Airbus crash/training flight
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OilCan
That sums it up: They all "supposedly" fly the aircraft.
Sorry for that sarcasm, but I get the same feeling. So many interpretations, so many explanations, so many Airbus-Rocket-Scientists with even more fancy theories -- and when the proverbial s#!t hits the fan, the poor average skippers ,as my poor soul itself, should know it all, switch it all and with his superiour knowledge of all the wonderful programs and how to circumnavigate them when they screw up, he'll come up as a Sully II.
I always thought that "keep it simple" is the remedy -- and it should.
That sums it up: They all "supposedly" fly the aircraft.
Sorry for that sarcasm, but I get the same feeling. So many interpretations, so many explanations, so many Airbus-Rocket-Scientists with even more fancy theories -- and when the proverbial s#!t hits the fan, the poor average skippers ,as my poor soul itself, should know it all, switch it all and with his superiour knowledge of all the wonderful programs and how to circumnavigate them when they screw up, he'll come up as a Sully II.
I always thought that "keep it simple" is the remedy -- and it should.
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What the safety statistics actually show us is that more automation leads to fewer accidents and much better reliability. As so often happens in this world though, never let a good story get in the way of the facts.
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I get the impression that some folks here believe that when you manipulate that great big column in a 777, you're moving the control surfaces directly.
Far from it: you're just making inputs to the flight control computers which then decide how to wiggle the moving surfaces. The only big difference from an Airbus is that the Boeing doesn't have the (anti-stall etc) protections.
Far from it: you're just making inputs to the flight control computers which then decide how to wiggle the moving surfaces. The only big difference from an Airbus is that the Boeing doesn't have the (anti-stall etc) protections.
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@ Safety Concerns: No one has contested that.
Automation has brought us the blessings of ACAS, GPWS, Cat3 and so forth. The one little setback, and these discussed incidents point in that direction, is that with every progress there are new problems arising. If we deal with them properly, then it's real progress. If we try to cover up the shortcomings, then we devaluate it.
There is no question that envelope protection is a great progress. The moment however that one of these features supposedly lead to aggravating a situation (almost proven on QF72, suspected on the NZ incident) and the involved parties display a reluctance to engage fully, from that moment you get some pros suspicious.
A pilot wanting to pull on a yoke/stick and the aircraft not willing to follow his command, for whatever reason, shows a situation that SHOULD NOT BE TOLERATED. It should be engaged with adequate measures, not only explained and discarded as extremely remote and therefore claiming the system beeing safe enough.
I truly hope most of my fellow pros would agree on that.
@Dysag
You are not entirely correct. When in manual on a 777, you actuate on the Actuator Control Electronics, they transmit to the Primary Flight Computers, these send back the signal which is executed by the ACEs.
If the envelope control protection in the PFCs intervene, you will feel resistance, BUT with a little force you can actuate the ACEs directly and therefore override any possibly erroneous input by a PFC.
That is the huge difference in both fly by wire systems. Such a feature would have worked on QF72.
Automation has brought us the blessings of ACAS, GPWS, Cat3 and so forth. The one little setback, and these discussed incidents point in that direction, is that with every progress there are new problems arising. If we deal with them properly, then it's real progress. If we try to cover up the shortcomings, then we devaluate it.
There is no question that envelope protection is a great progress. The moment however that one of these features supposedly lead to aggravating a situation (almost proven on QF72, suspected on the NZ incident) and the involved parties display a reluctance to engage fully, from that moment you get some pros suspicious.
A pilot wanting to pull on a yoke/stick and the aircraft not willing to follow his command, for whatever reason, shows a situation that SHOULD NOT BE TOLERATED. It should be engaged with adequate measures, not only explained and discarded as extremely remote and therefore claiming the system beeing safe enough.
I truly hope most of my fellow pros would agree on that.
@Dysag
You are not entirely correct. When in manual on a 777, you actuate on the Actuator Control Electronics, they transmit to the Primary Flight Computers, these send back the signal which is executed by the ACEs.
If the envelope control protection in the PFCs intervene, you will feel resistance, BUT with a little force you can actuate the ACEs directly and therefore override any possibly erroneous input by a PFC.
That is the huge difference in both fly by wire systems. Such a feature would have worked on QF72.
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Truly an amazing thread, and quite indicative of the "aero-culture" of the majority of the posters in this forum.
Either we're talking about aviation safety or Pprune has become the last refuge of the vocal anti Airbus brigade.
Just two comments :
1/- Why do they only concentrate on the paint on the static part of the safety bulletin ?
As far as I still can read, there were TWO recommendations in it :
(extract from the YahooXtra article).
Is the bit about performing low speed tests at a safe altitude, with a proper briefing just for the dogs ?
2/- The so-called technical discussion on A-vs-B FBW smacks of so much bias and intellectual dishonesty that it's hardly worth mentioning, and the fact that people talk about "Prims and Secs" (which are not in the architecture of the 320 family but on the 330 and later models) shows the level of awareness of what's involved.The folllowing statement is quite representative of the general atmosphere :
First I would say that on a particular MH flight, it didn't work.
Second, taking into account the Hudson ditching, which happened in Alpha prot, but two knots below Alpha prot speed and just 3 above Alpha max can the anti-A brigade please describe how easy that would have been on any other type (increased efforts on the yoke and inside continuous stick shaker... yeah! easy as pie !)
As far as I'm concerned, I'd still wait for the official prelim.
And I hope that the majority on this thread won't eat their caps. I'd gladly provide the mustard.
Either we're talking about aviation safety or Pprune has become the last refuge of the vocal anti Airbus brigade.
Just two comments :
1/- Why do they only concentrate on the paint on the static part of the safety bulletin ?
As far as I still can read, there were TWO recommendations in it :
As a result of the investigation's preliminary work and without prejudging the outcome of the investigation, the aircraft manufacturer's flight safety department in France today issued new recommendations to Airbus operators.
It said during painting and maintenance it was important to protect all aerodynamic data sensors.
It has also said that tests such as low speed tests "must be performed at safe altitude and be preceded by a recall of basic rules as regards to minimum speeds and recovery actions".
Air New Zealand chief executive Rob Fyfe today welcomed the recommendations.
It said during painting and maintenance it was important to protect all aerodynamic data sensors.
It has also said that tests such as low speed tests "must be performed at safe altitude and be preceded by a recall of basic rules as regards to minimum speeds and recovery actions".
Air New Zealand chief executive Rob Fyfe today welcomed the recommendations.
Is the bit about performing low speed tests at a safe altitude, with a proper briefing just for the dogs ?
2/- The so-called technical discussion on A-vs-B FBW smacks of so much bias and intellectual dishonesty that it's hardly worth mentioning, and the fact that people talk about "Prims and Secs" (which are not in the architecture of the 320 family but on the 330 and later models) shows the level of awareness of what's involved.The folllowing statement is quite representative of the general atmosphere :
If the envelope control protection in the PFCs intervene, you will feel resistance, BUT with a little force you can actuate the ACEs directly and therefore override any possibly erroneous input by a PFC.
That is the huge difference in both fly by wire systems. Such a feature would have worked on QF72.
That is the huge difference in both fly by wire systems. Such a feature would have worked on QF72.
Second, taking into account the Hudson ditching, which happened in Alpha prot, but two knots below Alpha prot speed and just 3 above Alpha max can the anti-A brigade please describe how easy that would have been on any other type (increased efforts on the yoke and inside continuous stick shaker... yeah! easy as pie !)
As far as I'm concerned, I'd still wait for the official prelim.
And I hope that the majority on this thread won't eat their caps. I'd gladly provide the mustard.
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Don't get excited, Lemurian. It's as if you'd throw a stone into a sheepherd, the one thats hit shouts the loudest ....
I repeatedly said that it's not a A vs. B argument. It's about a Airbus particularity i don't like. If someone else goes the A-B way, i only clarified some misconceptions.
To your argument:
it goes down the same road.
By the way the LHR almost idle approach was done in exactly this manner, and it worked to save a bad situation just as the Hudson incident did.
Once more, i am not on a anti-Airbus crusade, i simply point out that there is a weakness and i don't like the way it is dealt with. The responsable people should accept that there is room for improvement and should act accordingly.
I repeatedly said that it's not a A vs. B argument. It's about a Airbus particularity i don't like. If someone else goes the A-B way, i only clarified some misconceptions.
To your argument:
Second, taking into account the Hudson ditching, which happened in Alpha prot, but two knots below Alpha prot speed and just 3 above Alpha max can the anti-A brigade please describe how easy that would have been on any other type (increased efforts on the yoke and inside continuous stick shaker... yeah! easy as pie !)
By the way the LHR almost idle approach was done in exactly this manner, and it worked to save a bad situation just as the Hudson incident did.
Once more, i am not on a anti-Airbus crusade, i simply point out that there is a weakness and i don't like the way it is dealt with. The responsable people should accept that there is room for improvement and should act accordingly.
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GMDS
There are weaknesses in all designs, that then cause accidents, and strong points in each design that are never really acknowledged when they prevent accidents. But to be honest, it is not up to us, the pilots, how these are certified or balanced.
I fly Airbus. I'd rather fly certain B machines for the fun of flying them, but would then get slandered for hand flying in a busy TMA
There is no evidence yet that this accident was FBW related... as a few posts above, there seem 2 recommendations not directly related to FBW. It has always been my opinion that the "unusual" nature of the Flight (post Maint, post lease Flt Test) would be a factor in the accident - that's just the way the swiss cheese works i.e. drawing conclusions from it and relating them to normal Pax operations will probably not be appropriate
Of course B aeroplanes never have such issues In summary, I did not design the Airbus, I just sit in the damn thing. But it does it's job, in a low workload and efficient manner... as do varous B products. Posts above were just to correct or clarify other posters points... and I see no need for a big red button - the aircraft systems do that perfectly well by design, and if and when that design is found wanting, as with all types, it will be modified by the appropriate parties based on evidence, not armchair experts who just don't like it, probably because it's french
NoD
Once more, i am not on a anti-Airbus crusade, i simply point out that there is a weakness and i don't like the way it is dealt with. The responsable people should accept that there is room for improvement and should act accordingly.
I fly Airbus. I'd rather fly certain B machines for the fun of flying them, but would then get slandered for hand flying in a busy TMA
There is no evidence yet that this accident was FBW related... as a few posts above, there seem 2 recommendations not directly related to FBW. It has always been my opinion that the "unusual" nature of the Flight (post Maint, post lease Flt Test) would be a factor in the accident - that's just the way the swiss cheese works i.e. drawing conclusions from it and relating them to normal Pax operations will probably not be appropriate
Of course B aeroplanes never have such issues In summary, I did not design the Airbus, I just sit in the damn thing. But it does it's job, in a low workload and efficient manner... as do varous B products. Posts above were just to correct or clarify other posters points... and I see no need for a big red button - the aircraft systems do that perfectly well by design, and if and when that design is found wanting, as with all types, it will be modified by the appropriate parties based on evidence, not armchair experts who just don't like it, probably because it's french
NoD
GMDS;
The same claims and comments were made by dozens on the TAM A320 Congonhas accident regarding the thrust levers. "If only Airbus had designed...(fill in the blank)". NoD is right - every design is a compromise which satisfies conflicting requirements. The conclusions arrived at there and should be here were the correct ones: The A320 design is highly successful, has millions of uneventful landings, does not have a record of crew difficulties with the thrust levers, the sidestick, the C* Laws or anything else in the design. You may be uncomfortable and don't like the way it is dealt with and that's fine so long as such differences contribute to an improvement of the design without compromising other aspects of the airplane. I respectfully suggest that such a contribution can't be credibly offered unless you've spent a lot of time in the aircraft, not just flying it but learning deeply about it. Forgive me if I'm wrong about your background!
There isn't very much that the engineers haven't thought of, but there are a few from the early days. The VS/FPA issue had the potential for a human factors accident even before Strasbourg as I have seen the confusion personally on NPA's in the maritimes. Understanding "IDLE/OPEN DESCENT" and the autothrust system has been another for those transitioning to the airplane from another type.
I always felt that if a student could, while turning and climbing or descending, as well as on the approach, take the airplane from fully automated flight to fully manual flight and back again with everything engaged, without the passengers ever knowing something had changed "up front", s/he knew the airplane pretty well. Disconnecting the automation and flying the airplane like a 172 was another key to understanding, but this is where training, not the airplane, fail miserably.
The record of the design speaks for itself. The accident rate is no worse than any other design and the automation and fault-handling design is better than most. Those who call for the big red button simply don't understand a host of issues, many of which are related to such design matters.
All that acknowledged, the point illustrated by the QF72 incident may be something that Airbus should and perhaps is looking at - we don't know. A "BRB" won't solve such a problem for many reasons, weight for a separate "intervention" system not the least of these problems. The 727 on manual reversion with only one rudder working was certainly a handful and required very careful inputs, as does a 320 being flown on stabilizer and rudder alone, both of which are serious emergencies.
Once more, i am not on a anti-Airbus crusade, i simply point out that there is a weakness and i don't like the way it is dealt with. The responsable people should accept that there is room for improvement and should act accordingly.
There isn't very much that the engineers haven't thought of, but there are a few from the early days. The VS/FPA issue had the potential for a human factors accident even before Strasbourg as I have seen the confusion personally on NPA's in the maritimes. Understanding "IDLE/OPEN DESCENT" and the autothrust system has been another for those transitioning to the airplane from another type.
I always felt that if a student could, while turning and climbing or descending, as well as on the approach, take the airplane from fully automated flight to fully manual flight and back again with everything engaged, without the passengers ever knowing something had changed "up front", s/he knew the airplane pretty well. Disconnecting the automation and flying the airplane like a 172 was another key to understanding, but this is where training, not the airplane, fail miserably.
The record of the design speaks for itself. The accident rate is no worse than any other design and the automation and fault-handling design is better than most. Those who call for the big red button simply don't understand a host of issues, many of which are related to such design matters.
All that acknowledged, the point illustrated by the QF72 incident may be something that Airbus should and perhaps is looking at - we don't know. A "BRB" won't solve such a problem for many reasons, weight for a separate "intervention" system not the least of these problems. The 727 on manual reversion with only one rudder working was certainly a handful and required very careful inputs, as does a 320 being flown on stabilizer and rudder alone, both of which are serious emergencies.
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Another example of the arguments of the brigade I was referring to and Clandestino's reply :
There was, Clandestino, a more to the point answer, IMO : That this kind of failure is more likely to happen -however remote it might be- on a Boeing FBW as the boxes are the same. Airbus had these computers made by different electronics manufacturers in order to augment the un-likeliness of it happening.
But of course, Boeing products are totally trouble free, aren't they ?
As no one had taken the hint I made, just look into the description of a chandelle...or ask the 320 TRIs who've performed the required manoeuvres for a post-maintenance acceptance test...and compare these to the two-surfers' witness reports...And then re-read the Airbus recommendation, past the static port bit.
Still no clue ?
We have three indepentent systems, each required to be very reliable. Suddenly two of them simultaneously fail in the exactly same manner and their false outputs are diverging from real values with the very similar amplitude over time. I didn't take this scenario into consideration as my opinion is that chances of its occurence are virtually nil.
But of course, Boeing products are totally trouble free, aren't they ?
As no one had taken the hint I made, just look into the description of a chandelle...or ask the 320 TRIs who've performed the required manoeuvres for a post-maintenance acceptance test...and compare these to the two-surfers' witness reports...And then re-read the Airbus recommendation, past the static port bit.
Still no clue ?
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GMDS
By the way the LHR almost idle approach was done in exactly this manner, and it worked to save a bad situation just as the Hudson incident did.
The common characteristics of the two incidents is the cool-headedness of the Flight deck crews.
That said, one was trying to extend the glide as far as possible,
The other was to touch-down (on the water) at as low a speed as possible.
Piloting-wise, those are completely different strategies.
I don't say it would have been impossible on a T7, but a lot more difficult, due to the vastly increased effort on the yoke while trying to ignore the stall warning.
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What the safety statistics actually show us is that more automation leads to fewer accidents and much better reliability
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Burty,
You write "We are told this on a regular basis, highest level of automation etc etc,"
Airbus states very clearly that pilots must learn to use the appropriate level of automation, which may be none.
Those who tell us to always use the highest level of atutomation are disregarding one of the 'Golden Rules' and should be made to stand in the corner until they have them memorized.
During my time in the A319, A320, A321, A330 and A340 I saw two common errors among our fleet pilots. The first was not disengaging the automatics when they could no longer help you ..... and the second was not engaging them when they could.
best regards,
Bruce Waddington
You write "We are told this on a regular basis, highest level of automation etc etc,"
Airbus states very clearly that pilots must learn to use the appropriate level of automation, which may be none.
Those who tell us to always use the highest level of atutomation are disregarding one of the 'Golden Rules' and should be made to stand in the corner until they have them memorized.
During my time in the A319, A320, A321, A330 and A340 I saw two common errors among our fleet pilots. The first was not disengaging the automatics when they could no longer help you ..... and the second was not engaging them when they could.
best regards,
Bruce Waddington
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There is no excuse for not maintaining the highest level of hand-flying skill.
Except laziness.
In our MD-11's we've backed off from the "highest level" idea also. Our new mantra is "proficiency in all levels." Lo and behold, no tail strikes in quite some time......
Except laziness.
In our MD-11's we've backed off from the "highest level" idea also. Our new mantra is "proficiency in all levels." Lo and behold, no tail strikes in quite some time......
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Not all airlines encourage flying AP off...
Some airlines actively discourage GA flying
The airlines interest may be to promote automation over pilot skills. Perhaps there are statistics on the matter?
Some airlines actively discourage GA flying
The airlines interest may be to promote automation over pilot skills. Perhaps there are statistics on the matter?
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"The airlines interest may be to promote automation over pilot skills. Perhaps there are statistics on the matter?"
The airline's interest is to eventually eliminate the pilot altogether!
The airline's interest is to eventually eliminate the pilot altogether!
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I remember some time ago a report that said it was better to let the humans fly the aircraft with the automatics watching to warn of errors than it was to let the automatics fly the aircraft with the humans watching.
Humans make mistakes and become complacent - how many know they've read something and seen what they expect to see, not what's really there? If your automatics generally work fine and only report errors on sensor failure, how many people are going to immediately believe there's a problem the one time it really is a serious error?
Humans make mistakes and become complacent - how many know they've read something and seen what they expect to see, not what's really there? If your automatics generally work fine and only report errors on sensor failure, how many people are going to immediately believe there's a problem the one time it really is a serious error?
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Automatics
Don't innovate well. Not good at deductive reasoning, and have very little time in the sim (sic). They aren't skeptical, don't have families at home and have no time in type on other aircraft. Once they "fail", they're done, largely.
On UAL 232 what happens w/o a dead heading C/A in the back to suggest constant differential thrust on the remaining two?
Just Sayin'
On UAL 232 what happens w/o a dead heading C/A in the back to suggest constant differential thrust on the remaining two?
Just Sayin'
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what are the switch selections which have to be made (on the overhead panel i assume) to fly the aircraft in normal law?
is there a recall drill in the emergency checklist to do this?
is there a recall drill in the emergency checklist to do this?
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please explain
Don't innovate well. Not good at deductive reasoning, and have very little time in the sim (sic). They aren't skeptical, don't have families at home and have no time in type on other aircraft. Once they "fail", they're done, largely.
On UAL 232 what happens w/o a dead heading C/A in the back to suggest constant differential thrust on the remaining two?
Just Sayin'
On UAL 232 what happens w/o a dead heading C/A in the back to suggest constant differential thrust on the remaining two?
Just Sayin'
Thanks