Airbus crash/training flight
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If speed brakes (extension/arming), slats/flaps, or gear were commanded or extended either alternately or normally - does this change any auto-pilot, stall, FADEC logic
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Many years ago I remember being told on my DC9 course that you should always lower the gear before arming the speedbrake for landing, the reason given was that in case of a problem with Air/Ground logic you would receive full ground spoiler on selecting gear down. 
I was led to believe that someone had learned this the hard way, and continued to respect this sequence of selection in 20 yrs of 737 flying.
Can someone tell us if this failure mode is feasible with A320 Air/Ground logic failure.
I was led to believe that someone had learned this the hard way, and continued to respect this sequence of selection in 20 yrs of 737 flying.
Can someone tell us if this failure mode is feasible with A320 Air/Ground logic failure.
There are no alternate procedures for extending flaps/slats or arming ground spoilers on A320. Manual gear extension will leave the gear bay doors dangling and will deprive you of nosewheel steering. Extending the slats or activating engine anti-ice rises minimum idle N1 but otherwise doesn't affect "FADEC logic". A320 isn't difficult to fly in direct law - it evens feel livelier and trimming by wheel, C-172 style, felt quite fun, at least for me. Mind you, that was in the sim, I can't recall that my company's fleet ever suffered degradation into alternate law. A colleague of mine, flying in the ME, once had dual radalt failure. He claims that real aeroplane behaves even better in direct law than sim. Air/ground sensing on A320 controls much more than just ground spoilers and spoilers are armed after the final hi-lift devices config is set, anyway. Please be patient and wait for the report. Thank you.
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Conjecture ?
French newspaper "Le Figaro" quoted this evening on Catalan TV as stating accident was definitely caused by a sensor remaining covered following of work on aircraft, described as "grave error" by factory.
I have no idea as to whether Le Figaro have inside information or this is a conjecture expanded to a cause.
I have no idea as to whether Le Figaro have inside information or this is a conjecture expanded to a cause.
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From "Le Figuro" - conjecture after all.
Perpignan : un défaut de peinture à l'origine du crash
Thierry Vigoureux
24/01/2009 |
INFO FIGARO - Une panne des instruments de bord après la révision en atelier semble probable et Airbus vient d'envoyer un bulletin de sécurité à tous ses clients sur les vols de contrôle après révision.
Les techniciens du Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile (BEA), basé au Bourget, semblent avoir avancé sur le scénario de l'accident de l'Airbus A 320 survenu en mer au large de Perpignan le 27 novembre dernier. Sept personnes, des pilotes et des techniciens aéronautiques, avaient trouvé la mort.
Lors des opérations de peinture effectuées dans un atelier de Perpignan qui remettait l'avion loué à XL Airways Germany aux couleurs d'Air New Zealand, des capteurs sur le fuselage auraient été cachés par une couche de protection. Ce qui auraient rendu inefficaces les calculateurs et les commandes électriques de vol.Le déroulement de cet accident intriguait les experts car il était, théoriquement, impossible.
En approche finale avant d'atterrir à Perpignan, l'A 320 s'est cabré puis a décroché. Une manœuvre censée être impossible car les commandes électriques de vol de l'A 320 stabilisent automatiquement l'avion, éventuellement contre le gré du pilote. Les situations scabreuses sont donc impossibles. A moins que les sondes et les capteurs aérodynamiques situés sur les ailes et le fuselage n'aient pas rempli leurs rôles et n'aient pas alimenté en données les calculateurs de bord sur la vitesse, la pression, l'attitude de l'avion, etc. Les systèmes de sécurité intégrés aux commandes de vol deviennent alors inefficaces.
Scénario plausible
Reste à savoir pourquoi ces circuits de mesure doublés, voire triplés, n'ont pas fonctionné.Ce scénario est suffisamment plausible pour qu'Airbus ait envoyé hier à ses 218 compagnies aériennes clientes un bulletin de sécurité rédigé en collaboration avec le BEA à partir des premières informations tirées des enregistreurs de vol. Cette note, diffusée dans le monde entier, vise avant tout à éviter qu'un accident semblable ne se produise et recommande des mesures préventives comme le demande l'Organisation mondiale de l'aviation civile. C'est une garantie essentielle pour permettre à la sécurité dans le transport aérien de progresser.
L'enquête judiciaire ne doit pas interférer. Elle passe après l'enquête technique et s'efforcera plus tard de déterminer des responsabilités. Airbus met aussi en garde sur la conduite des vols de contrôle effectués après des opérations de maintenance, comme ce fut le cas à Perpignan.
L'avionneur rappelle les consignes sur les vols à basse vitesse qui ne doivent pas être effectués à basse altitude et donner lieu à un briefing spécifique.La presse néo-zéalandaise, alimentée la semaine dernière par des déclarations du procureur de Perpignan faisant état de données techniques incomplètes ou mal comprises, évoquait la possibilité d'une poussée soudaine des moteurs avant l'accident. Mais cette information ne peut être interprétée, faute d'être resituée dans la chronologie du vol.
Thierry Vigoureux
24/01/2009 |
INFO FIGARO - Une panne des instruments de bord après la révision en atelier semble probable et Airbus vient d'envoyer un bulletin de sécurité à tous ses clients sur les vols de contrôle après révision.
Les techniciens du Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile (BEA), basé au Bourget, semblent avoir avancé sur le scénario de l'accident de l'Airbus A 320 survenu en mer au large de Perpignan le 27 novembre dernier. Sept personnes, des pilotes et des techniciens aéronautiques, avaient trouvé la mort.Lors des opérations de peinture effectuées dans un atelier de Perpignan qui remettait l'avion loué à XL Airways Germany aux couleurs d'Air New Zealand, des capteurs sur le fuselage auraient été cachés par une couche de protection. Ce qui auraient rendu inefficaces les calculateurs et les commandes électriques de vol.Le déroulement de cet accident intriguait les experts car il était, théoriquement, impossible.
En approche finale avant d'atterrir à Perpignan, l'A 320 s'est cabré puis a décroché. Une manœuvre censée être impossible car les commandes électriques de vol de l'A 320 stabilisent automatiquement l'avion, éventuellement contre le gré du pilote. Les situations scabreuses sont donc impossibles. A moins que les sondes et les capteurs aérodynamiques situés sur les ailes et le fuselage n'aient pas rempli leurs rôles et n'aient pas alimenté en données les calculateurs de bord sur la vitesse, la pression, l'attitude de l'avion, etc. Les systèmes de sécurité intégrés aux commandes de vol deviennent alors inefficaces.
Scénario plausible
Reste à savoir pourquoi ces circuits de mesure doublés, voire triplés, n'ont pas fonctionné.Ce scénario est suffisamment plausible pour qu'Airbus ait envoyé hier à ses 218 compagnies aériennes clientes un bulletin de sécurité rédigé en collaboration avec le BEA à partir des premières informations tirées des enregistreurs de vol. Cette note, diffusée dans le monde entier, vise avant tout à éviter qu'un accident semblable ne se produise et recommande des mesures préventives comme le demande l'Organisation mondiale de l'aviation civile. C'est une garantie essentielle pour permettre à la sécurité dans le transport aérien de progresser.
L'enquête judiciaire ne doit pas interférer. Elle passe après l'enquête technique et s'efforcera plus tard de déterminer des responsabilités. Airbus met aussi en garde sur la conduite des vols de contrôle effectués après des opérations de maintenance, comme ce fut le cas à Perpignan.
L'avionneur rappelle les consignes sur les vols à basse vitesse qui ne doivent pas être effectués à basse altitude et donner lieu à un briefing spécifique.La presse néo-zéalandaise, alimentée la semaine dernière par des déclarations du procureur de Perpignan faisant état de données techniques incomplètes ou mal comprises, évoquait la possibilité d'une poussée soudaine des moteurs avant l'accident. Mais cette information ne peut être interprétée, faute d'être resituée dans la chronologie du vol.
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Google translation:
Perpignan: a failure to paint the cause of the crash
Thierry Vigoureux
24/01/2009 |
INFO FIGARO - A failure of on-board instrumentation after revision workshop seems likely and Airbus has just sent a security bulletin to all its customers on flights after revision control.
The technicians at the Bureau of Investigation and Analysis for the Safety of Civil Aviation (BEA), based on location, appear to have advanced on the scenario of the crash of the Airbus A 320 occurred at sea off Perpignan November 27 last. Seven people, pilots and aviation technicians, had died.
During the operations carried out in a paint shop Perpignan calling the aircraft leased to XL Airways Germany in the colors of Air New Zealand, sensors on the fuselage had been hidden by a layer of protection. What would make ineffective the computers and the electrical vol.Le course of this accident puzzled experts because it was theoretically impossible.
On final approach before landing at Perpignan, the A 320 reared then stalled. A maneuver meant to be impossible because the electrical flight of the A 320 automatically stabilize the plane, possibly against the will of the driver. Egregious situations are impossible. Unless the probes and sensors on aerodynamic wings and fuselage have not fulfilled their roles and are not supplied with data onboard on speed, pressure, the attitude of the aircraft, etc.. Security systems integrated with the flight controls become ineffective.
Plausible
It remains to know why these circuits measuring doubled or even tripled, not fonctionné.Ce scenario is plausible enough that Airbus had sent yesterday to its 218 airline customers a security bulletin written in collaboration with the BEA from Initial information from the flight recorders. The note, circulated throughout the world, is intended primarily to prevent a similar accident from happening and recommends preventive measures as requested by the World Organization for Civil Aviation. It is an essential guarantee for the security in air transport to grow.
The judicial inquiry should not interfere. It goes after the technical investigation and will try later to determine responsibility. Airbus also cautions about the conduct of flights made after control of maintenance operations, as was the case in Perpignan.
The manufacturer recalled the instructions on flights at low speed which should not be conducted at low altitude and give rise to a press briefing spécifique.La New zéalandaise, fueled last week by statements by the prosecutor Perpignan reporting data Technical incomplete or poorly understood, evoked the possibility of a surge engines before the accident. But this information can not be interpreted, if not viewed in the chronology of the flight.
Perpignan: a failure to paint the cause of the crash
Thierry Vigoureux
24/01/2009 |
INFO FIGARO - A failure of on-board instrumentation after revision workshop seems likely and Airbus has just sent a security bulletin to all its customers on flights after revision control.
The technicians at the Bureau of Investigation and Analysis for the Safety of Civil Aviation (BEA), based on location, appear to have advanced on the scenario of the crash of the Airbus A 320 occurred at sea off Perpignan November 27 last. Seven people, pilots and aviation technicians, had died.
During the operations carried out in a paint shop Perpignan calling the aircraft leased to XL Airways Germany in the colors of Air New Zealand, sensors on the fuselage had been hidden by a layer of protection. What would make ineffective the computers and the electrical vol.Le course of this accident puzzled experts because it was theoretically impossible.
On final approach before landing at Perpignan, the A 320 reared then stalled. A maneuver meant to be impossible because the electrical flight of the A 320 automatically stabilize the plane, possibly against the will of the driver. Egregious situations are impossible. Unless the probes and sensors on aerodynamic wings and fuselage have not fulfilled their roles and are not supplied with data onboard on speed, pressure, the attitude of the aircraft, etc.. Security systems integrated with the flight controls become ineffective.
Plausible
It remains to know why these circuits measuring doubled or even tripled, not fonctionné.Ce scenario is plausible enough that Airbus had sent yesterday to its 218 airline customers a security bulletin written in collaboration with the BEA from Initial information from the flight recorders. The note, circulated throughout the world, is intended primarily to prevent a similar accident from happening and recommends preventive measures as requested by the World Organization for Civil Aviation. It is an essential guarantee for the security in air transport to grow.
The judicial inquiry should not interfere. It goes after the technical investigation and will try later to determine responsibility. Airbus also cautions about the conduct of flights made after control of maintenance operations, as was the case in Perpignan.
The manufacturer recalled the instructions on flights at low speed which should not be conducted at low altitude and give rise to a press briefing spécifique.La New zéalandaise, fueled last week by statements by the prosecutor Perpignan reporting data Technical incomplete or poorly understood, evoked the possibility of a surge engines before the accident. But this information can not be interpreted, if not viewed in the chronology of the flight.
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On final approach before landing at Perpignan, the A 320 reared then stalled. A maneuver meant to be impossible because the electrical flight of the A 320 automatically stabilizes the plane, possibly against the will of the driver
This quite sums up the design flaw of the Airbus system. Murphy said quite rightly that if something can go wrong, eventually it will. Even in a Bus. Therefore depriving the driver of the final authority is a serious flaw.
I don't know where atakacs got his information from:
I have numerously advocated for a big red "kill all automation, let me fly this" button and I have been told that it was indeed available...
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I dont think you can take any stock in these automatically generated translations. 'Electric flight' is a term google translator came up with. Meanins and terms can be mixed up.
You should have seen the babel translator version :o
You should have seen the babel translator version :o
Quote:
I have numerously advocated for a big red "kill all automation, let me fly this" button and I have been told that it was indeed available...
I have yet to find that button, but it would make the Bus a safer equippment to fly.
I have numerously advocated for a big red "kill all automation, let me fly this" button and I have been told that it was indeed available...
I have yet to find that button, but it would make the Bus a safer equippment to fly.
1: FAC 1+2 off. (Alternate law)
2: Gear down (Direct law).
Last edited by HundredPercentPlease; 26th Jan 2009 at 08:13.
Having just re-converted back onto the bus. After 12 yes on boeing. I still can not understand how they could have flown around for so long without any problems only to have the machine do something un-controlable on approach.???
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Before this thread ends up going in the ridiculous direction of Boeing/Airbus, Fly-by-wire/Manual control lets not forget one thing.
There has already been accidents due to this type of mistake and all were Boeings are far as I can remember. The aircraft could not be manually controlled due to erroneous air data readings.
So erroneous air data information is just that, erroneous. It will in all probability lead to tragedy and has no respect for aircraft manufacturer. Therefore the boeing/airbus, manual/automated nonsense is not required here.
There has already been accidents due to this type of mistake and all were Boeings are far as I can remember. The aircraft could not be manually controlled due to erroneous air data readings.
So erroneous air data information is just that, erroneous. It will in all probability lead to tragedy and has no respect for aircraft manufacturer. Therefore the boeing/airbus, manual/automated nonsense is not required here.
There has already been accidents due to this type of mistake and all were Boeings are far as I can remember. The aircraft could not be manually controlled due to erroneous air data readings.
That being said most if not all "bad sensor" induced crashes where during night operation, in which case getting inexact readings from some or most instruments is obviously quite challenging (albeit survivable in most cases with the benefit of hindsight). Here they were flying with reasonably good visibility yet they still lost the aircraft. I can certainly foresee surprise and panic when the Bus decides to do something unexpected (this time because of possibly paint damaged sensors) but I am still convinced that there is no adequate takeover procedure for the pilot to regain control when things get out of hand. One can mention the A330 test flight that went bad and where the chief test pilot did not manage to recover in time because (among other factor, admittedly) he did not understand what the plane was doing or the TAM 320 where the crew was refused any kind of braking because the automation systems did not like what the pilot was doing. In both (and other cases) the pilots might have had a chance if they could quickly revert to a fully human controlled flight. I'm pretty sure this will be the case here too...
One might argue that the various automation built into the Airbus FWB systems did actually save the day more often than not by overriding the pilot and it is quite conceivably the case. But I would still be more reassured if there would be a quick way to get back full control of the plane and if the FWB pilots would be actually trained to take over when they don't understand what's going on (just remember the Flash Airline pilot whose only answer to increasing excessive bank angle was to revert to the autopilot... it was a 737 but it's NOT the attitude to have).
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Birgenair B757
A Birgenair B757-225 crashed in 1996. Speed indications were wrong because of obstructed pitot tube. But back then problems started very early in the flight.
Narrative:
Flight ALW 301 departed Puerto Plata for a charter flight to Frankfurt via Gander and Berlin at 23:42 LT. At 80 knots on take-off the captain found out that his air speed indicator (ASI) wasn't working properly. The co-pilot's indicator seemed to work fine. While climbing through 4700 feet the captain's ASI read 350 knots (real speed was about 220kts); this resulted in an autopilot/autothrottle reaction to increase the pitch-up attitude and a power reduction in order to lower the airspeed. At that time the crew got 'Rudder ratio' and 'Mach airspeed' advisory warnings. Both pilots got confused when the co-pilot stated that his ASI read 200 knots decreasing while getting an excessive speed-warning, followed by a stick shaker warning. This led the pilots to believe that both ASIs were unreliable.
Finally realizing that they were losing speed and altitude they disconnected the autopilot (which, fed by the captain's faulty ASI, had reduced the speed close to the stall speed) and applied full thrust. At 23:47:17 an aural GPWS warning sounded. Eight seconds later the aircraft struck the ocean.
The incorrect ASI readings were possibly caused by an obstructed pitot tube, which had left uncovered for 3-4 days prior to this flight.
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The crew's failure to recognize the activation of the stick shaker as a warning of imminent entrance to the stall, and the failure of the crew to execute the procedures for recovery from the onset of loss of control."
Flight ALW 301 departed Puerto Plata for a charter flight to Frankfurt via Gander and Berlin at 23:42 LT. At 80 knots on take-off the captain found out that his air speed indicator (ASI) wasn't working properly. The co-pilot's indicator seemed to work fine. While climbing through 4700 feet the captain's ASI read 350 knots (real speed was about 220kts); this resulted in an autopilot/autothrottle reaction to increase the pitch-up attitude and a power reduction in order to lower the airspeed. At that time the crew got 'Rudder ratio' and 'Mach airspeed' advisory warnings. Both pilots got confused when the co-pilot stated that his ASI read 200 knots decreasing while getting an excessive speed-warning, followed by a stick shaker warning. This led the pilots to believe that both ASIs were unreliable.
Finally realizing that they were losing speed and altitude they disconnected the autopilot (which, fed by the captain's faulty ASI, had reduced the speed close to the stall speed) and applied full thrust. At 23:47:17 an aural GPWS warning sounded. Eight seconds later the aircraft struck the ocean.
The incorrect ASI readings were possibly caused by an obstructed pitot tube, which had left uncovered for 3-4 days prior to this flight.
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The crew's failure to recognize the activation of the stick shaker as a warning of imminent entrance to the stall, and the failure of the crew to execute the procedures for recovery from the onset of loss of control."
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The Airbus Safety message text seems to have been removed (?) But from the Flight article, which I think fairly accurately reproduces what was said:
Might I suggest we do not think this is, as suggested above, exclusively applicable to "Static Ports". It might have been... but these are not the "sole" sensors.
I find the second paragraph more interesting... and possibly making comments such as:
not relevant 
There are numerous types of sensor, and numerous versions of each sensor. We do not what, or how many, were affected and when. But the second para seems to be giving out some clues as to the conduct of the "tests", possibly when combined with some sensor errors
NoD
It said during painting and maintenance it was important to protect all aerodynamic data sensors.
It has also said that tests such as low speed tests "must be performed at safe altitude and be preceded by a recall of basic rules as regards to minimum speeds and recovery actions".
It has also said that tests such as low speed tests "must be performed at safe altitude and be preceded by a recall of basic rules as regards to minimum speeds and recovery actions".
I find the second paragraph more interesting... and possibly making comments such as:
This quite sums up the design flaw of the Airbus system. Murphy said quite rightly that if something can go wrong, eventually it will. Even in a Bus. Therefore depriving the driver of the final authority is a serious flaw.
I still can not understand how they could have flown around for so long without any problems only to have the machine do something un-controlable on approach.???
There are numerous types of sensor, and numerous versions of each sensor. We do not what, or how many, were affected and when. But the second para seems to be giving out some clues as to the conduct of the "tests", possibly when combined with some sensor errors
NoD
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well we can speculate about many different scenario's but won't know the facts until they are published.
I would agree though that under normal circumstances blocked/covered probes/ports should become apparent immediately.
Angle of attack probes though could be a different story.
I would agree though that under normal circumstances blocked/covered probes/ports should become apparent immediately.
Angle of attack probes though could be a different story.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Originally Posted by SC
The aircraft (Boeing) could not be manually controlled due to erroneous air data readings.
IF the problem was a taped over static port, it must surely have shown itself earlier in the flight, so there should be discernable data? It would result in an increasing airspeed indication during descent which, I suppose, could have caused the auto system to reduce actual speed to compensate until Alpha Floor AoA was reached? As to why this may have caused loss of control, I know not - any AB folk to comment? I appreciate that the unexpected onset of TOGA could cause a huge pitch up but I thought the AB control system was designed to cope with that - unless of course it was being flown manually.
I have not read right back in the thread, but do we know the wx conditions prevailing around the crash site?
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@BOAC
you are of course correct and I could have worded it better. My point though was that it really makes no difference whether it was a digital aircraft or analogue. Erroneous air data is a difficult situation to handle.
I do not subscribe to this Boeing manual control or Airbus automated control nonsense. Both manufacturers aircraft are inherently safe.
you are of course correct and I could have worded it better. My point though was that it really makes no difference whether it was a digital aircraft or analogue. Erroneous air data is a difficult situation to handle.
I do not subscribe to this Boeing manual control or Airbus automated control nonsense. Both manufacturers aircraft are inherently safe.
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I truly understand the uproar of the Airbus lobby, them therefore bringing up the (somewhat childish) "but it can happen and happened to Boeing too....."
This is true and it also lead to accidents, yes.
Fact is simply, that in a sensor malfunction with erroneous data and electronic flight signals, the one still allows to be flown with the good old a$$ relying on attitude, RPM, sound and so forth. The other one does not, see Qantas incident.
For my part, I simply and sincerely prefer the earlier, even if the systems are less elaborated and sophisticated and those marvels might have saved one or two. This however applies just as much to the other system (beeing childish myself). And remember: You do not HAVE to disconnect everything, but at least there you CAN.
This is true and it also lead to accidents, yes.
Fact is simply, that in a sensor malfunction with erroneous data and electronic flight signals, the one still allows to be flown with the good old a$$ relying on attitude, RPM, sound and so forth. The other one does not, see Qantas incident.
For my part, I simply and sincerely prefer the earlier, even if the systems are less elaborated and sophisticated and those marvels might have saved one or two. This however applies just as much to the other system (beeing childish myself). And remember: You do not HAVE to disconnect everything, but at least there you CAN.