I was suggesting that there were two points that the error could have been "trapped", on entering the ZFW figures into the Laptop and on entering the V speeds into the FMC.

Surely one of the issues with this is that by bugging the speedtape through the FMS unless you are on the ball it is quite easy to enter an erroneous figure, ie one which the laptop says is correct but logic says isn't. Thus on takeoff the Rotate call will be made parrot-fashion without the usual, expected climb out.

Would things be any different if they were on old-fashioned steam-driven instruments, ie clockwork ASI with manually set bugs ? Maybe the picture would then have looked completely wrong, wrong enough to have been "trapped" before departure.

Which is why our performance program has been modified to ask for confirmation of any entered TOW below 300t for the A340-600 and both pilots have to do their calculations independently. Then we compare our figures and enter them into the FMS. Only way to prevent these things from happening.

Cheers,
DL

As an impartial SLF observer can I just say how unhappy I am with Emirates [can I use that word?] handling of this whole issue. As an outside observer it seems to me that the airline is taking an ostrich like approach to the whole issue rather than facing it head on [sorry for the cliche]. Surely in such a large company 'collective responsibilty' sholud be the management mantra rather than trying to find convenient scape-goats.

The issue of allocating blame seems incidental compared to the number of lives that could have been lost had not the flight crew been aware of the nature of the danger they were in, and taking the appropriate remedial eaction. Emirates seem reluctant [under-statement!]to give appropriate thanks to the flight crew- the 'sweep under carpet approach' seems more appropriate.

Given the choice on the routes operated by Emirates, I think I might prefer to choose other airlines, until Emirates become a little more open and honest in their dealings with the people who really matter.

The thrust is calculated so that at any speed below V1, the a/c can be stopped on the remaining runway. Often that distance is less than that required to continue a takeoff after losing an engine.

In order to provide the basis for takeoff performance charts and, these days, software, engineers determine by experimentation and interpolation braking distance from various speeds, weights and runway conditions and then add the mandated margins.

The fancy new takeoff performance software in the laptop uses the braking distance in its calculations.

Now if the laptop software also told the pilots that braking distance and if remaining distance signs were available for distances beyond 3000' where the first runway marks appear (for those cases where more than 3000' is required to stop from V1), the crew would know when the required braking distance came up before V1 that either the weight is wrong or that they did not obtain sufficient thrust at a point where they can get the a/c stopped before going off the end.

The software needs a number of variables, including aircraft weight, in order to calculate braking distance. Where does it get the weight? You guessed it - from pilot input! Different weight - different braking distance.

So this would not trap a pilot input error, as happened in Melbourne.

Reduced Thrust Take Off.
 

I had an fellow Licensed Engineer who became a Flight Engineer. He told me one day, that on a Boeing 747SP going from Sydney to Wellington they used a reduced thrust take off. After gear retraction the Captain called for climb thrust, so he advanced the thrust levers. !!!

Increase thrust.
 

Runaround Valve. Nothing at all unusual in increasing thrust from a Reduced Thrust Take-off EPR to initial Climb Thrust. Not an everyday event, but nonetheless not a rare event by any means.

consider night time, perception fatigue adn the few seconds they had to consider the "what the" factor.

DonLeslie - the 345s don't just do heavy ULR sectors but very often we operate them on short sectors such as the 3 hour trans Tasman hops, Europe, Middle East stuff.. Anyway - if you follow the SOPS that we had at the time then the error would have been picked up!!

Saskatoon - ECAM screens old bean, not Eicas:ugh:

Weight of fuel
 

@DonLeslie: (Not a pilot. No need to respond)

a) Could crosscheck calculations reveal: You have enough fuel for roughly forty hours in the air (or some other ridiculous figure)? (I'm presuming they had enough fuel onboard to keep that extra 100 tonnes airborne for the planned duration.)

b) A large US manufacturer will apply minimal paint upon request. The manufacturer's weight is monitored that closely. Couldn't the weight and balance calculations produce a figure somewhat in line with that original measure for the specific air frame?

To belabour: The weight and balance sheet for a short flight with ping pong balls would look vastly different than that for an automobile axle shipment halfway around the world. But, in both cases, a similar tare weight should emerge.

Edit: typos

...now look guzzi, I gotta tell ya...

you've hit the nail on the head with your post!...

you are definitely, The Man!!

as a matter of fact, you're my Hero! :ok::ok::ok:

@ White Knight:

That's what I thought. I would have been surprised if your procedures differed greatly from ours but I didn't want to accuse anybody of not following SOPs without knowing exactly what these SOPs are.

Cheers,
DL

To address a few questions put forth.
1-TOGA thrust WAS applied after the 2nd Rotate call after no rotation was apparent at the incorrect Vr speed. Therefore they made the correct response but unfortunately by this time the tail was scaping the runway.

2-Flex takeoff thrust does not supply less power than climb thrust (part of the computer program), unlike on some older aircraft types. Therefore, retarding the thrust levers to climb thrust at acceleration height, will not result in more thrust from the engines. I am basing that on past performance training, since these particulars were not taught at EK. Performance training on the Airbus, is less than ideal at EK and I don't think anyone would disagree with that fact.

3-One fellow was discussing how there can be some instances when it is still possible to get airborne on the remaining runway with a failed engine BEFORE V1. Sometimes this might be the case, but there are too many factors to even consider this option. VMCG is one of those factors. Engine failure before V1= rejected takeoff.

On the other hands, sometimes there is obviously enough runway available to STOP an aircraft AFTER V1 with an engine failure, but it is not an option. In fact, the experts have determined that a pilot should be GO MINDED after 100kts and up until V1, which of course means AFTER V1 a pilot should never consider trying to stop on the remaining runway, unless it is obvious the aircraft will not get airborne (something catastrophic in other words)

The manufacturers takes the view that it is better to get airborne after a problem occurs at high speed on the runway (below V1) except in a few instances. Airbus gives 5 examples when a pilot should consider rejecting a takeoff above 100kts and below V1.

Since these guys rotated at what they thought was the correct speed, and given the inherent time delay, they had but one option and that was to apply TOGA thrust and continue the takeoff. Perhaps it was possible to stop in the remaining distance, who knows, but it was not an option.

So they made one mistake, entering a number into either the laptop, MCDU or both computers. The question remains why?

4-Another fellow mentioned that being qualified on 3 types of airbus, each with vastly different performance, weights, (number of engines too) might be a factor. I agree. It was a causal factor and one that should be addressed. It is not uncommon to lose currency on either the A340/A332, which means more than 90 days without a takeoff and landing in one of the types. (A343 and A345 are considered one and the same, in spite of the fact they have much different characteristics on takeoff and landing)

The aviation gods at EK will say there is no issue flying the different types but isn't it interesting that both major and near catastrophic accidents at EK in the past 5 years occured as a direct/indirect result of CCQ on the Airbus. The Johannesburg accident was a direct result of cross-training and the MEL accident was likely in part caused by this policy as well. The Joburg guys had never even flown an A343 prior to their takeoff from a high elevation airport, in an underpowered (relatively speaking) aircraft, and with improper training. This fact, rather explicity demonstrates EK's attitude wrt to cross-training.

In any event, it is more likely for pilots to remain oblivious to an input error in the computers, if they are not as familiar on type. I hope this factor is addressed by the authorities.

Tare weights - Minimal Paint - 40 hours endurance
 

fotoguzzi - I think I know what you are driving at. 40 hours fuel - Not on this aircraft. Minimal paint - irrelevant in this instance. Tare weight - I guess you mean Aircraft Empty Weight. Mate, the problem occurred because an error was made in entering the Takeoff weight and from that error the resultant V speeds were incorrect and a lower than required thrust setting for takeoff was used. No rocket science, just an undetected error made which had the potential to cause a much worse outcome. I recommend the post by mensaboy to you, it is well thought out and makes a lot of sense, to me at least.

mensaboy, well said.

If I may add......

The fate of this flight was sealed the moment the laptop was put away.

Many people do not understand 4 engine take-off performance and that is why they reason "could the pilot not feel there was a problem". On day 1 of my A340 conversion, I was told "You are going to see a lot more of the departure end of the runway" and this is a fact. A correctly calculated takeof performance will optimally utilise every inch of runway and is very often TORA limited rather than the 2nd segment climb limits that usually dog the twins. In the MEL case the guys would have run most of the runway and then close to the end would have rotated at the calculated Vr(albeit an incorrect one).......why would the pilot have thought anything was amiss until the airplane did not lift off.

In terms of knowing the numbers....well, I don't think I have done a 350 ton take off in a 340 since my CCQ and I have been here a while(I have seen it done many time from the blind seat in the rear right corner). This is an academic point because do you really want to rely on the pilot operating on the wrong side of the clock to sense an error, or would you rather see more robust SOP's in place.

I also don't believe that these guys just ignored SOP.....I have never flown with a captain that did not do the performance check. The question should rather be did they follow the correct procedure(training) and if so, how did the error slip through. I personally have had to sit down and have a good review of the procedure. I don't know why the FCOM3 brings the qrh into the greeddot check. I think we should simply have a dispatch calculated greendot next to the Estimated TOW(on the LIDO flightplan)and next to this we write the laptop GD and the MCDU GD. If these 3 are close together you cannot have a gross error in TOW.

I might also add that the pre-departure workflow is total chaos. This has been identified as a problem but not addressed. It is like a ping pong ball in a jacuzzi.....all over the place. It is highly probable that the performance check was interrupted by some obscure requirement like security demanding their checklist be signed.......:rolleyes:

Anyway, just my tuppence worth.......

Given today's sensor technology, it is surprising that not at least one of the following solutions has been adopted:

• "weighbridge" concept: a/c passes over a strip of load cells on taxiway or at runway threshold, where actual take-off weight is determined and relayed to cockpit crew for verification of their loadsheet calculations

or

• built-in weighing capability by using load cells in landing gear suspension to continuously monitor actual aircraft weight at any given moment on the ground.

Neither solution is prohibitively expensive and could, essentially, even be integrated into take-off weight calculation software.

If something similar to Kennytheking's comment (below) isn't part of the final report, I'll be very, very surprised.

Al Fakhem
 

Self weighing aircraft ? Been discussed before,e.g.

http://www.pprune.org/questions/1523...hemselves.html

As for tarmac weighbridges,who pays for installation,maintenance,calibration ?

TWT, Al Fakhem
 

Never, ever, going to happen - refer to post #280.

Kennytheking


How I love your misspelling (please don't go and edit it!):


greeddot


It is so fitting for EK, almost freudian

Mensaboy - the JNB incident was because the captain derotated the aircraft trying to maintain the 'german cross' at 9 degrees. It may have been bad gen from a TRI or TRE or LTC but since when do you derotate a large, heavy bird at take-off?????

I personally have no problem with flying MFF - in fact I haven't flown 343 for 4 months but would be more than happy to jump in one tomorrow. Some of you guys try to turn a simple job into rocket science and want to get your astronaut wings issued too:ugh: I also know very few guys that have gone out of recency. It has happened but is not that common.... And I think the responsibility of maintaining currency is up to you the pilot, so if you mensaboy are going out of currency on 330 or 340 then I have no sympathy if you then have to go sim:E:E

Kenny - good post. I don't think the 2 guys were ignoring SOP but for both to miss the figures is somewhat startling.. I'm sure the loadsheet wasn't 130 tonnes out was it?

Dropp the Pilot, I certainly agree with your comment on post #280 but that was clearly not the case for EK407.
As the report did not mention any cargo, the average weight for each pax + his baggage was already over 200 kg (440 pounds)

The report is interesting for the pictures, but I would have loved to see a copy of the W&B, also the perf figures how they should have been, where the rotation should have taken place ?

Also no indication if in this scary situation the Captain touched its sidestick ... ?

Like everyone else I am not privy to what went on in the flightdeck that night. However, it would surprise me if the crew were not aware of the weight of the aircraft. It would have been discussed during the flight plan review, during the final fuel decision & passed to load control for the load sheet.

The problem as I see it, is that the weight was incorrectly entered into the laptop in what appears to be a simple typo. Then, for reasons not yet known, the error was not picked up on the cross-check of the laptop. Nor did the V-speeds look wrong for the weight, to 4 qualified pilots. If this does turn out to be the case, no amount of weighing the aircraft & delivering this weight to the crew would have prevented the accident in Melbourne.

Perhaps an SOP, that in this procedure simply required one crew member to check a bunch of figures entered into a computer by another crew member, is not an adequate error trap, particularly considering the serious safety impilcations of getting it wrong. I would have thought that with what is now known regarding human error, particularly in regard to aviation, that a more robust method of error trapping for this critical aspect of flight preparation would have been devised & formalised in the SOPs.

That being said, this accident hopefully will serve as a warning to all flight crew of the serious nature of the business & how quickly & easily it can bite you. It is certainly a sober warning to me of the need to constantly review my performance & the need to ensure that if I am required to cross-check something that I actually do a thorough & deliberate check, rather than just glancing over it because I am busy, distracted or tired & it has always been correct in the past.

sorry i have not read every reply in this thread so maybe this may have been posted already elsewhere, if it has sorry, it is a very easy and possible error to enter the ZFW instead of TOW???

Looking at the man-machine interface aspects, I have another question relating to the laptop tool in use at Emirates. Does it transpose the computed takeoff weight from the load and trim software directly to the takeoff performance software, or does the crew have to manually transpose the figure from one to the other?

Thanks in advance.

ishe Q
 

Nope. Just TOW-100tons. 2xx iso 3xx.

White Knight if life was that easy mate:ugh:.

Check out post 734. Did most major airlines in europe see something coming, that EK didn,t ?
Why is EK in that respect always behind the curve. Is it because of the old school thinkers ,like yourselfs, in to many keypositions, or is it a moneything( software cost for example). Hell ,even the low cost boys have the more expensive airbus fcom software on there laptop!

Forgive me if I am missing something blindingly obvious here!
Most of the previous threads refer to the possibility of entering erroneous figures into THE laptop, and transposing figures from THE laptop to the MCDU.

When I did my 'FOVE' course at Airbus we were taught that both pilots did the performance calculation independently and the results were compared between the TWO laptops. That precluded the possibilty of two incorrect calculations. This is standard SOP in my company.
It could well of course be that on the day, with many distractions that abound on a flight deck just prior to departure when everything comes together in the last few minutes, that caused the error to go un-noticed.

I presume EK use the same laptop system, so is it not SOP's for both pilots to do the performance calculations? If so, then presumably the problem started earlier in the chain.
Without, of course, any knowledge of what happened, the old adage with computers - 'rubbish in = rubbish out' springs to mind! :confused:

Whitenight,

It was not ''bad gen'' from the training department, it was the wrong technique being taught by some individuals. Many pilots were instructed to use the german cross, but thankfully the line guys knew better and most of us did not perform our first real takeoff in an A343 out of Joburg! Remember how ''avoid a tail-strike'' was literally beat into us, pretty much at the exclusion of everything else? So for you to explain away the accident simply by blaming the pilot for derotating, is to ignore the true causal factors.

I have no problem flying MFF either; you missed the point. It CAN be a contributing factor especially if currency is somewhat lacking. I'll bet you anything, the average A343 pilot who only flies an A343 will be more proficient than the average pilot who flies 3 types and as you put it, only once in 4 months.

I never complained about losing currency either. My currency has lapsed and the rostering department was advised well in advance, yet they did nothing to fix the problem. According to YOU, it is still the pilots fault even if he tried his best to fix the error coming out of rostering.

Some pilots who decree that this job is simple, MFF is never an issue or use the ''it's not rocket science'' argument, tend to expound on these topics in an attempt to convince people that 'they' manage things fine, so therefore they should be viewed as a better pilot than someone with the audacity to believe that MFF might be a contributing factor.

I once flew with a guy who spoke almost the exact same words you wrote in your post, yet on departure when ATC asked us to expedite our departure climb thru 2000', he went on a tirade about ATC not understanding the capabilities of the A340. Yet he continued accelerating past S speed, past green dot speed (about 240kts). Not too bright, and not exactly rocket science either.........but I have no doubt he still views himself in much the same light as you view yourself.

I enjoy MFF flying because it makes my job more interesting and it also makes my schedule better. But to go 89 days since your last flight on type, is not exactly ideal under some circumstances. Rostering 2 pilots for their first takeoff on the A343 out of Joburg, is just dumb.

To view yourself as maintaining the exact same proficiency on 3 types as opposed to 1 type, is a tad arrogant. To criticize pilots who realize it is more probable to omit something due to MFF, smacks of an attitude not conducive to safety or perhaps reality.

I truly hope you never forget some obscure OEB or FCI pertaining to one aspect of your flight on a given day. Do you base the success and skill of your flight solely on your landing too? Just wondering... kind of fits the pattern.

Three EK pilots speak off the record to the Herald-Sun about fatigue concerns:


Tired pilots plea | Herald Sun

Mensaboy - If I don't learn something from at least every flight I do then I shall hang up the flying gear and go farming... I don't think MFF is contributory if YOU OPERATE TO SOP..

If you're going 89 days between types then I suggest you try bidding slightly differently.. In nearly 6 years of MFF here I've never gone anywhere near 89 days:ugh::ugh:

"Bad gen" from a TRE, TRI or LTC was what I wrote regarding JNB - not from the training department... Try reading that again!!!

Airline beefs up safety checks - Herald-Sun
 

Airline beefs up safety checks - contains quotes from EK management on resignations, diaries, fatigue tests, etc.

Two stories and an editorial in the Herald-Sun today (3 May). Will sell newspapers but wont get bums on EK seats.

Airline beefs up its safety checks | Herald Sun

RAS

TWT, Dropp the Pilot:

Obviously, just because something is technically possible, it does not mean that it gets adopted immediately. There is always resistance to change. But the monetary argument has been shown as been without merit in road transport already.

Stationary automatic vehicle weighing is widely implemented in road transport, no reason it cannot be done so in aviation. Price of implementation is no real hindrance. If we can employ and pay for thousands of d1ckheads as security staff at airports to supposedly ward off the 1-in-10million chance of a terrorist attack on any given aircraft, there is obviously enough money around to fund minimizing crashes due to wrongly calculated a/c weight.

Whitenight,
The ATSB is looking into MFF as a causal factor now! This news came out, after I commented that they should delve into that area. I'm not saying it was definitely a factor in this instance, but it certainly was in Joburg.

The whole of EK is not represented by your personal experiences. In other words, sometimes people reach levels of currency that are not conducive to their proficiency, even if they follow SOP's. You stated that a person should change his bidding if he finds himself 89 days between types, so therefore you agree that the 90 day policy is not a good one, yet you contradict yourself by stating that the MFF policy can in no way affect a pilot's proficiency if he follows SOP's. If the policy is sound and there is no decrease in proficiency, then why should a pilot alter his bidding practice to reduce that limit??

Bad 'gen' coming from certain individuals in the training department means there is, or was, an issue regarding teaching the proper technique. You are quick to deny contributing factors to an accident, if these factors have not affected YOU. It is astounding how you are quick to blame the pilots and you have no desire to delve further into the matter to look at the underlying causes.
You might want to read the post about management styles/personalities X or Y in the EK forum.

Now look!... I think mensaboy and white knight ( how about that for a couple of stupid monikers? ) oughta go off and indulge themselves in a personal ego fest via PMs, and let the rest of us get on with sensible discussions! :ok:

Selfweighting aircraft vs acceleration meter
 

It has been mentioned some pages before about technological solutions to avoid accident like these, mainly selfweighting aircraft on gear strut or treshold markers on the runway.

Much more easier would be an acceleration meter on board. I learned recently that some business jets are already equipped with it.

The sensors are already on board, the IRS's. Some warning computer would compare actual acceleration vs. requested. You basically don't need any indication in the cockpit. Just give them an amber or red Acceleration Warning on the ECAM/Eicas. The warning would appear relatively early, depending on the size of the power setting error, at low speed, and standard policy would be to reject the take-off.

I guess that some bright engineer have already thought about it (otherwise it wouldn't be available), but manufactors of big airliners have decided against it, most probably not enough damage avoidance per unit's cost. This might change after this accident...

Dani

Well, the speed trend arrow should basically suffice for that, shouldn't it? Warnings about acceleration are very arbitrary anyway. Especially on four engined aircraft. On a twin, it might give up to 40kts trend, on a sluggish 340-300 out of ABB a meager 10 might be all it gives. How to program that??

I truly dread another of these possible nuisance warnings during crucial moments as the take off. Like "approaching runway xx" with RAAS when you are above 80kts and cross a intersecting runway!


Give it a break with all your well intended new devices and procedures. Just train the people adequately and give them decent rosters. The SOPs were not that bad up to now and new ones will only fix the mismanagements accountability, but not the real issue.

Mensaboy - you really don't read too well do you? MFF is fine if YOU FOLLOW SOPS whatever type you're in on a particular day... The SOPS are so rigid!!

My comments about the 90 day rule pertain only to having to avoid doing circuits in the sim when you hit 90 days.. You want to go sim - just don't fly 330 for 90 days.. Doesn't mean you're not proficient in it!

Indeed there are underlying problems leading to this incident - many which I think are far more causal than MFF.. Try morale for starters!! Lots of unhappy conversations on the flightdecks these days regarding our wonderful managers - how's that for distraction? However the discussion was about MFF if you can cast your mind back a few posts.. Indeed for those who have a problem with it maybe it would be a good idea to fly just 330 or 340 - have you put that to the office wallahs??

Obie - back into your hole;)

Every aircraft type has to have it's own performance database of course!

But I agree that SOPs and human performance considerations do have a priority here. Easiest way to avoid such a procedural break down would be to x-check actual TO speeds vs load sheet vs a speed booklet. But where are they in modern airplanes...

Dani

NO IT WASN'T :ugh::ugh:

J'oburg was bad technique, as taught or learnt. The rotation technique is basically the same on all 3 EK aircraft, as it is in all Airbus. 2.5-3 degrees/second towards your target pitch.

There were other factors included stupid rostering etc, but it wasn't the fact that the crew were MFF.