Iberia IB6166, BOS-MAD, 2nd Dec, Cowboys !!!!
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Here are the Metars for the time-period being referenced. There was no two inches of snow at KBOS at the time.
METAR KBOS 022054Z 19003KT 10SM OVC060 M02/M17 A3028 RMK AO2 SLP252 T10221167 58022
METAR KBOS 022154Z 20007KT 10SM OVC055 M02/M16 A3027 RMK AO2 SLP248 T10221156
SPECI KBOS 022242Z 24004KT 7SM -SN BKN025 OVC050 M03/M12 A3025 RMK AO2 SNB35 P0000
METAR KBOS 022254Z 22004KT 5SM -SN OVC025 M03/M11 A3024 RMK AO2 SNB35 SLP240 P0000 T10331111
METAR KBOS 022254Z 22004KT 5SM -SN OVC025 M03/M11 A3024
SPECI KBOS 022340Z 21003KT 1 3/4SM -SN BKN025 OVC060 M04/M09 A3023 RMK AO2 P0000
SPECI KBOS 022347Z 22004KT 1 1/4SM -SN BKN013 OVC055 M04/M08 A3023 RMK AO2 P0001
METAR KBOS 022354Z 21004KT 1 1/2SM -SN BKN015 OVC034 M04/M08 A3022 RMK AO2 SLP233 P0001 60001 T10441083 11022 21044 58019
SPECI KBOS 030011Z 00000KT 2SM -SN BKN015 BKN028 OVC034 M04/M08 A3021 RMK AO2 P0001
METAR KBOS 022154Z 20007KT 10SM OVC055 M02/M16 A3027 RMK AO2 SLP248 T10221156
SPECI KBOS 022242Z 24004KT 7SM -SN BKN025 OVC050 M03/M12 A3025 RMK AO2 SNB35 P0000
METAR KBOS 022254Z 22004KT 5SM -SN OVC025 M03/M11 A3024 RMK AO2 SNB35 SLP240 P0000 T10331111
METAR KBOS 022254Z 22004KT 5SM -SN OVC025 M03/M11 A3024
SPECI KBOS 022340Z 21003KT 1 3/4SM -SN BKN025 OVC060 M04/M09 A3023 RMK AO2 P0000
SPECI KBOS 022347Z 22004KT 1 1/4SM -SN BKN013 OVC055 M04/M08 A3023 RMK AO2 P0001
METAR KBOS 022354Z 21004KT 1 1/2SM -SN BKN015 OVC034 M04/M08 A3022 RMK AO2 SLP233 P0001 60001 T10441083 11022 21044 58019
SPECI KBOS 030011Z 00000KT 2SM -SN BKN015 BKN028 OVC034 M04/M08 A3021 RMK AO2 P0001
Last edited by SaturnV; 9th Dec 2007 at 22:26. Reason: clarify
lomapaseo;
Re, how you begin such an investigation, I think you've said it...
And perhaps connect the dots with facts such as the METARS.
By "investigation" is not meant the wholesale pursuit of a violation but a questioning and establishing of what occurred with the IB flight at BOS. From the initial post, something happened of sufficient import to warrant comment by both ATC and other crews. What was it?
If departing with contaminated wings is against the FARs (as it is against the CARs in Canada), and it is reported that that occurred, then establishing the facts as best as possible is required if only to review said procedures.
The "Ice Police" in Toronto sat at the end of the departing runway a number of times in my recollection. Their presence was highly controversial for the same reasons that the present matter is and the few times they charged a crew with a violation certainly heightened the controversy and the resulting fight to exonerate the crew was a strong one indeed. As far as I am aware, such "interventions" occurred after de-icing which simply added to the controversy of "who is in command". I believe the process is no longer used but perhaps someone now operating out of Pearson can verify this.
Our own de-ice procedures provided for co-authority of the Lead or the Captain and a decision by one to de-ice could not be over-ridden by the other.
Invariably, with precip, esp possibly-wet snow (could it make a snowball?), and at the temperatures indicated in the METARS as provided above, de-icing was as automatic as it could be while still permitting some leeway to judge circumstances. In the early days, (when formal de-ice procedures were being implemented and equipment designed), if the temp was much colder, (ie, -25), some consideration was given to the fact that, if the metal was clean underneath, (as inspected, usually by gloved hand) but the wings were covered with a "light dusting", no de-ice was called for because there was no adherence of the contaminating material, (and it couldn't make a snowball). Often, ropes and brooms would be used to clear off such contamination. Today, no such freedom exists to taxi out and take off even with this kind of contamination.
Whether such awarenesses and procedures exist at IB could be one series of questions. The assumption here is not to question the commander's authority but to examine by what procedures the captain had at his/her disposal for guidance. I know it is trite to say that a commander's authority cannot alter wing contamination but I should think this is more about procedures than about such authority. I think it is entirely reasonable to examine any company's procedures which permits an aircraft to depart with contaminated wings. So far as establishing facts, that would be done the usual way.
Re, how you begin such an investigation, I think you've said it...
What you start with is a review of the carrier's procedures and the lee way allowed the captain. It's pretty difficult for the FAA to do anything after the fact, other than review procedures.
By "investigation" is not meant the wholesale pursuit of a violation but a questioning and establishing of what occurred with the IB flight at BOS. From the initial post, something happened of sufficient import to warrant comment by both ATC and other crews. What was it?
If departing with contaminated wings is against the FARs (as it is against the CARs in Canada), and it is reported that that occurred, then establishing the facts as best as possible is required if only to review said procedures.
The "Ice Police" in Toronto sat at the end of the departing runway a number of times in my recollection. Their presence was highly controversial for the same reasons that the present matter is and the few times they charged a crew with a violation certainly heightened the controversy and the resulting fight to exonerate the crew was a strong one indeed. As far as I am aware, such "interventions" occurred after de-icing which simply added to the controversy of "who is in command". I believe the process is no longer used but perhaps someone now operating out of Pearson can verify this.
Our own de-ice procedures provided for co-authority of the Lead or the Captain and a decision by one to de-ice could not be over-ridden by the other.
Invariably, with precip, esp possibly-wet snow (could it make a snowball?), and at the temperatures indicated in the METARS as provided above, de-icing was as automatic as it could be while still permitting some leeway to judge circumstances. In the early days, (when formal de-ice procedures were being implemented and equipment designed), if the temp was much colder, (ie, -25), some consideration was given to the fact that, if the metal was clean underneath, (as inspected, usually by gloved hand) but the wings were covered with a "light dusting", no de-ice was called for because there was no adherence of the contaminating material, (and it couldn't make a snowball). Often, ropes and brooms would be used to clear off such contamination. Today, no such freedom exists to taxi out and take off even with this kind of contamination.
Whether such awarenesses and procedures exist at IB could be one series of questions. The assumption here is not to question the commander's authority but to examine by what procedures the captain had at his/her disposal for guidance. I know it is trite to say that a commander's authority cannot alter wing contamination but I should think this is more about procedures than about such authority. I think it is entirely reasonable to examine any company's procedures which permits an aircraft to depart with contaminated wings. So far as establishing facts, that would be done the usual way.
Last edited by PJ2; 10th Dec 2007 at 00:11.
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Do listen to those tapes, people. To begin with that little voice chirps up his few rehearsed words only when he dares, and when he does almost sounds like he has an inferiority complex about doing so.
He meekly requests pushback I think at least three times before he is acknowledged, and he doesn't sound like someone very confident about what he is requesting, does he? Or at best he doesn't sound like someone very confident in using RT, at least in English.
As a rule I think, when they are already handling higher workload than the norm, ATC quite rightly deliberately don't engage with weak-willed sounding pilots (pilots who sound like they might drop the ball). Better that any weak-wills and their passengers remain safely out of danger without extra clearances to engage in risk. ATC then create that little extra time to 'guide' any less than crisply communicating pilot. I think that's what this controller did with this pilot. I think that when ATC did acknowledge, ATC deliberately 'coaxed' the Iberia in ways designed to check the pilot's clear comprehension of the potential hazard before issuing any clearance that allowed engagement in the risk. ATC in fact had to coax this pilot a number of times about deicing. Finally the interrogated captain made that abundantly clear communication "We don't need it".
Immediately following that one, you can pretty much hear in ATC's tone, a conclusion that this captain has indeed heard all the prompts to deice, but contrary to what everyone else was doing, he has just said he knows what he is doing (God help him). In issuing the clearance to him, and following several warning attempts, there is now the clear transferance of full icing risk and liability to the Captain. ATC had done all he could possibly be expected to do to alert a presumably sensible 340 captain to a likely hazard, yet the Captain had as good as said "There is no such hazard affecting my aircraft PERIOD".
LTD also knew that ATC's clear warning had failed to influence the presumably sensible 340 captain. His own neatly interjected "You do" was not I think intended to be anything other than a shorthand gift of a comment - a 'one professional to another' suggestion - to please have a rethink. It was not a long detailed warning. It was a discreet prompt that was short enough to have been missed by most monitoring stations but should have been picked up by the two currently active stations (ATC and Iberia). Sadly, judged by his overall RT performance on the tapes, I think the Iberia captain's command of English, and awareness of what else was going on on the RT was all very limited, and I think he was completely oblivious to LTD's two word warning. LTD's was not standard RT, but it was clearly recognisable English, so Iberia had his chance for a discreetly prompted rethink, and was oblivious to it. That is why he was then chased down again more forcefully.
I would not be surprised if the Iberia captain had even formed any awareness from the RT traffic that he was indeed the only one not getting deiced. There was obviously a lot of ancilliary RT uncertainty about BOS procedures for pushing back a bit to conduct deicing, and the frequency was being used in non-standard exchanges about requesting 15 foot, 20 foot, 30 feet pushbacks prior to deice, and even a question about what ATC were doing with that information...ATC's response was something like "I was just trying to get an idea of how many were doing it" which was the type of RT that would have meant very little to a non-native English speaker.
Don't get me wrong, I don't speak more than the one language very well either, and I also know that at he best of times US RT is often difficult for the world's other English speakers, so I can guess it was difficult for the Iberia captain.
But we really do need to understand how despite all the warnings, this flight slipped through the net undeiced - RT isn't the best place to be having a conference about the pros and cons of deicing, but neither is the warm cosy flightdeck of the aircraft under discussion unless all the participants have been out and up very recently for a proper look
The particular thing I don't understand however, is when the entire three man Iberia crew did catch on as to what was being queried, they all gave BA that "wave" which I think only has one broad meaning i.e. "Thanks but no thanks".
Quite simply, the Iberia stepped out of line either deliberately or inadvertently, and ultimately they conciously took risks that peers didn't. We really do need to know how that happens, and I am glad it is being discussed here.
He meekly requests pushback I think at least three times before he is acknowledged, and he doesn't sound like someone very confident about what he is requesting, does he? Or at best he doesn't sound like someone very confident in using RT, at least in English.
As a rule I think, when they are already handling higher workload than the norm, ATC quite rightly deliberately don't engage with weak-willed sounding pilots (pilots who sound like they might drop the ball). Better that any weak-wills and their passengers remain safely out of danger without extra clearances to engage in risk. ATC then create that little extra time to 'guide' any less than crisply communicating pilot. I think that's what this controller did with this pilot. I think that when ATC did acknowledge, ATC deliberately 'coaxed' the Iberia in ways designed to check the pilot's clear comprehension of the potential hazard before issuing any clearance that allowed engagement in the risk. ATC in fact had to coax this pilot a number of times about deicing. Finally the interrogated captain made that abundantly clear communication "We don't need it".
Immediately following that one, you can pretty much hear in ATC's tone, a conclusion that this captain has indeed heard all the prompts to deice, but contrary to what everyone else was doing, he has just said he knows what he is doing (God help him). In issuing the clearance to him, and following several warning attempts, there is now the clear transferance of full icing risk and liability to the Captain. ATC had done all he could possibly be expected to do to alert a presumably sensible 340 captain to a likely hazard, yet the Captain had as good as said "There is no such hazard affecting my aircraft PERIOD".
LTD also knew that ATC's clear warning had failed to influence the presumably sensible 340 captain. His own neatly interjected "You do" was not I think intended to be anything other than a shorthand gift of a comment - a 'one professional to another' suggestion - to please have a rethink. It was not a long detailed warning. It was a discreet prompt that was short enough to have been missed by most monitoring stations but should have been picked up by the two currently active stations (ATC and Iberia). Sadly, judged by his overall RT performance on the tapes, I think the Iberia captain's command of English, and awareness of what else was going on on the RT was all very limited, and I think he was completely oblivious to LTD's two word warning. LTD's was not standard RT, but it was clearly recognisable English, so Iberia had his chance for a discreetly prompted rethink, and was oblivious to it. That is why he was then chased down again more forcefully.
I would not be surprised if the Iberia captain had even formed any awareness from the RT traffic that he was indeed the only one not getting deiced. There was obviously a lot of ancilliary RT uncertainty about BOS procedures for pushing back a bit to conduct deicing, and the frequency was being used in non-standard exchanges about requesting 15 foot, 20 foot, 30 feet pushbacks prior to deice, and even a question about what ATC were doing with that information...ATC's response was something like "I was just trying to get an idea of how many were doing it" which was the type of RT that would have meant very little to a non-native English speaker.
Don't get me wrong, I don't speak more than the one language very well either, and I also know that at he best of times US RT is often difficult for the world's other English speakers, so I can guess it was difficult for the Iberia captain.
But we really do need to understand how despite all the warnings, this flight slipped through the net undeiced - RT isn't the best place to be having a conference about the pros and cons of deicing, but neither is the warm cosy flightdeck of the aircraft under discussion unless all the participants have been out and up very recently for a proper look
The particular thing I don't understand however, is when the entire three man Iberia crew did catch on as to what was being queried, they all gave BA that "wave" which I think only has one broad meaning i.e. "Thanks but no thanks".
Quite simply, the Iberia stepped out of line either deliberately or inadvertently, and ultimately they conciously took risks that peers didn't. We really do need to know how that happens, and I am glad it is being discussed here.
Last edited by slip and turn; 21st Dec 2007 at 09:57. Reason: type-ing!
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You do.
You do! was not the start of it.
Before any transmission of the now famous "you do" the Iberia flight was asked by ATC what they wanted to do about de-cing.
I say again, listen to 2 hours of Boston Delivery and 2 hours of Boston Ground.
As to the discussion of how anything can be proved or not, if some one from Iberia could let us know the results of the analysis of the FDR for that flight.
If there was contamination it would show up.
Edit,
After listening to even more ATC tapes. especially the BOS Tower I now know why the Iberia pilots waved.....
Who was in the right seat of BAW045?
Before any transmission of the now famous "you do" the Iberia flight was asked by ATC what they wanted to do about de-cing.
I say again, listen to 2 hours of Boston Delivery and 2 hours of Boston Ground.
As to the discussion of how anything can be proved or not, if some one from Iberia could let us know the results of the analysis of the FDR for that flight.
If there was contamination it would show up.
Edit,
After listening to even more ATC tapes. especially the BOS Tower I now know why the Iberia pilots waved.....
Who was in the right seat of BAW045?
Last edited by soggy_cabbage; 10th Dec 2007 at 04:10. Reason: Additional info
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Slip and Turn, I think we are now on the realms of the historical novel. Always entertaining but not to be confused with fact.
Soggy cabbage, please enlighten us.
Soggy cabbage, please enlighten us.
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After listening to even more ATC tapes. especially the BOS Tower I now know why the Iberia pilots waved.....
Who was in the right seat of BAW045?
Who was in the right seat of BAW045?
Soggy cabbage, please enlighten us.
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Based on a chronology posted ^^^, the conversation between IB, BA, and Boston Tower occurred between 2320 and 2325 hours. The Metars covering that period are:
METAR KBOS 022254Z 22004KT 5SM -SN OVC025 M03/M11 A3024
SPECI KBOS 022340Z 21003KT 1 3/4SM -SN BKN025 OVC060 M04/M09 A3023 RMK AO2 P0000
The special observation reporting visibility as 1 3/4 with light snow was made 15-20 minutes after the pertinent conversation; 25-30 minutes prior to the conversation, the regular Metars reported visibility as 5 miles in what would be very light snow.
As the temperature at 2340 is -4C and the dewpoint is -9C, the light snow that was falling was almost certainly fluffy and unlikely to be adhering to surfaces.
The total snowfall measured for KBOS for all of December 2 was 0.3 inches.
METAR KBOS 022254Z 22004KT 5SM -SN OVC025 M03/M11 A3024
SPECI KBOS 022340Z 21003KT 1 3/4SM -SN BKN025 OVC060 M04/M09 A3023 RMK AO2 P0000
The special observation reporting visibility as 1 3/4 with light snow was made 15-20 minutes after the pertinent conversation; 25-30 minutes prior to the conversation, the regular Metars reported visibility as 5 miles in what would be very light snow.
As the temperature at 2340 is -4C and the dewpoint is -9C, the light snow that was falling was almost certainly fluffy and unlikely to be adhering to surfaces.
The total snowfall measured for KBOS for all of December 2 was 0.3 inches.
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soggy cabbage:
Listen to the BOS Tower tape for 3rd Dec 0000-0030z at about 0:45mins to 1:00 and then BOS Departure Dec 0000-0030z 3:00
Their radio is amazingly clear!
...Who was in the right seat of BAW045?
Listen to the BOS Tower tape for 3rd Dec 0000-0030z at about 0:45mins to 1:00 and then BOS Departure Dec 0000-0030z 3:00
Their radio is amazingly clear!
...Who was in the right seat of BAW045?
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Listen to the BOS Tower tape for 3rd Dec 0000-0030z at about 0:45mins to 1:00 and then BOS Departure Dec 0000-0030z 3:00
Their radio is amazingly clear!
Their radio is amazingly clear!
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which can't be said of your post. Tapes have 30 mins each, can you state the aprox times of the occurrence you refer?
Listen to the BOS Tower tape for 3rd Dec 0000-0030z at about 0:45mins to 1:00 and then BOS Departure Dec 0000-0030z 3:00
After listening to 5 hours of BOS I wanted to hear them finally depart.
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....and the relevance of that to this thread is...?!
Many aircraft were de-iced that night. Take off delays were about an hour. Thousands of gallons of de-cing fluid was used, and many thousands of dollars were spent.
Some evidence presented here stated that the weather conditions as reported did not pose a contamination problem.
The tapes say otherwise.
As to the wave.....
Would not any red blooded male wave to a fine young lady as they departed
As the temperature at 2340 is -4C and the dewpoint is -9C, the light snow that was falling was almost certainly fluffy and unlikely to be adhering to surfaces.
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So soggy cabbage is just saying that he personally likes the sound of the female BA co-pilot's voice, and deducing (using his view of the world) that this clearly intelligent, clearly and precisely on the ball English female voice might also be the reason the Iberia crew waved ... hence the cherchez la femme comment a while back.
Meanwhile, back on the ramp much earlier...
IB6166 had reported back on KBOS Ground at about 27:25 into the KBOS 2300Z Ground Tape with his " We have checked our wings. We don't need deice. Ready to pushback".
After a check of the gate number, clearance was given to pushback at his discretion.
Taxi clearance was obtained at about 03:45 into next (2330Z) KBOS Ground tape, then frequency change to Tower was directed at about 06:46 into the tape.
About 0813 into the KBOS Tower 2330Z tape, R15R was confirmed with instructions to "IB6166 Heavy, Boston Tower R15R Position and Hold. Traffic is landing the crossing runway". (IB response is not easy to discern but appears to contain the words 'hold' and '15R').
At 10:40 into same tape, ATC advisory given to IB6166 to keep him up to speed with events "I am planning one more arrival on R22L. Then your departure." There appears no response from IB except possibly a single blip two secs later at 10:47 ... Then there is (pregnant?) 20 sec pause on frequency and then comes "IB6166 Heavy No delay please. 15R - Cleared for takeoff."
IB's response sounds to me like like "Edoronnayweera 6166", but my hearing ain't the best!
I think the tower controller duty then changes.
At 12:34 into same tape, a frequency change is directed to what I guess passes for "Contact Boston Departure" but no frequency was passed ... IB responds "66".
IB is 1300 feet up and away climbing to five thousand and reports on Boston Departure, and is directed to climb 1 4 thousand and vectored Nantucket before QSY 120.6 (Boston Approach South)
At 1438 into Boston Approach South 2330Z tape, controller calls "IB6166H Boston" like it was the first contact without details. IB6166 responds " Climbing 1 4 Thousand on course to Nantucket" .... and receives an apology.
I must admit I really struggle with some of the RT both ways. These guys are evidently stretched too far on occasions.
... hence the cherchez la femme comment a while back.Meanwhile, back on the ramp much earlier...
IB6166 had reported back on KBOS Ground at about 27:25 into the KBOS 2300Z Ground Tape with his " We have checked our wings. We don't need deice. Ready to pushback".
After a check of the gate number, clearance was given to pushback at his discretion.
Taxi clearance was obtained at about 03:45 into next (2330Z) KBOS Ground tape, then frequency change to Tower was directed at about 06:46 into the tape.
About 0813 into the KBOS Tower 2330Z tape, R15R was confirmed with instructions to "IB6166 Heavy, Boston Tower R15R Position and Hold. Traffic is landing the crossing runway". (IB response is not easy to discern but appears to contain the words 'hold' and '15R').
At 10:40 into same tape, ATC advisory given to IB6166 to keep him up to speed with events "I am planning one more arrival on R22L. Then your departure." There appears no response from IB except possibly a single blip two secs later at 10:47 ... Then there is (pregnant?) 20 sec pause on frequency and then comes "IB6166 Heavy No delay please. 15R - Cleared for takeoff."
IB's response sounds to me like like "Edoronnayweera 6166", but my hearing ain't the best!
I think the tower controller duty then changes.
At 12:34 into same tape, a frequency change is directed to what I guess passes for "Contact Boston Departure" but no frequency was passed ... IB responds "66".
IB is 1300 feet up and away climbing to five thousand and reports on Boston Departure, and is directed to climb 1 4 thousand and vectored Nantucket before QSY 120.6 (Boston Approach South)
At 1438 into Boston Approach South 2330Z tape, controller calls "IB6166H Boston" like it was the first contact without details. IB6166 responds " Climbing 1 4 Thousand on course to Nantucket" .... and receives an apology.
I must admit I really struggle with some of the RT both ways. These guys are evidently stretched too far on occasions.
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Bigles
Iberia6166,Bos-Mad
You Can Do It Once And Get Away With It!!
You Can Do It Twice And Get Away With It!!
You Can Do It A Hundred Times And Get Away With It!!
You Only Have To Make The Wrong Decision Once And You And Your Passengers are in The History Books.
The Accident Records Are Littered With Big Egos And Crass Stupidity.
Mind You My Observations Are Being Made After Only 53 Years At The Sharp End.
You Can Do It Once And Get Away With It!!
You Can Do It Twice And Get Away With It!!
You Can Do It A Hundred Times And Get Away With It!!
You Only Have To Make The Wrong Decision Once And You And Your Passengers are in The History Books.
The Accident Records Are Littered With Big Egos And Crass Stupidity.
Mind You My Observations Are Being Made After Only 53 Years At The Sharp End.
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De-Ice
There is never a reason NOT TO, especially when external observations by another pro in the business sees a situation! This is not EGO stuff, this is pure Fight Safety. Next time I just hope/trust/pray that when someone calls in an observation, it's taken as a pure Flight Safety concern/notification.
Rant over, too much nationality banging-on here, this Flight Safety.
The ramp staff supervising this turn-around bear some responsibility also for not making observations.
Rant over, too much nationality banging-on here, this Flight Safety.
The ramp staff supervising this turn-around bear some responsibility also for not making observations.
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Sounds like you know more than most merlinxx, please expand on your knowledge of the ramp agents not making observations!!
Unless you're keeping to the theme of the thread and throwing false accusations around as fact!
With regards Flight Safety what if aforementionned crew had a look and with their inside knowledge of what prep they had taken made the right decision not to deice???
Unless you're keeping to the theme of the thread and throwing false accusations around as fact!
With regards Flight Safety what if aforementionned crew had a look and with their inside knowledge of what prep they had taken made the right decision not to deice???