I agree; the industry needs to change (adapt) safety thinking in order to progress safety performance in modern day operations.
This does not require ‘either / or’ views of safety (1 or 2), but to use both together.
The important messages are that safety is something which an organisation does vice something to have, and human behaviour must be seen as an asset not a source of failure – we should avoid using ‘error’ unless specifically defined.
A message beyond the document is the apparent lack of aviation involvement in these concepts in comparison with other industries (apart from Eurocontrol ATM). There are many ‘experts’ who talk about the theory, but there are few actions from the regulators. Thus the document has great value in its potential to brief senior management on the need to change their thinking.
I also agree with the views of LOSA; it’s more often misused, looking for errors - stuck in safety 1.
“It’s not that safety 1 is wrong, but precisely because it is wrong, wrong in particularly useful ways.” With apologies to Cook and Nemeth.
A good alternative, again from Eurocontrol, is in
Day to Day Safety Survey (D2D).
Perhaps its not a new generation of safety systems, but more like a slow and possibly painful evolution, and potentially more painful if operators and individuals do not change current safety thinking.
http://whcenter.org/documents/cme/Hollnagel.pdf
http://whcenter.org/documents/cme/1-Wears.pdf