Termination of formal CRM training
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My god you are an ignorant prat. CRM was not the point of discussion, as the man said, democracy does not reign on a flight deck. You better try some googling and study yourself. (and some english comprehension classes)
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Well, there is some food for thought here.
First, everything 411A said about the PIC's authority is backed 100% by regulations in the US, Europe, and Australasia, as Brian Abraham said.
Second, of course SM is posing: heshe is not "worried" by the culture at 411A's operation - heshe doesn't even know what operation it is. Suffice it to say (as 411A will no doubt tell us) that they don't have accidents or incidents attributable to poor crew coordination, in which case one may conclude that whatever "culture" it is at 411's operation works perfectly.
The point of CRM was to improve flight deck performance in the sense of lowering incident and accident rates, in particular with operators who had some history of poor flight deck performance contributing to accidents.
That may help explain why CRM training may have run its course in the US, Australasia and Europe. The lessons have been learned, the useful insights per operator have long been incorporated into SOPs, and the accidents happening to the major operators in those regions, when they do happen, no longer involve poor crew coordination. (To back up this assertion, let me refer to the annual Boeing statistical summary and Flight International's annual safety reviews.)
I would guess that any airline still suffering from a history of incidents involving poor crew coordination likely still has a lot to learn through CRM training.
PBL
First, everything 411A said about the PIC's authority is backed 100% by regulations in the US, Europe, and Australasia, as Brian Abraham said.
Second, of course SM is posing: heshe is not "worried" by the culture at 411A's operation - heshe doesn't even know what operation it is. Suffice it to say (as 411A will no doubt tell us) that they don't have accidents or incidents attributable to poor crew coordination, in which case one may conclude that whatever "culture" it is at 411's operation works perfectly.
The point of CRM was to improve flight deck performance in the sense of lowering incident and accident rates, in particular with operators who had some history of poor flight deck performance contributing to accidents.
That may help explain why CRM training may have run its course in the US, Australasia and Europe. The lessons have been learned, the useful insights per operator have long been incorporated into SOPs, and the accidents happening to the major operators in those regions, when they do happen, no longer involve poor crew coordination. (To back up this assertion, let me refer to the annual Boeing statistical summary and Flight International's annual safety reviews.)
I would guess that any airline still suffering from a history of incidents involving poor crew coordination likely still has a lot to learn through CRM training.
PBL
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Back to basic's ther is no "I" in team. Flying aircraft today is a team effort like it or not. Safety costs money like it or not. Therefore saving money will eventally compromise safety.
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Safety - Whose Monkey?
Besides agreeing with 'machone' that "safety costs money...", having been part of the military (but not as an aircrew) and with glimpses of the commercial aviation, I think Safety is all about a steadfast commitment at the organisational level and willingness to learn from the mistakes. I am afraid it is not always the case, and convictions of those assigned with responsibility to ensure safety is flexible as per the situational needs (read as, acceptable compromises without caring about safety).
Talking specifically about Indian aviation (Aviation Safety - Is the Future Bleak? | Aviation Medicine :: Aerospace Medicine), even though it is booming but are those responsible for implementing safety awake - I am afraid not!
Talking specifically about Indian aviation (Aviation Safety - Is the Future Bleak? | Aviation Medicine :: Aerospace Medicine), even though it is booming but are those responsible for implementing safety awake - I am afraid not!
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Originally Posted by AvMed.IN
I think Safety is all about a steadfast commitment at the organisational level and willingness to learn from the mistakes
PBL
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I suspect the reason that CRM is dying a well deserved death is because the right seat marshmellows that were hired to keep the cantankerous captain from hitting the hills, are now captains themselves now. Two marshmellows in the cockpit probably negate the need for CRM, rather a whole new set of problems. It's probably gone from this - 'Captain we are going to hit the mountain!' 'Shut up' To this - 'Hey where are we?' 'I don't know either.' I find the whole thing comical....well the chief pilots are pretty much getting what they deserve.
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Interesting discussion
I was just about to open a thread until I've found this one.
It's quite clear that the CRM issue is not as hot as it used to be, at least in the western hemisphere. Lessons have been learned as one said and it is expected that a pilot has CRM skills. On the other hand it has to be said that many pilots still have not adopted it. Some of them should probably not even work on a flightdeck.
On another note I'd like to add that there is still a lot of room for improvement in the bizjet and other parts of the world. Problem there is that operators are often not giving training the same attention as airlines do, hence we have lower standards in those areas.
Within the last ten years very little new stuff has been published about CRM, a clear indicator that it's no longer top priority...But what makes me angry is that a lot of useful stuff about CRM is not accessible (movies for instance) or only at horrendous costs. There are still a lot of new guys out there who would like to learn and improve...
CRM is pretty much a 'closed project' in US/EU and Oz, but not elsewhere.
I wonder how the rest of world is dealing with the issue. Perhaps by studying 20-30 year old publications?
theficklefinger is not far off -
'Captain we are going to hit the mountain!' 'Shut up' To this - 'Hey where are we?' 'I don't know either.'
It's quite clear that the CRM issue is not as hot as it used to be, at least in the western hemisphere. Lessons have been learned as one said and it is expected that a pilot has CRM skills. On the other hand it has to be said that many pilots still have not adopted it. Some of them should probably not even work on a flightdeck.
On another note I'd like to add that there is still a lot of room for improvement in the bizjet and other parts of the world. Problem there is that operators are often not giving training the same attention as airlines do, hence we have lower standards in those areas.
Within the last ten years very little new stuff has been published about CRM, a clear indicator that it's no longer top priority...But what makes me angry is that a lot of useful stuff about CRM is not accessible (movies for instance) or only at horrendous costs. There are still a lot of new guys out there who would like to learn and improve...
CRM is pretty much a 'closed project' in US/EU and Oz, but not elsewhere.
I wonder how the rest of world is dealing with the issue. Perhaps by studying 20-30 year old publications?
theficklefinger is not far off -
'Captain we are going to hit the mountain!' 'Shut up' To this - 'Hey where are we?' 'I don't know either.'
I think there is still justification for 'chalk n talk' CRM in the classroom. However, I would predicate that with the need for an experienced CRMI with lots of flying experience, and a big bag full of stories and scenarios.
Otherwise, I would imagine CRM with an less experienced Pilot quite tortuous as they awkwardly pose unlikely scenarios or present a dry old case for the prosecution.
Otherwise, I would imagine CRM with an less experienced Pilot quite tortuous as they awkwardly pose unlikely scenarios or present a dry old case for the prosecution.
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Yes, CRM has gone rather off the boil. The biggest problems are that trainers are not evolving their material and exercises at a rate sufficient to hold attention and they generally are intellectually poorly equipped to adapt to teh latest in safety thinking.
However there is still a lot to be learent from old case studies as many accidents do tend to be repeated cylically as the original lessons are forgotten.
However there is still a lot to be learent from old case studies as many accidents do tend to be repeated cylically as the original lessons are forgotten.
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CRM was designed to fix bad hiring practices. The captain, not listening to his FO, the FO too scared to tell a captain they were going to run into a mountain.
With the advent of EPGWS and TAWS...now a box tells the captain there is a mountain up ahead. Now the gear tells the captain he is off course.
Now the airlines can hire even lower experienced pilots, who are even more scared to pipe up.
It's so bad, even Rynair's CEO thinks that an airliner can be flown single pilot.
You don't need CRM if you fly by yourself, which has been my contention for a few years now, and now, I am right.
Where are all the CRM advocates? Where did they go?
How many people have been booted off this forum because they argued against standard airline practices that are now proven to be unworkable?
With the advent of EPGWS and TAWS...now a box tells the captain there is a mountain up ahead. Now the gear tells the captain he is off course.
Now the airlines can hire even lower experienced pilots, who are even more scared to pipe up.
It's so bad, even Rynair's CEO thinks that an airliner can be flown single pilot.
You don't need CRM if you fly by yourself, which has been my contention for a few years now, and now, I am right.
Where are all the CRM advocates? Where did they go?
How many people have been booted off this forum because they argued against standard airline practices that are now proven to be unworkable?
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CRM was designed to fix bad hiring practices.
It certainly had a voital role in tackling the bad practices caused by the airline seniority system that drove prima donna behaviour from Captains.
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What CRM was really brought in for was to make fullest use of all the resources in the cockpit.
One of my upstream colleagues in Houston has sent me this:
Alter cockpit leadership style, NTSB urges in Lubbock crash report | Lubbock Online | Lubbock Avalanche-Journal
This NTSB's findings on this accident, that no one else on PPRuNe seems to have bothered posting about shows that CRM is still not being routinely applied. See the video here:
NTSB - Lubbock, TX
One of my upstream colleagues in Houston has sent me this:
Alter cockpit leadership style, NTSB urges in Lubbock crash report | Lubbock Online | Lubbock Avalanche-Journal
The NTSB recommends to the Federal Aviation Administration that pilots and first officers undergo simulator or role-playing exercises “that teach first officers to assertively voice their concerns, and that teach captains to develop a leadership style that supports first officer assertiveness.”
The report summary notes the first officer recognized the problem and asked the captain if they should perform a go-around, which was the correct move.
It says her failure to press the issue “likely resulted from the steep authority gradient in the cockpit, and the first officer’s minimal training on assertiveness; further the captain’s quick dismissal of the first officer’s go-around inquiry likely discouraged the first officer from voicing her continued opinions and challenging the captain’s decision to continue the unstabilized approach.”
The report also was critical that the captain’s preoccupation with resolving the problem with the flaps kept him from calling out the airspeed changes to the first officer, who was flying the plane.
The report summary notes the first officer recognized the problem and asked the captain if they should perform a go-around, which was the correct move.
It says her failure to press the issue “likely resulted from the steep authority gradient in the cockpit, and the first officer’s minimal training on assertiveness; further the captain’s quick dismissal of the first officer’s go-around inquiry likely discouraged the first officer from voicing her continued opinions and challenging the captain’s decision to continue the unstabilized approach.”
The report also was critical that the captain’s preoccupation with resolving the problem with the flaps kept him from calling out the airspeed changes to the first officer, who was flying the plane.
NTSB - Lubbock, TX
