Airbus crash/training flight
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It wouldn't have happened in an A320 with competent pilots either. Or an Embraer or a Bombardier or a Piper.
No doubt the accident crew was competent, but unfortunately not for what they what they got themselves into. As with the "competent" Cali crew in P51guy's post, they made a huge mistake that day. It might be borne out by the CVR and FDR that through most of the flight, they did things well. Save for one. And that one thing was the one that killed them.
No doubt the accident crew was competent, but unfortunately not for what they what they got themselves into. As with the "competent" Cali crew in P51guy's post, they made a huge mistake that day. It might be borne out by the CVR and FDR that through most of the flight, they did things well. Save for one. And that one thing was the one that killed them.
Digging up Cali is a sign of desperation, the causes of Cali are well understood and had zilch to do with anything discussed here.
Maybe we should be discussing Nagoya... or all the other mode confusions/envelope protection incidents/accidents.. of which there are damned plenty... and none of 'em Boeing.
Maybe we should be discussing Nagoya... or all the other mode confusions/envelope protection incidents/accidents.. of which there are damned plenty... and none of 'em Boeing.
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too, not to. I hate those errors.
Edit: so that we knew which "to" was referred to.
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You can edit a post after submitting? I have never flown an airbus so was just saying letting pitch because of too much thrust reach an uncontrollably high attitude without quickly reducing power before reaching an unsafe attitude wouldn't be possible in any of the 72 different types of aircraft I have flown. The only way would be to let the power stay high and not do anything about it until it was uncontrollable.
If this line is here I now know how to edit and must be declared worthy of editing old posts.
If this line is here I now know how to edit and must be declared worthy of editing old posts.
Last edited by p51guy; 9th Jul 2010 at 21:38.
You can edit a post after submitting?
This is getting ridiculous, better things to do.
Last edited by ExSp33db1rd; 9th Jul 2010 at 21:19. Reason: Correct w to W and d to D
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Digging up Cali is a sign of desperation, the causes of Cali are well understood and had zilch to do with anything discussed here.
Maybe we should be discussing Nagoya... or all the other mode confusions/envelope protection incidents/accidents.. of which there are damned plenty... and none of 'em Boeing.
Maybe we should be discussing Nagoya... or all the other mode confusions/envelope protection incidents/accidents.. of which there are damned plenty... and none of 'em Boeing.
I don't think any air transport aircraft over 50Tons irrespective of who designed it could have been in that training flt energy regime and recovered within the height available.
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Advancing power levers on a 757 on the ground will retract the speed brakes automatically. It was to assist in a go around after touchdown. Boeing didn't deem it necessary in flight. Procedures were changed after that incident to verify speed brake retracted on all GPWS alerts. It might have let them clear the ridge but it would have been so close.
I flew that night in the same area and with no moon coming over the hills you could not see anything with unlimited visibility. A month later Cali offered us the same straight in approach down the Valley they were offered and I declined it to overfly and do the ILS. If it wasn't for their crash I would have taken it but it was an easy non precision approach and shouldn't have ended up like it did.
I flew that night in the same area and with no moon coming over the hills you could not see anything with unlimited visibility. A month later Cali offered us the same straight in approach down the Valley they were offered and I declined it to overfly and do the ILS. If it wasn't for their crash I would have taken it but it was an easy non precision approach and shouldn't have ended up like it did.
Last edited by p51guy; 9th Jul 2010 at 22:48.
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We declined it because a month before almost 200 people died doing that. It was a safe approach but it was too close to the tragedy and out of respect for the dead we didn't want to show how it should have been done. We respected the crew that died that day and proving it could be done easily didn't seem appropriate. It took 5 minutes and we had an ILS approach at night.
Most of the passengers probably knew what happened the month before and would have preferred what we did. Flying into Cali dozens of times that was the only time I was offered a straight in approach.
Most of the passengers probably knew what happened the month before and would have preferred what we did. Flying into Cali dozens of times that was the only time I was offered a straight in approach.
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Due to the faulty information sent by two of the AoA sensors, it is probable that the speed tape as presented to the crew was erroneous, bringing some confusion. The indicated airspeed was correct, but the protection speeds which are based on aerodynamic data were misplaced.
The FACs have been duped by the AoA sensors for the representation of the protection speeds on the PFDs. The ELACs have been duped as well, as the protections did not activate.
The FACs have been duped by the AoA sensors for the representation of the protection speeds on the PFDs. The ELACs have been duped as well, as the protections did not activate.
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Point to be clarified ?
- Page 9 of the report mentions that the THS went to the pitch-up stop.
- Page 20 ... that the THS moved to 11.2 degrees NU and remained in this position.
- FCOM mentions that the maximum THS deflection is 13.5° nose up.
What's going on here ?
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For a full 25 seconds, the Captain sidestick has been almost constantly to the full forward position ... did he say anything on the fact he was trying to manually move the trim wheel ?
The CVR data published by the BEA are too little. Many things have been told on this flight deck except that the NZ pilot was putting pressure on the XL crew to proceed with the alpha floor test and the XL crew was unprepared to do so ...
There is a possibility the crew was also facing a STABILIZER JAM.
The CVR data published by the BEA are too little. Many things have been told on this flight deck except that the NZ pilot was putting pressure on the XL crew to proceed with the alpha floor test and the XL crew was unprepared to do so ...
There is a possibility the crew was also facing a STABILIZER JAM.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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The point surely still remains that in the middle of all this the a/c was flying quite happily unstalled but was then allowed to pitch up out of control. I believe 7 nose up and 144kts was achieved at one point? It would seem (with the usual 20/20) that had the power been pulled back then there would have been some time to think.
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True, but that would be only the second thing to try after an attempt to trim didn't work. As you say, at that point the situation seemed under control, probably was also the feeling for the pilot, but the very temporary release of the stick at time 15 45 20 has been fatal.
Question remains : During the first 10 seconds after stall warning, airplane was still in normal law, sidestick was mainly forward, but the autotrim didn't move ... Why ?
Was the THS jammed ?
Question remains : During the first 10 seconds after stall warning, airplane was still in normal law, sidestick was mainly forward, but the autotrim didn't move ... Why ?
Was the THS jammed ?
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Indictment of the button pushers
Airbuses are fine machines when ever thing works properly. But when faults happen, they don't always clearly annunciate to the crew what's wrong in a clear fashion. For example, the predecessor aircraft the A310/300 the trim would move without the stabilizer motion audio sounding when it was on autopilot.
Why?
As Captain eating dinner, I'd like to know when the damn tailplane is moving. Old boeings always gave me a visual, moving trim wheel or audible trim motion horn that I could see out of the corner of my eye or hear softly in the background. I'd get a warning that something was wrong. I'd sure like some warning that a runaway stab is likely in progress. I'd sure like some noise to know if the autopilot is over trimming because a sensor failed. It would give me a few extra seconds to worry that a trim miss match with the THS is possible and I would be on guard for a wild pitch up or down when I disconnected. It would direct me to look at the pitch trim to see if it made sense. On the first airbuses, the motion was only audible after five seconds or so. It was way too long a requirement, and since the trim wheel didn't move, and the autopilot trim system trimmed in short bursts most of the time, I never knew when the machine was trimming; so I couldn't easily detect cross controlling the trim on the tailplane.
Ah yes, Thrust Latch and a wild desperate struggle between the auto throttles and the FCP (who apparently were different departments at airbus.) The airbus "Bob Hoover" tailslide pull-up never made sense to me either. The silly thing would go to deck angle 90 degrees straight up if you let it. All it knew was to protect overspeed at all costs. And all the autothrottles knew was full rated power. It never occurred apparently to the french flight control programers to try to sync the disparate systems together? All I could figure out was that the bird didn't have a reasonable target deck angle to shoot for, since it was always hopelessly behind in the pull up (gradual for pax comfort you see), and would invariably always overspeed, requiring desperate airshow elevator and trim actions to keep from busting red line. Or maybe the original Autopilot logic was designed for smaller engines?
All I know is that Boeings, Douglas, BAe's, never did this to me. With Airbus however, you had to always be on guard to disconnect both A/P and A/T anytime Outto was groping his way through the air.
The brands are distinctively different, despite some of the "airbus denials" you read on these threads.
I have no experience on airbus sidestick models, but I always hated sidestick airplanes for the simple fact that you can't switch hands. What if you need to adjust your seat and wiggle: there you are; when hand flying, cemented into position like a statue unable to drink coffee with the right hand if you're an F/O or unable to turn your approach plate with your left hand if you're a Captain.
On jets with a yoke I constantly would switch hands as one become tired, use both for the takeoff, push on the tops of the ramshorns for more leverage, "fly on the trim" button alone.
In hand flying, you receive a real "feedback" with the physical motion of a large control column lever that a pressure side-stick just can't duplicate. Humans, studies have shown, are poor at monitoring automation or at judging pressure. But more importantly, being able to physically see with your peripheral vision what the other guy is doing with the huge yokes of the old Boeings was a huge benefit to understand what inputs your cpt or f/o is putting in. Instead of trying to figure out what he's doing or not doing over there in the airbus corner, with big throw/large travel yoke right next to you, there is no doubt.
And over riding the other guy is instinctive if he's losing it. You don't have to think about "Gee, how do I assert control of this thing?; push a button wait a bunch of seconds and bla bla bla.
There isn't time for that crap. In the Boeing control columns world, if he doesn't let go the differing forces with snap the two apart leaving the capt in control. But it never goes that far; that never happens because handling pilot can already see the Body English of the other pilot leaning forward and grasping the yoke, indicating that he's about to take over because he's unhappy with the flightpath.
What happens, pray tell, when the flight path goes bad on a democratic Airbus with sidesticks? Take a survey? Take a vote? Split the difference? Push buttons and hope to regain control? Who the hell's flying the thing? Both of you? Is it the autopilot or the guy guarding his secret stick with his arm in a crack? Nobody knows! Maybe he's dead over there... Slumped down on the armrest with crumby posture like he's donating blood at the Red Cross....
Side sticks suck, they are the bygone relics of a single pilot age. They belong in tandem fighter jets, not multi-pilot airliners, imho. You should be hand flying in a conventional fashion, adding back pressure in the turns on a regular basis; preparing for the day when the AOA sensors, or all three Pitot probes fail like with AF 447, and you will, (gasp), have to use your hand flying skills in manual law.
On that day, when all those nanny protection devices go on strike at the same time because of simple sensor failure, you will be glad that you did not count yourself in the ranks of the great button pusher pilots of tomorrow, so many of who post here claiming just more training or "understanding the systems better" is all that's required to avoid a similar fate. You will instead, be able to actually hand fly your way out of a wet paper bag, if that is required of you.
No one will thank you, and the public will assume that these new computer machines just fly themselves. You however, a real pilot, will know differently since you recognize and uphold a one hundred year old tradition of actually manually hand flying the actual airplane on the line!
Or alternatively, you can lie to yourself and parrot the airbus marketing hype that flying is safer not worrying about flying on the back side of the power curve since alpha floor is here to protect everybody.
It's your choice.
Crunch - out
Why?
As Captain eating dinner, I'd like to know when the damn tailplane is moving. Old boeings always gave me a visual, moving trim wheel or audible trim motion horn that I could see out of the corner of my eye or hear softly in the background. I'd get a warning that something was wrong. I'd sure like some warning that a runaway stab is likely in progress. I'd sure like some noise to know if the autopilot is over trimming because a sensor failed. It would give me a few extra seconds to worry that a trim miss match with the THS is possible and I would be on guard for a wild pitch up or down when I disconnected. It would direct me to look at the pitch trim to see if it made sense. On the first airbuses, the motion was only audible after five seconds or so. It was way too long a requirement, and since the trim wheel didn't move, and the autopilot trim system trimmed in short bursts most of the time, I never knew when the machine was trimming; so I couldn't easily detect cross controlling the trim on the tailplane.
Ah yes, Thrust Latch and a wild desperate struggle between the auto throttles and the FCP (who apparently were different departments at airbus.) The airbus "Bob Hoover" tailslide pull-up never made sense to me either. The silly thing would go to deck angle 90 degrees straight up if you let it. All it knew was to protect overspeed at all costs. And all the autothrottles knew was full rated power. It never occurred apparently to the french flight control programers to try to sync the disparate systems together? All I could figure out was that the bird didn't have a reasonable target deck angle to shoot for, since it was always hopelessly behind in the pull up (gradual for pax comfort you see), and would invariably always overspeed, requiring desperate airshow elevator and trim actions to keep from busting red line. Or maybe the original Autopilot logic was designed for smaller engines?
All I know is that Boeings, Douglas, BAe's, never did this to me. With Airbus however, you had to always be on guard to disconnect both A/P and A/T anytime Outto was groping his way through the air.
The brands are distinctively different, despite some of the "airbus denials" you read on these threads.
I have no experience on airbus sidestick models, but I always hated sidestick airplanes for the simple fact that you can't switch hands. What if you need to adjust your seat and wiggle: there you are; when hand flying, cemented into position like a statue unable to drink coffee with the right hand if you're an F/O or unable to turn your approach plate with your left hand if you're a Captain.
On jets with a yoke I constantly would switch hands as one become tired, use both for the takeoff, push on the tops of the ramshorns for more leverage, "fly on the trim" button alone.
In hand flying, you receive a real "feedback" with the physical motion of a large control column lever that a pressure side-stick just can't duplicate. Humans, studies have shown, are poor at monitoring automation or at judging pressure. But more importantly, being able to physically see with your peripheral vision what the other guy is doing with the huge yokes of the old Boeings was a huge benefit to understand what inputs your cpt or f/o is putting in. Instead of trying to figure out what he's doing or not doing over there in the airbus corner, with big throw/large travel yoke right next to you, there is no doubt.
And over riding the other guy is instinctive if he's losing it. You don't have to think about "Gee, how do I assert control of this thing?; push a button wait a bunch of seconds and bla bla bla.
There isn't time for that crap. In the Boeing control columns world, if he doesn't let go the differing forces with snap the two apart leaving the capt in control. But it never goes that far; that never happens because handling pilot can already see the Body English of the other pilot leaning forward and grasping the yoke, indicating that he's about to take over because he's unhappy with the flightpath.
What happens, pray tell, when the flight path goes bad on a democratic Airbus with sidesticks? Take a survey? Take a vote? Split the difference? Push buttons and hope to regain control? Who the hell's flying the thing? Both of you? Is it the autopilot or the guy guarding his secret stick with his arm in a crack? Nobody knows! Maybe he's dead over there... Slumped down on the armrest with crumby posture like he's donating blood at the Red Cross....
Side sticks suck, they are the bygone relics of a single pilot age. They belong in tandem fighter jets, not multi-pilot airliners, imho. You should be hand flying in a conventional fashion, adding back pressure in the turns on a regular basis; preparing for the day when the AOA sensors, or all three Pitot probes fail like with AF 447, and you will, (gasp), have to use your hand flying skills in manual law.
On that day, when all those nanny protection devices go on strike at the same time because of simple sensor failure, you will be glad that you did not count yourself in the ranks of the great button pusher pilots of tomorrow, so many of who post here claiming just more training or "understanding the systems better" is all that's required to avoid a similar fate. You will instead, be able to actually hand fly your way out of a wet paper bag, if that is required of you.
No one will thank you, and the public will assume that these new computer machines just fly themselves. You however, a real pilot, will know differently since you recognize and uphold a one hundred year old tradition of actually manually hand flying the actual airplane on the line!
Or alternatively, you can lie to yourself and parrot the airbus marketing hype that flying is safer not worrying about flying on the back side of the power curve since alpha floor is here to protect everybody.
It's your choice.
Crunch - out
Crunch...
Putting aside the various (and often vehement) opinons re AB v/s Boeing, your post above is a superb summary of one particular aspect of human factors and human performance. Well done.
grizz
Putting aside the various (and often vehement) opinons re AB v/s Boeing, your post above is a superb summary of one particular aspect of human factors and human performance. Well done.
grizz
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cant we change the record on this subject.
757 with blocked pitot probe crashes
757 with blocked static ports crashes
Trident stalls on take off out of heathrow, crashes
Korean 747 exceeds bank angle due to faulty instrument, crashes
A320 stalls during test flight at low level, crashes
It may surprise you but it ain't the technology.
757 with blocked pitot probe crashes
757 with blocked static ports crashes
Trident stalls on take off out of heathrow, crashes
Korean 747 exceeds bank angle due to faulty instrument, crashes
A320 stalls during test flight at low level, crashes
It may surprise you but it ain't the technology.
Basically, if you don't understand the way your aeroplane flies, stick to a less-demanding occupation, I would suggest.
Why on earth would you want some stone age trim wheel rattling back and forth every time your autopilot makes a trim change? Just because that's what it did on ol' Bubba Boeing's 707 isn't really a legitimate reason.
Ah, bless.....
You don't need to cling on to the sidestick like grim death like you apparently did to the yoke in your stone-age Boeing. But if you need to use that hand for some other reason and really are petrified of letting go of the sidestick, then the words "You have control" spring to mind.
Why on earth would you want some stone age trim wheel rattling back and forth every time your autopilot makes a trim change? Just because that's what it did on ol' Bubba Boeing's 707 isn't really a legitimate reason.
What if you need to adjust your seat and wiggle: there you are; when hand flying, cemented into position like a statue unable to drink coffee with the right hand if you're an F/O or unable to turn your approach plate with your left hand if you're a Captain.
You don't need to cling on to the sidestick like grim death like you apparently did to the yoke in your stone-age Boeing. But if you need to use that hand for some other reason and really are petrified of letting go of the sidestick, then the words "You have control" spring to mind.