Polish Presidential Flight Crash Thread
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Edit: guys from a polish aviation forum confirm that the latter should have been expected, and that at least the quick access recorder should have recorded the event of pressing the "go-around" button. That's the recorder that was sent by Russians to the Polish manufacturer a few days after the crash, as they weren't equipped to read it.
The polish report lists as one of the direct causes of crash, the crews attempt to go-around in automatic mode.
Still its not clear if they draw that conclusion from an actual button press event having been recorded on the QAR or from the CVR transcript where the PIC says: "In case of failed attempt, we go-around in automatic mode".
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guys from a polish aviation forum confirm that the latter should have been expected, and that at least the quick access recorder should have recorded the event of pressing the "go-around" button.
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I read today (sorry, I can't find the link right now) that FMC installed in US (onboard Tu-154M 101) can be used to "fool" the autopilot and generate virtual ILS glidepath that in turn can be used to go around in automatic mode (hence in that situation "Uchod" button would work regardless of real ILS present or not on the airfield).
There was no conclusion if it was programmed to work over Smolensk North.
There was no conclusion if it was programmed to work over Smolensk North.
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There was no conclusion if it was programmed to work over Smolensk North.
Would have FMS been programmed for landing in Smolensk and Smolensk
put correctly manually into the FMS database, it would have not screamed
PULL UP and TRRAIN, at least not that early in the flight.
It was clearly stated in the report, that the PNF was responsible for
programming the FMS and he did it in a wrong way.
Not only wrong coordinates (based on Russian map),
but also wrong description in the database.
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Polish report p.48
A fu** up procedure, yes. And i doubt that NDB was treated even as advisory. Otherwise they would have noticed that their vertical descend path was not in compliance with the approach chart.
The reason for the crews obvious inability to conduct non-precision approaches is drastically depicted in the reports findings on crew training:
e.g. p.133
p.131:
And the report concludes (p.132):
During landing approach at SMOLENSK NORTH, the crew of Tu-154M, no.101, used the procedure described on approach plates as RSP + OSP.
....
It appears from the findings of the Committee that final approach was conducted with the use of FMS which controlled the aircraft via ABSU and the aircraft was kept on a crew preset track (nav fixes 10XUB-DRL-XUBS). The CC was maintaining altitude through controlling the aircraft via ABSU from panel PU-46. The auto-throttle was controlling the engines, adjusting their revs to the preset on panel PN-6 speed of 280 km/h. The crew treated NDB setting as advisory (FMS was the source of reference of the aircraft‘s course).
...
On the basis of the data recovered from FMS, the Committee has found that the crew put into the flight plan the fixes whose co-ordinates originated from accessible approach charts without conversion from the SK-42 system to WGS84.
....
It appears from the findings of the Committee that final approach was conducted with the use of FMS which controlled the aircraft via ABSU and the aircraft was kept on a crew preset track (nav fixes 10XUB-DRL-XUBS). The CC was maintaining altitude through controlling the aircraft via ABSU from panel PU-46. The auto-throttle was controlling the engines, adjusting their revs to the preset on panel PN-6 speed of 280 km/h. The crew treated NDB setting as advisory (FMS was the source of reference of the aircraft‘s course).
...
On the basis of the data recovered from FMS, the Committee has found that the crew put into the flight plan the fixes whose co-ordinates originated from accessible approach charts without conversion from the SK-42 system to WGS84.
The reason for the crews obvious inability to conduct non-precision approaches is drastically depicted in the reports findings on crew training:
e.g. p.133
Analysing the Squadron‘s files the Committee surmised that entries of atmospheric conditions in which training flights were conducted were made so that they might fit training needs, and did not reflect real conditions.
The navigator got a rating (on YAK-40) for landing under NDB and PAR though the check ride was conducted with ILS.
The pilot had never have checked his navigational skills on TU-154M.
It is evident that under RL-2006 § 13 item 6, on 10.04.2010 the pilot was not qualified to navigate the Tu-154M aircraft.
It is evident that under RL-2006 § 13 item 6, on 10.04.2010 the pilot was not qualified to navigate the Tu-154M aircraft.
Last edited by janeczku; 30th Jul 2011 at 12:41.
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On the basis of the data recovered from FMS, the Committee has found that the crew put into the flight plan the fixes whose co-ordinates originated from accessible approach charts without conversion from the SK-42 system to WGS84.
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I am almost through reading this very enlightning report and discovered in footnote 129 that the polish commission has indeed come to the conclusion (from circumstancial evidence) that the PIC pushed the go-around button after his go-around command at 40m(!) QFE (shortly after the 2nd "100m" call of the navigator).
According to the Committee, the pilot attempted to execute the planned go-around maneuver using the ABSU system, by pressing the ―go-around‖ button, and was surprised by lack of aircraft‘s reaction to his action. Deactivation of the autopilot (pitch channel) occurred after 3.5 s, by overriding its operation (by pulling the control column backwards), after which the aircraft commander increased thrust and initiated go-around procedure.
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a bit of nit-picking
Lena.Kiev, when you do calculations at this level of accuracy, you should be very careful about your arithmetics: N54 49.7 is, in fact, N54.8283333333, and it gives the difference of about 400 meters perpendicular to the runway and 140 meters up the centerline.
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Sorry, 49.7 was my typo when I posted, the chart says 49.5 min = 0.825 deg. My following calculations were correct I think.
After I posted that, I read on page 54 of Russian translation (page 49 of English translation) of the report of Miller's committee that the committee recalculated runway center (ARP) coordinates N54:49.50 E032:01.60 from WGS84 system to SK-42 system and got N54:49.56 E032:01.62, "the linear shift approximately 166 m to the South". However, using the calculator achawk.narod.ru/TransCoord.zip (second tab when executed), I got entirely another result of that recalculation: N54:49.5046 E032:01.7143, the shift 123 meters about to the West, almost exactly same azimuth as the runway. Please check.
After I posted that, I read on page 54 of Russian translation (page 49 of English translation) of the report of Miller's committee that the committee recalculated runway center (ARP) coordinates N54:49.50 E032:01.60 from WGS84 system to SK-42 system and got N54:49.56 E032:01.62, "the linear shift approximately 166 m to the South". However, using the calculator achawk.narod.ru/TransCoord.zip (second tab when executed), I got entirely another result of that recalculation: N54:49.5046 E032:01.7143, the shift 123 meters about to the West, almost exactly same azimuth as the runway. Please check.
The lattitude error is indeed small. The longitude error is between 100 and 150 m. Ona has to remember, that coordinates on the chart are rounded.
The best way to quickly check it is to open for example Google Earth and find the coordinates from the chart. Easy.
Interesting to know, how they know it considering the fact, that pressing an unarmed GA button is not recorded anywhere.
Arrakis
The best way to quickly check it is to open for example Google Earth and find the coordinates from the chart. Easy.
According to the Committee, the pilot attempted to execute the planned go-around maneuver using the ABSU system, by pressing the ―go-around‖ button,
Arrakis
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Arrakis wrote:
Knowing,
a) that after the go-around command, for a period of 4 seconds there was no input on wheel or engine throttle nor was the ABSU disconnected
b) that in the 36th regiment check flights for non-precision ratings where conducted most of the time in ILS approach and therefore automatic go-around was probably best practice,
c) that the PIC explicitly briefed the crew about his decision to do go-around in automatic mode in case of missed approach
it is quite valid to conclude that the PIC (or 2nd) did actually press the button.
Furthermore in absence of relevant flight recording data, there is nothing that could prove to the contrary.
Interesting to know, how they know it considering the fact, that pressing an unarmed GA button is not recorded anywhere.
a) that after the go-around command, for a period of 4 seconds there was no input on wheel or engine throttle nor was the ABSU disconnected
b) that in the 36th regiment check flights for non-precision ratings where conducted most of the time in ILS approach and therefore automatic go-around was probably best practice,
c) that the PIC explicitly briefed the crew about his decision to do go-around in automatic mode in case of missed approach
it is quite valid to conclude that the PIC (or 2nd) did actually press the button.
Furthermore in absence of relevant flight recording data, there is nothing that could prove to the contrary.
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Lena.Kiev, like I said, it was just nit-picking on my side. And it has nothing to do with either en-route navigation (for which the difference between SK-42 and WGS-84 is immaterial) or the landing approach (with its being NDB-based, the geographical coordinates of the ARP are also immaterial).
Furthermore in absence of relevant flight recording data, there is nothing that could prove to the contrary.
We are operating here purely at a speculation level. Personally I agree, probably it was pressed but still, no proof.
or the landing approach (with its being NDB-based, the geographical coordinates of the ARP are also immaterial).
Arrakis
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We are operating here purely at a speculation level. Personally I agree, probably it was pressed but still, no proof.
. But thank for it - in a wild atmosphere in Poland they cannot do more.
ARRAKIS, there's no such thing as "mixed NDB+GPS approach". And ARP is never used for any kind of approaches - GPS or otherwise.
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It sounds like the report says the FMS killed them in the end (FMS was steering the plane left-right, and they were following the FMS prompts up\down instead of the altimeters).
For my edification, where does the FMS get its altitude info from?
For my edification, where does the FMS get its altitude info from?
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