Polish report p.48
During landing approach at SMOLENSK NORTH, the crew of Tu-154M, no.101, used the procedure described on approach plates as RSP + OSP.
....
It appears from the findings of the Committee that final approach was conducted with the use of FMS which controlled the aircraft via ABSU and the aircraft was kept on a crew preset track (nav fixes 10XUB-DRL-XUBS). The CC was maintaining altitude through controlling the aircraft via ABSU from panel PU-46. The auto-throttle was controlling the engines, adjusting their revs to the preset on panel PN-6 speed of 280 km/h. The crew treated NDB setting as advisory (FMS was the source of reference of the aircraft‘s course).
...
On the basis of the data recovered from FMS, the Committee has found that the crew put into the flight plan the fixes whose co-ordinates originated from accessible approach charts without conversion from the SK-42 system to WGS84.
A fu** up procedure, yes. And i doubt that NDB was treated even as advisory. Otherwise they would have noticed that their vertical descend path was not in compliance with the approach chart.
The reason for the crews obvious inability to conduct non-precision approaches is drastically depicted in the reports findings on crew training:
e.g. p.133
Analysing the Squadron‘s files the Committee surmised that entries of atmospheric conditions in which training flights were conducted were made so that they might fit training needs, and did not reflect real conditions.
p.131:
The navigator got a rating (on YAK-40) for landing under NDB and PAR though the check ride was conducted with ILS.
And the report concludes (p.132):
The pilot had never have checked his navigational skills on TU-154M.
It is evident that under RL-2006 § 13 item 6, on 10.04.2010 the pilot was not qualified to navigate the Tu-154M aircraft.