Airbus crash/training flight
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Maxfli -
Thank you.....but.....40 seconds?! That seems like a very long time in a possible critical situation.
Depress the red disconnect pushbutton on the joystick for 40 secs and the other joystick becomes locked out.
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Sidestick priority
DC-ATE,
as soon as you press the button, your stick has priority. It was used "in anger" at least once to recover from an upset after takeoff when incorrect re-wiring of a stick after maintenance caused reverse roll commands.
If you press and hold the button for 40 seconds, the priority status becomes latched, and your stick keeps priority even when you release the button. Useful, e. g., as mentioned, when the other pilot becomes incapacitated, and his arm still leans against the stick, deflecting it.
If the take-over button (which doubles as A/P-disconnect button) is not pressed, both stick inputs are summed, limited to the amount of a single stick's maximum deflection.
Bernd
as soon as you press the button, your stick has priority. It was used "in anger" at least once to recover from an upset after takeoff when incorrect re-wiring of a stick after maintenance caused reverse roll commands.
If you press and hold the button for 40 seconds, the priority status becomes latched, and your stick keeps priority even when you release the button. Useful, e. g., as mentioned, when the other pilot becomes incapacitated, and his arm still leans against the stick, deflecting it.
If the take-over button (which doubles as A/P-disconnect button) is not pressed, both stick inputs are summed, limited to the amount of a single stick's maximum deflection.
Bernd
DC-ATE, you've misunderstood.
As I understand the concept:
Press and hold the 'on side' take-over button and control will be instantly transferred to that side. Keep it pressed for 40 sec and the other side will then be deactivated until reset, allowing the other side to maintain control permanently.
Thus if an incapacitated CM1 falls against the sidestick and keeps it displaced, as soon as CM2 presses his/her take-over button he/she takes control. After 40 sec he/she can release everything as the CM1 sidestick then has no effect.
Correct?
As I understand the concept:
Press and hold the 'on side' take-over button and control will be instantly transferred to that side. Keep it pressed for 40 sec and the other side will then be deactivated until reset, allowing the other side to maintain control permanently.
Thus if an incapacitated CM1 falls against the sidestick and keeps it displaced, as soon as CM2 presses his/her take-over button he/she takes control. After 40 sec he/she can release everything as the CM1 sidestick then has no effect.
Correct?
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Correct?
Press and hold the 'on side' take-over button and control will be instantly transferred to that side.
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BEagle - correct.
Lemurian - you do have to hold the priority button. If you release within 40 seconds the other sidestick becomes live again.
Tree said
You are right, no mention, and the current course no longer trains jammed THS as a separate item, it is included in the dual hydraulic failure training. However with a jammed THS you would only use CONF 3 for landing - as FCOM 3 says "Do not select configuration FULL so as not to degrade the handling qualities".
And in the FCTM when discussing HYD G+Y failure it says.. (not suggesting this failure happened, but it's good background)
"(1) The stabilizer is lost. In alternate law, the autotrim function is provided through the elevators. At landing gear extension, switching to direct law, the autotrim function is lost. However, the mean elevator position at that time is memorized, and becomes the reference for centered sidestick position. This is why, in order to ensure proper centered sidestick position for approach and landing, the procedure requires to wait for stabilization at VAPP, before landing gear extension.
If this procedure is missed, the flare and pitch control in case of go-around may be difficult. " (My bolding).
The information is there but you have to dig for it and understand the implications. So as this was effectively a go-around in CONF FULL instead of 3 - the pitch control was difficult...
Minor note - THS deflection was 11.2°, full deflection is 13.5°, so not quite at the stop.
TP
Lemurian - you do have to hold the priority button. If you release within 40 seconds the other sidestick becomes live again.
Tree said
My factory AI manuals do not make any mention of the fact that a HS trimmed full stop cannot be controlled by elevator. Neither was that covered during my training.
And in the FCTM when discussing HYD G+Y failure it says.. (not suggesting this failure happened, but it's good background)
"(1) The stabilizer is lost. In alternate law, the autotrim function is provided through the elevators. At landing gear extension, switching to direct law, the autotrim function is lost. However, the mean elevator position at that time is memorized, and becomes the reference for centered sidestick position. This is why, in order to ensure proper centered sidestick position for approach and landing, the procedure requires to wait for stabilization at VAPP, before landing gear extension.
If this procedure is missed, the flare and pitch control in case of go-around may be difficult. " (My bolding).
The information is there but you have to dig for it and understand the implications. So as this was effectively a go-around in CONF FULL instead of 3 - the pitch control was difficult...
Minor note - THS deflection was 11.2°, full deflection is 13.5°, so not quite at the stop.
TP
TP, I think Lemurian was referring to 'normal' take-over, whereas as you correctly surmised, my query concerned a take-over against an undesirable input from the other CM.
By keeping the button pressed, the CM who has taken over will maintain control - but needs to hold it for 40 sec to 'isolate' the other CM's sidestick.
Is that it?
By keeping the button pressed, the CM who has taken over will maintain control - but needs to hold it for 40 sec to 'isolate' the other CM's sidestick.
Is that it?
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Lemurian - you do have to hold the priority button. If you release within 40 seconds the other sidestick becomes live again.
Thanks. Shows how much I've used it !
I've only used it to confirm the "I have control ..." bit. I've never needed to de-activate the F/O's sidestick.
BEagle
my query concerned a take-over against an undesirable input from the other CM.
By keeping the button pressed, the CM who has taken over will maintain control - but needs to hold it for 40 sec to 'isolate' the other CM's sidestick.
Is that it?
By keeping the button pressed, the CM who has taken over will maintain control - but needs to hold it for 40 sec to 'isolate' the other CM's sidestick.
Is that it?
I have to say it's fascinating watching current, type rated pilots educating each other about more and more subtle interactions, reversions and sub-modes. I wish I knew that much about the aircraft I fly; *gets books out*.
I've just read the initial report and one section really hit home:
I remember being called off standby as P2 for an air test, very early on in my flying career. Great! I thought, that looks like fun... I won't bore with all the details but we did end up in an emergency descent with a door warning and both packs and one engine failed at one point (never got it relit). I had a fair amount of difficulty keeping up with the schedule and assumed the other pilot & engineers knew what they were doing. With the benefit of hindsight, I'm not sure that they did, especially as we had about 30 hangers-on in the back along for a 'jolly'. 
I really don't need to add that I had no training in and no adequate briefing for what we were attempting.
When you see:
followed by:
you can almost feel the time/commercial pressure building up. You end up in the absurd situation that you attempt something as a group that you would have never attempted as an individual. Two line pilots with an "observer" going where test pilots fear to tread. I'm very sympathetic as I've been there.
The precise technical details of what actually went wrong, near the end, will come out eventually. What stands out, I feel, is that when test pilots "test" something, they are prepared for that test to fail: indeed, they are *expecting* it to fail in a multitude of ways, having extensively researched the subject. For a normal line crew to be put into a situation like this is, at the very least, regrettable - in the extreme it could be argued it was a form of corporate manslaughter...
I've just read the initial report and one section really hit home:
The investigations initial findings brought to light the fact that there is a great diversity in the description made by operators of non-revenue flights, in the context that they establish for the preparation and execution of these flights, and in the selection and training of pilots. This diversity, along with the almost total absence of any indications or standards on non-revenue flights, can also lead to more or less improvising the performance of tests or to performing tests or checks in inappropriate parts of airspace and/or during flight phases with a high workload.
I really don't need to add that I had no training in and no adequate briefing for what we were attempting.When you see:
The Captain said “I think we will have to do the slow flight probably later” then “Or we do it on the way to Frankfurt or I even skip it”.
the Captain disengaged the autopilot. He said “Down below the clouds so you want what?” The New Zealand pilot answered “We need to go slow with err recovery from… recovery”.
The precise technical details of what actually went wrong, near the end, will come out eventually. What stands out, I feel, is that when test pilots "test" something, they are prepared for that test to fail: indeed, they are *expecting* it to fail in a multitude of ways, having extensively researched the subject. For a normal line crew to be put into a situation like this is, at the very least, regrettable - in the extreme it could be argued it was a form of corporate manslaughter...
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FullWings
Have a look at the CRM book, and it's certainly not commercial pressure...
That the cockpit set-up was a bit abnormal is saying the least as you've also noticed that (page 43) the ANZ pilot actively participated in the tests (Granted, just the "systems" test on the ECAM ) but still, it could have been done by either pilot or an engineer...
Who really was in charge ?
That has been the argument of a few of us for some time, but we cannot, with the data we have, rule out the possibility of a technical failure that prevented them from recovering from their predicament.
you can almost feel the time/commercial pressure building up. You end up in the absurd situation that you attempt something as a group that you would have never attempted as an individual.
That the cockpit set-up was a bit abnormal is saying the least as you've also noticed that (page 43) the ANZ pilot actively participated in the tests (Granted, just the "systems" test on the ECAM ) but still, it could have been done by either pilot or an engineer...
Who really was in charge ?
What stands out, I feel, is that when test pilots "test" something, they are prepared for that test to fail: indeed, they are *expecting* it to fail in a multitude of ways, having extensively researched the subject.
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The information is there but you have to dig for it and understand the implications. So as this was effectively a go-around in CONF FULL instead of 3 - the pitch control was difficult...
Minor note - THS deflection was 11.2°, full deflection is 13.5°, so not quite at the stop.
TP
Minor note - THS deflection was 11.2°, full deflection is 13.5°, so not quite at the stop.
TP
From 15 h 45 min 57 s, the Captain’s longitudinal input was nose up, the elevator was at 14.5° nose down. At 15 h 45 min 58 s, the flaps and slats were selected to position 1, then to position 0 two seconds later. At 15 h 46 min 00 s, the stall warning stopped and was followed by a CRC warning that corresponded to a Master Warning, which stopped two seconds later.
At 15 h 46 min 01 s, the pitch reached a maximum of 51° nose down. The bank angle was 45° to the right, the speed was 183 kt and the altitude about 1,620 ft. From this moment on, the Captain’s longitudinal input was to the rear stop. At 15 h 46 min 02 s, the thrust control levers were pulled back towards a position close to IDLE (about 6°). The EPR on both engines dropped towards 1.2.
At 15 h 46 min 02 s, the thrust control levers were placed on CLIMB. The EPR on both engines increased towards 1.25.
At 15 h 46 min 04 s, a GPWS TERRAIN TERRAIN warning was recorded.
At 15 h 46 min 05 s, another CRC warning (Master Warning) was set off.
The recordings stopped at 15 h 46 min 06.8 s. The last recorded values were a pitch of 14° nose down, a bank angle of 15° to the right, a speed of 263 kt and an altitude of 340 ft.
So in the last 5.8 seconds the a/c pitched from 51 degrees down to 14 degrees nose down.....it increased 80kts from 183kts to 263kts.
Does a 37 degree pitch change in 5.8 seconds with an average speed of 223 kts equate to a g loading similar to the limiting figure of 2.5g that some have mentioned?
Regards Framer
Does a 37 degree pitch change in 5.8 seconds with an average speed of 223 kts equate to a g loading similar to the limiting figure of 2.5g that some have mentioned?
Regards Framer
framer;
Perhaps what you're really asking is, was the aircraft's response limiting the ability to increase the 'g' load beyond the limit, possibly to avoid striking the water? How close the aircraft was to a tertiary stall would be one of the open questions of course.
Another point of view is, this is an interesting question because I believe it may touch upon a basic misconception of fbw and the 320 automation. The assumption may possibly be, the fbw automation will, through the flight controls, prevent a 2.5g load in all circumstances, (because that is the control law and that is what the system is designed to do).
At this point, we have an aircraft that is entirely out of control with, for reasons we do not fully understand yet, a THS angle of just above 11deg NU and a CAS of 263kts.
The key is in understanding that what the airplane was doing in pitch as a result of the 11+deg NU THS setting was, in the last 6 seconds or so, beyond the capability of the flight controls to counter regardless of the operating control laws and the flight control orders. This may be one interpretation of the L&R Elevator position parameter which, in the last 9 seconds or so is 12.5deg ND, perhaps, (we don't know) trying to counter the rising pitch and increasing 'g' load. At those speeds and pitch rates, the 'g' load would have been quite high I should think.
Both an acceleration rate and a pitch change in the time stated is obviously possible because that's what it did.
We do not know yet why the THS remained at it's last setting. From what I understand about the admittedly-rapidly changing events and circumstances, there were a few "windows" of possible response by the ELACs and SECs to begin reducing the THS setting. For whatever reason, that did not happen.
Clearly the airplane was responding, during the rapid, last dive, to the trim setting because the data shows that the nose was beginning to rise again, just as the aircraft struck the water.
It was mentioned in an earlier post that we don't know that the crew did not try to manually change the THS setting. I agree - we don't know that from the data that has been available to us all. We don't even know if the THS was not in some way jammed at it's last position and the crew tried very hard to move the manual trim wheel on the pedestal. The data shows no movement of the THS. We do know however, that, assuming a normally-operating THS, that it is manually, mechanically possible to change the trim setting. There is not enough data to conclude anything further.
Still thinking about this, however...
Does a 37 degree pitch change in 5.8 seconds with an average speed of 223 kts equate to a g loading similar to the limiting figure of 2.5g that some have mentioned?
Another point of view is, this is an interesting question because I believe it may touch upon a basic misconception of fbw and the 320 automation. The assumption may possibly be, the fbw automation will, through the flight controls, prevent a 2.5g load in all circumstances, (because that is the control law and that is what the system is designed to do).
At this point, we have an aircraft that is entirely out of control with, for reasons we do not fully understand yet, a THS angle of just above 11deg NU and a CAS of 263kts.
The key is in understanding that what the airplane was doing in pitch as a result of the 11+deg NU THS setting was, in the last 6 seconds or so, beyond the capability of the flight controls to counter regardless of the operating control laws and the flight control orders. This may be one interpretation of the L&R Elevator position parameter which, in the last 9 seconds or so is 12.5deg ND, perhaps, (we don't know) trying to counter the rising pitch and increasing 'g' load. At those speeds and pitch rates, the 'g' load would have been quite high I should think.
Both an acceleration rate and a pitch change in the time stated is obviously possible because that's what it did.
We do not know yet why the THS remained at it's last setting. From what I understand about the admittedly-rapidly changing events and circumstances, there were a few "windows" of possible response by the ELACs and SECs to begin reducing the THS setting. For whatever reason, that did not happen.
Clearly the airplane was responding, during the rapid, last dive, to the trim setting because the data shows that the nose was beginning to rise again, just as the aircraft struck the water.
It was mentioned in an earlier post that we don't know that the crew did not try to manually change the THS setting. I agree - we don't know that from the data that has been available to us all. We don't even know if the THS was not in some way jammed at it's last position and the crew tried very hard to move the manual trim wheel on the pedestal. The data shows no movement of the THS. We do know however, that, assuming a normally-operating THS, that it is manually, mechanically possible to change the trim setting. There is not enough data to conclude anything further.
Still thinking about this, however...
Last edited by PJ2; 2nd Mar 2009 at 23:32.
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Originally Posted by bsieker
Connecting lines should not have been drawn, and arguably even the invalid data points should not have been plotted. They have no significance whatsoever.
In fact such lines should never be drawn, unless the expected rate-of-change is so low that linear interpolation will provide a sufficient approximation.
In fact such lines should never be drawn, unless the expected rate-of-change is so low that linear interpolation will provide a sufficient approximation.
Thanks PJ,
I'm still not sure of the answer though...are you saying that it can't be calculated from the info available?
My line of thinking is that the THS and the aft side-stick are combining to try and pitch the a/c nose up. The attitude is pitching up at a rate of about 6 degrees per second (in the last 6 secs) . Is the reason for the pitch rate being limited to six degrees/sec because of aerodynamic forces or does it relate to the onboard computers limiting the rate (through elevator) with max g loading in mind?
PS I am aware that I'm out of my depth here with respect to Airbus systems knowledge and accident investigation knowledge, I appreciate the answers supplied by those of you more kowledgable than I.
I'm still not sure of the answer though...are you saying that it can't be calculated from the info available?
My line of thinking is that the THS and the aft side-stick are combining to try and pitch the a/c nose up. The attitude is pitching up at a rate of about 6 degrees per second (in the last 6 secs) . Is the reason for the pitch rate being limited to six degrees/sec because of aerodynamic forces or does it relate to the onboard computers limiting the rate (through elevator) with max g loading in mind?
PS I am aware that I'm out of my depth here with respect to Airbus systems knowledge and accident investigation knowledge, I appreciate the answers supplied by those of you more kowledgable than I.
framer;
Well I think first of all those are good questions to ask and would be challenging for even Airbus pilots to answer because these are flight regimes with which most would notbe familiar. Lest some take from that statement the false notion that there are pilots out there "who do not understand their airplane sufficiently, these control laws are at the very edges if not beyond the normal flight envelope and are in test-pilot and engineer territory where no airline pilot has a right to be.
The actual calculation of the 'g' load could be done quite easily - I imagine that it's a matter of inserting the knowns (TAS, pitch rate) into the equation but I am not a mathematician or engineer so will leave the rest of the answer for someone who is qualified to respond.
As stated, the elevators were already fully down to the stops. We don't know whether they were effective in reducing the 'g' load or whether the high speed and high THS angle made rendered their deflection less, or even not effective - that is a question for another Airbus engineer. Is there something to learn from the last eight seconds or so? The first people to answer that question will be the Investigators.
To the point many have brought up here however, is there something to learn regarding C* Laws (traditional name for fbw laws) or are we in territory so far outside the envelope that engineers cannot reasonably be expected to design a machine that is crash-proof. We must keep in mind that despite vast misconceptions on the part of some, especially those who do not fly the 320, automation, fbw and control laws do not make the airplane crash-proof nor was that ever the claim, nor would it reasonably be the expectation of flight crews.
The next question that is naturally to be asked however is, let us say that the control law did do as it was designed and limited the 'g' load to 2.5g's. What then, in this particular accident? Given a higher altitude, was the aircraft entering an increasing fugoid response which would have eventually exceeded either the airplane's or the crew's ability to regain control? We simply don't know.
Control laws are designed to take maximum advantage of the airfoil while keeping the aircraft out of the stall regime, (although high 'g' loads will pass the flight control computers to "alternate law, restricted or unrestricted"), and/or keep the structure within certification design limits. Must these same laws also cater to those circumstances where there may be insufficient altitude to recover?
That is about the limit of what I can say to someone who doesn't fly the airplane and it is getting close to the limits of my knowledge as well. Best leave the question open for others more capable than I to have a go at.
Well I think first of all those are good questions to ask and would be challenging for even Airbus pilots to answer because these are flight regimes with which most would notbe familiar. Lest some take from that statement the false notion that there are pilots out there "who do not understand their airplane sufficiently, these control laws are at the very edges if not beyond the normal flight envelope and are in test-pilot and engineer territory where no airline pilot has a right to be.
The actual calculation of the 'g' load could be done quite easily - I imagine that it's a matter of inserting the knowns (TAS, pitch rate) into the equation but I am not a mathematician or engineer so will leave the rest of the answer for someone who is qualified to respond.
As stated, the elevators were already fully down to the stops. We don't know whether they were effective in reducing the 'g' load or whether the high speed and high THS angle made rendered their deflection less, or even not effective - that is a question for another Airbus engineer. Is there something to learn from the last eight seconds or so? The first people to answer that question will be the Investigators.
To the point many have brought up here however, is there something to learn regarding C* Laws (traditional name for fbw laws) or are we in territory so far outside the envelope that engineers cannot reasonably be expected to design a machine that is crash-proof. We must keep in mind that despite vast misconceptions on the part of some, especially those who do not fly the 320, automation, fbw and control laws do not make the airplane crash-proof nor was that ever the claim, nor would it reasonably be the expectation of flight crews.
The next question that is naturally to be asked however is, let us say that the control law did do as it was designed and limited the 'g' load to 2.5g's. What then, in this particular accident? Given a higher altitude, was the aircraft entering an increasing fugoid response which would have eventually exceeded either the airplane's or the crew's ability to regain control? We simply don't know.
Control laws are designed to take maximum advantage of the airfoil while keeping the aircraft out of the stall regime, (although high 'g' loads will pass the flight control computers to "alternate law, restricted or unrestricted"), and/or keep the structure within certification design limits. Must these same laws also cater to those circumstances where there may be insufficient altitude to recover?
That is about the limit of what I can say to someone who doesn't fly the airplane and it is getting close to the limits of my knowledge as well. Best leave the question open for others more capable than I to have a go at.
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1) 2.5g if that's it, is a bit conservative I'd think... if you couldn't pull the 3g safely in such a situation, you'd be limited whatever the control situation..
2) but I don't think airframe limit loads at those airspeeds are an over-riding consideration. Recovery - even if you go to ultimate & bend it a bit (.1% strain from memory) is more important.
3) Why isn't there a...
4) Yes, I suspect the trim setting is crucial to all this, it should revert (or be set manually back to) somewhere near trim for Vref + a bit
So shoot me...
Ref: See Python comment in Schiphol therad for what a programmer would do, not my post, but I get the idea... I'd also revert back to the user - 'Cannot resolve this condition - here are your options... 1) Take total control 2) No other options
The Flight Computer has lost it, why revert to any mode other than... 'You have control'
2) but I don't think airframe limit loads at those airspeeds are an over-riding consideration. Recovery - even if you go to ultimate & bend it a bit (.1% strain from memory) is more important.
3) Why isn't there a...
I give up! You have (total) control of everything override?
So shoot me...
Ref: See Python comment in Schiphol therad for what a programmer would do, not my post, but I get the idea... I'd also revert back to the user - 'Cannot resolve this condition - here are your options... 1) Take total control 2) No other options
The Flight Computer has lost it, why revert to any mode other than... 'You have control'
Thanks PJ,
I guess it's a case of hurry up and wait now.
I think the entire CVR transcript will help with some of the human factors
unknowns as well.
Regards Framer.
I guess it's a case of hurry up and wait now.
I think the entire CVR transcript will help with some of the human factors
unknowns as well.
Regards Framer.
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The problem with the CVRs is they are only available to the accident investigators. And while that is perhaps appropriate because of loss of life of the crew, that really limits the info to a very few. If the information was available to other pilots (only) outside of the investigation, we might get more meaningful information.
HarryMann;
With respect to these details, I wouldn't take them as hard-and-fast limits/restrictions. I'm not a test pilot and have only had the need-to-know course a long time ago so these areas are far less familiar to me than normal ops on the 320. With the passage of time, one gets very good at flying this airplane and learns a trick or three but where these pilots were is well beyond airline experience. I'm just trying to think a bit outside the box with what I think are some possible but not definitive responses to the question asked. I recommend (when reading my post, anyway), a "hmm, interesting..." stance with a pause to keep the question open rather than hardening conclusions into 4 dot points. It's not as though I don't agree with your points...I just can't comment on them because I don't know enough about these 320 flight regimes.
DC-ATE;
At least in Canada, and possibly the US, it is against the law to make the CVR available to anyone other than the IIC (Investigator In Charge) and his/her investigating team.
There is no benefit nor reason to provide the CVR to "pilots" even though they may be involved in flight safety work for their association, (you don't mention this qualification but I didn't think you'd mean that the CVR would be handed over to just any pilots). Training, experience in flight safety work is needed to interpret all data including the CVR.
Providing a transcript is another matter and while not protected in law, is still not encouraged though especially in the US, it is done all the time, ostensibly for CNN's and Faux News' ratings.
The investigators almost always draw correct inferences and conclusions in the process. It just takes time, as you likely know.
With respect to these details, I wouldn't take them as hard-and-fast limits/restrictions. I'm not a test pilot and have only had the need-to-know course a long time ago so these areas are far less familiar to me than normal ops on the 320. With the passage of time, one gets very good at flying this airplane and learns a trick or three but where these pilots were is well beyond airline experience. I'm just trying to think a bit outside the box with what I think are some possible but not definitive responses to the question asked. I recommend (when reading my post, anyway), a "hmm, interesting..." stance with a pause to keep the question open rather than hardening conclusions into 4 dot points. It's not as though I don't agree with your points...I just can't comment on them because I don't know enough about these 320 flight regimes.
DC-ATE;
At least in Canada, and possibly the US, it is against the law to make the CVR available to anyone other than the IIC (Investigator In Charge) and his/her investigating team.
There is no benefit nor reason to provide the CVR to "pilots" even though they may be involved in flight safety work for their association, (you don't mention this qualification but I didn't think you'd mean that the CVR would be handed over to just any pilots). Training, experience in flight safety work is needed to interpret all data including the CVR.
Providing a transcript is another matter and while not protected in law, is still not encouraged though especially in the US, it is done all the time, ostensibly for CNN's and Faux News' ratings.
The investigators almost always draw correct inferences and conclusions in the process. It just takes time, as you likely know.
Last edited by PJ2; 3rd Mar 2009 at 01:14.