Airbus crash/training flight
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I'm not responsible for the rumors and the hype around that trial.
Too many lives and broken families and a thirst for some responsibility are at stake.
Now, to paint the whole system with a big brush and call this country a banana republic is at least far-fetched, just good for the idiots who can't even spell French as F.R.E.N.C.H . (I know, "fish" can be spelled as "ghoti" !)
On the subject of this thread, I'm afraid that the findings won't be to the taste of a few people :
1/- Airbus Industry hasn't issued a single paper about a technical defect (be it soft or hard ).
2/- If it's not an accident caused by an airplane failure, what could it be ?
And maybe, just maybe, the delay in publishing a pre-report is due to some extensive discussions between all parties involved as to where to lay the cause (s).( If I remember correctly, the investigation involves the US, NZ and Germany, too).
Too many lives and broken families and a thirst for some responsibility are at stake.
Now, to paint the whole system with a big brush and call this country a banana republic is at least far-fetched, just good for the idiots who can't even spell French as F.R.E.N.C.H . (I know, "fish" can be spelled as "ghoti" !)
On the subject of this thread, I'm afraid that the findings won't be to the taste of a few people :
1/- Airbus Industry hasn't issued a single paper about a technical defect (be it soft or hard ).
2/- If it's not an accident caused by an airplane failure, what could it be ?
And maybe, just maybe, the delay in publishing a pre-report is due to some extensive discussions between all parties involved as to where to lay the cause (s).( If I remember correctly, the investigation involves the US, NZ and Germany, too).
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And this is typically French?
Dysag,
And what makes you think the outcome of the poll would be very different if it had happened in another country?
And what makes you think the outcome of the poll would be very different if it had happened in another country?
Last edited by KiloMikePapa; 24th Feb 2009 at 16:26.
Report's out, published here
As a result, operators are obliged to define for themselves the programme and the operational conditions for these flights in their operations manual, without necessarily having evaluated the specific risks that these flights may present.
The investigations initial findings brought to light the fact that there is a great diversity in the description made by operators of non-revenue flights, in the context that they establish for the preparation and execution of these flights, and in the selection and training of pilots.
This diversity, along with the almost total absence of any indications or standards on non-revenue flights, can also lead to more or less improvising the performance of tests or to performing tests or checks in inappropriate parts of airspace and/or during flight phases with a high workload.
The investigations initial findings brought to light the fact that there is a great diversity in the description made by operators of non-revenue flights, in the context that they establish for the preparation and execution of these flights, and in the selection and training of pilots.
This diversity, along with the almost total absence of any indications or standards on non-revenue flights, can also lead to more or less improvising the performance of tests or to performing tests or checks in inappropriate parts of airspace and/or during flight phases with a high workload.
Consequently, the BEA recommends:
that EASA detail in the EU-OPS the various types of non-revenue flights that an operator from a EU state is authorised to perform,
that EASA require that non-revenue flights be described precisely in the approved parts of the operations manual, this description specifically determining their preparation, programme and operational framework as well as the qualifications and training of crews,
and
that as a temporary measure, EASA require that such flights be subject to an authorisation, or a declaration by the operator, on a case-by-case basis.
that EASA detail in the EU-OPS the various types of non-revenue flights that an operator from a EU state is authorised to perform,
that EASA require that non-revenue flights be described precisely in the approved parts of the operations manual, this description specifically determining their preparation, programme and operational framework as well as the qualifications and training of crews,
and
that as a temporary measure, EASA require that such flights be subject to an authorisation, or a declaration by the operator, on a case-by-case basis.
Last edited by RevMan2; 24th Feb 2009 at 18:05.
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Report is out
What happened to the AoA sensors 1 and 2 (see page 33 of the report, lowest parameter). For the last 40 minutes of the flight no more changes. Not a word about this in the report.
Why did the FAC1 and 2 fail ?
This report raises more questions than it gives answers.
Why did the FAC1 and 2 fail ?
This report raises more questions than it gives answers.
Report's out, published here
I raised the same question about that crash.
Crews who have sucessfuly conducted tests don't often consider the corner they can get into when they try the same maneuver too low and in poor altitude/attitude awareness.
That CVR showed complete confidence until the terrain call sounded.
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lomapaseo -
Yes.....both aircraft apparently stalled and the crew failed to recover from it. However, if there had not been a need to "check the alpha floor protection" in the XL aircraft, there would not have been an accident. In my mind, it's another strike against FBW aircraft.
Lot's of similarity with the ASX DC8 crash in West Virginia about 11 years ago.
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Accident survenu en approche sur Perpignan
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Just read the report and as a non-airbus specialist I do not quite follow what happenned in the last minute : why so many things apparently failed or were they disconected on purpose for the test ? (or a mixure of both ) .
If somebody with more knowledge on airbus laws could answer that would help (me at least) .
A (small ) contributing factor is the ATC reaction to the original PLN. The plan was standard IFR one with only mention in field 18 of Training/ferry flight.
The reaction not to allow the required requests ( involving serie of 360s) probably forced the crew to shorten their programme , and perhaps pushed the crew to do certain things in this low altitude approach phase. ( the partial CVR release shows clear pressure to the XL captain from the NZ crew to perform those low speed tests)
There I agree with the BEA recomendation on the adequate planning of such flights. I would even add that it is more than wise to advise ATC BEFORE of what you intend to do. A simple phone call to the ACC Bordeaux prior departure , would have probably eased, if not solved the problem.
I had to deal with such requests many times, and we always tried to find a solution , sometimes involving another route/area or time to perform the tests. Of course when possible, making a proper request 3 days before via fax would guarantee a specific area reserved for this for the duration of the test. While I agree this is not always possible, I think in this case, as it involved the positioning of NZ crews, the 3 days notice could have most probably been done.
If somebody with more knowledge on airbus laws could answer that would help (me at least) .
A (small ) contributing factor is the ATC reaction to the original PLN. The plan was standard IFR one with only mention in field 18 of Training/ferry flight.
The reaction not to allow the required requests ( involving serie of 360s) probably forced the crew to shorten their programme , and perhaps pushed the crew to do certain things in this low altitude approach phase. ( the partial CVR release shows clear pressure to the XL captain from the NZ crew to perform those low speed tests)
There I agree with the BEA recomendation on the adequate planning of such flights. I would even add that it is more than wise to advise ATC BEFORE of what you intend to do. A simple phone call to the ACC Bordeaux prior departure , would have probably eased, if not solved the problem.
I had to deal with such requests many times, and we always tried to find a solution , sometimes involving another route/area or time to perform the tests. Of course when possible, making a proper request 3 days before via fax would guarantee a specific area reserved for this for the duration of the test. While I agree this is not always possible, I think in this case, as it involved the positioning of NZ crews, the 3 days notice could have most probably been done.
DC-ATE
I wish that you hadn't said that
Most of your posts are positive and supporting of an open mind
if there had not been a need to "check the alpha floor protection" in the XL aircraft, there would not have been an accident. In my mind, it's another strike against FBW aircraft.
Most of your posts are positive and supporting of an open mind
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Report in English http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2008/d-la...la081127ea.pdf
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What happened to the AoA sensors 1 and 2 (see page 33 of the report, lowest parameter).
If somebody with more knowledge on airbus laws could answer that would help
Why did the FAC1 and 2 fail ?
« FAC 1, and FAC 2 is coming now »
This report raises more questions than it gives answers
This interim report presents the circumstances and facts established at this point in the investigation. Any interpretation or extrapolation of these elements would be mere speculation at the present time.
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lomapaseo-agree, DC-ATE has forgotten this was essentially the equivalent of a stick shaker test for non-FBW types.
NoD - thanks for the rational and reasonable post
Pls remember, in response to this accident, Airbus reminded all operators to check aerodynamic sensors after repainting. I'm sure all will be revealed in the final report...
NoD - thanks for the rational and reasonable post
Pls remember, in response to this accident, Airbus reminded all operators to check aerodynamic sensors after repainting. I'm sure all will be revealed in the final report...
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lomapaseo
Well, for what it's worth, it took a long time before I hit "Submit Reply". But, I have to be honest in how I feel. I started a thread on FBW and the feed back I got never did support the idea or show me where it was superior to what we had before. We all know why FBW is here and we're stuck with it. That doesn't make it any better in my opinion. Sometimes the truth hurts, I know. I am very critical of aircraft accident reporting, having been an airline pilot for over 25 years before retirement. I've seen too many accident reports where crews were blammed for things that were NOT of their doing and they weren't around to defend themselves.
I wish that you hadn't said that
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If you READ the report and understand it, low speed tests are supposed to be conducted at a window between FL100 and FL140 and in NORMAL LAW.
The test was conducted at 3000 feet in DIRECT LAW by disconecting or failure of two FACs(15:37:08). The instant the A/C degraded to ALT LAW, the low speed test must be stopped. The purpose of this check is for LOW SPEED PROTECTIONS which are NOT avilable in DIRECT LAW.
There is no mention of a Flight Test Engineer on any part of the report, I wonder who was handling the readding or the parameters on the AIDS.
G
The test was conducted at 3000 feet in DIRECT LAW by disconecting or failure of two FACs(15:37:08). The instant the A/C degraded to ALT LAW, the low speed test must be stopped. The purpose of this check is for LOW SPEED PROTECTIONS which are NOT avilable in DIRECT LAW.
There is no mention of a Flight Test Engineer on any part of the report, I wonder who was handling the readding or the parameters on the AIDS.
G
Last edited by guiones; 25th Feb 2009 at 00:23.
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A bit long...but
Air NZ critical of French crash report 
Five New Zealanders died in the crash off the coast of France in November. Photos / l'Independant, supplied
Updated 11:44AM Wednesday Feb 25, 2009
Catherine Field and Newstalk ZB
The 50 page document was released in Paris early this morning NZ time.
Air New Zealand CEO Rob Fyfe told Newstalk ZB he planned to complain to the director of the investigation and to France's Ministry of Transport about the way the report was published.
The French crash investigation process was different from that of other jurisdictions and he believed it breached protocol, he said.
Mr Fyfe said the airline had not been allowed to give any insight into the actions of the crew, such carrying out manoeuvres at low altitude, which the report suggested could have caused the crash.
"The excerpts that are in this report only give you glimpses of what happened at various stages and it doesn't give us enough detail to determine why this accident happened," he said.
Mr Fyfe also said Air New Zealand's specialists had not been given access to the flight recorders' data.
The report "only partially outlines certain aspects of what occurred during the flight and not why the accident occurred", he said.
"There is a combination of failures that will contribute to the cause of any accident," he said.
After reading the report Mr Fyfe said he felt nothing that happened during the acceptance flight "gave any concern for the normal commercial operation of the A320 fleet which is an integral part of our operations and, indeed, for many airlines around the world".
Stricter oversight
In their report, investigators called for stricter oversight of manoeuvres and training on such handover flights.
Speaking to the Herald at the release of the report, Paul-Louis Arslanian, Director of the Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses said his office was recommending that such flights have a pre-agreed programme of tasks, and not include any improvised manoeuvres particularly at lower altitudes.
Referring specifically to the Air New Zealand crash, Arslanian told the Herald. "They had some checks to do, they were unable to do these as the flight was shortened so they made a low speed check during approach. Then they lost control of the plane.
"A test check at low speed was supposed to be done during the flight and well, they decided, or to be more specific, they performed it during the approach which is not only low altitude but also as part of a flight which is linked with specific procedures and heavy work load."
The plane then reared up a steep 46 degree incline before dramatically plunging into the sea.
"We are trying to understand what caused this accident, this is a very complicated investigation," he said.
The BEA has also recommended that prior to such non-revenue flights (flights without passengers) civil aviation authorities ensure "the qualifications and training of crews" to carry out such manoeuvres.
Although it is still unclear who made which decisions, the report notes that the crew "had not received any specific training for this type of flight. The Air New Zealand pilot had undertaken two simulator training sessions."
Questioned on this, Arslanian told the Herald: "The Air New Zealand pilot was prepared for this flight, he received specific training in simulator. He was not in charge of the flight. Technically he was a passenger. In practice, he was in the cockpit and he was discussing with the crew. And he participated in the flight. We have to understand what was his role, and what was his input in the flight," said Arslanian.
The report is the first phase of what is likely to be a lengthy investigation into the cause of the disaster.
The interim document also identifies as a focus of inquiry the possibility that fuselage sensors may have been obscured or affected while the aircraft was being resprayed in Air New Zealand's colours after it had been leased to a German charter airline.
This could have affected the accuracy of the "fly-by-wire" system in which the aircraft's flight stability is automatically determined by its on-board computers, it said.
The crash off Perpignan on France's Mediterranean coast at 4.46pm on November 27 killed five New Zealanders and two Germans.
They were checking the twin-engine airliner before it was handed back to Air New Zealand by XL Airways Germany, which had leased the craft.
It had just been resprayed by EAS Industries, a Perpignan firm.
The crash was a mystery, because the plane had been doing a routine handover test flight over the sea and had not issued any distress call.
The probe by the BEA is separate to an investigation of involuntary homicide, being conducted by the Perpignan public prosecutor's office.
The BEA report was delayed by difficulties in getting data from the two "black boxes" that divers recovered from the wreckage at a depth of 40m.
Last month, the A320's makers, Airbus, issued a safety recommendation to all 218 of its customers.
Paint work
It warned them not to obscure the sensors during paint work, and reminded them that test flights should be conducted safely, and low-speed manoeuvres should not be conducted at low height.
The A320, a single-aisle aircraft seating 150 passengers is a workhorse of the air industry.
The high-tech "fly-by-wire" avionics - initially viewed with suspicion by pilots when they were introduced in 1988 - are a big factor in its success.
According to its makers, 1960 A320s were in service at the end of last year, with 155 airlines.
Four of the five New Zealanders killed in the crash worked for Air New Zealand.
They were Captain Brian Horrell, 52, from Auckland, and engineers Murray White, 37, also from Auckland, and Michael Gyles, 49, and Noel Marsh, 35, both from Christchurch.
The fifth was Jeremy Cook, 58, from Wellington, a Civil Aviation Authority airworthiness inspector.
The two Germans pilots, who were flying the aircraft when it crashed, have not been publicly named.
Five New Zealanders died in the crash off the coast of France in November. Photos / l'Independant, supplied
Updated 11:44AM Wednesday Feb 25, 2009
Catherine Field and Newstalk ZB
- <LI class=audioLink>Air NZ CEO Rob Fyfe unhappy with report <LI class=audioLink>Investigator Paul-Louis Arslanian on the crash
- The Air NZ A320 crash
- Air NZ crash report blames low altitude test
- Baby girl's arrival brings 'sparkle' to family of Air NZ crash victim
- Relatives return with bodies of Airbus victims
- Plane crash victims to arrive home to Dobbyn song
- Air NZ crash victims back home
- Fifth NZ body from Airbus crash recovered
- Air NZ crash report blames low altitude test
The 50 page document was released in Paris early this morning NZ time.
Air New Zealand CEO Rob Fyfe told Newstalk ZB he planned to complain to the director of the investigation and to France's Ministry of Transport about the way the report was published.
The French crash investigation process was different from that of other jurisdictions and he believed it breached protocol, he said.
Mr Fyfe said the airline had not been allowed to give any insight into the actions of the crew, such carrying out manoeuvres at low altitude, which the report suggested could have caused the crash.
"The excerpts that are in this report only give you glimpses of what happened at various stages and it doesn't give us enough detail to determine why this accident happened," he said.
Mr Fyfe also said Air New Zealand's specialists had not been given access to the flight recorders' data.
The report "only partially outlines certain aspects of what occurred during the flight and not why the accident occurred", he said.
"There is a combination of failures that will contribute to the cause of any accident," he said.
After reading the report Mr Fyfe said he felt nothing that happened during the acceptance flight "gave any concern for the normal commercial operation of the A320 fleet which is an integral part of our operations and, indeed, for many airlines around the world".
Stricter oversight
In their report, investigators called for stricter oversight of manoeuvres and training on such handover flights.
Speaking to the Herald at the release of the report, Paul-Louis Arslanian, Director of the Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses said his office was recommending that such flights have a pre-agreed programme of tasks, and not include any improvised manoeuvres particularly at lower altitudes.
Referring specifically to the Air New Zealand crash, Arslanian told the Herald. "They had some checks to do, they were unable to do these as the flight was shortened so they made a low speed check during approach. Then they lost control of the plane.
"A test check at low speed was supposed to be done during the flight and well, they decided, or to be more specific, they performed it during the approach which is not only low altitude but also as part of a flight which is linked with specific procedures and heavy work load."
The plane then reared up a steep 46 degree incline before dramatically plunging into the sea.
"We are trying to understand what caused this accident, this is a very complicated investigation," he said.
The BEA has also recommended that prior to such non-revenue flights (flights without passengers) civil aviation authorities ensure "the qualifications and training of crews" to carry out such manoeuvres.
Although it is still unclear who made which decisions, the report notes that the crew "had not received any specific training for this type of flight. The Air New Zealand pilot had undertaken two simulator training sessions."
Questioned on this, Arslanian told the Herald: "The Air New Zealand pilot was prepared for this flight, he received specific training in simulator. He was not in charge of the flight. Technically he was a passenger. In practice, he was in the cockpit and he was discussing with the crew. And he participated in the flight. We have to understand what was his role, and what was his input in the flight," said Arslanian.
The report is the first phase of what is likely to be a lengthy investigation into the cause of the disaster.
The interim document also identifies as a focus of inquiry the possibility that fuselage sensors may have been obscured or affected while the aircraft was being resprayed in Air New Zealand's colours after it had been leased to a German charter airline.
This could have affected the accuracy of the "fly-by-wire" system in which the aircraft's flight stability is automatically determined by its on-board computers, it said.
The crash off Perpignan on France's Mediterranean coast at 4.46pm on November 27 killed five New Zealanders and two Germans.
They were checking the twin-engine airliner before it was handed back to Air New Zealand by XL Airways Germany, which had leased the craft.
It had just been resprayed by EAS Industries, a Perpignan firm.
The crash was a mystery, because the plane had been doing a routine handover test flight over the sea and had not issued any distress call.
The probe by the BEA is separate to an investigation of involuntary homicide, being conducted by the Perpignan public prosecutor's office.
The BEA report was delayed by difficulties in getting data from the two "black boxes" that divers recovered from the wreckage at a depth of 40m.
Last month, the A320's makers, Airbus, issued a safety recommendation to all 218 of its customers.
Paint work
It warned them not to obscure the sensors during paint work, and reminded them that test flights should be conducted safely, and low-speed manoeuvres should not be conducted at low height.
The A320, a single-aisle aircraft seating 150 passengers is a workhorse of the air industry.
The high-tech "fly-by-wire" avionics - initially viewed with suspicion by pilots when they were introduced in 1988 - are a big factor in its success.
According to its makers, 1960 A320s were in service at the end of last year, with 155 airlines.
Four of the five New Zealanders killed in the crash worked for Air New Zealand.
They were Captain Brian Horrell, 52, from Auckland, and engineers Murray White, 37, also from Auckland, and Michael Gyles, 49, and Noel Marsh, 35, both from Christchurch.
The fifth was Jeremy Cook, 58, from Wellington, a Civil Aviation Authority airworthiness inspector.
The two Germans pilots, who were flying the aircraft when it crashed, have not been publicly named.
No Conclusions? No Control?
This interim report presents the circumstances and facts established at this point in the investigation. Any interpretation or extrapolation of these elements would be mere speculation at the present time.
Also, it's really hard to believe that people are flying around in airplanes designed so that the pilot(s) can't instantly get control from a bunch of computers and fly the thing out of danger.
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Smilin Ed -
Amen! Kinda what I was referring to above.
BTW, you have a PM.
Also, it's really hard to believe that people are flying around in airplanes designed so that the pilot(s) can't instantly get control from a bunch of computers and fly the thing out of danger.
BTW, you have a PM.
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For you guys that do not understand Airbus FBW, DIRECT LAW flies just like a regular airplane, no protections.
BTW, read my post above a few times, maybe you will get a clue.
G
BTW, read my post above a few times, maybe you will get a clue.
G
Well there are some lessons to be learned here, yet again.
The good news is that we don't have to blame anybody to learn them. All we have to do is read and decide that we don't have to go there.
Predictably some will fine tooth this claiming the lesson was unclear and that it was really the fault of this and that.
Most will remain neutral and vow that they will ensure that it won't happen to them.
Chief pilots please take note, the lesson is for you.
The good news is that we don't have to blame anybody to learn them. All we have to do is read and decide that we don't have to go there.
Predictably some will fine tooth this claiming the lesson was unclear and that it was really the fault of this and that.
Most will remain neutral and vow that they will ensure that it won't happen to them.
Chief pilots please take note, the lesson is for you.