PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - Airbus crash/training flight
View Single Post
Old 9th Feb 2009, 05:08
  #745 (permalink)  
PJ2
 
Join Date: Mar 2003
Location: BC
Age: 76
Posts: 2,484
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
CONF iture;

Yes, and another recommendation early in the design stage and which is, I believe, a legal matter with some of the AB engineers involved, is the V/S - FPA indication which, until long after Strasbourg, was not modified to be more clear. I suspect there are a number of other items which may or may not be part of the list of 62.

Would these changes have prevented an accident?

Perhaps, perhaps not; we can't rewind and play the tape over to see.

As I said then and say now, thorough, knowledgable training and equally thorough checking by knowledgable standards pilots can be cited in each of these accidents just as much as human factors causes may be found in faulty design. I know of none of the 320 accidents in which this one factor is not at work. Of course, the Habsheim captain ought to have known better from the get-go.

I have personally seen the VS/FPA error made on an approach into YHZ06 but it was caught almost immediately because the FMA was being carefully monitored as per our training. Yes, the smaller numbers and no (or tiny) decimal did not highlight the error but the FMA did. That was emphasized from Day One - if it's not on the FMA, the airplane isn't doing it, and if it is on the FMA, make sure it's what you want and expect - if not, re-program or disconnect everything. To emphasize, I know and have flown with many, many crews on the 320 series and 330/340 series who are literally afraid to disconnect the autothrust and don't even know how. That is partially a professional issue in terms of seeking the answer and then practising but it is also a standards and training issue which does not ensure that your crews are completely at home in all regimes of automation and manual flight. To me that was and remains, an unacceptable level of competence for an airline crew but that position though widely held among aircrews who flew the airplane, was outvoted by the bean counters and managers infatuated with the notion that "automation will do everything because that's what we've paid for".

To return to the Congonhas accident in re the Retard call, I would agree but the origin of the call was never intended to remind the pilots of the thrust lever position on the ground but in the air at 20, or 30ft depending upon autoland engaged or not, as the thrust levers do not move back to IDLE on their own as do some (but not all) Boeings. Certainly leaving one thrust lever in the "Full thrust commanded" position would not be a reasonable thing for an engineer to anticipate and design against, would it? Are not taught "from the cradle" to pull the throttle(s) off to land?, (to be sure, no sarcasm intended here CONF iture).

On the autobraking, spoiler deployment, reverse availability issue in CONF 3, after the Lufthansa accident at Warsaw, the design was changed and for a good reason. In fact long before that change came out and long before the Warsaw accident, 320 pilots knew how to get oleo-compression/wheelspin so reverse and spoilers were available in a CONF FULL, slippery runway-smooth landing circumstance.

I'm not about to hold onto allegiances where they are inappropriate - that isn't how safety work is done of course, (I know you know this). But I submit the above for consideration - training, training, training, and once the airplane is understood it is as straightforward to operate as any other design with it's own foibles, compromises and traps for young players.

That doesn't mean the safety message in these accidents isn't dismissed or plain missed. It isn't news to you that no design is without the above problems so I won't spend a second on the "perfect" airplane.

Quick question - Why do you suppose AB did not implement one, two, some, all, of the recommendations after Bangalore? Would you agree that AB has responded to the CONF 3 and FPA issues? As an A320 pilot, what other issues do you see that are both outstanding and a safety trap?

The dialogue is much appreciated - I fully realize it is off-topic but this is interesting and it readies the thread for awaited information on the accident that began this discussion.

PJ2

Last edited by PJ2; 9th Feb 2009 at 05:41.
PJ2 is offline