pitch.
Shortly after this, the flight control law changed from normal to direct due to a difference in the speed measurements. For this reason, after having progressively moved the horizontal stabiliser to the full pitch-up position during the deceleration, the autotrim system was no longer available. The horizontal stabiliser remained in this position until the end of the flight. Under the combined effect of the thrust and the increase in speed, the aeroplane was subject to a pitch-up moment that the Captain was not able to counter. The Captain did not react with any input on the trim wheel at any time or to reduce engine thrust in any prolonged manner.
Due to the position of the stabilizer and the pitch-up moment generated by the engines at full thrust, the crew lost control of the aeroplane during the increase in thrust. The aeroplane was completely destroyed on impact with the surface of the sea.
The crew waited for these protections to be triggered while allowing the speed to decrease. The first triggering of the stall warning in normal law, at an angle of attack close to the theoretical angle of attack in landing configuration, indicates that angle of attack sensor 3 was functioning at that moment. The Captain reacted in accordance with the technique for approach-to-stall by increasing engine thrust and reducing longitudinal pitch.
Shortly after this, the flight control law changed from normal to direct due to a difference in the speed measurements. For this reason, after having progressively moved the horizontal stabiliser to the full pitch-up position during the deceleration, the autotrim system was no longer available. The horizontal stabiliser remained in this position until the end of the flight. Under the combined effect of the thrust and the increase in speed, the aeroplane was subject to a pitch-up moment that the Captain was not able to counter. The Captain did not react with any input on the trim wheel at any time or to reduce engine thrust in any prolonged manner.
Due to the position of the stabilizer and the pitch-up moment generated by the engines at full thrust, the crew lost control of the aeroplane during the increase in thrust. The aeroplane was completely destroyed on impact with the surface of the sea.
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NO tactile feedback led to loss of control.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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I cannot understand why, having recovered once to S&L un-stalled controlled flight, they let it go again?
I wonder if the rah-rah crowd supporting auto-trim are quite so sure now? It was suggested a while back (somewhere) that a warning of trim position should be introduced requiring a conscious over-ride to move to an extreme nose-up position. NB All types
I wonder if the rah-rah crowd supporting auto-trim are quite so sure now? It was suggested a while back (somewhere) that a warning of trim position should be introduced requiring a conscious over-ride to move to an extreme nose-up position. NB All types
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I might understand the "anti Airbus" sentiments if this accident involved fare paying passengers, or crew members acting in accordance with their training.
I mean no criticism of the crew - they no doubt found themselves where they were partly by misfortune - but they flew a Test Pilots' schedule (not an airline handover schedule) and quite deliberately ignored the safety limits (min Alt) clearly stated in the Schedule.
Go and look at the now seemingly regular aerobatics flown by EJ 737s over East Anglia, and you will see this is an area fraught with danger for all types. In both EJ cases, I reckon if they had flown their tests at 4000', they would also have paid with their lives... fortunately they did not (or rather not "fortunately" but "correctly").
Can you really think it correct for airline crews to go out and test the equivalent of the "stalling speed" without having a good idea of what that speed should be, depsite it being presented in a table in the schedule, and still flying (IIRC) some 15K+ below it wondering when things might start to happen
Am sure I will be flamed for this pov
NoD
I mean no criticism of the crew - they no doubt found themselves where they were partly by misfortune - but they flew a Test Pilots' schedule (not an airline handover schedule) and quite deliberately ignored the safety limits (min Alt) clearly stated in the Schedule.
Go and look at the now seemingly regular aerobatics flown by EJ 737s over East Anglia, and you will see this is an area fraught with danger for all types. In both EJ cases, I reckon if they had flown their tests at 4000', they would also have paid with their lives... fortunately they did not (or rather not "fortunately" but "correctly").
Can you really think it correct for airline crews to go out and test the equivalent of the "stalling speed" without having a good idea of what that speed should be, depsite it being presented in a table in the schedule, and still flying (IIRC) some 15K+ below it wondering when things might start to happen
Am sure I will be flamed for this pov
NoD
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How come the AoA sensor seals let in water? There can be little difference between a jet wash and climbing to FL350 at 200kts through rain. Aren't the probes heated automatically?
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Nigel
Thanks. I thought that the recent AAIB on the EJ upset must have been a more thorough examination of the previous event. They seemed identical.
I never for a moment, thought they'd had a second event.
I thought the point of investigating these things was................
Thanks. I thought that the recent AAIB on the EJ upset must have been a more thorough examination of the previous event. They seemed identical.
I never for a moment, thought they'd had a second event.
I thought the point of investigating these things was................
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I expect there is already a link on the thread to what the AoA sensors on the A320 look like. Could somebody oblige, rather than wade back through 62 pages?
As an ancient, to me an AoA sensor is a small vane, and a jet of water would have drained off it like water from a duck's back.
CJ