Computers in the cockpit and the safety of aviation
BOAC re # 40. It obviously depends what’s in the ‘test’. Basic hand flying can be practiced in most situations in highly automated aircraft; this requires personal will power and appropriate SOPs – corporate culture.
Perhaps those who suggest more general hand flying, but not that related to automation or the situations we might allow degrading system lead us into, may have identified another important (emerging?) issue.
Does thier plea indicate aspects of a lack of confidence which I sense is increasing; do pilots feel that they need to hand fly ‘elsewhere’ because they feel ill-prepared to handle the big jets – even when hand flying.
If so, this could be due to a lack of appropriate basic training or that the complexity of technology enhanced aircraft in the modern aviation environment is too difficult to manage with the current level of training or experience, i.e. not only has the aircraft / technology changed, but so too has the operating environment. We don’t appear to have many Cessna’s fitted with FMS or auto-flight systems, nor those which have the necessary performance to fly complicated SID/STARs, CDA, Cat 3, etc.
This begs the question are we relying on simulations or part task trainers too much; do they fail to provide a sufficient ‘big picture’ of both the problems and hazards of technology in a complex operating environment? Are the interfaces – the links and consequences, of the generally well simulated aircraft systems adequately exercised in the operating environment, i.e. do we simulate ATC or operational issues with sufficient accuracy?
For hand-flying issues related to safety statistics (and the situations we allow technology get us into) I would have expected calls for more ‘loss of control’ flying and operations closer to the edge of established safety margins (limiting runways, RTO). These areas may be technology related, but as argued previously, if the technology is understood, pilots should be able to avoid any hazardous situation. Even with ‘gross’ failures and unforeseen situations (very rare events), the basics of aviation (not necessary hand flying skills) should suffice in maintaining safe flight.
Unfortunately recent events suggest that this assumption is incorrect, – why … I argued that the standards of training and of professionalism are in decline – that we should revisit airmanship.
However on reflection, what if the assumption that the essential elements of airmanship can be taught without flying is wrong?
Do we need to fly to ‘experience’ airmanship?
Perhaps those who suggest more general hand flying, but not that related to automation or the situations we might allow degrading system lead us into, may have identified another important (emerging?) issue.
Does thier plea indicate aspects of a lack of confidence which I sense is increasing; do pilots feel that they need to hand fly ‘elsewhere’ because they feel ill-prepared to handle the big jets – even when hand flying.
If so, this could be due to a lack of appropriate basic training or that the complexity of technology enhanced aircraft in the modern aviation environment is too difficult to manage with the current level of training or experience, i.e. not only has the aircraft / technology changed, but so too has the operating environment. We don’t appear to have many Cessna’s fitted with FMS or auto-flight systems, nor those which have the necessary performance to fly complicated SID/STARs, CDA, Cat 3, etc.
This begs the question are we relying on simulations or part task trainers too much; do they fail to provide a sufficient ‘big picture’ of both the problems and hazards of technology in a complex operating environment? Are the interfaces – the links and consequences, of the generally well simulated aircraft systems adequately exercised in the operating environment, i.e. do we simulate ATC or operational issues with sufficient accuracy?
For hand-flying issues related to safety statistics (and the situations we allow technology get us into) I would have expected calls for more ‘loss of control’ flying and operations closer to the edge of established safety margins (limiting runways, RTO). These areas may be technology related, but as argued previously, if the technology is understood, pilots should be able to avoid any hazardous situation. Even with ‘gross’ failures and unforeseen situations (very rare events), the basics of aviation (not necessary hand flying skills) should suffice in maintaining safe flight.
Unfortunately recent events suggest that this assumption is incorrect, – why … I argued that the standards of training and of professionalism are in decline – that we should revisit airmanship.
However on reflection, what if the assumption that the essential elements of airmanship can be taught without flying is wrong?
Do we need to fly to ‘experience’ airmanship?
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Thread Starter
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
alf -
I know from experience in my last airline that there is a great reluctance to depart from the comfort of an autopilot coupled ILS and fly a visual from downwind on a 'nice day'. Very early on in my time there I briefed a visual into XXX and was later advised by P2 that he was 'surprised' as 'very few Captains do that'. Countless times I have had to push hard to get Bloggs to fly even an A/P 'coupled' visual and have in desperation a few times had to take control to save both time and passenger comfort. In questioning afterwards it appeared that the lack of 'example' was persuading Bloggs that it was 'difficult' and therefore better not to risk 'messing up'. As airports go further along the lines of 'no visuals' and automation marches ever onwards in the cockpit, I fear we will eventually lose the ability to position an aeroplane visually from a random position. Likewise the art of 'orientation' - where am I and where am I going - is subsumed by the seductive 'magenta line' - "You are here, don't fret" psychology.
Regarding 'Cessnas' 'fitted with FMS', we are not far away.
As for
- you and I are old enough to recall this enless debate. I have always believed that it was an inbuilt faculty, although it could be honed through teaching and 'absorption'. Almost an inbuilt 'self-preservation' desire?
It is back to the big question - the way we appear to be heading at the moment, do we need these 'skills'? This leads inevitably to the fully automated aeroplane with system failure well into unlikely probabilities.
because they feel ill-prepared to handle the big jets – even when hand flying.
Regarding 'Cessnas' 'fitted with FMS', we are not far away.
As for
However on reflection, what if the assumption that the essential elements of airmanship can be taught without flying is wrong?
Do we need to fly to ‘experience’ airmanship?
Do we need to fly to ‘experience’ airmanship?
It is back to the big question - the way we appear to be heading at the moment, do we need these 'skills'? This leads inevitably to the fully automated aeroplane with system failure well into unlikely probabilities.
Moderator
there is a great reluctance to depart from the comfort of an autopilot coupled ILS
I guess that 737s today are different animals to the ones I remember ? .. some of us considered it a bit of a nuisance to use the autopilot .. anything under around half an hour's sector length generally was hand flown go to woe .. unless weather or traffic dictated otherwise. My first flight on the line post sim endorsement was MEL SYD (bit over an hour) ... the autopilot and FD didn't get a look in.
If nothing else the sector confirmed to me that the aircraft was easier to fly than the sim .. and the visuals were absolutely magic compared to the sim's.
I guess that 737s today are different animals to the ones I remember ? .. some of us considered it a bit of a nuisance to use the autopilot .. anything under around half an hour's sector length generally was hand flown go to woe .. unless weather or traffic dictated otherwise. My first flight on the line post sim endorsement was MEL SYD (bit over an hour) ... the autopilot and FD didn't get a look in.
If nothing else the sector confirmed to me that the aircraft was easier to fly than the sim .. and the visuals were absolutely magic compared to the sim's.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Thread Starter
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
the autopilot and FD didn't get a look in.
The problems (amongst others) with the 'visual' against the ILS is that:-
1) You have to think and work a bit more
2) You have to plan things for yourself (no 'turn left now and reduce speed 180kts' sort of thing
3) With the coupled ILS you don't really need to 'monitor' it, do you........................(AMS)
4) If it 'goes wrong' the chances are it will ONLY be your fault
5) You actually need to look out of the window and not at the coloured screens.
Why risk it?
Moderator
.. guess I'm just an over-the-hill anachronistic dinosaur ...
We were fortunate to have a pragmatic turn of the paradigm company. The 737 boss, when the 300 was introduced, started down the button pressing line but then the emphasis shifted to do it either way .. but be able to do it competently ... both ways !
We were fortunate to have a pragmatic turn of the paradigm company. The 737 boss, when the 300 was introduced, started down the button pressing line but then the emphasis shifted to do it either way .. but be able to do it competently ... both ways !
'Tis funny how people stressing the human failability and how wonderful automatics are, conveniently forget that machines do break down. I've had autopilots cutting out and refusing to reengage, flight directors developing mind of their own, autopilots deciding that they know better than FD and wandering away, a couple of times I've had localizers fail under me and bent glideslopes were too numerous to count. And I've been flying for living only last 8 1/2 years.
A couple of weeks ago I've thrown away well prepared and briefed ILS approach in favour of visual approach. It wasn't for the sheer fun of it, though it was fun, but because there was small but very red radar return too close to ILS FAF for my liking and 4-miles visual lineup gave smooth ride. Now if I were automatic ILS fanatic, I might have given my pax a rough ride or wait in holding or even divert. As it turned out, arrival was on time and completely uneventful.
Mind you, as BOAC somewhat ironically pointed out, visual approach is not "lets turn off everything, drop the gear and flaps and dive for the first runway we see". Visual approach needs good preparation and execution to give satisfactory results and it usually is more labour-intensive than automatic ILS.
As for riding the magenta line, it is basic airmanship, applicable to anything from UL glider to An-225, is that pilot has to know where he is, where he wants to go, has to fly the aeroplane and not allow the aeroplane to lead him. Magenta line is good tool for keeping the situational awareness but it has to be always crosschecked against the pilot's idea of position and direction. If pilot follows track line blindly, required redundancy is lost and chance of mishap greatly increases. In other words, FMSes, GPSes and all other electronic marvels of the modern age are not replacement for pilot's situational awareness, but a supplement to it.
Similar situation is with Airbus ECAM that automatically generates electronic checklists for detected failures. Just because it says:"now press such-and-such button" it doesn't mean that Airbus pilot doesn't have to know its systems very well or is not required to know what each button does. Especially as ECAM is not able to detect every failure, is (theoretically) quite capable of spouting rubbish when confronted with multiple failures and is unable to calculate all the consequences of failures. Also it can't be much improved, as it would require its CPU to be replaced with something intelligent, and AFAIK no one made intelligent computer yet.
Regarding the airmanship, I don't think its congenital, it has to be acquired and nurtured. Otherwise it withers and dies. Its easy to say "Such-and-such was
poor pilot, as final report suggests." However seeing 20 000 hr pilots putting its trust in the only faulty instrument on board and stalling the otherwise serviceable aeroplane or busting the MDA on non-precision approach and flying his aeroplane into ground or taking-off without clearance should really make us think. If they really were so substandard, how come they have enjoyed such a long careers? I'm not sure whether essential elements of airmanship can be taught without actually flying but I'm certain that anyone who acts upon belief that airmanship is old-fashioned and can be replaced by system operation proficiency is in for a very rude awakening.
There is Arab saying that goes something like: "Any child can walk into the lion's den, but only the bravest men would go in to save it." Self-preservation kicks in only if one is aware of the danger. Ones who are not aware of the ways their APs/FMSes can let them down can easily dismiss my ranting as another old-wives-tale. Sadly, not to their own peril alone.
JollyGirl, I'm not sure how to interpret
and how does it relate to Cali, Strasbourg and Bangalore crashes. I can offer you my perspective on them: all were cases of blindly following missprogrammed flight guidance computers, despite ample warnings that something is wrong. In Bangalore altitude selector was set below aerodrome elevation - something that was known to be dangerous in any such equipped aircraft, not just A320, and yet it was done. Strasbourg was case where design of control unit helped setting 3000fpm instead of 3° flight path but PFD showed nose down pitch, altimeters unwound rapidly, IVSIs have shown rapid descent and there was no reaction from flight deck. Even worse, the aeroplane would have missed the mountain it hit, if it were only on the proper final approach track. Cali was the case of following the track line despite it being to the 90° to the desired track. Also it is basic airmanship if there's doubt about one's position in descent, level off is a must. Sadly, it got neglected here.
A couple of weeks ago I've thrown away well prepared and briefed ILS approach in favour of visual approach. It wasn't for the sheer fun of it, though it was fun, but because there was small but very red radar return too close to ILS FAF for my liking and 4-miles visual lineup gave smooth ride. Now if I were automatic ILS fanatic, I might have given my pax a rough ride or wait in holding or even divert. As it turned out, arrival was on time and completely uneventful.
Mind you, as BOAC somewhat ironically pointed out, visual approach is not "lets turn off everything, drop the gear and flaps and dive for the first runway we see". Visual approach needs good preparation and execution to give satisfactory results and it usually is more labour-intensive than automatic ILS.
As for riding the magenta line, it is basic airmanship, applicable to anything from UL glider to An-225, is that pilot has to know where he is, where he wants to go, has to fly the aeroplane and not allow the aeroplane to lead him. Magenta line is good tool for keeping the situational awareness but it has to be always crosschecked against the pilot's idea of position and direction. If pilot follows track line blindly, required redundancy is lost and chance of mishap greatly increases. In other words, FMSes, GPSes and all other electronic marvels of the modern age are not replacement for pilot's situational awareness, but a supplement to it.
Similar situation is with Airbus ECAM that automatically generates electronic checklists for detected failures. Just because it says:"now press such-and-such button" it doesn't mean that Airbus pilot doesn't have to know its systems very well or is not required to know what each button does. Especially as ECAM is not able to detect every failure, is (theoretically) quite capable of spouting rubbish when confronted with multiple failures and is unable to calculate all the consequences of failures. Also it can't be much improved, as it would require its CPU to be replaced with something intelligent, and AFAIK no one made intelligent computer yet.
Regarding the airmanship, I don't think its congenital, it has to be acquired and nurtured. Otherwise it withers and dies. Its easy to say "Such-and-such was
poor pilot, as final report suggests." However seeing 20 000 hr pilots putting its trust in the only faulty instrument on board and stalling the otherwise serviceable aeroplane or busting the MDA on non-precision approach and flying his aeroplane into ground or taking-off without clearance should really make us think. If they really were so substandard, how come they have enjoyed such a long careers? I'm not sure whether essential elements of airmanship can be taught without actually flying but I'm certain that anyone who acts upon belief that airmanship is old-fashioned and can be replaced by system operation proficiency is in for a very rude awakening. There is Arab saying that goes something like: "Any child can walk into the lion's den, but only the bravest men would go in to save it." Self-preservation kicks in only if one is aware of the danger. Ones who are not aware of the ways their APs/FMSes can let them down can easily dismiss my ranting as another old-wives-tale. Sadly, not to their own peril alone.
JollyGirl, I'm not sure how to interpret
highly complex dynamic and event-driven domains such as aviation require operators to diagnose and cope with the consequences of breakdowns in human-machine performance that interact, cascade and escalate over time while maintaining the integrity and goals (i.e. efficiency, safety) of an underlying dynamic process.
Why?
JT re post 43, you must ask yourself why the management changed their approach.
Firstly, the new whizz=bang 732ADVs had all this newfangled button stuff. To force people to learn it, hand flying was as near as dammit banned. I can remember using the A/P to fly a circuit to final! That was OK as long as we weren't using the sim and renewals were in the a/c.
But, in the next round of PPC/OPC/IRT, too many people started failing the mandatory handflying bit (OEI ILS with PF doing the button pushing). I did and had a remedial session and so did quite a few others.
So someone somewhere decided on a compromise. And I guess the reason was money.
Firstly, the new whizz=bang 732ADVs had all this newfangled button stuff. To force people to learn it, hand flying was as near as dammit banned. I can remember using the A/P to fly a circuit to final! That was OK as long as we weren't using the sim and renewals were in the a/c.
But, in the next round of PPC/OPC/IRT, too many people started failing the mandatory handflying bit (OEI ILS with PF doing the button pushing). I did and had a remedial session and so did quite a few others.
So someone somewhere decided on a compromise. And I guess the reason was money.
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: Colorado
Age: 74
Posts: 48
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Cockpit computing ...
Just a thought ...
As pilots we learned that it was very beneficial to learn from others mistakes (or die from our own), probably the only industry that reports its incidents properly.
The computing industy, in any safety critical area, need to understand this lesson. It is not sufficent for a computer system to simply fail; reboot and all will be well, is not good enough. This is simply a recipe for a later disaster, proper real time data audits are required.
It is more important to know why a system fails than to know that the diagnostics say all is OK.
As pilots we learned that it was very beneficial to learn from others mistakes (or die from our own), probably the only industry that reports its incidents properly.
The computing industy, in any safety critical area, need to understand this lesson. It is not sufficent for a computer system to simply fail; reboot and all will be well, is not good enough. This is simply a recipe for a later disaster, proper real time data audits are required.
It is more important to know why a system fails than to know that the diagnostics say all is OK.
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: Australia
Posts: 1,414
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
So someone somewhere decided on a compromise. And I guess the reason was money
So now you have the ridiculous situation when once perfectly capable pilots are forced into twirling knobs and pushing buttons like a kid flying his radio controlled model aeroplane around a sports oval. And of course, once this crap goes into the company operations manual and in turn gets the wise old CASA nod of "approval" the rot inevitably sets in and the once capable pilot gradually sinks into a lazy hazy daze of automation. But what about his recurrent simulator training? Most of that will be automation, too. Despite countless research papers that warn of the dangers of automation complacency, (I am sure these are rarely ever seen by airline ops management people) the juggernaut of blind reliance on automation rolls on.
Read the editorial comment in Flight International 21-27 July 2009. Among other points it says "airline safety advance has stalled..pilot training looks like the key..it is high time the regulators and airlines reviewed how recurrent training is done in modern aircraft..in all the loss of control accidents over the past 20 years the aircraft could have been controlled..several involved failure to manage a stall..to describe it as pilot error is an oversimplification, obscuring the fact that the pilot was not trained to deal with the situation..conditioned trust in normally reliable automation...failure of their recurrent training to reinforce basic practices.
Ho hum! heard it all before. Now lets get back to those wonderful lazy real time LOFT exercises in the simulator - on full automatics of course..
Whilst searching for info on JG’s request I was reminded that ‘trust in automation’ appears in several documents.
The comparison between humans and automation is interesting. If a Captain trusts the FO to fly the aircraft - has faith or belief in the person, then is there any difference in the nature of ‘trust’ in automation?
Human trust stems from knowledge of a person, but in our industry more often from standardized training where there is an acceptable level of capability, i.e. the person can be trusted to conduct his duties in a range of situations.
So the question might be how we achieve a similar understanding about automation.
SOPs that require maximum use of automation duck the issue; - trust autos all the time. Conversely SOPs which enable the crew a choice of when to use autos might also fail in defining the level of trust as it depends on knowledge of the automation’s capabilities and reliability – is s/he (it) a ‘good chap’.
… More thinking required.
Is trust in humans comparable to trust in machines?
The cognitive capabilities of humans.
The comparison between humans and automation is interesting. If a Captain trusts the FO to fly the aircraft - has faith or belief in the person, then is there any difference in the nature of ‘trust’ in automation?
Human trust stems from knowledge of a person, but in our industry more often from standardized training where there is an acceptable level of capability, i.e. the person can be trusted to conduct his duties in a range of situations.
So the question might be how we achieve a similar understanding about automation.
SOPs that require maximum use of automation duck the issue; - trust autos all the time. Conversely SOPs which enable the crew a choice of when to use autos might also fail in defining the level of trust as it depends on knowledge of the automation’s capabilities and reliability – is s/he (it) a ‘good chap’.
… More thinking required.
Is trust in humans comparable to trust in machines?
The cognitive capabilities of humans.
Moderator
If a Captain trusts the FO to fly the aircraft - has faith or belief in the person, then is there any difference in the nature of ‘trust’ in automation?
Of course not, as a philosophical matter ... however, a pragmatic concern with the above statement relates to the competence with which the Captain can take over from a deteriorating situation (whether F/O or A/P) and save the day ... ?
Providing that the Captain understands and recognises the practical limits of competence of either his/her F/O or A/P ...
Of course not, as a philosophical matter ... however, a pragmatic concern with the above statement relates to the competence with which the Captain can take over from a deteriorating situation (whether F/O or A/P) and save the day ... ?
Providing that the Captain understands and recognises the practical limits of competence of either his/her F/O or A/P ...
John, “ Providing that the Captain understands and recognises the practical limits …”
Yes, recognition is a problem, part of communication.
Autos are ‘Dumb and Dutiful’, and unlike a human, generally they cannot tell you when there are struggling – they just quit at the limiting condition.
So the ability (of the crew), or inability (of the autos) to communicate are a potential problems.
Knowing when and what to ask the autos to do is an important part of being able to trust the system to perform as expected.
Thus, it may be that our expectation is a source of error. Do we expect autos to behave – think, react like a human because they appear capable of human like control and calculation (but without actually being able to think).
Not to reopen the AF accident here, but as an example, why should we be so concerned about a failure of the IAS displays and loss some flight envelope protections, whilst the aircraft remains flyable with a manual control system and attitude display?
Consider days of yore with piston power, crossing the Atlantic in icing conditions, no A/P, poor radar, systems freezing up (IAS failure), but the flights continued safety.
Why should we now focus on the failure of technology as a cause and seek to blame it as if ‘it’ was some third entity?
Why not re-examine the human, not for blame, but for change, things we no longer do, or can do. In these rare situations of technology failure, perhaps our expectation is that we should be able to do these things, but we can’t; does that mean we can’t trust ourselves?
That’s probable enough philosophical hot air to generate a Cb!
Yes, recognition is a problem, part of communication.
Autos are ‘Dumb and Dutiful’, and unlike a human, generally they cannot tell you when there are struggling – they just quit at the limiting condition.
So the ability (of the crew), or inability (of the autos) to communicate are a potential problems.
Knowing when and what to ask the autos to do is an important part of being able to trust the system to perform as expected.
Thus, it may be that our expectation is a source of error. Do we expect autos to behave – think, react like a human because they appear capable of human like control and calculation (but without actually being able to think).
Not to reopen the AF accident here, but as an example, why should we be so concerned about a failure of the IAS displays and loss some flight envelope protections, whilst the aircraft remains flyable with a manual control system and attitude display?
Consider days of yore with piston power, crossing the Atlantic in icing conditions, no A/P, poor radar, systems freezing up (IAS failure), but the flights continued safety.
Why should we now focus on the failure of technology as a cause and seek to blame it as if ‘it’ was some third entity?
Why not re-examine the human, not for blame, but for change, things we no longer do, or can do. In these rare situations of technology failure, perhaps our expectation is that we should be able to do these things, but we can’t; does that mean we can’t trust ourselves?
That’s probable enough philosophical hot air to generate a Cb!
Moderator
I liken the problem you cite to the analogy of PhDs ... 600 years ago, the newly annointed knew ALL of European wisdom .. nowadays, the PhD knows a lot about three-fifths of five-eighths in the overall scheme of things ..
In similar vein, is it reasonable to expect the modern (ie younger) pilot to be able to maintain the manipulative and situational skills of yesteryear as well as keeping on top of increasingly more convoluted and complex electronic systems ?
Or do we accept that the manipulative and cognitive risks of yesteryear have been displaced, to some extent, by the risks of generally improbably electronic failure .. and accept that, if the latter occurs in adverse conditions, the risk of hull loss may be higher than what a similar set of circumstances may have resulted in in the past ?
Indeed, is there an answer at the end of the day ?
In similar vein, is it reasonable to expect the modern (ie younger) pilot to be able to maintain the manipulative and situational skills of yesteryear as well as keeping on top of increasingly more convoluted and complex electronic systems ?
Or do we accept that the manipulative and cognitive risks of yesteryear have been displaced, to some extent, by the risks of generally improbably electronic failure .. and accept that, if the latter occurs in adverse conditions, the risk of hull loss may be higher than what a similar set of circumstances may have resulted in in the past ?
Indeed, is there an answer at the end of the day ?
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Thread Starter
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by alf
Autos are ‘Dumb and Dutiful’, and unlike a human, generally they cannot tell you when there are struggling – they just quit at the limiting condition.
Originally Posted by JT
In similar vein, is it reasonable to expect the modern (ie younger) pilot to be able to maintain the manipulative and situational skills of yesteryear as well as keeping on top of increasingly more convoluted and complex electronic systems ?
a) even 'more' failsafe
b) Easy to understand/use with proper training.
following a runway change to a parallel runway at about 10 miles, where the 'candidate' went head down to programme the computer for the new runway
You have to be kidding .. but I know you're not .. a sad indictment of the Industry's training programs and general understanding of flight management .. regardless of which seat is concerned.
You have to be kidding .. but I know you're not .. a sad indictment of the Industry's training programs and general understanding of flight management .. regardless of which seat is concerned.
Nothing is black and white, just shades of grey. With all due respect, whether "re-programming" (which you are not doing -- that's for software people) for the runway change --- as a decision to be evaluated by the check pilot, as "good" or "bad" needs a lot more information. Which airport/aircraft/runway even before we consider weather --- and who was pilot flying and who was support, and so on and so forth.
If the "re-programming" is confined to simply FMCS (by whatever name) selection of the runway, which brings up the ILS frequency and the go-around ---- this is no more labor intensive than manually selecting an ILS frequency by the keyboard, indeed, on some Boeing types, fewer keystrokes for lots more operationally useful information.
Even before the days of the "magenta line", at places like so many of the major US airports, I would suggest that having the ILS up for the runway you have just sidestepped to is a good idea ----- for the DME, if nothing else --- if it is at 10 miles of so ---- if it is a change at 800 ft at KLAX, from 25L to 25R, another story.
Quite honestly, I could spend several hours with a student posing all sorts of variations on the theme of just this one item, a "relatively" late runway change --- even before you get to type specific recommendations.
Lest you want to write me of as a "modern" technology captive, I go back far enough to have actually flown an MF Range, and was forced to become all too familiar with VAR, the US and Europe, at the time, having long since graduated to the VOR and (mercifully briefly) the Decca Navigator.
Modern flighdeck systems are wonderful aids, but we are seeing them become a crutch ---- the latest being Honeywell's "stable approach monitor" add-on to EGPWS ---- obviously Honeywell believes there is a market/safety sales pitch for this "you'r hot/high/going to land long and run off the end" performance prediction monitor. I abhor the thought that we actually need it, but I fear Honeywell is probably onto a nice little earner.
Remember:
Rule 1: Fly the aeroplane
Rule 2: Repealed due to politically correct EOE policies.
Rule 3: There is no Rule 3, see Rule 1
All in all, a very thought provoking thread.
Tootle pip!!
PS: Remember BOAC landing at Sharjah instead of Dubai, QF, Barber's Point instead of Honolulu, LH at Northolt, and many more --- having the ILS up might have been a bloody good idea --- how many have been trapped by "under planning" a visual approach??
Moderator
but we are seeing them become a crutch
.. is probably the concern we are pushing.
I'm all for tuning the ILS with a close in runway change ... I think it's silly not to have basic guidance to minimise the chance of foul ups as you cite .. but is there a sound need to play with the FMS when you only have a few minutes until touchdown ?
I can recall on my 733 check to the line years ago .. the checkie had a leg and, in CAVOK, three parts the way downwind .. started drawing circuits on the box. No problem and he did a nice circuit and landing .. but why bother ?
Only the opinion of a dinosaur and I am well aware of tempus fugit so maybe I should keep my archaic opinions to myself in this modern song and dance flying world ?
.. is probably the concern we are pushing.
I'm all for tuning the ILS with a close in runway change ... I think it's silly not to have basic guidance to minimise the chance of foul ups as you cite .. but is there a sound need to play with the FMS when you only have a few minutes until touchdown ?
I can recall on my 733 check to the line years ago .. the checkie had a leg and, in CAVOK, three parts the way downwind .. started drawing circuits on the box. No problem and he did a nice circuit and landing .. but why bother ?
Only the opinion of a dinosaur and I am well aware of tempus fugit so maybe I should keep my archaic opinions to myself in this modern song and dance flying world ?
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: Australia
Posts: 1,414
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I can recall on my 733 check to the line years ago .. the checkie had a leg and, in CAVOK, three parts the way downwind .. started drawing circuits on the box. No problem and he did a nice circuit and landing .. but why bother ?
OR: If he intends to fly a visual circuit by actually looking at the runway as he tracks downwind and base then what is the logic in setting up an LNAV flight plan unless he is going to rely on the FD. Like JT I have observed first officers frantically pushing buttons on the CDU to build a beautiful circuit pattern that Picasso would have been proud of. And why? I 'll tell you why. Because they cannot keep their fingers of the buttons. It is a simple case of automatics addiction and my guess is 70 percent of glass cockpit pilots are addicted. I have seen countless times, pilots settling themselves into a simulator for local airwork flying. Even before adjusting their seats you see them dive into the CDU and type madly away. And you know even then the poor bastards are addicted. A sad tale, but true..