Automatic TCAS Resolutions for Airbus
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: next to sidestick
Posts: 481
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Just another atempt by airbus to further remove the pilot from the loop, thus reduce our responsibilities , skills, and ultimately our pay or even ourselves.
Is it really a good idea to place a last minute, life saving avoidance manoeuver on the autopilot?! It doesn't even perform really well half of the time!!
Is it really a good idea to place a last minute, life saving avoidance manoeuver on the autopilot?! It doesn't even perform really well half of the time!!
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: Lausanne
Age: 47
Posts: 74
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Aren't you forced by the law to follow a TCAS RA anyway?
I am not a fan of over-automation but Ueberlingen would probably not have happened with TCAS connected to the auto-pilot.
Just a thought.
I am not a fan of over-automation but Ueberlingen would probably not have happened with TCAS connected to the auto-pilot.
Just a thought.
Join Date: Aug 1999
Location: England
Posts: 1,050
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Waste of time imho.
You could debate the pros and cons at length.
My brief take on it would be: No way with the current state of the art. TCAS performance inhibitions are approximate only; it is entirely possible to have an impossible RA commanded. Its not just as simple as take the RA as a commanded vertical speed and plumb that into the APs pitch channel.
Could it be developed? Yes, I don't see why not.
But I still think its a waste of time. You can still punch the AP disconnect and do your own thing, so whats the point?
This just says "don't make any effort to have a robust set of SOPs, train you crews, and employ people capable of hand flying an RA (and we're not talking aerobatics here!), just throw some money at a technological solution instead".
Ultimately, no.
Sorry, I disagree. IIRC the Tupolev crew believed ATC instructions had priority. What makes you think they wouldn't have just disconnected the AP and descended? I'd go for 'might not' but not 'probably not'.
Ueberlingen should not have happened - similar incidents happened in the USA in the early days of TCAS, including ones where only the presence of a bit of horizontal separation prevented a collision. The lesson "don't manouevre opposite an RA" was well and truly learnt and available to the worldwide community to implement in SOP. But it didn't happen, and folks died as a result.
The issue here is one of FAILING to provide robust SOP and rigorous training, rather than lack of technology.
CPB
You could debate the pros and cons at length.
My brief take on it would be: No way with the current state of the art. TCAS performance inhibitions are approximate only; it is entirely possible to have an impossible RA commanded. Its not just as simple as take the RA as a commanded vertical speed and plumb that into the APs pitch channel.
Could it be developed? Yes, I don't see why not.
But I still think its a waste of time. You can still punch the AP disconnect and do your own thing, so whats the point?
This just says "don't make any effort to have a robust set of SOPs, train you crews, and employ people capable of hand flying an RA (and we're not talking aerobatics here!), just throw some money at a technological solution instead".
Aren't you forced by the law to follow a TCAS RA anyway?
I am not a fan of over-automation but Ueberlingen would probably not have happened with TCAS connected to the auto-pilot.
Ueberlingen should not have happened - similar incidents happened in the USA in the early days of TCAS, including ones where only the presence of a bit of horizontal separation prevented a collision. The lesson "don't manouevre opposite an RA" was well and truly learnt and available to the worldwide community to implement in SOP. But it didn't happen, and folks died as a result.
The issue here is one of FAILING to provide robust SOP and rigorous training, rather than lack of technology.
CPB
Why not. Some aircraft already have auto wind-shear recovery mode.
Perhaps a more needed and simpler automation would be for EGPWS (red warning) to use the go-around mode. There are indications from incident reports that crews are not immediately responding to these warnings; see DHC-8.
Perhaps a more needed and simpler automation would be for EGPWS (red warning) to use the go-around mode. There are indications from incident reports that crews are not immediately responding to these warnings; see DHC-8.
Join Date: Mar 2003
Location: Tea green International
Posts: 563
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
but some do not recognise S/E ops
In the G550 and I am certain several other corporate types the information that the aircraft is S/E operations is not passed by the many systems computers to the TCAS computers.
Thus part of the S/E ops procedures, (but not in the check list) is the deselection of RA mode.
What happens in the Bus please. ??
Bumz
Thus part of the S/E ops procedures, (but not in the check list) is the deselection of RA mode.
What happens in the Bus please. ??
Bumz
Thread Starter
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: USA
Posts: 2,528
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by Bumz_Rush
In the G550 and I am certain several other corporate types the information that the aircraft is S/E operations is not passed by the many systems computers to the TCAS computers.
Thus part of the S/E ops procedures, (but not in the check list) is the deselection of RA mode.
What happens in the Bus please. ??
Bumz
Thus part of the S/E ops procedures, (but not in the check list) is the deselection of RA mode.
What happens in the Bus please. ??
Bumz
Join Date: Nov 2002
Location: ireland
Posts: 26
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by PEI_3721
Why not. Some aircraft already have auto wind-shear recovery mode.
Perhaps a more needed and simpler automation would be for EGPWS (red warning) to use the go-around mode. There are indications from incident reports that crews are not immediately responding to these warnings; see DHC-8.
Perhaps a more needed and simpler automation would be for EGPWS (red warning) to use the go-around mode. There are indications from incident reports that crews are not immediately responding to these warnings; see DHC-8.
eire757 the Avro RJ will ‘automatically’ up-rate the thrust setting and change to a windshear recovery mode during takeoff (initial takeoff mode) when wind shear is detected by the flight guidance computer. Similarly, when in the GA mode with either autopilot or flight director selected.
In addition, but not fully automatic, the wind shear recovery mode is ‘automatically’ engaged at GA selection when a wind shear warning present, again for autopilot or flight director use.
As the Avro RJ flight guidance system is based on the MD11 and previous MD / Honeywell auto designs it might be assumed that these might have a degree of auto windshear recovery / reversion.
In addition, but not fully automatic, the wind shear recovery mode is ‘automatically’ engaged at GA selection when a wind shear warning present, again for autopilot or flight director use.
As the Avro RJ flight guidance system is based on the MD11 and previous MD / Honeywell auto designs it might be assumed that these might have a degree of auto windshear recovery / reversion.
