From Safety 1 to Safety 2
Thread Starter
From Safety 1 to Safety 2
"From Safety 1 to Safety 2"
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/2437.pdf
“This paper helps explains the key differences between, and implications of, the two ways of thinking about safety.”
Although this has been prepared for ATM and directed towards SMS, the principles are relevant to all aspects of safety, and with a little adaptation could be applied to CRM / flight operations.
Also see this presentation relating to the subject: https://www.tekna.no/ikbViewer/Conte...06%20april.pdf
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http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/2437.pdf
“This paper helps explains the key differences between, and implications of, the two ways of thinking about safety.”
Although this has been prepared for ATM and directed towards SMS, the principles are relevant to all aspects of safety, and with a little adaptation could be applied to CRM / flight operations.
Also see this presentation relating to the subject: https://www.tekna.no/ikbViewer/Conte...06%20april.pdf
.
Last edited by safetypee; 26th Sep 2013 at 12:53.
Thanks for posting the link SafetyPee.
I'm working my way through the doc and finding it quite refreshing.
The reactive nature of current systems has always bugged me and from what I have read so far, an industry paradigm shift of this nature could help address that issue.
What's your opinion of the message being presented?
Framer
I'm working my way through the doc and finding it quite refreshing.
The reactive nature of current systems has always bugged me and from what I have read so far, an industry paradigm shift of this nature could help address that issue.
What's your opinion of the message being presented?
Framer
Also, it strikes me that LOSA is an incremental step in this direction as it is an assessment of 'work as done'. In saying that, I imagine that most LOSA reports are weighted more towards deviations/ violations etc than they are towards 'what went right'.
South West Airlines has some sort of program called 'Spotlight' if my memory serves me correctly whereby the identify their high performing pilots and actively seek input from them to distribute to the pilot group, that is another proactive and positive method of increasing safety that appears to me to be an incremental step in the same direction.Are we on the verge of the third generation of Safety Systems?
South West Airlines has some sort of program called 'Spotlight' if my memory serves me correctly whereby the identify their high performing pilots and actively seek input from them to distribute to the pilot group, that is another proactive and positive method of increasing safety that appears to me to be an incremental step in the same direction.Are we on the verge of the third generation of Safety Systems?
Last edited by framer; 27th Sep 2013 at 08:33.
Thread Starter
I agree; the industry needs to change (adapt) safety thinking in order to progress safety performance in modern day operations.
This does not require ‘either / or’ views of safety (1 or 2), but to use both together.
The important messages are that safety is something which an organisation does vice something to have, and human behaviour must be seen as an asset not a source of failure – we should avoid using ‘error’ unless specifically defined.
A message beyond the document is the apparent lack of aviation involvement in these concepts in comparison with other industries (apart from Eurocontrol ATM). There are many ‘experts’ who talk about the theory, but there are few actions from the regulators. Thus the document has great value in its potential to brief senior management on the need to change their thinking.
I also agree with the views of LOSA; it’s more often misused, looking for errors - stuck in safety 1.
“It’s not that safety 1 is wrong, but precisely because it is wrong, wrong in particularly useful ways.” With apologies to Cook and Nemeth.
A good alternative, again from Eurocontrol, is in Day to Day Safety Survey (D2D).
Perhaps its not a new generation of safety systems, but more like a slow and possibly painful evolution, and potentially more painful if operators and individuals do not change current safety thinking.
http://whcenter.org/documents/cme/Hollnagel.pdf
http://whcenter.org/documents/cme/1-Wears.pdf
This does not require ‘either / or’ views of safety (1 or 2), but to use both together.
The important messages are that safety is something which an organisation does vice something to have, and human behaviour must be seen as an asset not a source of failure – we should avoid using ‘error’ unless specifically defined.
A message beyond the document is the apparent lack of aviation involvement in these concepts in comparison with other industries (apart from Eurocontrol ATM). There are many ‘experts’ who talk about the theory, but there are few actions from the regulators. Thus the document has great value in its potential to brief senior management on the need to change their thinking.
I also agree with the views of LOSA; it’s more often misused, looking for errors - stuck in safety 1.
“It’s not that safety 1 is wrong, but precisely because it is wrong, wrong in particularly useful ways.” With apologies to Cook and Nemeth.
A good alternative, again from Eurocontrol, is in Day to Day Safety Survey (D2D).
Perhaps its not a new generation of safety systems, but more like a slow and possibly painful evolution, and potentially more painful if operators and individuals do not change current safety thinking.
http://whcenter.org/documents/cme/Hollnagel.pdf
http://whcenter.org/documents/cme/1-Wears.pdf
