GMDS;
Once more, i am not on a anti-Airbus crusade, i simply point out that there is a weakness and i don't like the way it is dealt with. The responsable people should accept that there is room for improvement and should act accordingly.
The same claims and comments were made by dozens on the TAM A320 Congonhas accident regarding the thrust levers. "If only Airbus had designed...(fill in the blank)". NoD is right - every design is a compromise which satisfies conflicting requirements. The conclusions arrived at there and should be here were the correct ones: The A320 design is highly successful, has millions of uneventful landings, does not have a record of crew difficulties with the thrust levers, the sidestick, the C* Laws or anything else in the design. You may be uncomfortable and don't like the way it is dealt with and that's fine so long as such differences contribute to an improvement of the design without compromising other aspects of the airplane. I respectfully suggest that such a contribution can't be credibly offered unless you've spent a lot of time in the aircraft, not just flying it but learning deeply about it. Forgive me if I'm wrong about your background!
There isn't very much that the engineers haven't thought of, but there are a few from the early days. The VS/FPA issue had the potential for a human factors accident even before Strasbourg as I have seen the confusion personally on NPA's in the maritimes. Understanding "IDLE/OPEN DESCENT" and the autothrust system has been another for those transitioning to the airplane from another type.
I always felt that if a student could, while turning and climbing or descending, as well as on the approach, take the airplane from fully automated flight to fully manual flight and back again with everything engaged, without the passengers ever knowing something had changed "up front", s/he knew the airplane pretty well. Disconnecting the automation and flying the airplane like a 172 was another key to understanding, but this is where training, not the airplane, fail miserably.
The record of the design speaks for itself. The accident rate is no worse than any other design and the automation and fault-handling design is better than most. Those who call for the big red button simply don't understand a host of issues, many of which are related to such design matters.
All that acknowledged, the point illustrated by the QF72 incident may be something that Airbus should and perhaps is looking at - we don't know. A "BRB" won't solve such a problem for many reasons, weight for a separate "intervention" system not the least of these problems. The 727 on manual reversion with only one rudder working was certainly a handful and required very careful inputs, as does a 320 being flown on stabilizer and rudder alone, both of which are serious emergencies.