AF 447 Search to resume
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voice controls
Nice one, bear.
But I DO wonder how your system would respond to ...
"Oh, feckin hell... now why did it do THAT?"
But I DO wonder how your system would respond to ...
"Oh, feckin hell... now why did it do THAT?"
Interestingly enough the more technical and complicated the subject the better voice recognition performs, one of the first commercially succesfull aplicatiosn was medical notes.
Of course being better than doctors handwriting is not all that difficult.
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The BBC program commented that with lack of airspeed information a setting of throttle to (75%) thrust and the elevator to (15) degrees would maintain safe speed.
(Forgive me if I have the figures wrong, someone give correct figures for airbus)
They claim that the crew should have set these parameters fairly quickly.
These settings are obviously right to MAINTAIN straight and level flight but would the same settings get an aircraft BACK to level flight from a near stalled or just after stalled position i.e. nose down and possibly accelerating?
(Forgive me if I have the figures wrong, someone give correct figures for airbus)
They claim that the crew should have set these parameters fairly quickly.
These settings are obviously right to MAINTAIN straight and level flight but would the same settings get an aircraft BACK to level flight from a near stalled or just after stalled position i.e. nose down and possibly accelerating?
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I cant quite believe it
Originally Posted by Wilyflier;#1312
Can any one equate the design strength of the VS with the max possible deceleration "G" in any sort of flat ditching, and the forward "G" required to permit a fin and rudder to rip clean off its fittings?
Just a crude laymans attempt to relate aerodynamics, structural strength, and crash deceleration:
Aerodynamic load. The area of the VT is estimated as 44 m^2, and the max. rudder angle is 35 degrees up to 150 kt CAS. Assuming cL=2, the sideforce on the vertical tail is 30 t.
Vertical loads on VS attachments. If the VS bending moment is distributed equally over the six attachments, each receives a vertical load of 44 t, tensile on one side, and compressive on the other.
Inertial load compatible with attachment strength. The forward inertia force results in a vertical pull force on the two aft attachments. A pull force of 2*44 t corresponds to 73 t at the c. of g. of the vertical tail surfaces. In his post #1116 (p.56) cc45 gives the VT a mass of 1800 kg, resulting in an acceleration of 41 g.
Graphic: A back-of-the-envelope sketch illustrating the above is available here:
https://docs.google.com/leaf?id=0B0C...MmZhNDI4&hl=fr
Last edited by HazelNuts39; 12th Jun 2010 at 23:12. Reason: VS1g corrected to 160 kt
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NTSB'ear "theory"
Hello Bear,
In summary, as nothing will change your point anyway, I'll consider that you are either a so damn good expert capable of dismissing field investigation work by looking at a couple of pictures and telling us they are totally incompetent about this matter, either that you are stretching all evidences in order to fit your pre-conceived theory already made before a single piece of this aircraft was actually recovered.
So, the BEA is obviously bullying us...
Investigation worked out aircraft-sattelite-ground communications. Its conclusion was not only based on what was received on the ground but on the whole protocole, including the fact that the last message received at 02.14.26 was duely aknowledged by the ground to the aircraft as being transmitted. ACARS can not transmit if the aircraft is not loged on the sattelite meaning that ACARS are not sent into thin air with hopes it will be picked up by chance (or not) by the communication system.
Of course it doesn't!
Airbus is so dumb as it does not want to bother pilots/maintenance when some control surface is falling from the sky, like if they needed it for something...
And so, the BEA is still bullying us... Where are the evidences (so obvious) of lateral failures here:
In summary, as nothing will change your point anyway, I'll consider that you are either a so damn good expert capable of dismissing field investigation work by looking at a couple of pictures and telling us they are totally incompetent about this matter, either that you are stretching all evidences in order to fit your pre-conceived theory already made before a single piece of this aircraft was actually recovered.
Originally Posted by Bearfoil
ACARS is a maintenance option, .. Just because a message wasn't received certainly does not mean it was not sent.
Originally Posted by BEA 2nd interim report
1.16.2.4.3. Interruption of the messages
The last ACARS message was received at 2 h 14 min 26. The traces of
the communications at the level of the satellite show that the ACARS
acknowledgement from the ground was effectively received by the aircraft.
No trace of any attempted communication by the aircraft with the ground was then recorded, although there was still at least one message to be transmitted
(see above). In absolute terms, there are several reasons that could explain
why communications stopped.
Ī no message to be transmitted: as explained above, the MAINTENANCE
STATUS ADR2 message should have been followed, one minute later, by
the transmission of a class 2 fault message. The aircraft therefore had, at
2 h 15 min 14 at the latest, one message to be transmitted.
Ī loss of one or more system(s) essential for the generation and routing of
messages in the aircraft:
ATSU / SDU / antenna: none of the maintenance messages sent is
related in any way whatsoever with the functioning of these systems. A
malfunction of this type should have occurred after the transmission of
the last message and without forewarning.
loss of electrical power supply: this would imply the simultaneous loss of
the two main sources of electrical power generation.
Ī loss of satellite communication:
loss of data during transmission: the satellites quality follow-up does
not show any malfunction in the time slot concerned.
loss of contact between the aircraft and the satellite:
unusual attitudes: given the relative position of the satellite with respect to the aircraft and the aircrafts tracking capability, the antenna would
have to be masked by the aircrafts fuselage or wings. Examination of
the debris showed that the aircraft hit the water with a bank angle close
to zero and a positive pitch angle. The aircraft would therefore have
been able, in the last seconds at least, to transmit an ACARS message.
end of the flight between 2 h 14 min 26 and 2 h 15 min 14.
The last ACARS message was received at 2 h 14 min 26. The traces of
the communications at the level of the satellite show that the ACARS
acknowledgement from the ground was effectively received by the aircraft.
No trace of any attempted communication by the aircraft with the ground was then recorded, although there was still at least one message to be transmitted
(see above). In absolute terms, there are several reasons that could explain
why communications stopped.
Ī no message to be transmitted: as explained above, the MAINTENANCE
STATUS ADR2 message should have been followed, one minute later, by
the transmission of a class 2 fault message. The aircraft therefore had, at
2 h 15 min 14 at the latest, one message to be transmitted.
Ī loss of one or more system(s) essential for the generation and routing of
messages in the aircraft:
ATSU / SDU / antenna: none of the maintenance messages sent is
related in any way whatsoever with the functioning of these systems. A
malfunction of this type should have occurred after the transmission of
the last message and without forewarning.
loss of electrical power supply: this would imply the simultaneous loss of
the two main sources of electrical power generation.
Ī loss of satellite communication:
loss of data during transmission: the satellites quality follow-up does
not show any malfunction in the time slot concerned.
loss of contact between the aircraft and the satellite:
unusual attitudes: given the relative position of the satellite with respect to the aircraft and the aircrafts tracking capability, the antenna would
have to be masked by the aircrafts fuselage or wings. Examination of
the debris showed that the aircraft hit the water with a bank angle close
to zero and a positive pitch angle. The aircraft would therefore have
been able, in the last seconds at least, to transmit an ACARS message.
end of the flight between 2 h 14 min 26 and 2 h 15 min 14.
Originally Posted by Bearfoil
I think the VS failed laterally while in flight, as a result of the fractures seen in the mountings in BEA's photography. This does NOT mean a failure of hydraulics, necessarily.
Airbus is so dumb as it does not want to bother pilots/maintenance when some control surface is falling from the sky, like if they needed it for something...
And so, the BEA is still bullying us... Where are the evidences (so obvious) of lateral failures here:
Originally Posted by BEA 2nd interim report
1.12.3.5.2 General examination of the vertical stabilizer
The vertical stabilizer was in generally good condition. The damage observed
on the side panels and on the rudder was largely due to the recovery and
transport operations. The damage due to separation from the fuselage was
essentially located at the root of the vertical stabiliser.
The vertical stabilizer separated from the fuselage at the level of the three
attachments:
the forward attachment (male and female lugs) and part of the leading
edge are missing;
the centre and aft attachments are present: male and female lugs and parts
of the fuselage frames (frames 84, 85, 86 and 87).
1.12.3.5.3 Examination of the fin structure
Rib 1 had almost completely disappeared.
Rib 2 was bent upwards with a right-left symmetry.
The front of the fin showed signs of symmetrical compression damage:
failure of the leading edge right- and left-hand panels
longitudinal cracking of the leading edge stiffener
HF antenna support (attached to the forward spar): failure of the lower
part, crumpling indicating bottom-upwards compression loads
1.12.3.5.4 Examination of the vertical stabiliser rudder attachments
The vertical load pick-up arm in the rudders hinge axis (arm 36 g) broke at the
level of the attachment lug on the rudder side.
The size of this arm is calculated to withstand a maximum load of 120,000 N,
corresponding to a relative acceleration of 36 g of the rudder in relation to the
vertical stabilizer.
Shear cracks, along a top-down axis, can also be seen on the rudder hinge arm
attachment fittings close to arm 36 g.
These observations indicate that the vertical stabiliser was subjected to a load
greater than 120,000 N in the rudders hinge axis.
1.12.3.5.5 Examination of the Rudder Travel Limiter Unit (RTLU)
The RTLU was found in its place in the fin and disassembled. An examination
was performed at the manufacturers and showed that it would allow travel
of the rudder measured as 7.9° +/- 0.1°. As an example, at FL350, this travel is
obtained for Mach 0.8 +/- 0.004, corresponding to a CAS of 272 +/- 2 kt.
Note: the maximum travel of the rudder is calculated in relation to the airplane
confi guration, its speed and its Mach number. This travel can be commanded between 4 degrees and 35 degrees.
1.12.3.5.6 Examination of the fuselage parts (remains of the skin, frames and
web frames)
The fuselage was sheared along the frames and centre and aft attachment
lugs by loads applied bottom-upwards.
The part of frame 87 that can be seen had undergone S-shaped deformation:
the left-hand side forwards, and the right-hand side backwards. The horizontal
stabiliser actuator supports were deformed and broke in a backwards
movement from the front. These observations indicate a backwards movement
of the trimmable horizontal stabiliser.
Frames 84 and 85 were pushed in backwards in the middle. The deformations
observed on the rudder control rod are consistent with this indentation.
The deformations of the frames were probably the consequence of the water
braking the aircrafts forward movement.
1.12.3.5.7 Examination of the fin-to-fuselage attachments
The centre attachment had pivoted backwards with the parts of the frames
and web frames that were attached to it. The aft attachment had pivoted
forwards with the parts of the frames and web frames that were attached to it.
The aft attachment lugs (male on the fin and female on the airframe) had
marks indicating a backwards movement of frames 86 and 87 as a whole.
The centre and aft lateral load pick-up rods showed damage that was consistent
with this backwards pivoting of frames 84 to 87:
tensile failure of the centre spar at the level of the centre rod attachments;
compression failure of the aft spar at the level of the aft rod attachments
and failure of the left-hand rod by buckling.
The vertical stabilizer was in generally good condition. The damage observed
on the side panels and on the rudder was largely due to the recovery and
transport operations. The damage due to separation from the fuselage was
essentially located at the root of the vertical stabiliser.
The vertical stabilizer separated from the fuselage at the level of the three
attachments:
the forward attachment (male and female lugs) and part of the leading
edge are missing;
the centre and aft attachments are present: male and female lugs and parts
of the fuselage frames (frames 84, 85, 86 and 87).
1.12.3.5.3 Examination of the fin structure
Rib 1 had almost completely disappeared.
Rib 2 was bent upwards with a right-left symmetry.
The front of the fin showed signs of symmetrical compression damage:
failure of the leading edge right- and left-hand panels
longitudinal cracking of the leading edge stiffener
HF antenna support (attached to the forward spar): failure of the lower
part, crumpling indicating bottom-upwards compression loads
1.12.3.5.4 Examination of the vertical stabiliser rudder attachments
The vertical load pick-up arm in the rudders hinge axis (arm 36 g) broke at the
level of the attachment lug on the rudder side.
The size of this arm is calculated to withstand a maximum load of 120,000 N,
corresponding to a relative acceleration of 36 g of the rudder in relation to the
vertical stabilizer.
Shear cracks, along a top-down axis, can also be seen on the rudder hinge arm
attachment fittings close to arm 36 g.
These observations indicate that the vertical stabiliser was subjected to a load
greater than 120,000 N in the rudders hinge axis.
1.12.3.5.5 Examination of the Rudder Travel Limiter Unit (RTLU)
The RTLU was found in its place in the fin and disassembled. An examination
was performed at the manufacturers and showed that it would allow travel
of the rudder measured as 7.9° +/- 0.1°. As an example, at FL350, this travel is
obtained for Mach 0.8 +/- 0.004, corresponding to a CAS of 272 +/- 2 kt.
Note: the maximum travel of the rudder is calculated in relation to the airplane
confi guration, its speed and its Mach number. This travel can be commanded between 4 degrees and 35 degrees.
1.12.3.5.6 Examination of the fuselage parts (remains of the skin, frames and
web frames)
The fuselage was sheared along the frames and centre and aft attachment
lugs by loads applied bottom-upwards.
The part of frame 87 that can be seen had undergone S-shaped deformation:
the left-hand side forwards, and the right-hand side backwards. The horizontal
stabiliser actuator supports were deformed and broke in a backwards
movement from the front. These observations indicate a backwards movement
of the trimmable horizontal stabiliser.
Frames 84 and 85 were pushed in backwards in the middle. The deformations
observed on the rudder control rod are consistent with this indentation.
The deformations of the frames were probably the consequence of the water
braking the aircrafts forward movement.
1.12.3.5.7 Examination of the fin-to-fuselage attachments
The centre attachment had pivoted backwards with the parts of the frames
and web frames that were attached to it. The aft attachment had pivoted
forwards with the parts of the frames and web frames that were attached to it.
The aft attachment lugs (male on the fin and female on the airframe) had
marks indicating a backwards movement of frames 86 and 87 as a whole.
The centre and aft lateral load pick-up rods showed damage that was consistent
with this backwards pivoting of frames 84 to 87:
tensile failure of the centre spar at the level of the centre rod attachments;
compression failure of the aft spar at the level of the aft rod attachments
and failure of the left-hand rod by buckling.
Last edited by takata; 2nd Jun 2010 at 11:12.
sb_sfo mentioned:
As it's one year to the day since this accident, I wonder if we'll be any closer to an answer in another year.
As it's one year to the day since this accident, I wonder if we'll be any closer to an answer in another year.
- Crashed into the Indian Ocean near Mauritius on 28 November 1987
- Abandoned the search on 8 January 1988 when the pingers were known to have stopped transmitting
- On January 6, 1989, the cockpit voice recorder was salvaged successfully from record depth of 4,900 metres (16,100 ft), but the flight data recorder was never found.
I would imagine that the sonar could be a lot better 20 years later, nearly everything else it.
So why not more progress on af477?
I found this a good read.
Blank Design page
I read it a while back and I recall thinking it might be somewhat self-congratulory however I was convinced overall.
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BBC AF447 documentary June 2010 available on the web
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Where?
The upset occurred within seconds of the ACARS position report at 0210 (02:10:10 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 221002006AUTO FLT AP OFF). Minutes later, the aircraft reported that cabin pressure couldn't keep up with ambient (02:14:26 - .1/WRN/WN0906010214 213100206ADVISORY CABIN VERTICAL SPEED). Assume the aircraft was (and had been) falling fast. But not so fast as to exceed V-tears-itself-apart: impacted water intact at high vertical speed in line of flight.
In the earlier thread there was quite a bit of discussion about stalls and spins in an A330. Could a slow, flat spin have occurred after being upset and stalling at altitude? Could the pilot(s) have been working their way out of the spin with inventive ailerons and flaps, elevators and spoilers, getting the nose down and rotation stopped, airflow and nose-up AOA back, finally inching out of dive towards a level flight, degree by degree, deep into g forces. "Stand on the opposite rudder and then pump the elevator forward and hold it," my CFI explained from the right seat many years ago. I'm pretty sure this NASA Standard spin recovery procedure (PARE) wouldn't work in rudder-limited Alt2 law... Don't know that control of AF447 was ever regained following the initial upset. Spin testing of commercial aircraft not part of the certification process nor part of training, as far as I know. Possibly a case of "unrecoverable spin mode" where "there is no guarantee that spin recovery can be effected beyond the first turn in a spin."
From the point of upset, and knowing/assuming the aircraft was in the water in less than five minutes, you can draw concentric circles showing the farthest the aircraft might have flown in a straight line at various averaged ground speeds. Thus in five minutes, the aircraft could have traveled as far as 24.9 nautical miles at an averaged ground speed of 300 knots. Could have traveled farther at a constant 400 knots. But forward travel not likely, with the aircraft out of control. See diagram.
More likely, all went bad and vertical very quickly. Shedding velocity and motion along the track, unusual attitudes, rapid descent (in a spin?), dark, stormy... Draw that circle maybe ten or fifteen nautical miles radius from the Last Known Position. BEA have not searched there yet.
GB
In the earlier thread there was quite a bit of discussion about stalls and spins in an A330. Could a slow, flat spin have occurred after being upset and stalling at altitude? Could the pilot(s) have been working their way out of the spin with inventive ailerons and flaps, elevators and spoilers, getting the nose down and rotation stopped, airflow and nose-up AOA back, finally inching out of dive towards a level flight, degree by degree, deep into g forces. "Stand on the opposite rudder and then pump the elevator forward and hold it," my CFI explained from the right seat many years ago. I'm pretty sure this NASA Standard spin recovery procedure (PARE) wouldn't work in rudder-limited Alt2 law... Don't know that control of AF447 was ever regained following the initial upset. Spin testing of commercial aircraft not part of the certification process nor part of training, as far as I know. Possibly a case of "unrecoverable spin mode" where "there is no guarantee that spin recovery can be effected beyond the first turn in a spin."
From the point of upset, and knowing/assuming the aircraft was in the water in less than five minutes, you can draw concentric circles showing the farthest the aircraft might have flown in a straight line at various averaged ground speeds. Thus in five minutes, the aircraft could have traveled as far as 24.9 nautical miles at an averaged ground speed of 300 knots. Could have traveled farther at a constant 400 knots. But forward travel not likely, with the aircraft out of control. See diagram.
More likely, all went bad and vertical very quickly. Shedding velocity and motion along the track, unusual attitudes, rapid descent (in a spin?), dark, stormy... Draw that circle maybe ten or fifteen nautical miles radius from the Last Known Position. BEA have not searched there yet.
GB
Anyone who wants to use Speech Recognition in cockpit is nuts!
Originally Posted by bearfoil 
Look for Voice recognition commands to the controls in the future.
Look for Voice recognition commands to the controls in the future.
I can categorically state that no one reading this forum would want speech recognition controlling anything at all flight critical. For one thing, any accent is likely to break the recognition completely or at best reduce the word-recognition success rates to pitiful numbers, and secondly stressed, faster speech results in the same reduction in accuracy.
I have previously worked on cockpit speech control control systems for aircraft such as the Eurofighter and in that case only non-flight critical systems were capable of speech control.
"I'm sorry Dave, I'm afraid I can't do that"
- GY
Height loss
The BBC programme had a military pilot fly a full simulator with a 'commercial jet' profile. Lost 19000 feet in less than 50 seconds and was of the opinion that unless you had been trained in stall recovery the chances of successful outcome were low. From what I have read elsewhere on this thread the chance of significant structural damage following a stall are high. The BBC hedged its bets on this and went with the BEA report, citing the radome and VS as evidence that the aircraft was structurally intact on impact. The programme was quite sympathetic to the crew I felt and was fair to the extent that it didn't pretend to have the final answer or paper over inconclusive/conflicting evidence.
Last edited by Mr Optimistic; 2nd Jun 2010 at 18:17. Reason: typo
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Stall
Originally Posted by Mr Optimistic;
From what I have read elsewhere on this thread the chance of significant structural damage following a stall are high.
EDIT:: Stalls are demonstrated from various altitudes, if I remember correctly, from 5000 ft upwards. I heard the BBC person say that a stall is catastrophic, which is somewhat exaggerated. The colonel was clearly hired to demonstrate just that, and made an exciting show of it.
HN39
Last edited by HazelNuts39; 2nd Jun 2010 at 20:35. Reason: demonstration altitudes
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I think she didn't spin. Besides the constant com via ACARS, the Vertical Stabilizer could not have sustained that load. A spin would involve too much immediate roll to deal with as well. Level the wings (or at least center the ailerons), stomp the Rudder, and PUSH to break the Stall. 150 tons; wouldn't have entered a spin or recovered if it had. This is what the "Intact at Impact" suggests, deliberately or parenthetically. If the Elevator was used in this fashion, and failed (separated), it would have been "Up".
The same way as the water would have failed it.
The airframe was yawing left at impact, and flat, (minor NU), with a left wing low. (BEA).
Large Vertical velocity (vertical acceleration at impact). What does that say? If nothing else, it means it was falling, fast, ie, losing altitude at a rapid rate. If she began her descent in the deep vertical, and finished the same way, there isn't much forward progress to send the searchers 70 miles out. (Great Bear).
bear
The same way as the water would have failed it.
The airframe was yawing left at impact, and flat, (minor NU), with a left wing low. (BEA).
Large Vertical velocity (vertical acceleration at impact). What does that say? If nothing else, it means it was falling, fast, ie, losing altitude at a rapid rate. If she began her descent in the deep vertical, and finished the same way, there isn't much forward progress to send the searchers 70 miles out. (Great Bear).
bear
bearfoil
I think she didn't spin. Besides the constant com via ACARS, the Vertical Stabilizer could not have sustained that load. A spin would involve too much immediate roll to deal with as well.
I think she didn't spin. Besides the constant com via ACARS, the Vertical Stabilizer could not have sustained that load. A spin would involve too much immediate roll to deal with as well.
In a spin there must not be a lot of load on the VS. In a spin there is a corksqrew flightpath with simultaneous yaw, roll and turn and high descent rate. The uneven stalled wings will produce the yaw, the following load on the VS will cause the rolll, both together keep the system turning. The forces are not hitting it broadside, to tell it simple it is the only part still aerodynamically effective. The load is only higher during entry and recovery. It is also noticable in the cockpit (have done spins myself in T-37 Trainer), the spin itself is not that uncomfortable, the entry and exit is.
franzl
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bank
Originally Posted by bearfoil
The airframe was yawing left at impact, and flat, (minor NU), with a left wing low. (BEA).
As expected, you would respond to my casual remark. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to explain.
Originally Posted by BEA's no.1
The distortions of the frames showed that they broke during a forward motion with a slight twisting component towards the left.
HN39
Last edited by HazelNuts39; 2nd Jun 2010 at 20:42.
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The "load" I meant to be the load to stop the spin with opposite Rudder.
Ruddering opposite the yaw caused the failure in AA587. (Allegedly).
If in RTLU at 4 degree limit, will that accomplish recovery? Enough?
HazelNuts39
I remembered the first report as left wing low, yawing left. Wrong? This computer does not have BEA reports.
thanks, bear
The "load" I meant to be the load to stop the spin with opposite Rudder.
Ruddering opposite the yaw caused the failure in AA587. (Allegedly).
If in RTLU at 4 degree limit, will that accomplish recovery? Enough?
HazelNuts39
I remembered the first report as left wing low, yawing left. Wrong? This computer does not have BEA reports.
thanks, bear
Is there a recovery procedure with full rudder opposite the turning direction of the spin for airbus?
We had a saying that rudder brings you into spin, but not aut of it.
As mentioned before, i didnīt fly it in heavies, we had to unload to the max extent and apply full aileron in the direction of the spin / turnneedle and keep the rudder neutral. When the aircraft unloaded, rudder and ailerons had to be kept at neutral antil flying speed was achieved.
The force on leaving a spin is not the sudden stop of turning (because it doesnīt happen that fast), it is the sudden unloading when spin recovery procedure is successful.
But again, my expieience is not on heavies.
franzl
We had a saying that rudder brings you into spin, but not aut of it.
As mentioned before, i didnīt fly it in heavies, we had to unload to the max extent and apply full aileron in the direction of the spin / turnneedle and keep the rudder neutral. When the aircraft unloaded, rudder and ailerons had to be kept at neutral antil flying speed was achieved.
The force on leaving a spin is not the sudden stop of turning (because it doesnīt happen that fast), it is the sudden unloading when spin recovery procedure is successful.
But again, my expieience is not on heavies.
franzl
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@RetiredF4
It was stated in earlier posts that Airbus test pilots have drag chutes to deploy when testing, can't find the reference but
AF 447 – What The Crew Did … Maybe Dark Matter
states
@GreatBear re where?
In your scenario surely South or South East of last position is possible? The flightpath to Tasil was well searched by SAR. Recent searches went right up to the 40NM limit North/ North West, ignoring debris field drift evidence. Why?
It was stated in earlier posts that Airbus test pilots have drag chutes to deploy when testing, can't find the reference but
AF 447 – What The Crew Did … Maybe Dark Matter
states
10. A hazard of large aircraft design is that they can become inertially locked in a developed spin and are unrecoverable without a drag chute, if at all.
In your scenario surely South or South East of last position is possible? The flightpath to Tasil was well searched by SAR. Recent searches went right up to the 40NM limit North/ North West, ignoring debris field drift evidence. Why?
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mm43 or takata may have the exact coordinates for the two search boxes flown on June 1, but eyeballing the graphic, it would seem that the search that day covered an area about 20 NM to the left of the track, from the last reported position halfway to Tasil. It is hard to believe that if the plane had impacted within this grid, that evidence of the impact would have been missed. The first bodies and wreckage were recovered on June 6 at about 30 deg 30' N, 3 deg 30' W; an area, where some of which was probably within the search grid flown on June 1.