Cirrus SR20/22 - Was this a bad idea?
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Dallas, TX USA
Posts: 739
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Cirrus SR20/22 - Was this a bad idea?
I didn't see any reference to this after searching the website...
I recently discovered that the SR-20 and SR-22 do not conform to the spin resisant/spin recovery requirements as set forth in FAR 23.221. The FAA apparently allowed the aircraft to be certified without this ability, based on the fact that the CAPS (Cirrus Aircraft Parachute System) was installed in the aircraft. The following is an airworthiness directive link and quote regarding a previous CAPS issue, that attests to this fact:
airworthiness directive link
Here is an NTSB report (and a quote from the full narrative) of an accident for an SR-22 where the poor pilots apparently didn't understand that this safe new airplane with a built-in parachute, has a built-in spin problem.
spin crash of SR22
Does anyone else think it was a bad idea to manufacture these fast and highly safe aircraft (as they are marketed), with very poor spin characteristics?
(edited to add quote from NTSB report)
(edited again to fix a link)
I recently discovered that the SR-20 and SR-22 do not conform to the spin resisant/spin recovery requirements as set forth in FAR 23.221. The FAA apparently allowed the aircraft to be certified without this ability, based on the fact that the CAPS (Cirrus Aircraft Parachute System) was installed in the aircraft. The following is an airworthiness directive link and quote regarding a previous CAPS issue, that attests to this fact:
airworthiness directive link
Section 23.221 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 23.221) requires that single-engine, normal category airplanes demonstrate compliance with either the one-turn spin or the spin-resistant requirements. The airplane, for spin recovery compliance, must recover from a one-turn spin or a three-second spin, whichever takes longer, in not more than one additional turn after the controls have been applied for recovery. The Cirrus SR20/SR22 are not certificated to meet the spin requirements or spin resistant requirements of 14 CFR 23.221. Instead, Cirrus installed an Airplane Parachute System (CAPS) that was FAA-approved as part of the SR20/SR22 type design.
spin crash of SR22
- SR22 Spins -
According to the SR-22 Pilot's Operating Handbook:
"The SR22 is not approved for spins, and has not been tested or certified for spin recovery characteristics. The only approved and demonstrated method of spin recovery is activation of the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (See CAPS Deployment, this section). Because of this, if the aircraft 'departs controlled flight,' the CAPS must be deployed.
While the stall characteristics of the SR22 make accidental entry into a spin extremely unlikely, it is possible. Spin entry can be avoided by using good airmanship: coordinated use of controls in turns, proper airspeed control following the recommendations of this Handbook, and never abusing the flight controls with accelerated inputs when close to the stall. If, at the stall, the controls are misapplied and abused accelerated inputs are made to the elevator, rudder and/or ailerons, an abrupt wing drop may be felt and a spiral or spin may be entered. In some cases it may be difficult to determine if the aircraft has entered a spiral or the beginning of a spin.
If time and altitude permit,...determine whether the aircraft is in a recoverable spiral/incipient spin or is unrecoverable and, therefore, has departed controlled flight.
WARNING
In all cases, if the aircraft enters an unusual attitude from which recovery is not expected before ground impact, immediate deployment of the CAPS is required. The minimum demonstrated altitude loss for a CAPS deployment from a one-turn spin is 920 feet. Activation at higher altitudes provides enhanced safety margins for parachute recoveries. Do not waste time and altitude trying to recover from a spiral/spin before activating CAPS.
According to the SR-22 Pilot's Operating Handbook:
"The SR22 is not approved for spins, and has not been tested or certified for spin recovery characteristics. The only approved and demonstrated method of spin recovery is activation of the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (See CAPS Deployment, this section). Because of this, if the aircraft 'departs controlled flight,' the CAPS must be deployed.
While the stall characteristics of the SR22 make accidental entry into a spin extremely unlikely, it is possible. Spin entry can be avoided by using good airmanship: coordinated use of controls in turns, proper airspeed control following the recommendations of this Handbook, and never abusing the flight controls with accelerated inputs when close to the stall. If, at the stall, the controls are misapplied and abused accelerated inputs are made to the elevator, rudder and/or ailerons, an abrupt wing drop may be felt and a spiral or spin may be entered. In some cases it may be difficult to determine if the aircraft has entered a spiral or the beginning of a spin.
If time and altitude permit,...determine whether the aircraft is in a recoverable spiral/incipient spin or is unrecoverable and, therefore, has departed controlled flight.
WARNING
In all cases, if the aircraft enters an unusual attitude from which recovery is not expected before ground impact, immediate deployment of the CAPS is required. The minimum demonstrated altitude loss for a CAPS deployment from a one-turn spin is 920 feet. Activation at higher altitudes provides enhanced safety margins for parachute recoveries. Do not waste time and altitude trying to recover from a spiral/spin before activating CAPS.
(edited to add quote from NTSB report)
(edited again to fix a link)
Last edited by Flight Safety; 15th Feb 2005 at 02:09.
There are several a/c besides the Cirrus "Not Certified for Spins"
Incipient Spin recovery is another matter and must be demonstrated for certification.
The tricky part is that practicing incipient spin recoveries in an a/c not certified for spins courts the possibility that an incipient spin left too long becomes an unrecoverable spin or an opportunity to become instant test pilot
5,000' AGL generally provides a reasonable margin in SE piston a/c -- aka. parachute deployment time.
Incipient Spin recovery is another matter and must be demonstrated for certification.
The tricky part is that practicing incipient spin recoveries in an a/c not certified for spins courts the possibility that an incipient spin left too long becomes an unrecoverable spin or an opportunity to become instant test pilot
5,000' AGL generally provides a reasonable margin in SE piston a/c -- aka. parachute deployment time.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Dallas, TX USA
Posts: 739
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Ratherbeflying, you said:
You are correct, however this appears to be the exact part of FAR 23.221 that the SR20/22 does not comply with. The Reg reads in part:
This Reg further states the requirements for "utility" and "acrobatic" category aircraft, but the SR20/22 are not certified for acrobatics, they are "normal" catagory aircraft.
My point is that the SR20/22 do not appear to be certified to this particular Regulation for "normal" catagory aircraft, and this appears to have been waved because of the CAPS system. So my question still stands, was this a bad idea?
Incipient Spin recovery is another matter and must be demonstrated for certification.
FAR § 23.221 Spinning.
(a) Normal category airplanes. A single-engine, normal category airplane must be able to recover from a one-turn spin or a three-second spin, whichever takes longer, in not more than one additional turn after initiation of the first control action for recovery, or demonstrate compliance with the optional spin resistant requirements of this section.
(1) The following apply to one turn or three second spins:
(i) For both the flaps-retracted and flaps-extended conditions, the applicable airspeed limit and positive limit maneuvering load factor must not be exceeded;
(ii) No control forces or characteristic encountered during the spin or recovery may adversely affect prompt recovery;
(iii) It must be impossible to obtain unrecoverable spins with any use of the flight or engine power controls either at the entry into or during the spin; and
(iv) For the flaps-extended condition, the flaps may be retracted during the recovery but not before rotation has ceased.
(2) At the applicant's option, the airplane may be demonstrated to be spin resistant by the following:
(i) During the stall maneuver contained in §23.201, the pitch control must be pulled back and held against the stop. Then, using ailerons and rudders in the proper direction, it must be possible to maintain wings-level flight within 15 degrees of bank and to roll the airplane from a 30 degree bank in one direction to a 30 degree bank in the other direction;
(ii) Reduce the airplane speed using pitch control at a rate of approximately one knot per second until the pitch control reaches the stop; then, with the pitch control pulled back and held against the stop, apply full rudder control in a manner to promote spin entry for a period of seven seconds or through a 360 degree heading change, whichever occurs first. If the 360 degree heading change is reached first, it must have taken no fewer than four seconds. This maneuver must be performed first with the ailerons in the neutral position, and then with the ailerons deflected opposite the direction of turn in the most adverse manner. Power and airplane configuration must be set in accordance with §23.201(e) without change during the maneuver. At the end of seven seconds or a 360 degree heading change, the airplane must respond immediately and normally to primary flight controls applied to regain coordinated, unstalled flight without reversal of control effect and without exceeding the temporary control forces specified by §23.143(c); and
(iii) Compliance with §§23.201 and 23.203 must be demonstrated with the airplane in uncoordinated flight, corresponding to one ball width displacement on a slip-skid indicator, unless one ball width displacement cannot be obtained with full rudder, in which case the demonstration must be with full rudder applied.
(a) Normal category airplanes. A single-engine, normal category airplane must be able to recover from a one-turn spin or a three-second spin, whichever takes longer, in not more than one additional turn after initiation of the first control action for recovery, or demonstrate compliance with the optional spin resistant requirements of this section.
(1) The following apply to one turn or three second spins:
(i) For both the flaps-retracted and flaps-extended conditions, the applicable airspeed limit and positive limit maneuvering load factor must not be exceeded;
(ii) No control forces or characteristic encountered during the spin or recovery may adversely affect prompt recovery;
(iii) It must be impossible to obtain unrecoverable spins with any use of the flight or engine power controls either at the entry into or during the spin; and
(iv) For the flaps-extended condition, the flaps may be retracted during the recovery but not before rotation has ceased.
(2) At the applicant's option, the airplane may be demonstrated to be spin resistant by the following:
(i) During the stall maneuver contained in §23.201, the pitch control must be pulled back and held against the stop. Then, using ailerons and rudders in the proper direction, it must be possible to maintain wings-level flight within 15 degrees of bank and to roll the airplane from a 30 degree bank in one direction to a 30 degree bank in the other direction;
(ii) Reduce the airplane speed using pitch control at a rate of approximately one knot per second until the pitch control reaches the stop; then, with the pitch control pulled back and held against the stop, apply full rudder control in a manner to promote spin entry for a period of seven seconds or through a 360 degree heading change, whichever occurs first. If the 360 degree heading change is reached first, it must have taken no fewer than four seconds. This maneuver must be performed first with the ailerons in the neutral position, and then with the ailerons deflected opposite the direction of turn in the most adverse manner. Power and airplane configuration must be set in accordance with §23.201(e) without change during the maneuver. At the end of seven seconds or a 360 degree heading change, the airplane must respond immediately and normally to primary flight controls applied to regain coordinated, unstalled flight without reversal of control effect and without exceeding the temporary control forces specified by §23.143(c); and
(iii) Compliance with §§23.201 and 23.203 must be demonstrated with the airplane in uncoordinated flight, corresponding to one ball width displacement on a slip-skid indicator, unless one ball width displacement cannot be obtained with full rudder, in which case the demonstration must be with full rudder applied.
My point is that the SR20/22 do not appear to be certified to this particular Regulation for "normal" catagory aircraft, and this appears to have been waved because of the CAPS system. So my question still stands, was this a bad idea?
Do a Hover - it avoids G
Join Date: Oct 1999
Location: Chichester West Sussex UK
Age: 91
Posts: 2,206
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If, at the stall, the controls are misapplied and abused accelerated inputs are made to the elevator, rudder and/or ailerons, an abrupt wing drop may be felt and a spiral or spin may be entered. In some cases it may be difficult to determine if the aircraft has entered a spiral or the beginning of a spin.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Dallas, TX USA
Posts: 739
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A link to the certification document and a quote from the certification basis section:
Cirrus SR20/22 certification document
The first equivalent safety item covers it, and basically implies that the aircraft does NOT comply with 23.221, but has an "equlivalent level of safety finding", namely the CAPS parachute.
Cirrus SR20/22 certification document
Equivalent Safety Items
Equivalent Levels Of Safety finding (ACE-96-5) made per the provisions of 14 CFR Part 23.221; Refer to FAA ELOS letter dated June 10, 1998 for models SR20, SR22.
Equivalent Levels Of Safety finding (ACE-00-09) made per the provisions of 14 CFR Part 23.1143(g) and 23.1147(b); Refer to FAA ELOS letter dated September 11, 2000 for model SR22.
Equivalent Levels Of Safety finding (ACE-01-01) made per the provisions of 14 CFR Part 23.1143(g) and 23.1147(b); Refer to FAA ELOS letter dated February 14, 2001 for model SR20.
Special Conditions
23-ACE-88 for ballistic parachute.
23-134-SC for protection of systems for High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF).
Equivalent Levels Of Safety finding (ACE-96-5) made per the provisions of 14 CFR Part 23.221; Refer to FAA ELOS letter dated June 10, 1998 for models SR20, SR22.
Equivalent Levels Of Safety finding (ACE-00-09) made per the provisions of 14 CFR Part 23.1143(g) and 23.1147(b); Refer to FAA ELOS letter dated September 11, 2000 for model SR22.
Equivalent Levels Of Safety finding (ACE-01-01) made per the provisions of 14 CFR Part 23.1143(g) and 23.1147(b); Refer to FAA ELOS letter dated February 14, 2001 for model SR20.
Special Conditions
23-ACE-88 for ballistic parachute.
23-134-SC for protection of systems for High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF).
Join Date: Mar 2001
Location: Thames Valley
Posts: 110
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I think it is a bad idea
Not really clever nowadays to design this.
From the others i only recall the Piper Tomahawk with this dangerous spin problem.
Anyway can't spin a 757 either,
cheers.
Not really clever nowadays to design this.
From the others i only recall the Piper Tomahawk with this dangerous spin problem.
Anyway can't spin a 757 either,
cheers.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Dallas, TX USA
Posts: 739
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
E Morse, my problem with this design decision is if you accidently enter a spin, the best possible outcome will be the loss of the aircraft (since using the CAPS will almost always result in a totaled airplane). The worst outcome could be the loss of your life, if for any reason you fail to use the CAPS (an example is the NTSB report above).
I don't understand why this design decision was made for such an otherwise wonderful airplane.
An interesting AOPA article on the subject.
AOPA article "Spinning In"
I don't understand why this design decision was made for such an otherwise wonderful airplane.
An interesting AOPA article on the subject.
AOPA article "Spinning In"
Join Date: Mar 2001
Location: Thames Valley
Posts: 110
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Agree , don't understand it either.
Looks like airplane was already designed and build, when only then it was found out about the spin problem.
And of course , i.s.o. re-designing , fixing the problem with a parachute system is more handy.
most accidents with spins was from turning base to final,
on these low altitudes a parachute is of no use anymore, but as well for the opposite rudder etc. procedure there may not be sufficient altitude left.
so in real life it doesn't make a difference i guess, but it gives a strange feeling.
cheers
Looks like airplane was already designed and build, when only then it was found out about the spin problem.
And of course , i.s.o. re-designing , fixing the problem with a parachute system is more handy.
most accidents with spins was from turning base to final,
on these low altitudes a parachute is of no use anymore, but as well for the opposite rudder etc. procedure there may not be sufficient altitude left.
so in real life it doesn't make a difference i guess, but it gives a strange feeling.
cheers
Actually the parachute idea was in the plane from very early on - the founder of the company had being in a mid air and lived to tell - figured you needed a little more than luck.
There is a very valid discussion going on if the parachute is really a gimmick or a real tool.
In the GA reality world - most unintentional spins occur in the pattern and there is not enough room fo recovery regardless.
All in all it is a sweet plane - wish I had one
There is a very valid discussion going on if the parachute is really a gimmick or a real tool.
In the GA reality world - most unintentional spins occur in the pattern and there is not enough room fo recovery regardless.
All in all it is a sweet plane - wish I had one
Join Date: Apr 2000
Location: Canberra, ACT, Australia
Posts: 12
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Flight Safety,
Why do you say the aircraft has a spin problem????
I think the important sentance out of the manual is:
"While the stall characteristics of the SR22 make accidental entry into a spin extremely unlikely, it is possible."
I have never flown that aircraft but it sounds to me like it is extremely hard to get the thing to spin so it is probably extremely unlikely that a pilot would ever encounter one if they dont grossly mishandle the aircraft. Personally I would rather fly an aircraft which won't generally spin than one that does so easily - a stall warning and nose drop (without spin) on the turn onto final approach is generally not fatal - a spin at that altitude even in a machine with good spin recovery may just be.
A lot of my flying has been in gliders and quite a few have spin characteristics that would be perfectly described by that sentence so I suspect that maybe the SR-20/22 is similar.
In one of the gliders I flew the ONLY way to get it into a spin was to start with a climbing turn with high nose up attitude (no power of course
) - just before the stall you then needed to apply full rudder in the direction of the turn and full opposite aileron and full elevator and get the timing exactly right otherwise you would just get a gentle stall.
Why do you say the aircraft has a spin problem????
I think the important sentance out of the manual is:
"While the stall characteristics of the SR22 make accidental entry into a spin extremely unlikely, it is possible."
I have never flown that aircraft but it sounds to me like it is extremely hard to get the thing to spin so it is probably extremely unlikely that a pilot would ever encounter one if they dont grossly mishandle the aircraft. Personally I would rather fly an aircraft which won't generally spin than one that does so easily - a stall warning and nose drop (without spin) on the turn onto final approach is generally not fatal - a spin at that altitude even in a machine with good spin recovery may just be.
A lot of my flying has been in gliders and quite a few have spin characteristics that would be perfectly described by that sentence so I suspect that maybe the SR-20/22 is similar.
In one of the gliders I flew the ONLY way to get it into a spin was to start with a climbing turn with high nose up attitude (no power of course
) - just before the stall you then needed to apply full rudder in the direction of the turn and full opposite aileron and full elevator and get the timing exactly right otherwise you would just get a gentle stall.
Join Date: Dec 2001
Location: what U.S. calls ´old Europe´
Posts: 941
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hi E.Morse
"Anyway can't spin a 757 either"
Date
02/06/1996
Location
Puerto Plata, Domincan Republic
Operator
Alas Nacionales (operated by Birgen Air)
Aircraft
Boeing 757-200
Registration
TC-GEN
Fatalities:Aboard
189:189
Comments
The plane crashed into the Atlantic Ocean, 21 km north of Puerto Plata, shortly after taking off. Incorrect airspeed indications resulting from a clogged pitot tube. The readings were greater than the actual airspeed resulting in the crew reducing power and leading to a stall. Failure of the crew to recognize the activation of the control column shaker as a warning of an imminent stall. Failure of the crew to carry out the procedures to recover the aircraft from the stall and restore lift.
Most aircraft can spin if mishandled, so in my opinion all aircraft should be spin tested.
I recently lost a friend in an microlight spin accident, microlights are also not spin tested, but do have a ballistic rescue system.
REALLY no good idea.
"Anyway can't spin a 757 either"
Date
02/06/1996
Location
Puerto Plata, Domincan Republic
Operator
Alas Nacionales (operated by Birgen Air)
Aircraft
Boeing 757-200
Registration
TC-GEN
Fatalities:Aboard
189:189
Comments
The plane crashed into the Atlantic Ocean, 21 km north of Puerto Plata, shortly after taking off. Incorrect airspeed indications resulting from a clogged pitot tube. The readings were greater than the actual airspeed resulting in the crew reducing power and leading to a stall. Failure of the crew to recognize the activation of the control column shaker as a warning of an imminent stall. Failure of the crew to carry out the procedures to recover the aircraft from the stall and restore lift.
Most aircraft can spin if mishandled, so in my opinion all aircraft should be spin tested.
I recently lost a friend in an microlight spin accident, microlights are also not spin tested, but do have a ballistic rescue system.
REALLY no good idea.
Join Date: Dec 2001
Location: what U.S. calls ´old Europe´
Posts: 941
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
´there is nothing about a spin in the Birgen Air / Puerto Plata
accident.´
I was desperately looking it up in the web, but did not find it.
I have seen the FDR recording first hand, the 757 made about 3 full rotations before impact. It was really spinning.
Anyway this AOPA report is worth a read.
accident.´
I was desperately looking it up in the web, but did not find it.
I have seen the FDR recording first hand, the 757 made about 3 full rotations before impact. It was really spinning.
Anyway this AOPA report is worth a read.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Dallas, TX USA
Posts: 739
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
TerryB, from what research I've had time to do, it appears that the FAA is allowing a new design philosophy for GA aircraft in regard to spins.
The FAA is allowing new spin resistant designs to be approved, that incorporate leading edge changes to the wing (and sometimes multiple airfoil profiles along the wing), that cause the wingtips to stall at much higher angles of attack than the rest of the wing. The purpose is to keep the wing tips and the ailerons in unstalled airflow longer, to help prevent entry into a spin.
But this new philosophy simultaneously overlooks normal spin recovery features, when the new spin resistant features are incorporated into the new designs. So while these new aircraft designs are more spin resistant, they also don't appear to be very good at spin recovery once a spin is entered. From a quick search of the Internet, there also appears to be a fair amount of debate about whether this new design philosophy is good or not.
While I'm grateful for better spin resistance in these new aircraft designs, I'm not sure it's a good idea to simultaneously relax the design standards for spin recovery in these same designs (which include the Cirrus SR20/22s).
The FAA is allowing new spin resistant designs to be approved, that incorporate leading edge changes to the wing (and sometimes multiple airfoil profiles along the wing), that cause the wingtips to stall at much higher angles of attack than the rest of the wing. The purpose is to keep the wing tips and the ailerons in unstalled airflow longer, to help prevent entry into a spin.
But this new philosophy simultaneously overlooks normal spin recovery features, when the new spin resistant features are incorporated into the new designs. So while these new aircraft designs are more spin resistant, they also don't appear to be very good at spin recovery once a spin is entered. From a quick search of the Internet, there also appears to be a fair amount of debate about whether this new design philosophy is good or not.
While I'm grateful for better spin resistance in these new aircraft designs, I'm not sure it's a good idea to simultaneously relax the design standards for spin recovery in these same designs (which include the Cirrus SR20/22s).
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Dallas, TX USA
Posts: 739
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
TerryB, you said in an earlier post about the SR20/22 POH:
These new designs (including the SR20/22) are not impossible to spin, they are just more resistant to spin entry. Given this fact regarding flight test and certification, you can still induce spin entry for spin recovery testing.
However, with this new design philosophy's more relaxed rules for spin recovery incorporation into the airframe's design, I'd hate to be the assigned test pilot for this duty.
(edited for added clarity)
I think the important sentance out of the manual is:
"While the stall characteristics of the SR22 make accidental entry into a spin extremely unlikely, it is possible."
"While the stall characteristics of the SR22 make accidental entry into a spin extremely unlikely, it is possible."
However, with this new design philosophy's more relaxed rules for spin recovery incorporation into the airframe's design, I'd hate to be the assigned test pilot for this duty.
(edited for added clarity)
Last edited by Flight Safety; 2nd Sep 2004 at 19:06.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Dallas, TX USA
Posts: 739
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I haven't had time to get back to this until now...
Although posted earlier, this link to an AOPA article;
AOPA article - Spinning In
discusses the main reasoning behind the FAA's decision to certify the SR20/22 and other new aircraft without requiring them to comply with the one-turn spin recovery requirement. Their main reasoning point is that statistically, most spins (stall induced spins) are entered at altitudes too low to effect spin recovery during patterns, approaches, etc., so building in more spin prevention near the stall was deemed safer overall.
I think that increasing spin resistance near the stall adds to overall safety, since it's virtually impossible to recover from a spin below 1000 AGL. So I agree with the FAA's philosophy in that low level flight is made safer, and statistically this is where most of the spin related accidents occur.
However, in my opnion, higher level flight (where spin recover is possible) is now made less safe than it was. The Cirrus SR20/22s at least have a parachute if you enter a spin at altitude, but other aircaft such as the Lancair Columbia 300 (certified to the same philosophy) do not. Hear is an extract from the Information Manual Rev. 2, Limitations Section page 2-7, of the Lanair Columbia 300:
What's interesting is that the aircraft is approved for certain acrobatic manuvers such as Chandelles, Lazy Eights, and steep turns, with speed limits. However if a spin were entered at altitude in this aircraft due to "sporty" manuevering, the outcome would most likely be loss of life, since the aircraft has no parachute, and no demonstrated or tested ability to recover from a spin.
So while low level altitudes have been made safer by this certification philosophy change, higher altitudes now appear to be made less safe by this same philosophy change.
I think the reduction in higher altutude flight safety cause by this certification philosophy change is a bad idea.
Although posted earlier, this link to an AOPA article;
AOPA article - Spinning In
discusses the main reasoning behind the FAA's decision to certify the SR20/22 and other new aircraft without requiring them to comply with the one-turn spin recovery requirement. Their main reasoning point is that statistically, most spins (stall induced spins) are entered at altitudes too low to effect spin recovery during patterns, approaches, etc., so building in more spin prevention near the stall was deemed safer overall.
I think that increasing spin resistance near the stall adds to overall safety, since it's virtually impossible to recover from a spin below 1000 AGL. So I agree with the FAA's philosophy in that low level flight is made safer, and statistically this is where most of the spin related accidents occur.
However, in my opnion, higher level flight (where spin recover is possible) is now made less safe than it was. The Cirrus SR20/22s at least have a parachute if you enter a spin at altitude, but other aircaft such as the Lancair Columbia 300 (certified to the same philosophy) do not. Hear is an extract from the Information Manual Rev. 2, Limitations Section page 2-7, of the Lanair Columbia 300:
SPINS
The airplane, as certified by the Federal Aviation Agency, is not approved for spins of any duration. During the flight test phase of the airplane’s certification, spins and/or spin recovery techniques were not performed or demonstrated. It is not known if the airplane will recover from a spin.
WARNING
Do not attempt to spin the airplane under any circumstances. The airplane, as certified by the Federal Aviation Agency, is not approved for spins of any duration. During the flight test phase of the airplane’s certification, spins were not performed. It is not known if the airplane will recover from a spin.
The airplane, as certified by the Federal Aviation Agency, is not approved for spins of any duration. During the flight test phase of the airplane’s certification, spins and/or spin recovery techniques were not performed or demonstrated. It is not known if the airplane will recover from a spin.
WARNING
Do not attempt to spin the airplane under any circumstances. The airplane, as certified by the Federal Aviation Agency, is not approved for spins of any duration. During the flight test phase of the airplane’s certification, spins were not performed. It is not known if the airplane will recover from a spin.
So while low level altitudes have been made safer by this certification philosophy change, higher altitudes now appear to be made less safe by this same philosophy change.
I think the reduction in higher altutude flight safety cause by this certification philosophy change is a bad idea.
Join Date: Jan 2004
Location: LPPT
Age: 58
Posts: 431
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Does anyone else think it was a bad idea to manufacture these fast and highly safe aircraft (as they are marketed), with very poor spin characteristics?
and what a beautiful plane this is 
Regards
GD&L
