AF 447 Search to resume
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Originally Posted by Machaca
Plenty of relevant data contained in NTSB report on AA 587
The lateral gust limit load attachment lug force given in the NTSB report for the A310 of 466 kN is 8% higher than the 44 t of my estimate. More serious is that I omitted the 1.5 safety factor to ultimate load. After correction for these differences, the calculated longitudinal acceleration increases to 66 g, which IMHO could suggest substantial horizontal speed at impact.
regards,
HN39
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HazelNuts39
I don't see a value for "longitudinal" strength. Popping off the tail as the airframe comes to a complete stop is not a (planned for) dynamic load, and has no bearing on the above destructive testing by NTSB. While the action might happen in a fatal crash (Might), your "longitudinal" strength I take to be what The NTSB calls "Bending moment".
Longitudinal is not Lateral, for purposes of VS failure discussion vis a vis Machaca's images. As you bring it up, I would point out that it is not a design consideration, except collaterally as a result of the other three vectors. As an opinion I would venture to say this direction of failure is least likely in all but a rapid horizontal stop. The value of the velocity (horizontally) would be quite high, as you suggest. I think quoting a value of 66g is misleading, if what you mean is failure as described by BEA to wit: They claim a "Slight horizontal acceleration" and a "large vertical acceleration". They also claim an "En Ligne de Vol" so bias in heading can not be included. This brings up an apparent contradiction, as they (I believe) also claim a slight "rotation, left".
Longitudinal failure in the opposite direction, backward, though also unlikely, is quite possible. It would involve an inflight failure, however. The six joins resist the airstream (through drag) in respectively a tensile at #1 (pair), a tensile at #2(pair), and a compression at #3(pair). #2 works as a consonant fulcrum with #1. The system is basically an inverted "teeter".
That is with the Rudder centered, acting merely as additional "area" in the VS/R combination. If deflected, The Rudder introduces a Torsion, and additional tension at #1, with an additive tensile at #2. It also adds a "bending moment". Compression at #3 is comparably increased.
As with 587, if reversals occur, the self same failure could occur with 447. As I see it, the only addition to the antiquated design of the A300 in the A330 is the addition of what are termed "lateral rods". From the photographs, and aside from disagreeing with BEA re: the mode of failure, The rods look (demonstrably, qed) frankly inadequate; that is another discussion.
If my take on your post is incorrect, I am sorry, please do correct me.
I am extremely interested in your thoughts in disagreement with BEA relative to forward velocity at impact. I have not ever thought the a/c had time in her descent to lose enough energy to allow for the docile impact that is seemingly intimated by BEA. I think you are on to something, as is JD-EE. Next is evidence of damage to a/c not consistent with benign horizontal "acceleration".
bearfoil
I don't see a value for "longitudinal" strength. Popping off the tail as the airframe comes to a complete stop is not a (planned for) dynamic load, and has no bearing on the above destructive testing by NTSB. While the action might happen in a fatal crash (Might), your "longitudinal" strength I take to be what The NTSB calls "Bending moment".
Longitudinal is not Lateral, for purposes of VS failure discussion vis a vis Machaca's images. As you bring it up, I would point out that it is not a design consideration, except collaterally as a result of the other three vectors. As an opinion I would venture to say this direction of failure is least likely in all but a rapid horizontal stop. The value of the velocity (horizontally) would be quite high, as you suggest. I think quoting a value of 66g is misleading, if what you mean is failure as described by BEA to wit: They claim a "Slight horizontal acceleration" and a "large vertical acceleration". They also claim an "En Ligne de Vol" so bias in heading can not be included. This brings up an apparent contradiction, as they (I believe) also claim a slight "rotation, left".
Longitudinal failure in the opposite direction, backward, though also unlikely, is quite possible. It would involve an inflight failure, however. The six joins resist the airstream (through drag) in respectively a tensile at #1 (pair), a tensile at #2(pair), and a compression at #3(pair). #2 works as a consonant fulcrum with #1. The system is basically an inverted "teeter".
That is with the Rudder centered, acting merely as additional "area" in the VS/R combination. If deflected, The Rudder introduces a Torsion, and additional tension at #1, with an additive tensile at #2. It also adds a "bending moment". Compression at #3 is comparably increased.
As with 587, if reversals occur, the self same failure could occur with 447. As I see it, the only addition to the antiquated design of the A300 in the A330 is the addition of what are termed "lateral rods". From the photographs, and aside from disagreeing with BEA re: the mode of failure, The rods look (demonstrably, qed) frankly inadequate; that is another discussion.
If my take on your post is incorrect, I am sorry, please do correct me.
I am extremely interested in your thoughts in disagreement with BEA relative to forward velocity at impact. I have not ever thought the a/c had time in her descent to lose enough energy to allow for the docile impact that is seemingly intimated by BEA. I think you are on to something, as is JD-EE. Next is evidence of damage to a/c not consistent with benign horizontal "acceleration".
bearfoil
Last edited by bearfoil; 30th Aug 2010 at 14:12.
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Any guesses when the BEA will issue its' scheduled September report? From what I understand, no additional searches will begin until such report is issued, and then only if the report's decision favors such effort. I still got that feeling that what we know now may be the only thing we know - i.e. little official info to follow. Lets hope - but we will see.
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wes wall
I am less than totally ignorant of how BEA will do this. I fear this will be played as tightly as they feel they can escape with. Frankly, any "new" released information or opinion would challenge their recent history of having control, and sufficient "answers" to close the issue, with impunity, if not total public satisfaction. It will disappoint, but the disappointment will reside in those who are not privy to the evidence collected (such as it is). "We've done our best, here's the keys to the warehouse, someone else have a go" Right.
Doesn't harmonize with reality.
bear
I am less than totally ignorant of how BEA will do this. I fear this will be played as tightly as they feel they can escape with. Frankly, any "new" released information or opinion would challenge their recent history of having control, and sufficient "answers" to close the issue, with impunity, if not total public satisfaction. It will disappoint, but the disappointment will reside in those who are not privy to the evidence collected (such as it is). "We've done our best, here's the keys to the warehouse, someone else have a go" Right.
Doesn't harmonize with reality.
bear
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Originally Posted by bearfoil
I am extremely interested in your thoughts in disagreement with BEA relative to forward velocity at impact.
Originally Posted by bearfoil
Longitudinal is not Lateral, for purposes of VS failure discussion (...) I think quoting a value of 66g is misleading, if what you mean is failure as described by BEA
your "longitudinal" strength I take to be what The NTSB calls "Bending moment".
regards,
HN39
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No. BEA claims in the initial report a (not sure of the word) minor, small horizontal acceleration, which is an acceptable way of saying "deceleration". Clearly the emphasis is on the vertical, a "pop" off the fuse solely due to horizontal disappearance of forward velocity is not possible given their set-up. They declare a "Compression", followed by a forward flyaway, I'll check this.
What NTSB shows as Shear is actually drag, as I grok it, and can have little to do with forward loss, assuming a centered Rudder and slow forward velocity. Shear turns into a terrifying backwards element with full exposure of the VS "Sides" (alternately) to a 259 knot airstream, (587). The Boeing 737NG and Airbus330 are not dissimilar enough to dismiss a failure cascade of the airframe of 447 mimicing Schiphol. Fully stalled high vertical velocity, Tail slam, middle plant, and cockpit the last to hit, and with the most energy. Occam would suggest that 447 after impact looked reasonably similar to the Boeing, three pieces, but with a tail that stayed attached, ostensibly rather well, at that.
best
bear
What NTSB shows as Shear is actually drag, as I grok it, and can have little to do with forward loss, assuming a centered Rudder and slow forward velocity. Shear turns into a terrifying backwards element with full exposure of the VS "Sides" (alternately) to a 259 knot airstream, (587). The Boeing 737NG and Airbus330 are not dissimilar enough to dismiss a failure cascade of the airframe of 447 mimicing Schiphol. Fully stalled high vertical velocity, Tail slam, middle plant, and cockpit the last to hit, and with the most energy. Occam would suggest that 447 after impact looked reasonably similar to the Boeing, three pieces, but with a tail that stayed attached, ostensibly rather well, at that.
best
bear
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Originally Posted by bearfoil
What NTSB shows as Shear is actually drag, ...
The external aerodynamic and mass inertial loadings on the vertical stabilizer can also be quantified as a net shear (a side load), a net bending (a moment about the longitudinal axis), and a net torsion (a moment about the vertical axis), as shown in figure 9.
The rudder is attached to the vertical stabilizer rear spar by seven hinge arm assemblies. (...) The rudder is also attached to the vertical stabilizer rear spar by a support strut assembly, which maintains vertical alignment of the rudder. This assembly consists of a support strut and a support strut attachment fitting on the vertical stabilizer skin panels and rear spar. The support strut and its attachment fitting are made of an aluminum alloy. The support strut assembly is installed above and attached to hinge arm assembly number 4.
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AF447 - The Numbers
Let's put some numbers on it - revisited.
The following is a rehash of Post #467 and has had the forces in both vectors doubled. The horizontal velocity represents that proposed by Machinbird in Post #468, and the vertical velocity comes very close to what the Cabin Vertical Speed advisory portrays if it happened in real-time, i.e. activation, transmission, receipt handshake and then end of flight.
18240 ft/min = 304 ft/sec, and 100KTS = 168.88 ft/sec, resulting = 347.76 ft/sec or 106 meters/sec.
The mechanics of determining the time over which the acceleration was reduced to zero is not easily calculated due to the cylindrical shape of the fuselage, plus the area of the main wings and elevators come into play. On top of this, the aircraft is initially buoyant, and the forces canceled out will reciprocate as buoyancy moments. If the aircraft impacted terra firma, the time taken to dissipate the impact moments would be about 100 milliseconds and the structural damage would be extreme. In the case we are dealing with, the shape and area of the fuselage combined with the large area of the wing will provide a dampening effect and probably the time to accelerate to zero is around 250 milliseconds, with half the remaining velocity being absorbed each 50 milliseconds.
Density of air at sea level and 25°C is around 1.185 kg/m3, whereas sea water is 1,025 kg/m3 or 865 times denser than air. Not quite solid, but at the velocities we are talking about, its close to it. On top of that we have an aircraft weighing in at about 210 tonnes, but the total volume is about 1260m^3, and that is potentially the water that could be displaced during impact. The moment at impact will be around 210,000kg x 106m/sec = 22,260,000 m kg/s, and that either has to be dissipated by the aircraft or transmitted into the water. Water does not compress, therefore the energy gets turned into a wave with amplitude and length, e.g. the stone in the pond principle.
Looking at the force vectors drawn through the V/S, it can been seen that there would definitely be compression on the forward end of the V/S, and a combination of compression on the aft end caused by the THS forcing framing upwards, later reverting to tension at the aft clevis as the canceling of the forward moment caused the V/S to rotate off in that direction and to port. All these forces will have created their own local tsunami and the effects of that will most likely take a minute to oscillate down to the background sea and swell conditions. HN39's link to a sketch in Post #1345 deals with likely forces the V/S attachments suffered and could easily be adjusted to represent the scenario discussed here.
Likely points of fracture through the fuselage have been marked, and discussion around the items recovered may help determine if there was another fracture near the aft pressure bulkhead (I think not).
However, the initial parting of the waves will result in a violent return of the water, and the wing spar section will pop to the surface, and fractures already formed at its fore and aft ends will be flexed in the opposite direction, causing complete separation of the fuselage ends. Water will invade those ruptured spaces, eventually permeating through linings etc.. and buoyancy will be lost.
The potentially large volume of the aircraft is the reason I believe that the time to arrest the impact forces was close to 250 milliseconds. What little we know of the pathology reports tends to describe spinal and pelvic injuries that point to terminal velocities similar to those represented above. Deformation of the galley sides, toilet doors etc.. was on the narrow sides from bottom to top. In fact the deformation was mostly near the bottom and relatively small in length, which could imply that the "g" forces were high and of a very short duration. Longitudinal distortion to objects recovered was relatively small, possibly indicative of the greater absorption of energy available in that plane.
Finally, even though the BEA was careful not to mention anything specific regarding the forward velocity at impact, they did draw attention to the high vertical speed, i.e "... the airplane had likely struck the surface of the water in a straight line, with a high rate [of] vertical acceleration".
mm43
The following is a rehash of Post #467 and has had the forces in both vectors doubled. The horizontal velocity represents that proposed by Machinbird in Post #468, and the vertical velocity comes very close to what the Cabin Vertical Speed advisory portrays if it happened in real-time, i.e. activation, transmission, receipt handshake and then end of flight.
18240 ft/min = 304 ft/sec, and 100KTS = 168.88 ft/sec, resulting = 347.76 ft/sec or 106 meters/sec.
The mechanics of determining the time over which the acceleration was reduced to zero is not easily calculated due to the cylindrical shape of the fuselage, plus the area of the main wings and elevators come into play. On top of this, the aircraft is initially buoyant, and the forces canceled out will reciprocate as buoyancy moments. If the aircraft impacted terra firma, the time taken to dissipate the impact moments would be about 100 milliseconds and the structural damage would be extreme. In the case we are dealing with, the shape and area of the fuselage combined with the large area of the wing will provide a dampening effect and probably the time to accelerate to zero is around 250 milliseconds, with half the remaining velocity being absorbed each 50 milliseconds.
Density of air at sea level and 25°C is around 1.185 kg/m3, whereas sea water is 1,025 kg/m3 or 865 times denser than air. Not quite solid, but at the velocities we are talking about, its close to it. On top of that we have an aircraft weighing in at about 210 tonnes, but the total volume is about 1260m^3, and that is potentially the water that could be displaced during impact. The moment at impact will be around 210,000kg x 106m/sec = 22,260,000 m kg/s, and that either has to be dissipated by the aircraft or transmitted into the water. Water does not compress, therefore the energy gets turned into a wave with amplitude and length, e.g. the stone in the pond principle.
Looking at the force vectors drawn through the V/S, it can been seen that there would definitely be compression on the forward end of the V/S, and a combination of compression on the aft end caused by the THS forcing framing upwards, later reverting to tension at the aft clevis as the canceling of the forward moment caused the V/S to rotate off in that direction and to port. All these forces will have created their own local tsunami and the effects of that will most likely take a minute to oscillate down to the background sea and swell conditions. HN39's link to a sketch in Post #1345 deals with likely forces the V/S attachments suffered and could easily be adjusted to represent the scenario discussed here.
Likely points of fracture through the fuselage have been marked, and discussion around the items recovered may help determine if there was another fracture near the aft pressure bulkhead (I think not).
However, the initial parting of the waves will result in a violent return of the water, and the wing spar section will pop to the surface, and fractures already formed at its fore and aft ends will be flexed in the opposite direction, causing complete separation of the fuselage ends. Water will invade those ruptured spaces, eventually permeating through linings etc.. and buoyancy will be lost.
The potentially large volume of the aircraft is the reason I believe that the time to arrest the impact forces was close to 250 milliseconds. What little we know of the pathology reports tends to describe spinal and pelvic injuries that point to terminal velocities similar to those represented above. Deformation of the galley sides, toilet doors etc.. was on the narrow sides from bottom to top. In fact the deformation was mostly near the bottom and relatively small in length, which could imply that the "g" forces were high and of a very short duration. Longitudinal distortion to objects recovered was relatively small, possibly indicative of the greater absorption of energy available in that plane.
Finally, even though the BEA was careful not to mention anything specific regarding the forward velocity at impact, they did draw attention to the high vertical speed, i.e "... the airplane had likely struck the surface of the water in a straight line, with a high rate [of] vertical acceleration".
mm43
Last edited by mm43; 10th Apr 2011 at 02:30. Reason: replaced "volumetric area" and "force" with correct names. Thanks PBL.
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HazelNuts39, mm43
Thanks for your patience, I see my blunder as to your first response, but defend my characterization of the A330 VS/Rudder join as stated. The 36g arm design I neglected to mention was copied in A330. The differentiation I see is the addition of "Lateral Rods" to "resist" Lateral Loading, the "Bending Moment" you reiterate from Machaca's post, in which I have utmost faith.
As to my First mistake, it was a big one, and you need to watch me, I can be overconfident and extrapolate a disagreement with a design into areas that do not deserve my critique. The "Longitudinal Load" is most definitely the Shear, but the blending of the Shear with mass inertial load (with a Rudder deflection) sent me ahead of myself, picturing a forward failure of 447 instead of the rearward failure of 587.
A forward failure of the VS in 447's case I consider to be remote, in spite of the confidence expressed in it by BEA. You seemed to have a similar position, noting the Horizontal velocity would have had to have been markedly higher than as reported by BEA. Did I misinterpret your emphasis on a need for the extra velocity?
I wouldn't argue with that possibility, as I said, 447 had little time to slow.
Let's look at "Terminal velocity" (Trends). This is a term of which to be wary. In a standard use, it means the fall of an object in acceleration due to gravity only, ie, Ballistic, until acted upon by (usually) aerodynamic drag until it acquires a stable velocity some point before impact.
I'm sure it isn't purposeful, but the Initial report leaves a misunderstanding waiting to jump. 447 was not falling and accelerating. She was falling and "slowing". I believe she was well over the velocity at impact that could be expected in even a "rough" fall.
It is in the nature of an intact a/c to find a rough stability when in a deep Stall. Pictures of this phenomenon abound. The alternative possibility is one to which I lean sharply, She was donating some parts to the airstream as she made her way down. Radome, (blister) antennae, outer ailerons, spoilers, etc. If upset was sudden and at high speed, "recovery" attempts if even attempted, would be unmeasured, very likely out of sequence, etc. Here the vulnerability of the control surfaces with Kv and Kh "constants" to shed are especially open to loss (aerodynamic). Rudder loss in this instance would actually be one of the last separations, the HS was full of fuel, and would not take kindly to Pitch excursions allowed with Direct Law. If the VS failed in a forward flyaway, as stated, the vH would have been substantial.
I write as I think, and make corrections after I post, not the best way to do it.
Eventually, I'll learn some skills, although I have software that prints directly from my voice! "Automation" to insult rather than my friends, what a concept!
best,
bear
Unaddressed from here, Lateral rods, 36g arm, Radome, Spoiler, Impact speeds and transition to zero value, plus cabin items recovered. Also Aft fuel impetus on upset and difficulty in Pitch recovery.
Thanks for your patience, I see my blunder as to your first response, but defend my characterization of the A330 VS/Rudder join as stated. The 36g arm design I neglected to mention was copied in A330. The differentiation I see is the addition of "Lateral Rods" to "resist" Lateral Loading, the "Bending Moment" you reiterate from Machaca's post, in which I have utmost faith.
As to my First mistake, it was a big one, and you need to watch me, I can be overconfident and extrapolate a disagreement with a design into areas that do not deserve my critique. The "Longitudinal Load" is most definitely the Shear, but the blending of the Shear with mass inertial load (with a Rudder deflection) sent me ahead of myself, picturing a forward failure of 447 instead of the rearward failure of 587.
A forward failure of the VS in 447's case I consider to be remote, in spite of the confidence expressed in it by BEA. You seemed to have a similar position, noting the Horizontal velocity would have had to have been markedly higher than as reported by BEA. Did I misinterpret your emphasis on a need for the extra velocity?
I wouldn't argue with that possibility, as I said, 447 had little time to slow.
Let's look at "Terminal velocity" (Trends). This is a term of which to be wary. In a standard use, it means the fall of an object in acceleration due to gravity only, ie, Ballistic, until acted upon by (usually) aerodynamic drag until it acquires a stable velocity some point before impact.
I'm sure it isn't purposeful, but the Initial report leaves a misunderstanding waiting to jump. 447 was not falling and accelerating. She was falling and "slowing". I believe she was well over the velocity at impact that could be expected in even a "rough" fall.
It is in the nature of an intact a/c to find a rough stability when in a deep Stall. Pictures of this phenomenon abound. The alternative possibility is one to which I lean sharply, She was donating some parts to the airstream as she made her way down. Radome, (blister) antennae, outer ailerons, spoilers, etc. If upset was sudden and at high speed, "recovery" attempts if even attempted, would be unmeasured, very likely out of sequence, etc. Here the vulnerability of the control surfaces with Kv and Kh "constants" to shed are especially open to loss (aerodynamic). Rudder loss in this instance would actually be one of the last separations, the HS was full of fuel, and would not take kindly to Pitch excursions allowed with Direct Law. If the VS failed in a forward flyaway, as stated, the vH would have been substantial.
I write as I think, and make corrections after I post, not the best way to do it.
Eventually, I'll learn some skills, although I have software that prints directly from my voice! "Automation" to insult rather than my friends, what a concept!
best,
bear
Unaddressed from here, Lateral rods, 36g arm, Radome, Spoiler, Impact speeds and transition to zero value, plus cabin items recovered. Also Aft fuel impetus on upset and difficulty in Pitch recovery.
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Pollution Spot - again.
The New York Times published details of grid searches made by the FAB on 2009-06-02. A section of the chart with the Pollution Spot is shown below.
Whether these grids were "actually" flown is anyone's guess.
mm43
Whether these grids were "actually" flown is anyone's guess.
mm43
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Originally Posted by bearfoil
The differentiation I see is the addition of "Lateral Rods" to "resist" Lateral Loading,
regards,
HN39
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Bearfoil
That interesting manufacturing photograph (thanks Machaca) of the tail cone section does show that the longitudinal strength is continuous through to frame 76, i.e. to just before the aft door(s).
The following graphic taken from the BEA Interim Report No.2 confirms the location of the 1a, 1b clevis joints.
I named the antennas [green] and "Arm 36 g" [blue] for good measure.
mm43
That interesting manufacturing photograph (thanks Machaca) of the tail cone section does show that the longitudinal strength is continuous through to frame 76, i.e. to just before the aft door(s).
The following graphic taken from the BEA Interim Report No.2 confirms the location of the 1a, 1b clevis joints.
I named the antennas [green] and "Arm 36 g" [blue] for good measure.
mm43
Last edited by mm43; 1st Sep 2010 at 00:25. Reason: adjusted frame numbers
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bearfoil:
But you have known this since reading the very detailed section 1.12.3.5 Examination of the vertical stabiliser in the BEA's Interim Report No.2, issued December 2009, no?
...the positioning of 1A,1B (VS joins) forward of the Pressure vessel...
But you have known this since reading the very detailed section 1.12.3.5 Examination of the vertical stabiliser in the BEA's Interim Report No.2, issued December 2009, no?
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Machaca
Yes, I have known that. Why would I make this remark? I am not trying to be mean, nor disrespectful. I love every aircraft ever built, regardless of provenance, and I would never insult especially the beauty of this one.
My motive is not sinister, but it is a motive, as you have made known. I have grown uncomfortable, bringing things up over and over, (En Ligne de Vol?) The purpose is not deception, but to keep as much interest in this tragedy as possible. The enemy of the Truth can be ennui, or the passage of time. It isn't known that 447 didn't experience a corruption of the pressure vessel by a forward and partial failure of the Vertical Stabilizer/Rudder soon after, or even in concert with initial upset. Upset seems a strong possibility, perhaps upset warrants a confidence in reverse, eg the loss of pressure may be as unlikely as is upset likely. I know how investigations are done in this venue, but that is another thread; At all costs must sceptics step up and risk the shushing from those whose confidence is in a paradigm that is old, political, and fraught with parochial motive.
bearfoil
Yes, I have known that. Why would I make this remark? I am not trying to be mean, nor disrespectful. I love every aircraft ever built, regardless of provenance, and I would never insult especially the beauty of this one.
My motive is not sinister, but it is a motive, as you have made known. I have grown uncomfortable, bringing things up over and over, (En Ligne de Vol?) The purpose is not deception, but to keep as much interest in this tragedy as possible. The enemy of the Truth can be ennui, or the passage of time. It isn't known that 447 didn't experience a corruption of the pressure vessel by a forward and partial failure of the Vertical Stabilizer/Rudder soon after, or even in concert with initial upset. Upset seems a strong possibility, perhaps upset warrants a confidence in reverse, eg the loss of pressure may be as unlikely as is upset likely. I know how investigations are done in this venue, but that is another thread; At all costs must sceptics step up and risk the shushing from those whose confidence is in a paradigm that is old, political, and fraught with parochial motive.
bearfoil
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Bearfoil
You are correct regarding Arm 36 g, and the graphic at Post #2073 now has that feature identified.
Frame 76 is four frames forward of the "aft pressure bulkhead" (frame 80).
mm43
You are correct regarding Arm 36 g, and the graphic at Post #2073 now has that feature identified.
Frame 76 is four frames forward of the "aft pressure bulkhead" (frame 80).
mm43
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Bearfoil
The following is directly from the BEA Interim Report No2 -
The rudder is attached to the fin by means of eight hinge arms and one vertical load pick-up arm in the rudder’s hinge axis (arm 36 g). The rudder is controlled by means of a control unit (frames 84 and 85) and a mechanical control linkage (rods).
You will see that the arm is effectively two arms with a common intersection each side of the bush above the rudder bearing on the hinge arm. The fracture occurred on the bottom starboard side.
mm43
The following is directly from the BEA Interim Report No2 -
The rudder is attached to the fin by means of eight hinge arms and one vertical load pick-up arm in the rudder’s hinge axis (arm 36 g). The rudder is controlled by means of a control unit (frames 84 and 85) and a mechanical control linkage (rods).
You will see that the arm is effectively two arms with a common intersection each side of the bush above the rudder bearing on the hinge arm. The fracture occurred on the bottom starboard side.
mm43