Take another perspective.
 

I don't condone EK management’s disciplinary actions however take a step back and look at it form a different angle.

After reading the more sensible replies it would seem that SOPs aren't correctly enforced allowing for a variety of TOW/LPC inputs to be tolerated with the eventual undetected GIGO result. There are many holes in Swiss cheese, they aren't going away, we just have to make sure they aren't all aligned.

An unfortunate product of the need for more efficiency in aviation is computer driven task management. Pilots need to be more effective managers in this area and also more importantly the computer software should be more robust to self check logical data entry and output.

Pilots are the last line in defence, don't lower your guard.

TO MEMO, have a look at my post #31 at http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/3...-flight-2.html

Excellent reading Brian !
Thanks for your effort.

Does this airline have a (Just) Safety Culture?
 

Interesting comments in this thread for sure but I would ultimately ask the above question.....

Are their employees comfortable reporting safety concerns, even if they involve an error on the part of the employee? I would argue that having two pilots removed from the property after an unintentional act such as this drives the reporting and errors underground. The employees are in fear of their jobs now.

I wonder when a non-reprisal policy will be signed by the CEO there! The buck stops with The Boss for all matters safety. I am just aghast that two livelihoods have been lost because of the arguable lack of a Just Culture there.

Thank you Payscale. I did try and make this point earlier, the bottom line is the safty of the paying customers.

Prelim Report
 

Isn't there supposed to be a preliminary report by 30 days after the incident. Not so far at ATSB
200901310

For Vino re Airbus take - offs: All white lights out, Big weight = high speeds - lotsa thrust, small weight = low speeds - low thrust. straight from a very senior training Capt at Airbus during training.

So as you line up, take some time ie step back - no white lights, take off green no blue. Cross reference weights and speeds and off you go and enjoy!

Good luck to the EK boys - there but for...

ATSB Reports
 

Isn't there supposed to be a preliminary report by 30 days after the incident. Not so far at ATSB 200901310

ATSB don't seem to have a great record in producing timely reports. Oldest still outstanding are Incident 200702402 (19 Apr 07), Serious Incident 200607202 (27 Nov 06) and Accident 200603722 (17 Jul 06). :=

Rumour circulating that Airbus has agreed to repair the A345 at the request of EK. The aircraft will be issued with a permit to fly and ferried to Toulouse depressurised. The rear pressure bulkhead will be replaced. There are still some concerns of other damage caused by the tail impacts and high speed overweight landing.

Writeoff?
 

I think this has a lot to do with the construction of the A340, in fact, all Airbus types. For years now, engineers have complained that, where you could slap on a patch on other types (note I'm trying not to turn this into a boeing versus Airbus rant), with an Airbus, because everyting is tweaked down to absolute minimum tolerances, the simple patch job is impossible and it involves a major structural replacement.

I think what was said in the link above is also true - it all comes down to ecomomics. Someone, hopefully EK, should make a small killing on spare parts, as the aircraft will be cannabilised before the remainder is turned into frying pans.

Having seen the scrape marks for myself recently while lining up on RWY34, I cannot believe how lucky they were not to have become a horrible statistic!!
:eek:
The scrape marks are VERY evident right up to the end of the clearway/stopway and then into the grass at the end of the runway.
SOOOO CLOSE !!!!!! :uhoh:

Wow. They don't get any closer than that!


This is a huge airline management failure imho. For years decisions made by senior managers have loaded up the crews to the point where less than an hour will not cut it.

It starts with too many block hours and skimping on good quiet hotels and ends with security hassling people and delaying the crew from arriving on time at the aircraft. You need a full hour at the gate to cope with the unexpected distraction; a full hour to cope with the unexpected loading FUBAR. Most of the time you won't use that extra time. Read a magazine or take a quick combat nap and hope inept, toady managers won't see you doing it.

Then, on the departure that turns into mayhem, instead of dealing with headaches right up until brake release, the capt has a few extra minutes before pushback to double check the killer items ZFW, flex pwr, fuel ticket (remaining plus added), flap & trim setting, runway length.... do they make sense?

Again, just like the disappearance of manual line flying, basic airmanship has evaporated off the syllabus of the Brave New Button-pusher of tomorrow. Just "suck-it-up" they used to tell me. "This is the real world."

Well, the real world sucks.

Recall that pilots used to be blamed and fired for busting altitudes. Then ALPA, in concert with industry, developed the altitude alerter which is now a part of every flight. Altitude busts are much rarer today.

Since government and business seem only interested in reacting to events and interested only in finding a scapegoat to fry, may I suggest a worldwide SOS (suspension of service) until we can bypass security and arrive at the airplane on time.

You need to strengthen your unions gentlemen.

Crunch - out

False alarm. Quote from EK

Oddly enough, in my airline, the 'brave new button-pusher of tomorrow' has not yet arrived.
I don't care if we are delayed, we do what is necessary.
Management backs me up, every time.

Case closed.

So your airplane actually has pushbuttons?
Wouldn't have thought so, considering your contributions 411A.

Pool - I think you will find that the L1011 is the original push-button aircraft, goes back to the early seventies!:ok:

Woftam, by chance any picture ?
How long would you estimate the scrape mark ?
Do you see repetitive marks or is it a single one ?

Pilot of Emirates flight that nearly crashed at Melbourne Airport was sleep-deprived
[url=http://www.news.com.au/travel/story/0,28318,25387505-5014090,00.html]
Ellen WhinnettSunday Herald SunApril 26, 2009 12:01am

Concerns ... the Emirates Airbus that had to land at Melbourne Airport after it was damaged during take off / Brad Marsellos

The pilot of the Emirates flight that nearly crashed at Melbourne Airport with 225 passengers on board had almost no sleep the previous day and was following the airline's orders to take off at reduced power to save money on fuel.

Several sources told the Sunday Herald Sun that Emirates - like many modern airlines - ordered its pilots to take off at reduced thrust when possible to cut fuel costs, emissions and wear on the aircraft.

The thrust or power settings are determined by factors such as aircraft weight, weather conditions, the surrounding terrain and runway length.

But an Emirates source said the March 20 flight - EK407 to Dubai - was set at the "absolute minimum" thrust, leaving little room for error.

"There was no margin for error," the source said.
"This is all about the money."

Emirates yesterday issued a statement saying safety was a top priority for the airline.

"Safety is at the forefront of all operations within the Emirates group," a spokeswoman said.

Sources said a report due on Thursday was expected to show the near-catastrophic accident happened after the incorrect weight was typed into the plane's computers, causing it to set an inadequate take-off speed.

Air safety investigators are examining Emirates' staff records, including the work rosters of some of its pilots, to see if there are systemic safety problems within the airline that could have contributed to the near disaster.

The Sunday Herald Sun learned that the pilot of the plane was also almost at the threshold of the number of hours he was legally able to fly.

Emirates pilots are permitted to fly a maximum 100 hours each 28 days.

Investigators are examining whether pilot fatigue was a factor after being told the pilot had barely slept the day before the flight.

Several sources confirmed that Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigators were also looking at whether any other "human factors" needed to be addressed.

The inspection of Emirates' records is part of the bureau's investigation - expected to take up to a year - into the reasons behind the error.

The inquiry will investigate issues such as cockpit distractions and crew resource management.

A source said it was not possible for one person alone to commit the error.

"It happens because a range of things come together at the right time," the source said.

An Emirates source said the airline was in a risky situation because it did not have a culture that encouraged people to voice their safety concerns.

The source said some Emirates pilots were badly fatigued, but people were afraid to speak out.

"There is a limit to how far you can push people," the source said. "Those long-haul flights are really, really fatiguing and demanding.

"But a punitive culture means people are too afraid to speak out.

"Two things, (flight safety and the punitive culture) in my view, that do not match in 2009 and in a major airline.

"A very bad cocktail."

It can also be revealed that:

THE tail crashed into the runway with such force that passengers heard a loud scraping noise and some saw a heavy shower of sparks.

THE impact ripped a hole in the fuselage, causing what appeared to be smoke and dust to swirl into the cabin.

THE pilot made three announcements during the next 35 minutes as he circled Port Phillip Bay to dump fuel before returning to land.

NONE of the announcements told passengers how serious the situation was and the passengers were not in the "brace position" when the plane landed.

THE weight error was made before the plane left the departure gate.

PASSENGERS, including Anita and Ray Chappel, escaped uninjured after the plane landed safely.

The two pilots involved in the accident were forced to resign 48 hours after they were flown back to Dubai.

Safety Bureau and Civil Aviation Safety Authority officials are thought to be concerned about the action taken against the pilots, but have no jurisdiction to intervene.

Emirates pilots, using false names, have flooded the internet to express their concern about rostering, fatigue and the action taken against the two pilots.

The men are expatriates and at least one has since returned to his home country.

The United Arab Emirates does not allow unions, so more than 2000 Emirates pilots employed worldwide are not covered by a union.

Investigations by the Sunday Herald Sun further revealed the pilot was no stranger to the runways at Tullamarine, flying into Melbourne for almost five years, about once every two months.

The pilots - two operating pilots and two augmenting pilots - and 14 crew members returned to their hotel in Melbourne immediately after the accident.

The next day, bureau investigators came to the hotel to conduct interviews.

The man leading the inquiry is investigator Paul Ballard.

Emirates is sending some of its senior managers to Australia to handle the fall-out from Thursday's release of the preliminary report.

Andrew Parker, an Australian now based in Dubai as Emirates' senior vice-president of public, government and environmental affairs, will arrive in Australia this week with Capt Alan Stealey, Emirates' divisional senior vice-president of flight operations.

Emirates declined to comment on the March 20 accident because of the bureau's investigation.

But the company said it had continuously reached international safety standards and had been a founding member of the Gulf Flight Safety Committee - a Middle East aviation body.

The company denied it had a punitive culture that discouraged open discussion about safety concerns.

"Emirates has a positive and open safety reporting culture that helps management understand safety issues before they become significant concerns," a spokeswoman said.

The company would not answer direct questions about reduced-thrust take-offs, the fate of the pilots and the future of the damaged aircraft.

Nothing new in all this

She must be reading pprune

EK407 news story
 

Thoughts?

Pilot of Emirates flight that nearly crashed at Melbourne Airport was sleep-deprived | Travel News | News.com.au

Thoughts?
 

Pretty much garbage. Author hasn't got a clue what a flex takeoff is and that flex/ derate/ assumed temp are best industry practice. Fatigue has already been ruled out as a factor. Preliminary report is due out soon. EK made a mistake with less than proactive media work though, which is I believe in the process of being rectified.

Actually the Melbourne 2001 engine surge comes to mind. EK claimed rightfully that there was no fire and then somebody came up with a video of a huge fireball belching out of the N1 fan (which is to be expected during a surge but is absolutely not an engine fire). EK ended up appearing defensive pointing this out and were seen as liars by the uninitiated crowd.

"Fatigue has already been ruled out as a factor."

I will be curious about the motivation for this one...

The Mach 5.5 did it again!

If you use the word garbage, be careful, it might bite back.

Regarding flex/derate/assumed take off:
You cite best industry practice. Well, it's not completely true. With the EK software, you can only go for full thrust or max reduction. Any in-between, which is used a lot elsewhere for a little more safety margin but not full thrust, is not recommedable here, because the gross error trapping procedure a la EK will no longer be possible. It's not in the SOP, so either full or full reduction, which I believe is not best practice.

Regarding surge and fireballs:
A surge does NOT necessarily have a fireball, and you pretend it is to be expected. It may or it may not. If there is a fireball however, I would NEVER rule out a possible real fire, as you so brilliantly do by pretending that this is absolutely no fire.

By the way: How do you know that fatigue has already been ruled out? The prelim is not out yet, isn't it?

The more you post, the more you seem like a seat cushion warmer in the obscene palace, but not someone confronted with the real garbage happening on line with EK.

so-pilot's only thanks-
do we really think, that on a Max Flex/Red thrust (Airbus/Boeing) take-off, at night, we can differentiate/identify correct acceleration for
-a 3700m runway
-a 3500m runway
-a 3900m runway with a second segment limit
-a 3200m uphill runway with tailwind component
etc etc.
Of course we can't. The only reality is staring at the red/whites and knowing you need to be airborne -soonish!
Regardless.
This crew responded to an impending threat
So forget the 'perception/should 'ave caught it/ rule of thumb', theories. The only thing that 'got 'em' was an input error.
Now- if you read back an altitude, and wind in something else in the window,you have a potential breakdown in separation=potential collision. However, there are still a couple of protection levels available (TCAS, ATC).
Typing in an incorrect weight has only one error trapping mechanism- the other pilot.
Some more work needed here perhaps?
Like many others here- I feel for the crew.
And perhaps EK need a gentle 'Taser up the Rear' to re-define their culture.
At the moment, despite nice new kit, flashy terminal, they are looking rather shabby.
No offense to the highly professional line aircrew there.
Cheers

oh pool...
 

Pool: Didn't they tell you to stop posting after a couple of stiff ones? Okay - I ll respond to the stuff that's worth to be qualified.
EK performance software are the 1:1 Boeing and Airbus factory modules. In terms of what it does, dial up the Pelesys module or Wiki and look for 'balanced V1'.
In the MEL surge case the media hype about a fire cooked up days after it was established that there hasn't been any. Media just got onto it because the footage was too good. For the rest of your post: Yes, I love you too.

Re: Thoughts?
 

Mr Mach5.5:

Would you be kind enough to share with us the source of this information ? ATSB investigator ? EK management ? Tarot cards ? And while you're at it you could also let us know exactly what your relationship is with EK.

Otherwise an old cynic like me might think that the pro-active media work has already started :).

Regards

Fascinating. Would you care to provide anything to substantiate this claim?

Source: eeekayspinnmethinks

I must admit that I used to think of EK as a fairly well run airline. If they are resorting to trolling on pprune, poorly writen trolling at that, then I will have to substantially revise downward that impression.

fatigue or not?
 

Wait till Thursday.

Typing in an incorrect weight has only one error trapping mechanism- the other pilot.

If this is true, it could not be that difficult to flag a query.
A simple extra line like "souls on board" and distance to go could easily trap a typing error?:ugh:

Complete tosh :=

The SOPs have been devised to catch just this sort of mistake.
The question is... Why didn't the mistake get caught :confused:

MEDIA ALERT Adjust font size:



2009/04
ATSB Preliminary Factual Report: A340-500 Tail Strike at Melbourne Airport, 20 March 2009
28 April 2009

A media conference to release the Preliminary Factual Report on the investigation into the circumstances surrounding the A340-500 Tail Strike at Melbourne Airport on 20 March 2009, will be held on: Thursday 30 April 2009

Where: ATSB offices, Level 2, 62 Northbourne Avenue, CANBERRA

Time: 10:30 am (local time)

Mr Julian Walsh, Director of Aviation Safety Investigation will discuss factual information known to the investigation team at this time and will outline the investigation process.


Media Contact: 1800 020 616

ATSB first report
 

See here 200901310

Incorrect weight
 

To all those who pointed fingers, refer Post # 27 and Post # 31.

Not making excuses but from the official report Capt & F/O hours for the last 30 days were 98.9 & 89.7 respectively, fatigue has to play a part in there somewhere & airlines better start taking some notice of this issue :ugh:

Fatigue
 

Four round trips DXB-MEL-DXB in a month would give more than those hours.

Not a pilot, just trying to understand something. Would the hours referred to in the report (98.9 and 89.7 respectively) refer to DUTY hours or IN COCKPIT hours or FLYING hours (defined loosely as, say, hours in cockpit with engines running).

If it is duty hours (from when arriving at place of work until leaving place of work), then:

1 - if half the 30 days were non-duty days this averages to 6.7 duty hours per day (based on 100 hours). This would not sound like an overworked person, only working 1 day in 2, and only for approx 7 hours a day.

2 - if this was compared to 'the average worker' (whoever that is) working 5 days on, 2 days off, then there would be a maximum of 20 duty days in this 30-day cycle, which equals 5 duty hours per day. This also sounds like a reasonably non-overworked person - working 5 days in 7 for an average of 5 hours a day.

Now averages are misleading - given, but I am trying to understand the basis for comments like "... fatigue has to play a part...."

If the hours cited are actual IN COCKPIT hours (and not DUTY hours), what is a reasonable estimate of the actual DUTY hours these pilots may have done in the past 30 days?