I didn't see any reference to this after searching the website...
I recently discovered that the SR-20 and SR-22 do not conform to the spin resisant/spin recovery requirements as set forth in FAR 23.221. The FAA apparently allowed the aircraft to be certified without this ability, based on the fact that the CAPS (Cirrus Aircraft Parachute System) was installed in the aircraft. The following is an airworthiness directive link and quote regarding a previous CAPS issue, that attests to this fact:
airworthiness directive link
Section 23.221 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 23.221) requires that single-engine, normal category airplanes demonstrate compliance with either the one-turn spin or the spin-resistant requirements. The airplane, for spin recovery compliance, must recover from a one-turn spin or a three-second spin, whichever takes longer, in not more than one additional turn after the controls have been applied for recovery. The Cirrus SR20/SR22 are not certificated to meet the spin requirements or spin resistant requirements of 14 CFR 23.221. Instead, Cirrus installed an Airplane Parachute System (CAPS) that was FAA-approved as part of the SR20/SR22 type design.
Here is an NTSB report (and a quote from the full narrative) of an accident for an SR-22 where the poor pilots apparently didn't understand that this safe new airplane with a built-in parachute, has a built-in spin problem.
spin crash of SR22
- SR22 Spins -
According to the SR-22 Pilot's Operating Handbook:
"The SR22 is not approved for spins, and has not been tested or certified for spin recovery characteristics. The only approved and demonstrated method of spin recovery is activation of the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (See CAPS Deployment, this section). Because of this, if the aircraft 'departs controlled flight,' the CAPS must be deployed.
While the stall characteristics of the SR22 make accidental entry into a spin extremely unlikely, it is possible. Spin entry can be avoided by using good airmanship: coordinated use of controls in turns, proper airspeed control following the recommendations of this Handbook, and never abusing the flight controls with accelerated inputs when close to the stall. If, at the stall, the controls are misapplied and abused accelerated inputs are made to the elevator, rudder and/or ailerons, an abrupt wing drop may be felt and a spiral or spin may be entered. In some cases it may be difficult to determine if the aircraft has entered a spiral or the beginning of a spin.
If time and altitude permit,...determine whether the aircraft is in a recoverable spiral/incipient spin or is unrecoverable and, therefore, has departed controlled flight.
WARNING
In all cases, if the aircraft enters an unusual attitude from which recovery is not expected before ground impact, immediate deployment of the CAPS is required. The minimum demonstrated altitude loss for a CAPS deployment from a one-turn spin is 920 feet. Activation at higher altitudes provides enhanced safety margins for parachute recoveries. Do not waste time and altitude trying to recover from a spiral/spin before activating CAPS.
Does anyone else think it was a bad idea to manufacture these fast and highly safe aircraft (as they are marketed), with very poor spin characteristics?
(edited to add quote from NTSB report)
(edited again to fix a link)