From a Boeing to an Airbus - Pilot Point of View
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What in the world are you guys talking about "d/c the A/T at any time" ??? what does that give you? CLB thrust when you want to decend? Manual thrust?. how is this rectifying the fact that the A/T provides no feedback, keeps you effectivly out of the loop and does not give any early warning of an A/T failure?
Out of the loop? How? Are you solely dependent on throttle movement for your cues? If so.. not good.
When instructing in the -300, I used to induce a governor failure with the AT engaged. The thrust lever on the engine with the failure would retard to idle to try and control the thrust. When that failed with the AP on and in an LNAV/VNAV mode, the second thrust lever would then come back to idle to try and maintain the commanded speed. THEN when the crew finally looked at the instruments or when the red dot illuminated showing the engine WAY over normal temp and %RPM, they would disconnect the AP and what a fun time that was..
Anyway, it is just an airplane with different systems. And if you really want to jump on failures, you may go research the 777 that had the software failure a few years ago.
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As it is with any aircraft, if you don't like whats its doing, take the A/P out and do it yourself.
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Im suposed to do a 320 course in Jan. Been a Boeing boy since birth and cut my command teeth on the 737.
Ive been reading up and asking around. Seems this A320 is quite ok when everything is working just hunkey-dorey. Soon as you get a REAL problem (fuel leak, blocked pitot/static, loss of prim ess AC feed) the ECAM gives you crap. Follow it blindly and your dead.
Wasnt there an incident in UK where a cockpit went dark and lost all the screens and the prob was ess AC feed? The all-singing dancing ECAM had the required drill many pages down!
Ive tryed reading the FCOMs and QRH. What a nighmare! Boeing has 99% of all the info you need in the QRH. Scarebus has 99% of all the info you need scattered within 5 confusing books (1% youll never find)!
Im still deciding if I realy should do a course on this thing.
Ive been reading up and asking around. Seems this A320 is quite ok when everything is working just hunkey-dorey. Soon as you get a REAL problem (fuel leak, blocked pitot/static, loss of prim ess AC feed) the ECAM gives you crap. Follow it blindly and your dead.
Wasnt there an incident in UK where a cockpit went dark and lost all the screens and the prob was ess AC feed? The all-singing dancing ECAM had the required drill many pages down!
Ive tryed reading the FCOMs and QRH. What a nighmare! Boeing has 99% of all the info you need in the QRH. Scarebus has 99% of all the info you need scattered within 5 confusing books (1% youll never find)!
Im still deciding if I realy should do a course on this thing.
Best piece of advice!
RTO,
When you turn the a/c,do you look at the control wheel displacement or bank angle?When you move the thrust level to set the thrust you want,do you look at the thrust level or the EPR or N1 gauge?
Now you know why Airbus made them stay put.
How come I read reports of AT failure in the bus causing speed loss, mode reversion and decend, and the flightcrews first discovery is the TA that follows from the aircraft decending onto traffic below?
Gretchenfrage and RTO, I assume that by "dead stick" you mean stick that doesn't move with flight controls movement rather than FBW failure. Did I guess it correctly?
And the throttles that doesn't move with autothrust on, where's the problem with that? I mean, does anyone really use thrust levers position as indication of engine thrust, rather than checking N1/EPR? Hopefully not.
Slasher, nothing is to be followed blindly but more often than not ECAM (or even better, QRH) gives the best way to resolve most of the situations. It might be the cultural difference between us, because I wasn't born pilot (let alone Boeing TRed at birth, like you), and had to work long and hard to get into RHS of humble ATR, but with attitudes like "ECAM is crap, QRH is crap" I wouldn't suggest you to take the course. They're not the best possible but they're the best we have and not using them is not an option.
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Dead stick and fixed throttle.
If you "suddenly wake up" after a jolt or bang, then the first pilots instinctive action is to grab the controls. In a Boeing you will get instant tactile feedback that "it" turns to ... and that the thrust is up high or low. Every research found out that the tactile input is like parallel computer input, 10 times faster than a serial input. Humans react similarily. If you have to collect data via intellectual input (visual on display) you finally get the same values, agreed, but 10 times slower. That's my point.
I would go as far as pretending that Habsheim and Bangalore would have been avoided in a Boeing, because the tactile feedback, however distracted the pilots may have been, would have instinctively told them "...there's NO thrust" and they would have slammed the throttles to the mechanical stop. Any excuse like "they fiddled with the cb's or with wrong modes" is oblivious: If a pilot induced accident could have been avoided by better design, there's no excuse NOT to implement it.
Furthermore there is the pending outcome of the investigation of the Toronto accident. Apparently the inspectors will argue that a disconnection of the AT would have been the better solution. If however you disconnect the AT in a Airbus, you lose some protections. In contrast on a Boeing under such circumstances you need not disconnect the AT. Even if it works badly, by overcorrecting huge gusts, you can leave it in as a valuable back up and protection, but you can hold it back or override it with thrust, if required. This is undoubtedly the much better suited solution and again, there's no excuse NOT to implement a better one for extreme conditions. Especially if the constructor and the operators mostly recommend to use the AT.
That's my point.
If you "suddenly wake up" after a jolt or bang, then the first pilots instinctive action is to grab the controls. In a Boeing you will get instant tactile feedback that "it" turns to ... and that the thrust is up high or low. Every research found out that the tactile input is like parallel computer input, 10 times faster than a serial input. Humans react similarily. If you have to collect data via intellectual input (visual on display) you finally get the same values, agreed, but 10 times slower. That's my point.
I would go as far as pretending that Habsheim and Bangalore would have been avoided in a Boeing, because the tactile feedback, however distracted the pilots may have been, would have instinctively told them "...there's NO thrust" and they would have slammed the throttles to the mechanical stop. Any excuse like "they fiddled with the cb's or with wrong modes" is oblivious: If a pilot induced accident could have been avoided by better design, there's no excuse NOT to implement it.
Furthermore there is the pending outcome of the investigation of the Toronto accident. Apparently the inspectors will argue that a disconnection of the AT would have been the better solution. If however you disconnect the AT in a Airbus, you lose some protections. In contrast on a Boeing under such circumstances you need not disconnect the AT. Even if it works badly, by overcorrecting huge gusts, you can leave it in as a valuable back up and protection, but you can hold it back or override it with thrust, if required. This is undoubtedly the much better suited solution and again, there's no excuse NOT to implement a better one for extreme conditions. Especially if the constructor and the operators mostly recommend to use the AT.
That's my point.
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A good friend, a trainer on the 737-300, rang me up after a flight. He'd dispatched with the auto thrust u/s.
On approach the flaps and gear were extended.
Then the stick shaker went off.
Totally forgot that he had no auto thrust.
I also flew the Boeing. Loved it.
I'm on the Airbus now. I like it, it's definately a lot easier. But I don't find it a rewarding plane to fly; for me it has no soul.
Agree about the FCOM, not the easiest read. And the QRH binder! What a pain. Literally!
On approach the flaps and gear were extended.
Then the stick shaker went off.
Totally forgot that he had no auto thrust.
I also flew the Boeing. Loved it.
I'm on the Airbus now. I like it, it's definately a lot easier. But I don't find it a rewarding plane to fly; for me it has no soul.
Agree about the FCOM, not the easiest read. And the QRH binder! What a pain. Literally!
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[QUOTE=longarm;2959829 p.s How do I put quotes in the blue box thingy? (makes an airbus look simple)[/QUOTE]
Look in the lower right corner of the comment box you're reading, there's a button marked "QUOTE". Press it and you will be taken to a new text box with the requested quotation in it. You can edit the quote to suit your response. Very simple, as this is a well-planned and moderated website.*
Cheers, y'all.
(*) - I haven't been banned yet...
Look in the lower right corner of the comment box you're reading, there's a button marked "QUOTE". Press it and you will be taken to a new text box with the requested quotation in it. You can edit the quote to suit your response. Very simple, as this is a well-planned and moderated website.*
Cheers, y'all.
(*) - I haven't been banned yet...
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Thanks for the tutoring, CF.
The AT or MT would not be any different ...... if it REALLY would apply thrust when you slam the levers forward.
Now how was it there?
Did they slam them to the stop?
Did the system perform this command?
We can stop it here. Never will we consent.
It is just MY oppinion that Airbus is easier as long as everything works fine, but if something goes the other way, after having flown all three major products, I like Airbus least.
Gretchenfrage out.
The AT or MT would not be any different ...... if it REALLY would apply thrust when you slam the levers forward.
Now how was it there?
Did they slam them to the stop?
Did the system perform this command?
We can stop it here. Never will we consent.
It is just MY oppinion that Airbus is easier as long as everything works fine, but if something goes the other way, after having flown all three major products, I like Airbus least.
Gretchenfrage out.
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Sorry Man ... but there is so much misconception on this specific event.
The CAPT wrote a book on that, but I could not say if it's avail in English.
Le Pilote est-il Coupable
Yes
Not exactly as expected
Don't be offended.
Have a good day !
Now how was it there?
Le Pilote est-il Coupable
La suite est facile à comprendre. Lorsque j'ai avancé la première fois les manettes des gaz
vers une position intermédiaire, en arrivant au-dessus du terrain de Habsheim, le signal de
commande N1 a été élaboré avec le retard démontré précédemment, ce que j'ai assimilé à une
non-reprise des moteurs. J'ai alors instinctivement repassé les manettes dans le cran 0, avant de
les mettre sur pleins gaz, dans le cran TOG4.La suite est facile à comprendre. Lorsque j'ai avancé la première fois les manettes des gaz
vers une position intermédiaire, en arrivant au-dessus du terrain de Habsheim, le signal de
commande N1 a été élaboré avec le retard démontré précédemment, ce que j'ai assimilé à une
non-reprise des moteurs. J'ai alors instinctivement repassé les manettes dans le cran 0, avant de
les mettre sur pleins gaz, dans le cran TOG4.
vers une position intermédiaire, en arrivant au-dessus du terrain de Habsheim, le signal de
commande N1 a été élaboré avec le retard démontré précédemment, ce que j'ai assimilé à une
non-reprise des moteurs. J'ai alors instinctivement repassé les manettes dans le cran 0, avant de
les mettre sur pleins gaz, dans le cran TOG4.La suite est facile à comprendre. Lorsque j'ai avancé la première fois les manettes des gaz
vers une position intermédiaire, en arrivant au-dessus du terrain de Habsheim, le signal de
commande N1 a été élaboré avec le retard démontré précédemment, ce que j'ai assimilé à une
non-reprise des moteurs. J'ai alors instinctivement repassé les manettes dans le cran 0, avant de
les mettre sur pleins gaz, dans le cran TOG4.
Did they slam them to the stop?
Did the system perform this command?
Gretchenfrage out.
Have a good day !
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CF
Sorry, I got a little upset.
It’s the constant battering by Airbus and it’s home crowd that gets to me and it shouldn’t. By battering I mean:
“you should have … not done this … rather done that … checked that … known better … read this … not followed ECAM in that case … done the QRH … not done the summaries … etc. etc.”
- Extremely wise words for afterwards.
I said it before and repeat myself: Not being the perfect pilot, I sometimes forget or screw up. Recovery is the magic word. To be able to do just that, in due time, I want a partner, mechanical or human, that’s simple and doesn’t give me a hard time. Any more sophisticated solution, programm or any more intellectual by-seater (or worse back- seater), both of them taking me longer to grasp, might be a enrichement for leisure hours and philosophy. But I definitely prefer the simple and fast to understand other option for my professional flying business, because I believe it gives me the better chance of survival.
Just analyse these quotes, they somewhat sum up my criticism:
le signal de commande N1 a été élaboré avec le retard démontré précédemment,
(the N1 command signal was processed with the formerly demonstrated delay)
- I do not like a delay, however demonstrated it is, if there’s a solution without.
ce que j'ai assimilé à une non-reprise des moteurs.
(what I correlated with a non-spool up of the engines)
- This is precisely a characteristic of the Airbus system. To make it work to your liking, you sometimes have to disengage the AT (I am not talking about malfunctions). On a Boeing you practically never do this, because you can intervene to cover your liking in AT mode, you would have felt the levers move up (keeping a feedback) and no one would have felt the need (instinctive behaviour in a stress situation) of doing the following:
J'ai alors instinctivement repassé les manettes dans le cran 0, avant de les mettre sur pleins gaz
(I therefore instinctively selected the levers to 0 (idle), before repositioning them to full thrust (TOGA) again.
I give every credit to all you guys who feel completely at ease with the Airbus. Some of you surprise me every single day with your extensive knowledge about it and its use.
Myself I have been taken by surprise by it twice, which scared the bejeesus out of me. Let me stay very sceptical, as I am still flying these birds, and let us hope we will not get caught out by them.
Back to the numerous FCOM’s, AOM’s, QRH’s, Memo’s, Notam’s ……………
GF
Sorry, I got a little upset.
It’s the constant battering by Airbus and it’s home crowd that gets to me and it shouldn’t. By battering I mean:
“you should have … not done this … rather done that … checked that … known better … read this … not followed ECAM in that case … done the QRH … not done the summaries … etc. etc.”
- Extremely wise words for afterwards.
I said it before and repeat myself: Not being the perfect pilot, I sometimes forget or screw up. Recovery is the magic word. To be able to do just that, in due time, I want a partner, mechanical or human, that’s simple and doesn’t give me a hard time. Any more sophisticated solution, programm or any more intellectual by-seater (or worse back- seater), both of them taking me longer to grasp, might be a enrichement for leisure hours and philosophy. But I definitely prefer the simple and fast to understand other option for my professional flying business, because I believe it gives me the better chance of survival.
Just analyse these quotes, they somewhat sum up my criticism:
le signal de commande N1 a été élaboré avec le retard démontré précédemment,
(the N1 command signal was processed with the formerly demonstrated delay)
- I do not like a delay, however demonstrated it is, if there’s a solution without.
ce que j'ai assimilé à une non-reprise des moteurs.
(what I correlated with a non-spool up of the engines)
- This is precisely a characteristic of the Airbus system. To make it work to your liking, you sometimes have to disengage the AT (I am not talking about malfunctions). On a Boeing you practically never do this, because you can intervene to cover your liking in AT mode, you would have felt the levers move up (keeping a feedback) and no one would have felt the need (instinctive behaviour in a stress situation) of doing the following:
J'ai alors instinctivement repassé les manettes dans le cran 0, avant de les mettre sur pleins gaz
(I therefore instinctively selected the levers to 0 (idle), before repositioning them to full thrust (TOGA) again.
I give every credit to all you guys who feel completely at ease with the Airbus. Some of you surprise me every single day with your extensive knowledge about it and its use.
Myself I have been taken by surprise by it twice, which scared the bejeesus out of me. Let me stay very sceptical, as I am still flying these birds, and let us hope we will not get caught out by them.
Back to the numerous FCOM’s, AOM’s, QRH’s, Memo’s, Notam’s ……………
GF
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Just as you can end up in trouble by trusting the FMC too explicitly without checking it's inputs/outputs properly, you can end up in trouble by blindly following ECAM.
Just as you can end up in trouble by blindly following QRH or RECALL drills on a B737.
Proper diagnosis of any failure must be completed by the flight crew prior to taking corrective action no matter what aircraft type you fly.
In the same way I like to think of the FMC as replacing the flight deck Navigator of old, the ECAM replaces the Flight Engineer. He may be an expert on the aircraft systems but he is not a pilot - the ECAM can only give you the info and no airbus pilot is trained to follow ECAM without reference to other sources of information, just like proper pilots.
I've seen the screens go dark in the sim with an AC BUS 1 fault combined with dispatch with DMC 3 replacing a failed DMC 2.
There aren't pages of ECAM, because there's no ECAM or anything else on in the cockpit except one amber FAULT LT, on the AC ESS FEED pb.
So we pressed it.
And everything came back up. No drama.
Gotta love the foot rests, too..
Just as you can end up in trouble by blindly following QRH or RECALL drills on a B737.
Proper diagnosis of any failure must be completed by the flight crew prior to taking corrective action no matter what aircraft type you fly.
In the same way I like to think of the FMC as replacing the flight deck Navigator of old, the ECAM replaces the Flight Engineer. He may be an expert on the aircraft systems but he is not a pilot - the ECAM can only give you the info and no airbus pilot is trained to follow ECAM without reference to other sources of information, just like proper pilots.
I've seen the screens go dark in the sim with an AC BUS 1 fault combined with dispatch with DMC 3 replacing a failed DMC 2.
There aren't pages of ECAM, because there's no ECAM or anything else on in the cockpit except one amber FAULT LT, on the AC ESS FEED pb.
So we pressed it.
And everything came back up. No drama.
Gotta love the foot rests, too..
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I am reading with interest this thread. Traditional against 'modern'. I am still suprised how a lot of pilots still think visual movement of the control columns and thrust levers are important in flying. O well, maybe that's the only way they know how.
Gary Lager, I believe if the pullout table is unservicable, the aircraft is a no go.
Gary Lager, I believe if the pullout table is unservicable, the aircraft is a no go.
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Chrome:
Do you mean Airbus to be more modern??
They're only different. A MD11 was much more advanced in Flight Guidance.
Again, I have flown Airbus, McDonnell and Boeing, so your sarcasm about "the only thing they know" is maybe misplaced.
You might call me a traditionalist, but I know what I'm talking about and the thread still reads: Pilot point of view.
What did you fly up to today? Multichrome or monochrome?
Cheers GF
Do you mean Airbus to be more modern??
They're only different. A MD11 was much more advanced in Flight Guidance.
Again, I have flown Airbus, McDonnell and Boeing, so your sarcasm about "the only thing they know" is maybe misplaced.
You might call me a traditionalist, but I know what I'm talking about and the thread still reads: Pilot point of view.
What did you fly up to today? Multichrome or monochrome?
Cheers GF
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Just analyse these quotes, they somewhat sum up my criticism:
le signal de commande N1 a été élaboré avec le retard démontré précédemment,
(the N1 command signal was processed with the formerly demonstrated delay)
- I do not like a delay, however demonstrated it is, if there’s a solution without.
ce que j'ai assimilé à une non-reprise des moteurs.
(what I correlated with a non-spool up of the engines)
- This is precisely a characteristic of the Airbus system. To make it work to your liking, you sometimes have to disengage the AT (I am not talking about malfunctions). On a Boeing you practically never do this, because you can intervene to cover your liking in AT mode, you would have felt the levers move up (keeping a feedback) and no one would have felt the need (instinctive behaviour in a stress situation) of doing the following:
J'ai alors instinctivement repassé les manettes dans le cran 0, avant de les mettre sur pleins gaz
(I therefore instinctively selected the levers to 0 (idle), before repositioning them to full thrust (TOGA) again.
le signal de commande N1 a été élaboré avec le retard démontré précédemment,
(the N1 command signal was processed with the formerly demonstrated delay)
- I do not like a delay, however demonstrated it is, if there’s a solution without.
ce que j'ai assimilé à une non-reprise des moteurs.
(what I correlated with a non-spool up of the engines)
- This is precisely a characteristic of the Airbus system. To make it work to your liking, you sometimes have to disengage the AT (I am not talking about malfunctions). On a Boeing you practically never do this, because you can intervene to cover your liking in AT mode, you would have felt the levers move up (keeping a feedback) and no one would have felt the need (instinctive behaviour in a stress situation) of doing the following:
J'ai alors instinctivement repassé les manettes dans le cran 0, avant de les mettre sur pleins gaz
(I therefore instinctively selected the levers to 0 (idle), before repositioning them to full thrust (TOGA) again.
(link is in the previous post ans it's a free download)
There is a lot to learn from it, especially for a bus driver.
The quote I've inserted in the previous post is from that book and it relates part of the chronology of the Habsheim flight just before the crash.
This flight showed some dysfunctions, one of them was related to the A/THR, another was related to the VSV (valve that regulates airflow in the engines).
So you will understand these actions and slow response were not standard on that flight.
Remember, 320 operation was brand new at that time, and Airbus had chosen to certify this revolutionary technology in only 1200 hours test flight ...
What happened is that the 320 was not ready yet to enter service ...
In normal ops, spool up time on 737 or 320 must be similar as they probably share common engine types.
But you're right: disconnect A/THR on 320 takes little thinking before action, and everybody get caught once at least.
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after reading your comments on the autothrottle, I remember when in the 320sim , you have to "recycle" the throttle, or you have no power.
I don't have any experience on the 320 except some hours in the sim, ... to kick a computer to react (an important one),you must move the throttle handle all way back .is that safe?
I can not say at what stage of the flight, we got this "simulation"or if it was a sim problem, but our instructor told us to recycle the power...
I don't have any experience on the 320 except some hours in the sim, ... to kick a computer to react (an important one),you must move the throttle handle all way back .is that safe?
I can not say at what stage of the flight, we got this "simulation"or if it was a sim problem, but our instructor told us to recycle the power...
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If you "suddenly wake up" after a jolt or bang, then the first pilots instinctive action is to grab the controls. In a Boeing you will get instant tactile feedback that "it" turns to ... and that the thrust is up high or low. Every research found out that the tactile input is like parallel computer input, 10 times faster than a serial input. Humans react similarily. If you have to collect data via intellectual input (visual on display) you finally get the same values, agreed, but 10 times slower. That's my point.
Slasher's comments about the ECAM are worrying.Can some Airbus pilot elaborate a little further perhaps?