Flex / derate / assumed temp - call it what you will, but it DOES increase engine life and it DOES save real hard money. We had a memo in our airline reminding us to use the correct assumed temp reduction for every take off and the savings quoted were staggering.

Anyhoo - all those advocating full thrust for take off, you still have to do the performance calcs and if you make the same mistake made here and in Halifax with the 747 you are still going to rotate underspeed, still going to drag along the runway with the tail, but with alot more thrust. You will probably get airborne, but then again who knows.
Besides full thrust take offs can also have their own risk. Especially in a light aircraft, so maybe you are just swapping one risk for another, not reducing the overall risk level.

Appears yet another great lesson in safety lost.

EK should begg the crew to remain employed.

Fully understand and never forget the causes of this event.

Fully understand and never forget how the crew handled the aircraft after aware of problem.

My best wishes to all the crew involved, am sure your intentions were all good.

My bloody oath it saves money. Just ask Boeing how much they are charging us for using our uprated 717 engines. Gouging is not the word.

I drove by the front of the hangar that it's parked in yesterday. It still has the plastic sheet covering the damaged area and there were no signs of any repair work being carried out. No people and no GSE in sight.

still broken
 

KANUCK 33 what are you taking about? "condolenses for sacrifical lambs" These pilots are profeessional and well trained people. They made a mistake and nearly killed all the passengers and crew. I will not mension anything about how much it will cost to fix because I don't see it as an issue. Peoples lifes are what we deal with, however as a ground engineer and I am the of person who will have to fix this very damaged aircraft. I take full resposabilty for my work and I expect others in this industry to do the same.

Donal,

If you think it is as simple as that, you have a lot to learn about flight safety.

If pilots err, they assume responsibility and have their bums at risk.

If mechanics err, training is inadequate, managers impose stupid sops, manufacturors mess up, they assume responsibility (some hardly ever though ) and pilots have their bums at risk.

Don't go down that road ...

@ Donal Barber

If you fired every professional in this industry that made a mistake you would soon not have anybody left. We are human and there for make errors. The trick is to have a system in place that traps errors before they become accidents. thta is why you engineers have dual inspections and the MM, and why there are two cockpit crew and SOP's. Firing the crew solves nothing and allows this error to happen again. The question should be what is wrong with the system and procedures in place that allowed a highly experienced and professional crew to make an error that did not get caught.

If you fail to address that then its just a matter of time before it happens again to someone else.

757 driver
Thanks, I'm happy to accept your word (rather than the motherhood statements such as "flex saves money" hitherto offered). If running the engines for a minute or so at the upper end if their performence capability does have such a dramatic affect on their life, then so be it. I wondered if/how many here actually had access to any numbers, and were just doing it because they were told to.

TBALYX et al, well said. (spoken as someone who has experienced/been the victim of the preferred ME management style).

"Tbaylx" said what I wanted to say, only more eloquently. If there is a systemic problem with the bus departure process then it needs to be addressed. I'm an EK Boeing FO and I can tell you that the captains I fly with double check my work before departure, and then I check it again. Even so, anyone can make a mistake.

I'm sorry that these chaps got the sack.

tbaylx
As SLF having read this thread I would not wish to fly on EK in the future unless I felt assured that the airline had seriously acknowledged and addressed the many safety issues whch have been raised by concerned professionals in some 585 posts. I am referring to not just pre-flight data compilation cross checking and entry, but also to the apparent lack of opportunity to access online flight planning data in a timely manner, eg prior to leaving the hotel. I am also concerned to read about the poor T&C's for crew, including crew rest issues, and layover times.
Paul

Paul,

I can assure you that some of the issues that you bring up are problems at all airlines and not just EK. Often proper rest and days off are lost at the whims of management that really don't understand the effects of long haul flying on rest/sleep cycles.

Since EK has been very quiet on the whole MEL incident i can only hope that they are in the process of completing an internal investigation in coordination with the australians and the results of which will be taken into account and our procedures modified to prevent that sort of thing from happening again.

Should the investigation show that it was a crew input error it will not be the first and certainly not the last time that has occured in transport catagory aircraft operations. It may be time the the industry as a whole come up with a better mousetrap with regards to performance data entry.

This just another opinion, but I believe the following,

The flex/assumed temp on engines does save money, and is a safe operating program. It is not the issue that needs changing.

These airplanes are operating safely around the world every single minute using this function and have been doing so for decades.

This incident seems to be just a very unfortunate and isolated mistake by two very capable crew. The laptop SOP calculation when done correctly should and do trap errors. This is not to say that a revised system is not forthcoming but I find the system and SOP's to be reasonable. The process to input, SOP's and adherence to SOP's is the issue. Distraction and interruption in the flight deck pre departure also needs addressing.

I'm sure every pilot will now pay closer attention to the TO calculation and reduced thrust/flex numbers. This is a positive net result. I wish the crew a better future ahead.

Interesting.

Since this would be classified as an accident, and not an incident (significant damage occurred to the aircraft structure) wouldn't there automatically be an official investigation by the ATSB? Complete with preliminary (possibly interim) and final report?

One of the criteria for an occurrence to be classified as an accident is:


Bernd

ATSB link here; 200901310

2nd Post
 

Donal you said it yourself "These pilots are profeessional and well trained people."
I am sure they maliciously did not try to bend the aircraft and put lives in jeopardy.
I believe there maybe other contributing factors (I am speculating).

We are human ("to err IS human" remember). We are not perfect.

"To err is human, to forgive is not company policy".

(Graffiti in the gents near the Dan-Air crewroom at MAN, circa 1978)

Bernd;
I hope so, Bernd. So far, nothing has been published regarding the details of the accident. I can't recall if it is ICAO or merely NTSB policy that a preliminary report must be published within 30 days of an accident. What is of course disturbing is the way the crew has, apparently, been handled. There is nothing here nor elsewhere to refute the rumour that the crew has been fired. In fact the entire incident has gone silent, which is not how flight safety work is done, as we know.

This definitely falls within the definition of an accident.

As said earlier, while the ATSB have access to the CVR and QAR/FDR, that's not the whole story. All that tells is the mechanics of what happened on the night. And yes - I'm sure the crew did make errors.

The ATSB will be hamstrung in getting to the root cause, because our beloved employer (Emirates aka Dubai Inc.) will never release any data on systemic, training or management issues that actually led to the final "piece" in the chain of events.:mad:

The crew have been made the scapegoats yet again. Crew retraining, and acceptance by Emirates of corporate responsibility would have been a far more mature approach here.

AAR, TCAS and ED should fall on their swords.

As a layman, was aircrew but not a driver, the situation with engine life, and operating with maximum power can be clearly seen in the situation of commercial flying and military flying.

In the military, where often it is performance that is sought, the engine life even of the same type and brand of engine, is greatly different between an engine which is operated commercially than one used by the military. However even in a military situation the use of maximum power is restricted to situations where it is absolutely required. In spite of that situation, engines on service aircraft never get to the time hung on the wing with a civilian one and are often changed long before the normal operating limits.

Again to the layman, it is not a requirement to run at maximum power, I mean after all when looks at different models of the same airframe, but one running a different brand of engine to another, there also a different level of power level for take off, does this mean that the available power on the lower powered airplane makes it unsafe. The answer must be that the the airplane if operated within its envelope is quite safe.

My experience with accidents, is that they are seldom caused by one factor.

An example.

Aircraft overloaded for what ever reason, but unknown to the crew.

The crew perhaps tired because of turn around times and or poor sleeping arrangements.

A miscalculation on the take off requirements either as an combination or part of the above.

A lack of understanding about what was going on, my understanding is that the tail on this flight contacted the runway three times, and the associated problems that caused, including the lack of acceleration.

The lack of understanding by management of their directions.

Yes it is easy to blame the crew, but some of the factors I am sure in this case where either beyond their control or not in their knowledge sector.

The operator has "sacked" the crew, but has it fixed the problem, the answer I suspect is NO.

The crew who have departed, will now be better pilots because of this incident, and I would have been using them to improve and bring about better standards than showing them the door. Perhaps the answer is that the wrong people were sacked.

Hope they turn up with a better job with a better airline.

Regards

Col

Again good to see the "blame policy" alive and well:ugh:

Glad my airline out grew that...:ok:

Flight International reports data entry error ...
 

Flight's "Unusual attitude" blog reports (at So what did happen to the Emirates A340-500 at Melbourne - Unusual Attitude) that

"What I'm told is that the first officer entered a digit 2 instead of a 3 when entering the take-off weight in the laptop that the crew uses - resulting in a selection of a weight 100t less than the actual. "

:uhoh:

Contact, Flight Global confirmed they've gone.

If you ask them, they are gone!

It's ICAO:


Cheers,

Bernd

Contacted

Guess you haven,t been too long in DXB, or maybe you don,t leave the house that much!

Its quite a small community over here. The operating crew could be your neighbour:ugh:

Positivegee:

"If you follow company SOP's and use reduced power take-off's and/or intersection departures (or any other company SOP's for that matter), a tech crew is protected by the law of vicarious liability. If a tech crew ignores company SOP's and are involved in any incident that results in any liability, a crew may be found negligent and a court may then find them liable. This is not to say a crew must used reduced power or intersection departures, that decision is always left to the PIC."

The first comment is not correct under English law. Vicarious liability is purely a mechanism by which an employer is held accountable for an employee's negligent actions. If you follow the SOP and it leads to an accident, the airline is vicariously liable for your actions. It does not "protect" the employee in any way! Indeed, if you follow erroneous SOPs blindly and they cause an accident, the "I was just doing what I was told to do" argument will not stand up in court. I think this is worth clarifying.

news.com.au
 

Emirates jet 'close to crashing' in Melbourne

Sunday Herald Sun / April 12, 2009 12:01am

A FULLY-LADEN jet came only centimetres from crashing at Melbourne Airport last month, it has been revealed.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau has placed it in the most serious category of aircraft mishap available to it - an accident, rather than an incident.

An ATSB investigation update shows the accident was labelled a "significant event" by investigators, who also listed damage to the aircraft as "substantial".

"During the take-off the aircraft's tail scraped the runway surface. Subsequently smoke was observed in the cabin," the report says.

A Sunday Herald Sun investigation has confirmed that the flight - EK407 to Dubai - almost failed to become airborne and barely made it over the airport perimeter fence, half a kilometre away.

Damage to the $220 million plane is so severe that the airline is considering writing it off rather than repairing it.

The fully-laden Airbus A340-500 was believed to have been travelling about 280km/h when it reached the end of the runway without becoming airborne.
At the last minute, the two pilots "rotated" the plane - or pulled its nose up into a steep ascent - causing its tail to crash into the end of the runway.

Despite its steep climb, the plane was still so low that it wiped out strobe lights that were only 70cm high and positioned 170m from the end of the runway.

It then took out an antenna, believed to be near a small building, before barely making it over the 2.44m wire perimeter fence.
Aviation expert Dick Smith said something had gone badly wrong.

"It's the closest thing to a major aviation accident in Australia for years," he said.

"The people (passengers) are incredibly lucky, it was an overrun where the plane didn't get airborne."

Mr Smith said Emirates was a "very good airline" and it was strange the pilots had resigned immediately after the accident.

"Emirates' standards are very high and they have a lot of Australian pilots," he said.

"What I'm startled by is that there hasn't been a more immediate announcement. We should get some urgent advice from the ATSB. This is one of the most serious accidents you can imagine."

A Melbourne Airport spokeswoman confirmed the size of the strobe lights, which are on a grassed area between the end of the runway and the perimeter fence, which runs alongside Operations Rd.

"The height of the runway strobe lights is 0.7m above ground level," she said.

Procedures Before Take Off
 

Assume all checks are carried out on board before take off.

Suggestion

For weight and other critical input data could this be input and checked by ground staff with pilots giving last check, thus reducing risk of input error.

Reality

Accidents happen and we should learn from them.

Emirate Business Rationale

Managers in Commerce use blame as a strategy, advising the market place that it was not us, but like in Baring Brothers, someone messed up and we have solved the problem by getting rid of them. Thus it is safe to fly with us.

Speculation

Commerce has always had govt depts by the Sphericals. Look at a merchant bank's luck with competing ABC2 radio station closure, short selling extensions, negative analyst sacked, infrastructure contracts.

If an input error was the cause, I am very sure the authority advised Emirates immediately, hence the "resignations".

Commercial Reality

Regardless of Emirates playing that game, they can be counted on to fix those procedures.

Consumer Reality

If there is a next time the collective consumer body, those that can, may well decide to walk away whilst others, sadly, may not have that choice.

For those who do walk, they will still be vulnerable to human and mechanical failure, which is endemic with other carriers.

What Emirates should do is own up, detail their solution so we all can be reassured and learn from it.

Now look, I know this is your first post, but for an experienced airline pilot like me, who obviously knows b*gger all, compared to a super hero like you...

could you please decipher that psycho babble you've just posted?? :ok::ok:

Searched through the pages of posts, but have not seen the nationality of the operating crew.

Can someone please enlighten me...?

Procedures
 

Sorry Obie, here's the translation,

1. Should airport admin calculate settings for pilots to check and input when they come on board. These settings are then reconciled with airport admin by wireless computer link.

2. Corporations will cover up for errors if exposure affects their market. Govt and carriers should be made to publicise errors and solutions. Then we all could learn.

Yes I crap on a lot.

Cheers NS

Thanks Nic. Now I understand! :ok:

You don't crap on...I agree with you.

Pre Flight Checking
 

Note discussion concerning cabin disruption when pilots are calculating and inputting data.

Is it not possible for pilots to do all this in airport before boarding. Create a quiet pilots pre flight admin room with computers linked to their craft loaded with data from oil, baggage, cargo, weather, runway, flight details etc as soon as it is to hand.

This way data input can be checked by an airport administrator as being consistent for plane and admin before pilots board.

Computer self checks would also screen 3rd party input as being within normal range for this craft, cargo, fuel, destination and passengers.

If any data subsequently changes prior to take off the revised data is advised and input agreed by pilots and airport administrator, cross checking that the crafts settings have been updated and are consistent.

High Nr

I heard one of the flight deck crew that night, he sounded North American to me.

Nicolaus silver

No it is not possible nor practical and under what "regulatory" system would your "administrator" work.
You may think your ideas are workable but unfortunately you obviously have never worked in an airline / aircraft environment, details are never finalised until well after the aircrew have boarded!

Sorry Nicolaus, but I have to disagree on that.
Far too much administration already, far too many signatures before we can go.

I believe the key is in some other place :

Probably 90% of the operation nowadays is done for a crew of only two members. These two guys must always check each other, and never ever take for granted anything. To look over your partner's shoulder is one of the main part of your job. You have to pick up any of its possible mistakes as much as you need him to do exactly the same for you, and you never miss thanking him anytime he does so.

If one the crew made a mistake in the numbers, that's ok.
But if the other crew didn't pick up the mistake because he relied on his partner and didn't take the time or didn't have the energy to check by himself the entries ... that's where is the bobo !

Also the job is exhausting at times ... Fatigue is a major intruder ...
15 days off a month should be the rule ... everywhere !

Local reporting:

Pilot error blamed for Emirates runway mishap in Melbourne

OK, so what IS possible?
 

Iceman:
OK, so what "can" we do? If we believe the rumor, one of the pilots typed a "2" instead of a "3" and nearly spread a 300-tonne mixture of passengers and kerosine all over the end of the runway.

The aircraft's computer could have spotted that one with its in-built sanity-checking algorithm, and issued a beep and a question such as "Is this aircraft empty? Then why so much fuel?"

Expecting the other pilot, apparently bleary-eyed from fatigue, to not suffer from dyslexia, was not so successful.

How about we get the ARRIVING crew to enter the estimated settings for the next flight before they leave the aircraft? The computer could then compare each of them with the real settings entered by the operating crew, and query any that seem so different as to be unlikely?

Just a thought...

Thats flying man, thats flying. There are hundreds of other opportunities to make tiny errors that can have catastrophic results as well. Entering in the weight on he FMC is just one. Many are shocked to find out that a simple mistake like that can result in a major crash, mind you, often they're the same people that think pilots are just bus drivers.
The next crew haven't planned the next flight, they don't know the weight of the aircraft for the next sector. They don't care too much about it either as it isn't heir flight. The fuel loads and pax numbers change quite a lot sometimes.

The best way to reduce this kind of thing is having excellent crew layover conditions, good HF training, fatigue management teams/systems, and if it's a turn around then make it long enough so that the crew aren't under pressure.