Attitude at impact
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jul 2000
Location: Thailand
Posts: 942
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Attitude at impact
Apropos nothing current, I just wondered what you all think of this point relating to CRM and our training?
As pilots, flying multi engined aircraft, we are trained to cope with all forseeable situations and emergencies. Generally, the outcome is a landing at a suitable airfield and everyone walks away. At least that is the outcome when we are in the simulator.
Real life is sadly different, the outcome is often far from ideal and sometimes catastrophic. Some situations and failures are so far removed from the experience and training we have recieved that a disasterous outcome is almost inevitable. The training and mind set, or attitude we have built up over years of simulator exercises can, in my opinion, contribute to the worsening of some of the situations we might find ourselves in.
Why do we persist in the idea that we must get back to an airfield and attempt a landing, even under the most trying condiotions?
Without criticising in any way the acheivement of the flight crew of the Souix City accident, consider this;
If, after finding the aircraft was controllable, up to a point, the crew had come to a different conclusion, disregarded all their previous training and gone for a simpler option?
If the conclusion was that turns and changes in pitch could be effected using thrust was good enough to keep the aircraft flying reasonable safely, why risk that stability in trying to line it up with a distant runway?
Why not look ahead for the open field and gently lower the aircraft to the ground?
I am not saying that I know the outcome would have been different but I suspect the survival rate would have been greatly improved. Aircraft can take a huge amount of damage to the undercarriage before the fusealge is damaged. Writing off a $100 million aircraft should not even enter our minds when it comes to choosing a course of action. Getting the aircraft safely on the ground doesn't mean we have to be at or close to and airfeild.
There are a few other examples where this type of situation has occured but this incident, while so close to being a success, was in the end, a major disaster with severe loss of life.
Just a subject for discussion! Your thoughts please.
As pilots, flying multi engined aircraft, we are trained to cope with all forseeable situations and emergencies. Generally, the outcome is a landing at a suitable airfield and everyone walks away. At least that is the outcome when we are in the simulator.
Real life is sadly different, the outcome is often far from ideal and sometimes catastrophic. Some situations and failures are so far removed from the experience and training we have recieved that a disasterous outcome is almost inevitable. The training and mind set, or attitude we have built up over years of simulator exercises can, in my opinion, contribute to the worsening of some of the situations we might find ourselves in.
Why do we persist in the idea that we must get back to an airfield and attempt a landing, even under the most trying condiotions?
Without criticising in any way the acheivement of the flight crew of the Souix City accident, consider this;
If, after finding the aircraft was controllable, up to a point, the crew had come to a different conclusion, disregarded all their previous training and gone for a simpler option?
If the conclusion was that turns and changes in pitch could be effected using thrust was good enough to keep the aircraft flying reasonable safely, why risk that stability in trying to line it up with a distant runway?
Why not look ahead for the open field and gently lower the aircraft to the ground?
I am not saying that I know the outcome would have been different but I suspect the survival rate would have been greatly improved. Aircraft can take a huge amount of damage to the undercarriage before the fusealge is damaged. Writing off a $100 million aircraft should not even enter our minds when it comes to choosing a course of action. Getting the aircraft safely on the ground doesn't mean we have to be at or close to and airfeild.
There are a few other examples where this type of situation has occured but this incident, while so close to being a success, was in the end, a major disaster with severe loss of life.
Just a subject for discussion! Your thoughts please.
ECON cruise, LR cruise...
Join Date: Apr 2002
Location: MIRSI hold - give or take...
Age: 52
Posts: 568
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Agree, Rubik!
We are taught relatively simple scenarios in the box, scenarios that we in 99,5% of the time are able to solve using a checklist & a bit of brains. The problem arises when we're faced with an emergency that requires thinking "outside the box" (pun intended)
It would be adventageous if we - just once in every other sim cycle for the loft mission were faced with these "out-of-context problems" (bless you, Iain Banks
) that required some really, really good CRM & thoughts to have just more than 50% walk away from.
I only fly short/medium haul on a 73X, so have not come across many of these scenarios - but would I be right in suspecting that you long-haul, ETOPS guys sometimes come across a scenario where you have been unable to extinguish a cabin/cargo/wing fire within a few minutes & have to choose between:
a) pressing on for your ETOPS alternate, hoping that you will be able to put the fire out en-route or
b) ditch the aircraft now (while you can) and plan on saving the 30% that would survive 12 hrs in the NAT in wintertime as opposed to saving 0% in case the fire continues to be uncontrollable & spreading
On the other hand, I accept that you must train for those things that are most likely to kill you & your pax, and also accept that we only have limited time avbl in the sim.
So in principle - rubik has a valid point. Any TEI/TREs have any good scenarios or thoughts on the subject?
Brgds fm
Empty
We are taught relatively simple scenarios in the box, scenarios that we in 99,5% of the time are able to solve using a checklist & a bit of brains. The problem arises when we're faced with an emergency that requires thinking "outside the box" (pun intended)
It would be adventageous if we - just once in every other sim cycle for the loft mission were faced with these "out-of-context problems" (bless you, Iain Banks
) that required some really, really good CRM & thoughts to have just more than 50% walk away from.I only fly short/medium haul on a 73X, so have not come across many of these scenarios - but would I be right in suspecting that you long-haul, ETOPS guys sometimes come across a scenario where you have been unable to extinguish a cabin/cargo/wing fire within a few minutes & have to choose between:
a) pressing on for your ETOPS alternate, hoping that you will be able to put the fire out en-route or
b) ditch the aircraft now (while you can) and plan on saving the 30% that would survive 12 hrs in the NAT in wintertime as opposed to saving 0% in case the fire continues to be uncontrollable & spreading
On the other hand, I accept that you must train for those things that are most likely to kill you & your pax, and also accept that we only have limited time avbl in the sim.
So in principle - rubik has a valid point. Any TEI/TREs have any good scenarios or thoughts on the subject?
Brgds fm
Empty
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: White Waltham, Prestwick & Calgary
Age: 72
Posts: 4,159
Likes: 0
Received 29 Likes
on
14 Posts
I just came across a similar discussion on a helicopter forum (not on pprune).
I agree totally that on occasions you have to think out of the box, and that, while standards, SOPs etc are a Good Thing, sometimes they just don't cut it, and you have to revert to the decision making capability that the authorities assume you have (well, you've got a licence, haven't you?
). Of course, helicopters expect to end up in fields as a matter of course!
On such occasions, the expression "Rules are for the guidance of wise men" is most appropriate.
Phil
TRE/CRMI (Helicopter)
I agree totally that on occasions you have to think out of the box, and that, while standards, SOPs etc are a Good Thing, sometimes they just don't cut it, and you have to revert to the decision making capability that the authorities assume you have (well, you've got a licence, haven't you?
). Of course, helicopters expect to end up in fields as a matter of course!On such occasions, the expression "Rules are for the guidance of wise men" is most appropriate.
Phil
TRE/CRMI (Helicopter)
Join Date: Oct 2000
Location: South West UK
Posts: 367
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Ribik,
I certainly agree that thinking outside the box (both in the literal sense of trying to avoid the sim mentality and in the sense of exploring new ideas) however these scenarios have a huge number of variables to consider. I once met Capt Al Hayes (the Capt at Sioux City) and listened to him describe the incident and discuss their thought processes. One of the reasons so many did survive is because they had immediate help from the crash rescue and medical personel at the airport. In an off airport landing help could be a long time coming and this could significantly affect the survivability. During the approach they did consider landing on a freeway but discounted it due to the risk to those on the ground.
In any case they did a hell of a job and more than earned their pay that day!
Happy landings
3 Point
I certainly agree that thinking outside the box (both in the literal sense of trying to avoid the sim mentality and in the sense of exploring new ideas) however these scenarios have a huge number of variables to consider. I once met Capt Al Hayes (the Capt at Sioux City) and listened to him describe the incident and discuss their thought processes. One of the reasons so many did survive is because they had immediate help from the crash rescue and medical personel at the airport. In an off airport landing help could be a long time coming and this could significantly affect the survivability. During the approach they did consider landing on a freeway but discounted it due to the risk to those on the ground.
In any case they did a hell of a job and more than earned their pay that day!
Happy landings
3 Point
Apparently, immediately after the crash UA replayed the event in one of it's DC-10 simulators at Denver. 12 of the most senior DC-10 captains were invited to have a go. Not one managed to get the aircraft anywhere near the airport.
I think that about says it all when it comes to Capt Haynes' airmanship and that of his crew.
I think that about says it all when it comes to Capt Haynes' airmanship and that of his crew.
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: Southeast USA
Posts: 801
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Generally, I agree with Paco about what exists for the guidance of wise men; but I also believe that there was not, and is not, an intent to have rules be hand-cuffs. I also had a pretty plain talking instructor that taught me a lot about flying who used to say “the book never landed the airplane.” I, too, would not want to 2nd guess the guys at Sioux City (or any other place); I don’t mean to suggest that everyone add a little “cowboy” to their thought processes; and I certainly cannot say that what is taught routinely today is worthless or a waste of time; but I do think that sometimes we’re caught in the grip of “rote” operations … which, at times, may be unnecessarily limiting.
Avibridge
Join Date: May 2005
Location: Bangkok,Thailand
Posts: 40
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
There are very good reasons why we (Pilots) are not encouraged, even forbidden in some companys to think let alone act outside the box.
I will list a few:
1. Regulators use risk management to assess what is reasonable to have to cope with and what is not.
2. Operators are obliged to train for situations that are set by the regulator.
3. New emergencies are introduced after a very long gestative pperiod following a specific recommendation from a an accident investigative body.
4. The history of aviation proves this to be true.
5. This system is known as the analytical system.
6 If one wants meaningful change in this and many other areas of traditional thinking one needs to start looking at the issue from a systemic point of view.
7. Lastly the regulator, operator, ATS provider and Insurer are all quite comfortable with the staus quo because it compartmentalises the risk.
The thinking in the event of an out of the box accident goes like this:
1. Regulator has oversight and monitoring procedures. May be criticised by accident investigator and recommendations made. But recommendations are just that. If the accident happens to knock down the Regulator's Head office, recomendations suddenly become madatory.
2. Operator is confident that his SOPs are approved and that his training and standards are the highest in the business.
3. ATS has a similar view to operator.
4. Insurer knows that premiums are going to go up.
5. Guess who is in the compartmentalised box?
I will list a few:
1. Regulators use risk management to assess what is reasonable to have to cope with and what is not.
2. Operators are obliged to train for situations that are set by the regulator.
3. New emergencies are introduced after a very long gestative pperiod following a specific recommendation from a an accident investigative body.
4. The history of aviation proves this to be true.
5. This system is known as the analytical system.
6 If one wants meaningful change in this and many other areas of traditional thinking one needs to start looking at the issue from a systemic point of view.
7. Lastly the regulator, operator, ATS provider and Insurer are all quite comfortable with the staus quo because it compartmentalises the risk.
The thinking in the event of an out of the box accident goes like this:
1. Regulator has oversight and monitoring procedures. May be criticised by accident investigator and recommendations made. But recommendations are just that. If the accident happens to knock down the Regulator's Head office, recomendations suddenly become madatory.
2. Operator is confident that his SOPs are approved and that his training and standards are the highest in the business.
3. ATS has a similar view to operator.
4. Insurer knows that premiums are going to go up.
5. Guess who is in the compartmentalised box?
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jul 2000
Location: Thailand
Posts: 942
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I am pleased to hear that Cpt. Haynes and the other pilots on board considered landing on the highway/motorway. I am not decrying their skills or their thought processes. All I am asking is; what is the matter with a ploughed field and landing the right way up?
This isn't about boxes. It's about making the most of what we have in the situation we so unexpectedly find ourselves. It's about our attitude, ingrained from years of experience and training in you, me and Cpt. Haynes alike. Considerations of SOPs, training, insurance etc. should be totally disregarded in such a situation. There are no SOPs for these events.
Having seen the abuse undercarriage/gear systems get in everyday use, I am convinced a gentle touchdown even in a ploughed field would be a 'soft landing' for most aircraft.
I say again, the loss of life would almost certainly have been less had the aircraft been put on the ground the right way up.
Its about our attitude as well as that of the aircraft when we reach the ground that is important and I think we need to rethink our attitude. Hence this discussion.
This isn't about boxes. It's about making the most of what we have in the situation we so unexpectedly find ourselves. It's about our attitude, ingrained from years of experience and training in you, me and Cpt. Haynes alike. Considerations of SOPs, training, insurance etc. should be totally disregarded in such a situation. There are no SOPs for these events.
Having seen the abuse undercarriage/gear systems get in everyday use, I am convinced a gentle touchdown even in a ploughed field would be a 'soft landing' for most aircraft.
I say again, the loss of life would almost certainly have been less had the aircraft been put on the ground the right way up.
Its about our attitude as well as that of the aircraft when we reach the ground that is important and I think we need to rethink our attitude. Hence this discussion.
Join Date: Aug 2001
Location: Europe-the sunshine side
Posts: 755
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I would try to reach an airfield suitable for the a/c for some obvious reasons:
*there will be available immediate help-which is critical regarding fire or medical help.
* the rwy should be clear of obstacles as opposed to a 'clean,open field ".I flew aerobatic and utility planes years ago,but I remember how tricky can be an 'open field' seen from above ,full of ditches,solitary obstacles,...discovered only after touchdown.
Those could be handled sometimes flying a low speed ,light aircraft,but it's a lot different trying to land an airliner.
Don't believe what you see in the movies...the plane will become a wreck,almost sure there'll be a fire,etc...You'll have to consider the worst scenario,and get any help available asap.
Of course,if the closest airport is out of reach,or the danger too high ,then ....is the cpt decision,and it's not out of the box.
Rubik....did you land on an open field?Not on a grass rwy,or somewhere in England on a nice,green field?
What you see from 300m above is totally different from what you find on the ground.
Do you think you'll avoid all the cars on a highway (as seen on movies) ,or that the asphalt will hold your 744?...You'll almoust sure start a huge accident ,raging fire,many victims on the ground and on the plane...
I saw small agricultural planes hitting unseen electrical wires,tumbling upside down due to soft ground or ditches,or what a damage a hidden rock or fountain can do to a plane...
I guess you won't think a Bus or a Boeing will be stronger that a small aerobatic plane....it's 1mm alumimium skin,landing with a speed incomparable greater,and maybe with a lot of fuel onboard..Maybe one of the older russian planes will survive though...I flew some and there can be quite impressive
So,I suggest you should try to reach an airfield ,if you fly an airliner...it's the safest way IMHO
Brgds fly safe
Alex
*there will be available immediate help-which is critical regarding fire or medical help.
* the rwy should be clear of obstacles as opposed to a 'clean,open field ".I flew aerobatic and utility planes years ago,but I remember how tricky can be an 'open field' seen from above ,full of ditches,solitary obstacles,...discovered only after touchdown.
Those could be handled sometimes flying a low speed ,light aircraft,but it's a lot different trying to land an airliner.
Don't believe what you see in the movies...the plane will become a wreck,almost sure there'll be a fire,etc...You'll have to consider the worst scenario,and get any help available asap.
Of course,if the closest airport is out of reach,or the danger too high ,then ....is the cpt decision,and it's not out of the box.
Rubik....did you land on an open field?Not on a grass rwy,or somewhere in England on a nice,green field?
What you see from 300m above is totally different from what you find on the ground.
Do you think you'll avoid all the cars on a highway (as seen on movies) ,or that the asphalt will hold your 744?...You'll almoust sure start a huge accident ,raging fire,many victims on the ground and on the plane...
I saw small agricultural planes hitting unseen electrical wires,tumbling upside down due to soft ground or ditches,or what a damage a hidden rock or fountain can do to a plane...
I guess you won't think a Bus or a Boeing will be stronger that a small aerobatic plane....it's 1mm alumimium skin,landing with a speed incomparable greater,and maybe with a lot of fuel onboard..Maybe one of the older russian planes will survive though...I flew some and there can be quite impressive
So,I suggest you should try to reach an airfield ,if you fly an airliner...it's the safest way IMHO
Brgds fly safe
Alex
One airliner off-airport landing attempt by a Southern Airways DC-9 in April 1977 on to a highway after a double engine flameout did not have an especially good outcome.
A Korean Airlines 707 did manage a landing onto an ice-covered lake in Russia after taking a missile hit in 1978. Also three successful landings were made in the Jordanian desert in a mass hijack in 1970.
Of the 85 persons aboard Flight 242, 62 were killed, 22 were seriously injured, and 1 was slightly injured. Eight persons on the ground were killed and one person was seriously injured; one person died about 1 month later.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jul 2000
Location: Thailand
Posts: 942
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Having spent time operating a Combined Harvester for several years I can tell you that most fields are flat, level and fairly solid. If the wheels break the surface, all the better. If the wheels come off, so what? If the engines gouge into the ground and get ripped off, great!
4th APR 1978. B737. The right main gear collapsed and the no.2 engine was torn off in the slide. The aircraft came to rest 300m past the runway end and was destroyed by fire. There were no fatalities.
17DEC 1978. B737. The aircraft belly landed in nose up, left wing low attitude, on the centre line of the runway. It slid for 3080 feet, hit a boundary fence, crossed a drain and ploughed in rough terrain negotiating with small boulders and came to rest. Fire broke out on impact. One passenger and 3 maintenance workers cutting grass were killed.
17FEB 1981 B737. The 737 left the runway surface at 900ft past the threshold and skidded another 1170ft before coming to rest 115ft to the right of the centreline. The aircraft was destroyed but there were no fatalities
25MAY 1982. B737. The aircraft landed heavily in a rainstorm and broke in two.The crash killed two of the 112 passengers.
This is just a review of accidents involving B737s over a few years. They all indicate that survivability rates even from a severa and catastrophic impact are greatly enhanced if the aircraft remains upright, regardless of how quickly the fire services arrive.
4th APR 1978. B737. The right main gear collapsed and the no.2 engine was torn off in the slide. The aircraft came to rest 300m past the runway end and was destroyed by fire. There were no fatalities.
17DEC 1978. B737. The aircraft belly landed in nose up, left wing low attitude, on the centre line of the runway. It slid for 3080 feet, hit a boundary fence, crossed a drain and ploughed in rough terrain negotiating with small boulders and came to rest. Fire broke out on impact. One passenger and 3 maintenance workers cutting grass were killed.
17FEB 1981 B737. The 737 left the runway surface at 900ft past the threshold and skidded another 1170ft before coming to rest 115ft to the right of the centreline. The aircraft was destroyed but there were no fatalities
25MAY 1982. B737. The aircraft landed heavily in a rainstorm and broke in two.The crash killed two of the 112 passengers.
This is just a review of accidents involving B737s over a few years. They all indicate that survivability rates even from a severa and catastrophic impact are greatly enhanced if the aircraft remains upright, regardless of how quickly the fire services arrive.
Rubik, The cases you have just cited all had their initial contact on a runway.
The initial contact is the most critical part as that's when the a/c is at its highest energy. By the time they have run off the runway, a considerable part of the energy has been dissipated.
NASA ran some impact tests with flood damaged Navaho airframes. The first series was onto concrete and the crashes were deemed largely survivable.
They then covered the surface with earth. The subsequent crashes demonstrated a tendency to dig in and the dummies did not fare as well as before.
When coming back to Earth under control, moderating longitudinal acceleration is the key survivability factor.
The initial contact is the most critical part as that's when the a/c is at its highest energy. By the time they have run off the runway, a considerable part of the energy has been dissipated.
NASA ran some impact tests with flood damaged Navaho airframes. The first series was onto concrete and the crashes were deemed largely survivable.
They then covered the surface with earth. The subsequent crashes demonstrated a tendency to dig in and the dummies did not fare as well as before.
When coming back to Earth under control, moderating longitudinal acceleration is the key survivability factor.
ECON cruise, LR cruise...
Join Date: Apr 2002
Location: MIRSI hold - give or take...
Age: 52
Posts: 568
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Having used the Sioux City accident in CRM training quite a no. of times, I have seen various interwievs with the crew. In one of them, Al Haynes described why the aircraft did not touch down in a wings-level attitude.
If memory serves me right (don't have the tapes @ hand), he said something along the lines of "...when I got the 30 ft. call-out, training & routine took over - I closed the throttles, even though we had just agreed that thrust was the only thing holding that wing up...".
If this is the case, the choice of landing surface would not have mattered as to the likelihood of the airplane cartwheeling. But no doubt did coming down inside the fence contribute to post-crash survivability. The guys handled that one as near to textbook perfect as one could expect - they have my deepest respect & admiration.
Only off-airport landing I've heard off w/o any fatalities was an MD-8X out or ARN many years back where both engines failed due ice ingestion. The guys managed to glide it into a field - they kept it in 3 pieces
and everybody walked away, only a couple of broken arms & legs, that was all. However, I have no doubt that Captn. Rasmussen would have preferred an airport 
Targaman is spot on in listing the reasons why we only train what can be expected to kill us i.s.o. spending time on marginal cases, and I agree that training stuff that might only save 1 flight over 20 years will take away time from training the stuff that will save 5 flights over 10 years. I hope that command upgrade training in most companies provide suficient scenarios for people to feel comfortable with their ability to act in an intelligent & prudent way should they be running the show that one day in a billion.
Again, would be interested to hear scenarios from other CRI/Es that - used in moderation - can give people a chance to gain confidence in this kind of operation.
Used to give turbine command upgrades a scenario involving some mountains enroute & then having 1 gear fail to retract after t/o with wx this side of the range just below approach minima
I know, I'm not a very nice person...
Brgds fm
Empty
If memory serves me right (don't have the tapes @ hand), he said something along the lines of "...when I got the 30 ft. call-out, training & routine took over - I closed the throttles, even though we had just agreed that thrust was the only thing holding that wing up...".
If this is the case, the choice of landing surface would not have mattered as to the likelihood of the airplane cartwheeling. But no doubt did coming down inside the fence contribute to post-crash survivability. The guys handled that one as near to textbook perfect as one could expect - they have my deepest respect & admiration.
Only off-airport landing I've heard off w/o any fatalities was an MD-8X out or ARN many years back where both engines failed due ice ingestion. The guys managed to glide it into a field - they kept it in 3 pieces
and everybody walked away, only a couple of broken arms & legs, that was all. However, I have no doubt that Captn. Rasmussen would have preferred an airport Targaman is spot on in listing the reasons why we only train what can be expected to kill us i.s.o. spending time on marginal cases, and I agree that training stuff that might only save 1 flight over 20 years will take away time from training the stuff that will save 5 flights over 10 years. I hope that command upgrade training in most companies provide suficient scenarios for people to feel comfortable with their ability to act in an intelligent & prudent way should they be running the show that one day in a billion.
Again, would be interested to hear scenarios from other CRI/Es that - used in moderation - can give people a chance to gain confidence in this kind of operation.
Used to give turbine command upgrades a scenario involving some mountains enroute & then having 1 gear fail to retract after t/o with wx this side of the range just below approach minima
I know, I'm not a very nice person... Brgds fm
Empty
Join Date: Nov 1999
Location: I wish I knew
Posts: 179
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Sorry if I misunderstand you Rubik but you seem to infer that Flight 232 - the Souix City DC10 - didn't land the right way up.... There are several good documentries on the accident and I suggest you take a look. Or type "Flight 232" into Google and take a read.
The aircraft touched down at over 200 knots the correct way up but with a high sink-rate which caused fusilage to break up and the wings to part, spilling fuel which then ignited. The pieces were then spread over a wide area. Of the 285 pax on board, 185 survived thanks in part to the close proximity of the emergency services but mostly due to Capt. Al Hayes, assisted by another UA captain, Dennis Fitch. As mentioned, they couldn't find another crew who could replicate the effort. Sure, think out of the box, but please acknowledge that these guys DID and survived in real life rather than just talking about it.
As for an open field vs. airport, my 2c is - sure, if you can't find a suitable airport, sure, go for the best field you can see but it's got to be a BIG field to be better than an airport.
Cheers,
Chips
The aircraft touched down at over 200 knots the correct way up but with a high sink-rate which caused fusilage to break up and the wings to part, spilling fuel which then ignited. The pieces were then spread over a wide area. Of the 285 pax on board, 185 survived thanks in part to the close proximity of the emergency services but mostly due to Capt. Al Hayes, assisted by another UA captain, Dennis Fitch. As mentioned, they couldn't find another crew who could replicate the effort. Sure, think out of the box, but please acknowledge that these guys DID and survived in real life rather than just talking about it.
As for an open field vs. airport, my 2c is - sure, if you can't find a suitable airport, sure, go for the best field you can see but it's got to be a BIG field to be better than an airport.
Cheers,
Chips
Join Date: Jun 2005
Location: England
Posts: 6
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
low pass
232 did not land wings level! The whole point was that the controls were jammed in a descending left hand turn, so when Capt Haynes closed the throthles the airplane made and uncommanded roll to the left and the left wing/engine pod impacted first. This caused the cartwheel/fireball so familiar to news footage of the time.
Had the engine impacted a ploughed field or water then the crash would have been even more spectacular and probably would have resulted in total loss of all aboard.
One of the reasons why stricken aircraft always try to land at an airport. Procedures/SOPs need to take a back seat if necessary - in a dire emergency, getting into a manageable landing opportunity on an adequate runway is surely the most likely situation for a reasonably successful outcome.
232 did not land wings level! The whole point was that the controls were jammed in a descending left hand turn, so when Capt Haynes closed the throthles the airplane made and uncommanded roll to the left and the left wing/engine pod impacted first. This caused the cartwheel/fireball so familiar to news footage of the time.
Had the engine impacted a ploughed field or water then the crash would have been even more spectacular and probably would have resulted in total loss of all aboard.
One of the reasons why stricken aircraft always try to land at an airport. Procedures/SOPs need to take a back seat if necessary - in a dire emergency, getting into a manageable landing opportunity on an adequate runway is surely the most likely situation for a reasonably successful outcome.
> 232 did not land wings level!
Indeed they didn't. Also during the whole ordeal this airplane was caught in a hardly controllable sequence of phugoid oscillations that didn't have anything to do with the choice of landing location. They just were unlucky enough to have entered the downward cycle right at the moment of touchdown. Had they not touched on concrete, chances are the plane would have toppled over much more violently, probably killing all on board. No way a landing in an outside field would have increased the survivability rate in this scenario.
This Sioux City accident was a tragedy, but it is also a prime example of an outstanding crew who survived because they thought outside the box.
Indeed they didn't. Also during the whole ordeal this airplane was caught in a hardly controllable sequence of phugoid oscillations that didn't have anything to do with the choice of landing location. They just were unlucky enough to have entered the downward cycle right at the moment of touchdown. Had they not touched on concrete, chances are the plane would have toppled over much more violently, probably killing all on board. No way a landing in an outside field would have increased the survivability rate in this scenario.
This Sioux City accident was a tragedy, but it is also a prime example of an outstanding crew who survived because they thought outside the box.
Join Date: Nov 1999
Location: I wish I knew
Posts: 179
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Folks, sorry to imply that the aircraft touched down on the mains first as any text-book landing, this was not my intention. Rubik inferred that the aircraft did not touch down at something close(ish) to the normal attitude - and that it was more controlable than it was.
Yes, the wing and pod dug in and this contributed to the break-up of the airframe in combination with the excess speed and sink-rate. However, the aircraft DID land upright, or as near to upright as possible ,and the idea that they could have achieve a more gentle touch down in a field boggles the mind.
Dennis Fitch, who was controling the throttles for the most part stated that in the last couple of hundred feet, he realised that the sink rate was to great and firewalled the throttles. Just prior to touch down, Capt. Hayes told Capt. Fitch to close the throttles however Finch stated that he couldn't as that was all that was holding the wing up.
http://www.airborneaircrafts.com/lib..._United232.htm
Agree with you both new_nigel777 and xetroV
LP
This is just a review of accidents involving B737s over a few years. They all indicate that survivability rates even from a severa and catastrophic impact are greatly enhanced if the aircraft remains upright, regardless of how quickly the fire services arrive.
Dennis Fitch, who was controling the throttles for the most part stated that in the last couple of hundred feet, he realised that the sink rate was to great and firewalled the throttles. Just prior to touch down, Capt. Hayes told Capt. Fitch to close the throttles however Finch stated that he couldn't as that was all that was holding the wing up.
http://www.airborneaircrafts.com/lib..._United232.htm
Agree with you both new_nigel777 and xetroV
LP
