"Culture of the Nation" vs Safety record
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"Culture of the Nation" vs Safety record
If this has been covered tell me so, and i am not a pilot - somewhat political topic
but whats the opinion on the effect on aircraft safety if the culture of the country "seems" not condusive to safety - like (to pick on someone) comparing Air Jamaica (no problem mon) vs say Switzerland or El Al?
Any thoughts on this topic????
I have seen saftey records in manufacturing companies decline in hard times and seems the pressures of the home base would have a similar effect on the airlines safety over time.
???
but whats the opinion on the effect on aircraft safety if the culture of the country "seems" not condusive to safety - like (to pick on someone) comparing Air Jamaica (no problem mon) vs say Switzerland or El Al?
Any thoughts on this topic????
I have seen saftey records in manufacturing companies decline in hard times and seems the pressures of the home base would have a similar effect on the airlines safety over time.
???
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There is plenty of scientific hard data regarding the topic. To get a good overview:
"Culture at Work in Aviation and Medicine- National, Organisational and Professional Influences"
Prof.Robert L.Helmreich/Ashleigh C. Merritt 1998, Ashgate
ISBN 0-291-39853-7
Have fun!
"Culture at Work in Aviation and Medicine- National, Organisational and Professional Influences"
Prof.Robert L.Helmreich/Ashleigh C. Merritt 1998, Ashgate
ISBN 0-291-39853-7
Have fun!
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yes great text i have a paper that i have written on national, organisational, and safety culture.
The nation's aviation infrastructure should be of particular note. Also topography, weather phenomena etc... Is english a second language?? All valid factors when considering national culture. It has been found that pilots are less representative of their national culture than the average joe. Pilots professional culture is thought to moderate this.
Well i could yabba on for hours so if ur interested contact me ie msg in controlm panel i will send u my paper
The nation's aviation infrastructure should be of particular note. Also topography, weather phenomena etc... Is english a second language?? All valid factors when considering national culture. It has been found that pilots are less representative of their national culture than the average joe. Pilots professional culture is thought to moderate this.
Well i could yabba on for hours so if ur interested contact me ie msg in controlm panel i will send u my paper
edwardh1, your use of Switzerland as an example is a poor (or inspired) choice in the circumstances. Their recent national accident record is not one of the best. Notwithstanding that, not all of the accidents involved Swiss nationals; the culture of the organisations behind the accident have a major effect on safety. These cultures may be organisational or professional and apply equally to individuals, operators, regulators, and governments, all who have a role to play in safety, but each with differing levels of power, and thus effect.
The standard texts are available from Publications: year 1998 onwards
The standard texts are available from Publications: year 1998 onwards
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Interesting
At first I thought it would be too political a topic and that no one would touch it.
In manufacturing sector safety, it is a factor.
The delta audit of korean air caught my eye
http://www.pprune.org/go.php?go=/pub/tech/korean.html
Especially the part where the captain had to order the FE to turn on deicing (after the FE refused) and the FE said he was a professional and had been "insulted" by the pilot.
I guess the root question is
how/where does 2nd and 3rd world "sloppiness" (or non compliance with the exact requirement) creep into operations.
In manufacturing sector safety, it is a factor.
The delta audit of korean air caught my eye
http://www.pprune.org/go.php?go=/pub/tech/korean.html
Especially the part where the captain had to order the FE to turn on deicing (after the FE refused) and the FE said he was a professional and had been "insulted" by the pilot.
I guess the root question is
how/where does 2nd and 3rd world "sloppiness" (or non compliance with the exact requirement) creep into operations.
edwardh1, I think that it is unfair to label 2nd/3rd world operators with "sloppiness" or imply that they have a culture of non compliance; it would be more accurate if you could give hard evidence over and above a single and rather pointed report.
You may wish to consider that the root question is how does "sloppiness" (or non compliance with the exact requirement) creep into all operations. You could start with MD80 at Denver, GIV at Teterboro, CRJ near Jefferson City, GIII at Houston, and J32 at Kirksville, but of course, it would be more sensible to wait the outcome of the investigations.
You may wish to consider that the root question is how does "sloppiness" (or non compliance with the exact requirement) creep into all operations. You could start with MD80 at Denver, GIV at Teterboro, CRJ near Jefferson City, GIII at Houston, and J32 at Kirksville, but of course, it would be more sensible to wait the outcome of the investigations.
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alf i agree-
edward, slopiness is a company safety culture problem, yes professional and national cultures will have an influnece on the safety culture-(sloppy is a validating remark, i beleive stems from "fundamental attribution error", meaning that people have the choice to be sloppy or not - in the context of accidents, there is enough data that clearly shows that accidents incidents are not solely caused by" sloppines" or more a journo term, human factor related, people mostly do not want to die in accidents, therfoer don't chose to be sloppy,all accidents have systemic origins- there is a lot of investigation report data around, and the academic research community has analysed a lot of it) company safety culture is a managemnt issue-in my opinion related to managment qualifications. As indicated earlier methodologicaly solid studies from various academic fields have been conducted covering the subject of safety culture- which you basically are refering to.
safety culture- or identifiable "slopiness" as you call it is not linked to national culture- that is a fact- i think there is a link between mangement and resources allocated to avoid accidents.
that is not nation specific.
some basic reading would be JAMES Reason- organisational accidents- and other titles.
nevertheless, good thread though! sorry for the typos...
edward, slopiness is a company safety culture problem, yes professional and national cultures will have an influnece on the safety culture-(sloppy is a validating remark, i beleive stems from "fundamental attribution error", meaning that people have the choice to be sloppy or not - in the context of accidents, there is enough data that clearly shows that accidents incidents are not solely caused by" sloppines" or more a journo term, human factor related, people mostly do not want to die in accidents, therfoer don't chose to be sloppy,all accidents have systemic origins- there is a lot of investigation report data around, and the academic research community has analysed a lot of it) company safety culture is a managemnt issue-in my opinion related to managment qualifications. As indicated earlier methodologicaly solid studies from various academic fields have been conducted covering the subject of safety culture- which you basically are refering to.
safety culture- or identifiable "slopiness" as you call it is not linked to national culture- that is a fact- i think there is a link between mangement and resources allocated to avoid accidents.
that is not nation specific.
some basic reading would be JAMES Reason- organisational accidents- and other titles.
nevertheless, good thread though! sorry for the typos...
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what I meant
My thinking was more about maintenance for example than "pilot"things. many of you are pilots and may have taken it that way.
My thoughts were how many substitutions of hydraulic oil, fastners, cables, greases etc are made - in a 2 or 3rd world country - is there more of that? And are there more loading, haz material (non) identification problems etc.
My thoughts were how many substitutions of hydraulic oil, fastners, cables, greases etc are made - in a 2 or 3rd world country - is there more of that? And are there more loading, haz material (non) identification problems etc.
See: The investigation determined that the contents of the water methanol tank were not water methanol.
This was not a 2nd / 3rd world operator.
These are human problems that prevail worldwide.
Edit, check http://www.airliners.net/open.file?i...%3D&photo_nr=1
This was not a 2nd / 3rd world operator.
These are human problems that prevail worldwide.
Edit, check http://www.airliners.net/open.file?i...%3D&photo_nr=1
Last edited by alf5071h; 10th Dec 2004 at 16:34.
Edwardh1: as for regulatory factors, you might check into the well-known fact that our FAA regulators were aware of a problem with anti-icing certification criteria. Some of the administrators knew about serious control problems during icing conditions, on some ATR-42 turboprops in Europe. They were silent about their awareness, but after a plane rolled over in icing conditions, having suffered from "aileron-snatch" and a load of people died, the truth came out. They then spent a lot of money (note, after a plane crashed), investigated the known problem and required ATRs to have redesigned anti-icing boots on the wing leading edges.
After a jet landed and lots of people died in Little Rock, AR a few years ago, our friends with the FAA decided that it was time to require pilots on continuous standby duty (up to six days or so) to have a defined eight-hour rest period in each 24, so that their company schedulers can not call them any hour of the day or night. This only defines a rest period-the probability of actual quality sleep is assumed by the regulators. Pilots had no idea if they should sleep at night or in the day, being prepared to throw a suitcase on very short notice into the car trunk/boot/Kofferraum. Get it? How does this affect your safety performance if you guess wrong on WHEN to sleep, and are on duty for 12-18 hours or more?
A foreign guy who flew Connie Kalitta's Learjets told me that when notified, they were required to be at the plane in about 30 minutes. Sometimes their official duty period would last 16 hours or more, but because they must reposition planes with no 'revenue payload', they could go up to 24-30 hours with only short naps in the c@ckp1t/flightdeck, to get by. No autopilot or automation, either. Lekker slapen Mijnheer/Tot ziens-
After a jet landed and lots of people died in Little Rock, AR a few years ago, our friends with the FAA decided that it was time to require pilots on continuous standby duty (up to six days or so) to have a defined eight-hour rest period in each 24, so that their company schedulers can not call them any hour of the day or night. This only defines a rest period-the probability of actual quality sleep is assumed by the regulators. Pilots had no idea if they should sleep at night or in the day, being prepared to throw a suitcase on very short notice into the car trunk/boot/Kofferraum. Get it? How does this affect your safety performance if you guess wrong on WHEN to sleep, and are on duty for 12-18 hours or more?
A foreign guy who flew Connie Kalitta's Learjets told me that when notified, they were required to be at the plane in about 30 minutes. Sometimes their official duty period would last 16 hours or more, but because they must reposition planes with no 'revenue payload', they could go up to 24-30 hours with only short naps in the c@ckp1t/flightdeck, to get by. No autopilot or automation, either. Lekker slapen Mijnheer/Tot ziens-
Last edited by Ignition Override; 15th Dec 2004 at 05:03.
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Ignition Override, you are incorrect about ATR's in icing.
ATR were not compelled to make changes to the deicing boots. They did so themselves. Furthermore, ATR carried out testing and demonstration of the ATR in severe icing, and released a video of the results. I have seen it, and it's quite spectacular how much ice the ATR can actually carry.
In the Roselawn, Indiana, American Eagle incident of which you speak, people died for one reason and one reason alone - the sheer unprofessional attitude and actions of the crew. They operated the aircraft in a manner it was not designed to stand and the oeprated it in direct opposition to the manufacturer's recommendation.
It is disappointing that most of the CVR transcripts one can read on the Internet of the accident are cut, and in cutting, make the crew look better (although that is not necessarily the intention, it is the effect). But they were holding for quite some time in severe icing conditions without flaps, with a very inexperienced FO alone on the flight deck while the captain was at the back of the aircraft chatting up cabin crew, with autopilot engaged. Despite at least 5 occurrences of the pitch trim whooler going off, this did not occasion any comment that the A/P was having trouble, nor any action. At no time, despite the icing, did they even mention it to ATC, nor ask for a level change.
Those people died because of complacency and unprofessionalism. Nothing more. If you operate ANY aircraft in a manner not recommended by the manufacturer, sooner or later you will kill people.
I have around 2,000 hours on various models of ATR's and I know them to be an excellent design.
ATR were not compelled to make changes to the deicing boots. They did so themselves. Furthermore, ATR carried out testing and demonstration of the ATR in severe icing, and released a video of the results. I have seen it, and it's quite spectacular how much ice the ATR can actually carry.
In the Roselawn, Indiana, American Eagle incident of which you speak, people died for one reason and one reason alone - the sheer unprofessional attitude and actions of the crew. They operated the aircraft in a manner it was not designed to stand and the oeprated it in direct opposition to the manufacturer's recommendation.
It is disappointing that most of the CVR transcripts one can read on the Internet of the accident are cut, and in cutting, make the crew look better (although that is not necessarily the intention, it is the effect). But they were holding for quite some time in severe icing conditions without flaps, with a very inexperienced FO alone on the flight deck while the captain was at the back of the aircraft chatting up cabin crew, with autopilot engaged. Despite at least 5 occurrences of the pitch trim whooler going off, this did not occasion any comment that the A/P was having trouble, nor any action. At no time, despite the icing, did they even mention it to ATC, nor ask for a level change.
Those people died because of complacency and unprofessionalism. Nothing more. If you operate ANY aircraft in a manner not recommended by the manufacturer, sooner or later you will kill people.
I have around 2,000 hours on various models of ATR's and I know them to be an excellent design.
The book: see the abbreviated paper Latitude or Attitude, which covers the essential items.
N.B. web link intermittent 29/12/05.
N.B. web link intermittent 29/12/05.
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Thanks
Good report - I guess my interest was in maintenance decisions- things like
- parts substitition "hey this 1/4 inch stainless wire will work fine"
- or
decisions to repair (sand a bearing's race - or replace it with a new race)
wonder how the nations culture invades that world - not discussed directly much in the article
- parts substitition "hey this 1/4 inch stainless wire will work fine"
- or
decisions to repair (sand a bearing's race - or replace it with a new race)
wonder how the nations culture invades that world - not discussed directly much in the article
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Safety and Culture
Attitude or Latitude is a book about how Australia managed to achieve its 'above average' safety record of zero fatalities attributed to commercial jet aircraft accidents. There is plenty of debate about whether it is 'the best' and its all but impossible to quantify that. Instead the book looks at Australia as a case study of an apparently good system and tries to look at some of the reasons behind it.
There are some obvious one and some that are often cited, but not necessarily straightforward. For example, the weather in Australia is generally kind to aviation especially compared to N America or Europe, but this should be balanced against less experience of crews of handling poor weather and also by remembering that by definition, 50% of Qantas' international takeoffs and landings are not in Australia!
Culture played a significant role, not just in terms of communication (Second Officers speaking up when they spot a problem without fear of causing loss of face and so on), but also in terms of corporate culture and the position Australia placed aviation. Certainly in the early days, aviation had a huge amount to offer Australia which was so far from the 'mother country' which was still the largest imported of goods.
Having said all that, the debate on 'nationality' and the effect of culture on different accident records is a complex one. I saw a paper at ISASI in 2002 by the US DOT that looked at accident rates in different countries and tried to correlate them with all manner of things including infant mortality, kms of covered roads and so on. The results showed that economic performance and the relative importance of aviation did have an input. Certainly in a country where malnutrition, disease and civil war are rife, the priority of aviation safety may not be as high as, say, the USA.
There is lots of debate still to be had and there is no simple relationship. Its easy to offend people or draw false conclusions so care is needed!
I hope this helps!
There are some obvious one and some that are often cited, but not necessarily straightforward. For example, the weather in Australia is generally kind to aviation especially compared to N America or Europe, but this should be balanced against less experience of crews of handling poor weather and also by remembering that by definition, 50% of Qantas' international takeoffs and landings are not in Australia!
Culture played a significant role, not just in terms of communication (Second Officers speaking up when they spot a problem without fear of causing loss of face and so on), but also in terms of corporate culture and the position Australia placed aviation. Certainly in the early days, aviation had a huge amount to offer Australia which was so far from the 'mother country' which was still the largest imported of goods.
Having said all that, the debate on 'nationality' and the effect of culture on different accident records is a complex one. I saw a paper at ISASI in 2002 by the US DOT that looked at accident rates in different countries and tried to correlate them with all manner of things including infant mortality, kms of covered roads and so on. The results showed that economic performance and the relative importance of aviation did have an input. Certainly in a country where malnutrition, disease and civil war are rife, the priority of aviation safety may not be as high as, say, the USA.
There is lots of debate still to be had and there is no simple relationship. Its easy to offend people or draw false conclusions so care is needed!
I hope this helps!
