Airbus crash/training flight
NoD;
Yeah, me too, (back in the books, that is).
Yes, except (I believe), if you level off a Boeing anywhere in a descent but not at the Selected Altitude, the power will come up to maintain the speed in FLCH because the Speed mode is always engaged. In Idle-Open Descent the power will not come up - not until ALT*/ALT because "Idle" is engaged, not Speed.
On the mode reversion, thanks. I think on the first point, we're talking about the above point - in descent in Idle-Open, the airplane will decelerate until Vls + 4 at which time the A/T system reverts to Speed - I couldn't recall if the F/D's were removed or not.
TyroPicard;
I understand your point in terms of small movements at the base, large up top. The sidesticks I've used do not seem to have a breakaway resistance and thus the method suggested for turbulence works academically and it works in practise. Clearly one never lets the airplane get away with anything one doesn't want!, but that said, the slight, "felt" resistance is precisely what makes the method work well. It keeps forces at the bottom of the stick from moving the stick either too rapidly or too far. It's a judgement thing after all. Some sticks are more resistant than others, just as some Thrust Levers move very easily, others not quite so - at least in my experience - (we got our first 320's in the late 80's and still have them plus 319's & 321's, -the latter of which I have not flown).
CONF iture - oh, okay, I thought the F/D system had been modified so that if one F/D was switched off the AT reverted to Speed - thanks. In any case, for a TCAS Resolution Warning, our SOPs require both F/D's to be switched off so that "Speed" is the available mode.
I could never understand why Airbus just didn't install one pushbutton for the F/D's if both either had to be on or off, but, like the answer I got in 1991 when I asked (foolishly, at the time, given AB's willingness to listen to customers and users), something else about the VNAV system, the reply in a heavy French accent was, "..zat ees zee whay zee hairplan ees design". Nothing further was forthcoming - they opened up to pilots and customers somewhat after a few..."incidents".
Anyway - passing time while the current theory regarding paint and sensors awaits confirmation or ?
Yeah, me too, (back in the books, that is).
My "recollection" (which maybe wrong) is that (Idle) OP DES is pretty much like FLCH is a B757/767...
On the mode reversion, thanks. I think on the first point, we're talking about the above point - in descent in Idle-Open, the airplane will decelerate until Vls + 4 at which time the A/T system reverts to Speed - I couldn't recall if the F/D's were removed or not.
TyroPicard;
I understand your point in terms of small movements at the base, large up top. The sidesticks I've used do not seem to have a breakaway resistance and thus the method suggested for turbulence works academically and it works in practise. Clearly one never lets the airplane get away with anything one doesn't want!, but that said, the slight, "felt" resistance is precisely what makes the method work well. It keeps forces at the bottom of the stick from moving the stick either too rapidly or too far. It's a judgement thing after all. Some sticks are more resistant than others, just as some Thrust Levers move very easily, others not quite so - at least in my experience - (we got our first 320's in the late 80's and still have them plus 319's & 321's, -the latter of which I have not flown).
CONF iture - oh, okay, I thought the F/D system had been modified so that if one F/D was switched off the AT reverted to Speed - thanks. In any case, for a TCAS Resolution Warning, our SOPs require both F/D's to be switched off so that "Speed" is the available mode.
I could never understand why Airbus just didn't install one pushbutton for the F/D's if both either had to be on or off, but, like the answer I got in 1991 when I asked (foolishly, at the time, given AB's willingness to listen to customers and users), something else about the VNAV system, the reply in a heavy French accent was, "..zat ees zee whay zee hairplan ees design". Nothing further was forthcoming - they opened up to pilots and customers somewhat after a few..."incidents".
Anyway - passing time while the current theory regarding paint and sensors awaits confirmation or ?
Last edited by PJ2; 8th Feb 2009 at 23:41.
"..zat ees zee whay zee hairplan ees design".
Was that ET by chance?
I remember asking him a similar question. It was also explained that the independent FD buttons were to provide the necessary redundancy in the case of a total loss of one of the FMGCs.
Hi J.O. - no, that was Charlie Nagel in Toronto and it was '92, not '91 (guess what else goes after technical knowledge!), but ET gave us a really fine lecture-presentation-lesson on "Why We Designed the 320 the Way We Did" at a Flight Safety Symposium put on by USAir (now US Airways) in Pittsburgh a few years ago - it was the most entertaining, delightful and educational talk a pilot could have heard about the 320 at the time.
Thanks for the comment on the FD's - makes sense, just like the airplane, if one keeps with it long enough!
Thanks for the comment on the FD's - makes sense, just like the airplane, if one keeps with it long enough!
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PJ2, not too long ago, you and I could not agree on an issue regarding the RETARD call out philosophy - here
My point was based on a recommendation addressed to Airbus, a recommendation that Airbus decided not to follow ...
I make this point because what you mention here was exactly one of the 62 recommendations made after the Bangalore accident in 1990.
No need to say Airbus decided not to follow it ...
My point was based on a recommendation addressed to Airbus, a recommendation that Airbus decided not to follow ...
Originally Posted by PJ2
I could never understand why Airbus just didn't install one pushbutton for the F/D's if both either had to be on or off, but, like the answer I got in 1991 when I asked (foolishly, at the time, given AB's willingness to listen to customers and users), something else about the VNAV system, the reply in a heavy French accent was, "..zat ees zee whay zee hairplan ees design". Nothing further was forthcoming - they opened up to pilots and customers somewhat after a few..."incidents".
No need to say Airbus decided not to follow it ...
CONF iture;
Yes, and another recommendation early in the design stage and which is, I believe, a legal matter with some of the AB engineers involved, is the V/S - FPA indication which, until long after Strasbourg, was not modified to be more clear. I suspect there are a number of other items which may or may not be part of the list of 62.
Would these changes have prevented an accident?
Perhaps, perhaps not; we can't rewind and play the tape over to see.
As I said then and say now, thorough, knowledgable training and equally thorough checking by knowledgable standards pilots can be cited in each of these accidents just as much as human factors causes may be found in faulty design. I know of none of the 320 accidents in which this one factor is not at work. Of course, the Habsheim captain ought to have known better from the get-go.
I have personally seen the VS/FPA error made on an approach into YHZ06 but it was caught almost immediately because the FMA was being carefully monitored as per our training. Yes, the smaller numbers and no (or tiny) decimal did not highlight the error but the FMA did. That was emphasized from Day One - if it's not on the FMA, the airplane isn't doing it, and if it is on the FMA, make sure it's what you want and expect - if not, re-program or disconnect everything. To emphasize, I know and have flown with many, many crews on the 320 series and 330/340 series who are literally afraid to disconnect the autothrust and don't even know how. That is partially a professional issue in terms of seeking the answer and then practising but it is also a standards and training issue which does not ensure that your crews are completely at home in all regimes of automation and manual flight. To me that was and remains, an unacceptable level of competence for an airline crew but that position though widely held among aircrews who flew the airplane, was outvoted by the bean counters and managers infatuated with the notion that "automation will do everything because that's what we've paid for".
To return to the Congonhas accident in re the Retard call, I would agree but the origin of the call was never intended to remind the pilots of the thrust lever position on the ground but in the air at 20, or 30ft depending upon autoland engaged or not, as the thrust levers do not move back to IDLE on their own as do some (but not all) Boeings. Certainly leaving one thrust lever in the "Full thrust commanded" position would not be a reasonable thing for an engineer to anticipate and design against, would it? Are not taught "from the cradle" to pull the throttle(s) off to land?, (to be sure, no sarcasm intended here CONF iture).
On the autobraking, spoiler deployment, reverse availability issue in CONF 3, after the Lufthansa accident at Warsaw, the design was changed and for a good reason. In fact long before that change came out and long before the Warsaw accident, 320 pilots knew how to get oleo-compression/wheelspin so reverse and spoilers were available in a CONF FULL, slippery runway-smooth landing circumstance.
I'm not about to hold onto allegiances where they are inappropriate - that isn't how safety work is done of course, (I know you know this). But I submit the above for consideration - training, training, training, and once the airplane is understood it is as straightforward to operate as any other design with it's own foibles, compromises and traps for young players.
That doesn't mean the safety message in these accidents isn't dismissed or plain missed. It isn't news to you that no design is without the above problems so I won't spend a second on the "perfect" airplane.
Quick question - Why do you suppose AB did not implement one, two, some, all, of the recommendations after Bangalore? Would you agree that AB has responded to the CONF 3 and FPA issues? As an A320 pilot, what other issues do you see that are both outstanding and a safety trap?
The dialogue is much appreciated - I fully realize it is off-topic but this is interesting and it readies the thread for awaited information on the accident that began this discussion.
PJ2
Yes, and another recommendation early in the design stage and which is, I believe, a legal matter with some of the AB engineers involved, is the V/S - FPA indication which, until long after Strasbourg, was not modified to be more clear. I suspect there are a number of other items which may or may not be part of the list of 62.
Would these changes have prevented an accident?
Perhaps, perhaps not; we can't rewind and play the tape over to see.
As I said then and say now, thorough, knowledgable training and equally thorough checking by knowledgable standards pilots can be cited in each of these accidents just as much as human factors causes may be found in faulty design. I know of none of the 320 accidents in which this one factor is not at work. Of course, the Habsheim captain ought to have known better from the get-go.
I have personally seen the VS/FPA error made on an approach into YHZ06 but it was caught almost immediately because the FMA was being carefully monitored as per our training. Yes, the smaller numbers and no (or tiny) decimal did not highlight the error but the FMA did. That was emphasized from Day One - if it's not on the FMA, the airplane isn't doing it, and if it is on the FMA, make sure it's what you want and expect - if not, re-program or disconnect everything. To emphasize, I know and have flown with many, many crews on the 320 series and 330/340 series who are literally afraid to disconnect the autothrust and don't even know how. That is partially a professional issue in terms of seeking the answer and then practising but it is also a standards and training issue which does not ensure that your crews are completely at home in all regimes of automation and manual flight. To me that was and remains, an unacceptable level of competence for an airline crew but that position though widely held among aircrews who flew the airplane, was outvoted by the bean counters and managers infatuated with the notion that "automation will do everything because that's what we've paid for".
To return to the Congonhas accident in re the Retard call, I would agree but the origin of the call was never intended to remind the pilots of the thrust lever position on the ground but in the air at 20, or 30ft depending upon autoland engaged or not, as the thrust levers do not move back to IDLE on their own as do some (but not all) Boeings. Certainly leaving one thrust lever in the "Full thrust commanded" position would not be a reasonable thing for an engineer to anticipate and design against, would it? Are not taught "from the cradle" to pull the throttle(s) off to land?, (to be sure, no sarcasm intended here CONF iture).
On the autobraking, spoiler deployment, reverse availability issue in CONF 3, after the Lufthansa accident at Warsaw, the design was changed and for a good reason. In fact long before that change came out and long before the Warsaw accident, 320 pilots knew how to get oleo-compression/wheelspin so reverse and spoilers were available in a CONF FULL, slippery runway-smooth landing circumstance.
I'm not about to hold onto allegiances where they are inappropriate - that isn't how safety work is done of course, (I know you know this). But I submit the above for consideration - training, training, training, and once the airplane is understood it is as straightforward to operate as any other design with it's own foibles, compromises and traps for young players.
That doesn't mean the safety message in these accidents isn't dismissed or plain missed. It isn't news to you that no design is without the above problems so I won't spend a second on the "perfect" airplane.
Quick question - Why do you suppose AB did not implement one, two, some, all, of the recommendations after Bangalore? Would you agree that AB has responded to the CONF 3 and FPA issues? As an A320 pilot, what other issues do you see that are both outstanding and a safety trap?
The dialogue is much appreciated - I fully realize it is off-topic but this is interesting and it readies the thread for awaited information on the accident that began this discussion.
PJ2
Last edited by PJ2; 9th Feb 2009 at 05:41.
Well, Dysag, and others: You boys stick with your new fangled toys and I'll just go along with my old needle/ball and airspeed and hopefully, we'll all get to wherever it is we're going safely.
( with a stall speed of 35 kts. and 1100 mtrs of smooth tarmac - hardly a challenge, really, once one had got over the initial shock )
Wonder what a FADEC or EICAS or FMS might have done ?
Sorry, slightly off thread I guess !
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ExS33db1rd,
I'm quite surprised at the question. What is the speed check we do during the takeoff roll for ?
Grizzled,
Edited. Don't encourage the village idiots.
Wonder what a FADEC or EICAS or FMS might have done ?
Grizzled,
Edited. Don't encourage the village idiots.
What is the speed check we do during the takeoff roll for ?
Parmesan
As soon as I typed that line I figured (even hoped?) this would happen.
And I'm happy to see that Delia is sticking to the traditional "finely grated reggiano." Here in The Sandbox a lot of restaurants have started placing great slabs of parmesan on top of the salad, and it just doesn't work. The bits of reggiano have to be small enough that your tongue and tatebuds are getting little zaps of it -- not great wads.
Grizz
And I'm happy to see that Delia is sticking to the traditional "finely grated reggiano." Here in The Sandbox a lot of restaurants have started placing great slabs of parmesan on top of the salad, and it just doesn't work. The bits of reggiano have to be small enough that your tongue and tatebuds are getting little zaps of it -- not great wads.
Grizz
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PJ2,
So much food for thought in your last post.
I think the following will mainly resume what is on my mind :
Of course YOU are the one to be correct, and coming from the father of the 320 technology, his comment is plain arrogance, way out of touch from the reality, and clearly reflects the unwillingness to accept any criticism, as constructive it aims to be.
Never publicly acknowledge a possible weak link in the selected technical options.
Stick to your gun. Keep modification to the minimum but do not admit any error and certainly not any fault in the initial concept.
Not familiar with the CONF 3 issue regarding Warsaw accident, so I’ll have to go in the research mode first … but I can illustrate my statement through the VS-FPA episode.
According to the BEA report, one contributory factor to the Air Inter accident was the lack of difference between VS and FPA selection on the FCU as well as the absence of numeric value in the FMA only true reflection of the FCU entered figure.
Airbus did follow the recommendation this time … but you may not be aware that during the last trial on Ste-Odile in late 2007, Bernard Ziegler defended the idea that the pilots deliberately set HDG-VS at a negative value of 3600 ft / min and therefore the conception of the FCU had nothing to do with the accident and was just fine as it was before modification.
Airbus and BZ have been relaxed of any charge, which is, in my view, still correct.
Even if the initial conception was not ideal, it was of course not designed in a harmful way.
A quick word on the RETARD call out logic.
Absolutely correct, but the same applies to the rotation : Would we need a PULL call out at Vr ?
My words to Airbus and there are not only mine : No need for any RETARD call out , but if you choose to go with it, do not fool the crew by canceling it before ALL thrust levers comply to the request, especially when the consequences are huge.
Reports confirm Congonhas is not an isolated case, something, bizarre, I concede, is repeating on the Airbus side, so just go with the very simple recommendation to be applied and improve the chance the next crew will identify their omission before it’s getting catastrophic one more time.
So much food for thought in your last post.
I think the following will mainly resume what is on my mind :
- You advocate : Training, training, training.
- Bernard Ziegler position : My airplane is perfect, even my doorman could fly it.
Of course YOU are the one to be correct, and coming from the father of the 320 technology, his comment is plain arrogance, way out of touch from the reality, and clearly reflects the unwillingness to accept any criticism, as constructive it aims to be.
Never publicly acknowledge a possible weak link in the selected technical options.
Stick to your gun. Keep modification to the minimum but do not admit any error and certainly not any fault in the initial concept.
Not familiar with the CONF 3 issue regarding Warsaw accident, so I’ll have to go in the research mode first … but I can illustrate my statement through the VS-FPA episode.
According to the BEA report, one contributory factor to the Air Inter accident was the lack of difference between VS and FPA selection on the FCU as well as the absence of numeric value in the FMA only true reflection of the FCU entered figure.
Airbus did follow the recommendation this time … but you may not be aware that during the last trial on Ste-Odile in late 2007, Bernard Ziegler defended the idea that the pilots deliberately set HDG-VS at a negative value of 3600 ft / min and therefore the conception of the FCU had nothing to do with the accident and was just fine as it was before modification.
Airbus and BZ have been relaxed of any charge, which is, in my view, still correct.
Even if the initial conception was not ideal, it was of course not designed in a harmful way.
A quick word on the RETARD call out logic.
Are not taught "from the cradle" to pull the throttle(s) off to land?
My words to Airbus and there are not only mine : No need for any RETARD call out , but if you choose to go with it, do not fool the crew by canceling it before ALL thrust levers comply to the request, especially when the consequences are huge.
Reports confirm Congonhas is not an isolated case, something, bizarre, I concede, is repeating on the Airbus side, so just go with the very simple recommendation to be applied and improve the chance the next crew will identify their omission before it’s getting catastrophic one more time.
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CONF iture,
what exactly is your point?
That there is a discrepancy between elevator control surface deflection and stick input?
Well, the aircraft in question was in normal law, so we would not expect a 1:1 relation between stick deflection and control surface deflection.
Between 0 and Alpha-Prot, stick input controls g-load demand.
Beyond Alpha-Prot, stick input controls Alpha. And, allowing for a certain hysteresis and limited measuring accuracy, this is what I find from your numbers.
Elevator surface deflection is controlled by the ELAC to fulfill the demand.
Without a high-fidelity simulation of all forces involved and the exact control algorithms, an analysis of stick deflection vs. elevator surface deflection must remain inconclusive.
Without power, g-load demand sometimes cannot be fulfilled, and AoA-protection obviously takes precedence.
Again, what's your point?
As to Congonhas, there was, now almost a year ago, a change to the FCOM, incorporating reversionary procedures for "No Spoilers", and advice for the activation conditions of the autobrake. It is also my understanding that the "Thrust lever above idle" warning is now part of the Flight Warning Computer software. Yes, it took Airbus too long (after two other known incidents), but finally something was done, and it is no longer left to the crew to figure it out. (They didn't have a real chance to do so in the accident, the information just wasn't there in any cockpit display.)
Bernd
what exactly is your point?
That there is a discrepancy between elevator control surface deflection and stick input?
Well, the aircraft in question was in normal law, so we would not expect a 1:1 relation between stick deflection and control surface deflection.
Between 0 and Alpha-Prot, stick input controls g-load demand.
Beyond Alpha-Prot, stick input controls Alpha. And, allowing for a certain hysteresis and limited measuring accuracy, this is what I find from your numbers.
Elevator surface deflection is controlled by the ELAC to fulfill the demand.
Without a high-fidelity simulation of all forces involved and the exact control algorithms, an analysis of stick deflection vs. elevator surface deflection must remain inconclusive.
Without power, g-load demand sometimes cannot be fulfilled, and AoA-protection obviously takes precedence.
Again, what's your point?
As to Congonhas, there was, now almost a year ago, a change to the FCOM, incorporating reversionary procedures for "No Spoilers", and advice for the activation conditions of the autobrake. It is also my understanding that the "Thrust lever above idle" warning is now part of the Flight Warning Computer software. Yes, it took Airbus too long (after two other known incidents), but finally something was done, and it is no longer left to the crew to figure it out. (They didn't have a real chance to do so in the accident, the information just wasn't there in any cockpit display.)
Bernd
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As for the Mt Ste Odile CFIT, twenty years later, it still astonishing to me that one could mistake a TRK/FPA display for a HDG.../VS one...And the FMA annunciations... Weren't we taught that we should check the result of our actions in the Flight deck ?
Therefore, Human Factor(s) problem, starting with : "should have these two low-experience pilots have been allowed to share the same cockpit?"...
Therefore, Human Factor(s) problem, starting with : "should have these two low-experience pilots have been allowed to share the same cockpit?"...
Last edited by Lemurian; 11th Feb 2009 at 21:02.
My words to Airbus and there are not only mine : No need for any RETARD call out , but if you choose to go with it, do not fool the crew by canceling it before ALL thrust levers comply to the request, especially when the consequences are huge.
Reports confirm Congonhas is not an isolated case, something, bizarre, I concede, is repeating on the Airbus side, so just go with the very simple recommendation to be applied and improve the chance the next crew will identify their omission before it’s getting catastrophic one more time.
Reports confirm Congonhas is not an isolated case, something, bizarre, I concede, is repeating on the Airbus side, so just go with the very simple recommendation to be applied and improve the chance the next crew will identify their omission before it’s getting catastrophic one more time.
Anyone who would take the time to attend one of their safety conferences would see that Airbus is not only committed to flight safety safety, but is highly responsive to operator feedback, as are the folks at Boeing.
J.O.;
Precisely.
It is difficult to say when a legitimate flight safety concern or design becomes instead "an axe to grind" with all attendant prejudices creeping into the dialogue, but citing minutae as "evidence" of a design failure in the face of millions of hours of uneventful, successful operation certainly cannot qualify.
Safety people are notoriously passionate but that must always be tempered with one's own internal sober-second-thought in the face of both commentary and evidence as presented to one when expounding upon one's favourite topic. I know this occurs because I've done it and have had to learn that just because one is passionate and "right", does not make one's issue a front-and-center issue for everybody else including the designers and engineers. Sometimes while one may be technically right, one must step back. Most things really do require the perspective and input of one's compatriots and colleagues. Therein partly lies the great value of this forum notwithstanding the rabbit trails and valuable thread drifts. It is easy to become "stuck" because safety is a motherhood issue but in the end the process itself has shown that it can overcome politics, economics and prejudices of all sorts - not always in time or fully, but it does.
Thanks for your continuously balanced and intelligent contributions.
Anyone who would take the time to attend one of their safety conferences would see that Airbus is not only committed to flight safety safety, but is highly responsive to operator feedback, as are the folks at Boeing.
It is difficult to say when a legitimate flight safety concern or design becomes instead "an axe to grind" with all attendant prejudices creeping into the dialogue, but citing minutae as "evidence" of a design failure in the face of millions of hours of uneventful, successful operation certainly cannot qualify.
Safety people are notoriously passionate but that must always be tempered with one's own internal sober-second-thought in the face of both commentary and evidence as presented to one when expounding upon one's favourite topic. I know this occurs because I've done it and have had to learn that just because one is passionate and "right", does not make one's issue a front-and-center issue for everybody else including the designers and engineers. Sometimes while one may be technically right, one must step back. Most things really do require the perspective and input of one's compatriots and colleagues. Therein partly lies the great value of this forum notwithstanding the rabbit trails and valuable thread drifts. It is easy to become "stuck" because safety is a motherhood issue but in the end the process itself has shown that it can overcome politics, economics and prejudices of all sorts - not always in time or fully, but it does.
Thanks for your continuously balanced and intelligent contributions.
What I don’t get is how it takes so long to perform a simple program modification on the Flight Warning Computer !?
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If they can do it at Buffalo..?
To return to to a debate which raged earlier in this thread.
A number of posters expressed concern at the time it took for the FDR/CVR data to become available (and the time it took for the recorders to even make it to the lab by all account).
Given that the data from the recorders in the Buffalo Q400 crash has started to be disseminated to the media already (1 day after the fire-damaged units were pulled from the wreckage) it does make the French look a little sluggish doesn`t it. I agree that getting the recorders from a small land-based crash site is easier but come on - most of the delay seemed to be after the recorders had been found. The intense heat of that post-crash fire surely would have an impact on data recovery, just as sea-water immersion would.
Understood that hastily releasing the wrong information is bad but surely the quicker this data can be made available the better so why did it take so long?
Cheers
James
A number of posters expressed concern at the time it took for the FDR/CVR data to become available (and the time it took for the recorders to even make it to the lab by all account).
Given that the data from the recorders in the Buffalo Q400 crash has started to be disseminated to the media already (1 day after the fire-damaged units were pulled from the wreckage) it does make the French look a little sluggish doesn`t it. I agree that getting the recorders from a small land-based crash site is easier but come on - most of the delay seemed to be after the recorders had been found. The intense heat of that post-crash fire surely would have an impact on data recovery, just as sea-water immersion would.
Understood that hastily releasing the wrong information is bad but surely the quicker this data can be made available the better so why did it take so long?
Cheers
James
One might also wonder why it has taken more than one month now for the BEA to analyze the data... If they are having problems with it they ought to say so in a press release.
Sorry folks, nothing new about Perpignan yet.
Rottenlungs, DFDR and CVR on Q400 are situated in the tailcone. Now go check the post crash pictures again.
CONFiture, around 15° AoA was agreed upon as a proper value by designers, test pilots, FTEs and certification authorities. You'd rather take the salesman's word that his aeroplane can do 17.5° ?!? And you are spectacularly wrong about worst case scenario. If it weren't for alpha prot there is fat chance that we'd see the worst case and it's fully stalled aeroplane hitting the ground wing first and cartwheeling into forest.
That's not what the first page of the FCOM says. Whoever believed this sales hype and filled cockpits of his A320 with substandard pilots was in for a rude awakening. Protections can prevent temporarily incapacited pilot from stalling the aeroplane or flipping it on its back, but they cannot prevent the crew that has no clue about where they are or what should they do from flying the perfectly servicable aeroplane into ground. Selection and training is the key and with A320 you don't need less training than with classic types, au contraire, you need to know and understand your electronic gizmos very well and you have to be able to fly the aeroplane without them.
So what if the FCU mode was set wrong? There were two PFD and one stby AH showing excessive nose down pitch, three altimeters winding down rapidly, two VSIs showing 3000fpm, two engines at idle and speed rising. And no one noticed. Like in Cali, where there was 90° discrepance between needed and actual heading, It's not the matter of experience but the matter of lacking the basic instrument flying skills. You can loose it if you don't use it.
Rottenlungs, DFDR and CVR on Q400 are situated in the tailcone. Now go check the post crash pictures again.
CONFiture, around 15° AoA was agreed upon as a proper value by designers, test pilots, FTEs and certification authorities. You'd rather take the salesman's word that his aeroplane can do 17.5° ?!? And you are spectacularly wrong about worst case scenario. If it weren't for alpha prot there is fat chance that we'd see the worst case and it's fully stalled aeroplane hitting the ground wing first and cartwheeling into forest.
Originally Posted by CONFiture
Bernard Ziegler position : My airplane is perfect, even my doorman could fly it.
Originally Posted by Lemurian
As for the Mt Ste Odile CFIT, twenty years later, it still astonishing to me that one could mistake a TRK/FPA display for a HDG.../VS one...And the FMA annunciations... Weren't we taught that we should check the result of our actions in the Flight deck ?
Therefore, Human Factor(s) problem, starting with : "should have these two low-experience pilots have been allowed to share the same cockpit?"...
Therefore, Human Factor(s) problem, starting with : "should have these two low-experience pilots have been allowed to share the same cockpit?"...
Back to the thread. Have the French come out with any preliminary report yet even if a statement of facts. Whilst I don't read french their output of information seems completely lacking compared to the U.S.A NTSB info on the Q400 crash in New York State.
The short answer is "no". A "first report" has been postponed until "the first few weeks of 2009". Data analysis started on Jan 8.
Four short releases here on right hand side of the BEA news page:
News
Four short releases here on right hand side of the BEA news page:
News