'Tis funny how people stressing the human failability and how wonderful automatics are, conveniently forget that machines do break down. I've had autopilots cutting out and refusing to reengage, flight directors developing mind of their own, autopilots deciding that they know better than FD and wandering away, a couple of times I've had localizers fail under me and bent glideslopes were too numerous to count. And I've been flying for living only last 8 1/2 years.
A couple of weeks ago I've thrown away well prepared and briefed ILS approach in favour of visual approach. It wasn't for the sheer fun of it, though it was fun, but because there was small but very red radar return too close to ILS FAF for my liking and 4-miles visual lineup gave smooth ride. Now if I were automatic ILS fanatic, I might have given my pax a rough ride or wait in holding or even divert. As it turned out, arrival was on time and completely uneventful.
Mind you, as BOAC somewhat ironically pointed out, visual approach is not "lets turn off everything, drop the gear and flaps and dive for the first runway we see". Visual approach needs good preparation and execution to give satisfactory results and it usually is more labour-intensive than automatic ILS.
As for riding the magenta line, it is basic airmanship, applicable to anything from UL glider to An-225, is that pilot has to know where he is, where he wants to go, has to fly the aeroplane and not allow the aeroplane to lead him. Magenta line is good tool for keeping the situational awareness but it has to be always crosschecked against the pilot's idea of position and direction. If pilot follows track line blindly, required redundancy is lost and chance of mishap greatly increases. In other words, FMSes, GPSes and all other electronic marvels of the modern age are not replacement for pilot's situational awareness, but a supplement to it.
Similar situation is with Airbus ECAM that automatically generates electronic checklists for detected failures. Just because it says:"now press such-and-such button" it doesn't mean that Airbus pilot doesn't have to know its systems very well or is not required to know what each button does. Especially as ECAM is not able to detect every failure, is (theoretically) quite capable of spouting rubbish when confronted with multiple failures and is unable to calculate all the consequences of failures. Also it can't be much improved, as it would require its CPU to be replaced with something intelligent, and
AFAIK no one made intelligent computer yet.
Regarding the airmanship, I don't think its congenital, it has to be acquired and nurtured. Otherwise it withers and dies. Its easy to say "Such-and-such was
poor pilot, as final report suggests." However seeing 20 000 hr pilots putting its trust in the only faulty instrument on board and stalling the otherwise serviceable aeroplane or busting the MDA on non-precision approach and flying his aeroplane into ground or taking-off without clearance should really make us think. If they really were so substandard, how come they have enjoyed such a long careers? I'm not sure whether essential elements of airmanship can be taught without actually flying but I'm certain that anyone who acts upon belief that airmanship is old-fashioned and can be replaced by system operation proficiency is in for a very rude awakening.
There is Arab saying that goes something like: "Any child can walk into the lion's den, but only the bravest men would go in to save it." Self-preservation kicks in only if one is aware of the danger. Ones who are not aware of the ways their APs/FMSes can let them down can easily dismiss my ranting as another old-wives-tale. Sadly, not to their own peril alone.
JollyGirl, I'm not sure how to interpret
highly complex dynamic and event-driven domains such as aviation require operators to diagnose and cope with the consequences of breakdowns in human-machine performance that interact, cascade and escalate over time while maintaining the integrity and goals (i.e. efficiency, safety) of an underlying dynamic process.
and how does it relate to Cali, Strasbourg and Bangalore crashes. I can offer you my perspective on them: all were cases of blindly following missprogrammed flight guidance computers, despite ample warnings that something is wrong. In Bangalore altitude selector was set below aerodrome elevation - something that was known to be dangerous in any such equipped aircraft, not just A320, and yet it was done. Strasbourg was case where design of control unit helped setting 3000fpm instead of 3° flight path but PFD showed nose down pitch, altimeters unwound rapidly, IVSIs have shown rapid descent and there was no reaction from flight deck. Even worse, the aeroplane would have missed the mountain it hit, if it were only on the proper final approach track. Cali was the case of following the track line despite it being to the 90° to the desired track. Also it is basic airmanship if there's doubt about one's position in descent, level off is a must. Sadly, it got neglected here.