As I have mentioned twice before they may well have resigned.

My real agenda is to counter the inappropriate and dubious details of the resignations posted on this board and maybe balance up the curious sense of relish that is a feature in the posts of some of the armchair experts and 'sayers of doom' in these two threads.

Depends on whether they have been given the contractual 3 months or just 3 weeks as posted by one of the experts. If it's 3 weeks it should appear in the system.

How Did V1 Get Into This?
 

I don't know how V1 got into this. Of course you go if you hit V1. What I'm saying is that if you take off from an intersection, the runway you don't use is of no use. Try explaining to a court why you didn't use all of it..

STAN, Sum Total and Nose, also installed on many B707's
Worked quite well, if maintained properly.

How Did V1 Get Into This?

Ed, I was just pointing out that the amount of runway ahead of you after passing V1 is irrelevant as you are committed to take-off.

Try explaining to a court why you didn't use all of it..

The court would understand because you were following company SOP's.

+G

"Upon reaching V1, the pilots of EK407 would have been expecting everything to continue as normal. At VR (I assume they got to that too) they would have pulled back and expected to lift off as it has always done. When lift-off did not occur, the PIC and EFFO would have faced a very unusual situation as to "what to do now"? Correctly, and this should be applauded, they decided to continue and apply TOGA thrust (apparently, from other posts) and avoided a disaster that could have cost many lives and the future of EK as an airline."

+G, although I would not normally recommend anyone in a heavy "Heavy" to abort after V1 I belive that in this case they were closer to a disaster because they DIDN'T abort. In reality they were way below the "true" V1 and thus they had plenty of runway to stop at.

SAS had a 767 in CPH once were ZFW was entered instead of TOW. When they reached "VR" (which was actually some 30 knots below the real VR) and the aircraft refused to lift off the captain aborted.

They stopped well before the runway end and we don't know if he would have been able to get airborne had he continued.

This is not said to discredit the EK crew's action. They acted correctly and in accordance with general knowledge and training. I just wanted to point out that in real life decisions are not always black and white.

Disclaimer: above reasoning is based on the assumption that wrong weight was entered in the FMC. I don't know if that's the case. The investigation will tell.

expat 400, whilst I agree that the computer V1 may have been well under the accurate V1 for the runway/conditions/aircraft weight and configuration, I think most would agree that your comment might be highly debatable.

You're making the Monday Morning Quarterback's classic mistake: coming up with a course of action, after two weeks to consider it and with considerably more information available to you than the crew had immediately to hand. Remember also that they had to make an immediate decision in a vaery dynamic situation.

The only circumstances that immediately come to mind that would make me consider aborting a takeoff after I had passed V1 would be a restriction in the flight controls or my only then becoming aware of a CofG so grossly out that I was having difficulty controlling the aircraft and therefore, that I considered might not be controllable after liftoff.

I think I speak for quite a few EK pilots when I say that I am deeply saddened if the story I have read here about the way the pilots were invited to resign is true. I would like to think that the management pilots who asked them to do so were doing so on orders from above and acting very much against their will.

One mark of a professional aviator is to drag an impossible situation - perhaps especially one that an error on his own part has caused - and get on with dealing with it and recovering the situation to a satisfactory outcome. It's sad to say, but true, that there'd be some (a small number), who'd throw their hands into the air and give up after making such a mistake. Whatever this crew did wrong, like the Jo'burg crew, they did a remarkable job of fixing their mistake.

If the company felt it had no further use of services, I'd like to think that that decision would not have been reached before the full report was to hand.

Wiley, I guess pulling on the stick at V1 and all that happens is a tailstrike, but no lift-off, seems to me could be interpreted as a problem controlling the aircraft! Therefore a decision to abort would not have been wrong, according to your own argument. Who guarantees you that the bird will fly even with hitting TOGA? There might be another reason for no lift-off than simply inadequate thrust.

I am not pretending to know which decision is the correct one, but both seem equally reasonable.

From the National Newspaper
 

ABU DHABI // The two Emirates Airline pilots involved in an emergency landing at Melbourne Airport last month have resigned. It was reported that the jet’s tail hit the runway on take-off.

In announcing the resignations, Boutros Boutros, the airline’s senior vice president for media relations, said he did not know why the pilots had quit. He declined to give further details.

“We do not like to talk about it because now the investigation is ongoing,” Mr Boutros said. “We have to wait for the investigation. I know that they resigned; that is all I can confirm.”

Wiley,

I'm not saying they should have acted differently. Read my post again:

"This is not said to discredit the EK crew's action. They acted correctly and in accordance with general knowledge and training."

But, if they were 20 knots under the true V1 they would have enough runway to stop on, don't you agree?

Re; expat400
 

Not if it had taken most of the available runway to get anywhere near V1 due to incorrectly flexed thrust.

Complex Ops Manual procedures are inherently dangerous. KISS & concentrating on 'killer' items keep us safe.

ISO managers don't like the word 'killer' - it doesn't look good in their matrix....but have a guess what happens if you miss them.

Well that would depend on several factors, for example a lower weight may give a lower flap setting and higher take-off speeds. Also field length and "optimisation" of speeds for climb performance will affect V1 and not necessarily quite the way you might expect. It depends on stop vs go performance.
However, even assuming the only variable as weight, a lower than required power setting would mean V1 was achieved far further down the runway. Furthermore the higher mass would further reduce the likelihood of stopping in time. In fact V1 is not even relevant as the problem would not manifest itself until VR and I am going to speculate that it would have been far too late to stop.
Note, if you will, that I have had an idle half an hour an half a glass of wine to think this through.
The crew on the day had zero time to think yet still managed to react correctly and recover the situation as well as possible under the circumstances. I hope if it ever happens to me I can do as well.

As a matter of interest what is the minimum thrust/maximum derate available.

I am surprised even a heavily loaded bus, even with max derate would have had trouble getting airborne on a nearly 4 km long downhill sloping runway.

(of course safety heights etc would not be met and it may waffle into the air - but it should still accelerate without dramas...)


As an aside - what are minimum unstick tests for? To prove that an early over rotation will still be able to get airborne ? Do they test this at MTOW?

Wiley, Jungle drums and No land 3.

Fair enough, I understand what you're saying. And once again, I never critisized the actual crew. They did what was expected of them in a difficult situation.

I only wish they would have been treated the same as the SAS crew. That could have been an inspiration for all other EK pilots.

True; after all, the guys managed to get the groundhog A 340-3 airborne taking off from the taxiway (heading 250) rather than runway 32 at Anchorage some years back. Some 7000 ft available, but they still made it, albeit after running the tires over a snow "berm" (?) at the end. Continued on to Taipei without further ado (10 hr plus flight, so can't have been too light on takeoff). I believe the augmenting Capt on the jumpseat was a training guy, but I could be wrong; would need to reread the report.

Gremlins will forever be standing by waiting to trap the unwary.

With a long enough runway and the right weight, etc., V1 could be after Vr. It doesn't happen often but it could. Therefore if it didn't fly at Vr, an abort would still be feasible. It's when V1 comes before Vr that you are committed at V1.

Also, if you make an intersection takeoff and you've computed V1 using the full length of the runway, then the computed V1 is no longer valid. It's something smaller.

G+ I wouldn't bet on it. Lawyers don't think that way. They would simply say the SOP created a dangerous situation and continue the lawsuit.

Intersection takeoffs mean you've negated some of your safety margin. If you choose to make one and you have an accident, you have put yourself in jeopardy for not choosing the safest course of action. Following SOP might help you keep your job with the company but won't help in a lawsuit.

have I got your message right, Ed? You're suggesting there's someone out there (you?) who'd sit there and conduct a pre-takeoff brief that included the gem that he would abort AFTER the nose wheel was off the ground?

Not this little black duck - nor very many others who actually fly for a living, I think. What do you fly? MSFS?

Ed -

Out of curiosity, do you currently fly Airbus, Boeing/MD heavy aircraft ? :confused:

Ed.
V1 exceeds Vr???
great, well
its not what we train and its not what we expect so if you can quote an example, fantastic, but we are not conditioned for it, nor do we expect it.

Airline pilots train and expect 2 scenarios,
1 V1 = Vr
2 V1, accelerate, VR
anything else is not the norm.
That is the airline world. If you can show or have real world experience, it is not relevant to this scenario.

This thread is clearly going to absolute farce.

We have one idiot suggesting V1 may be greater than Vr and another giving legal advice which is clearly imbecilic at best and dangerous at worst.

I've read some nonsense in my time, but that is a belter......

Hey, why don't you name-callers climb out of your cribs and contribute something other than hot air? If you don't like what's been contributed, then put up a counter argument.

Fools.:mad:

Loose liver - lets have your in depth analysis then.

Mr. Ed - Some significant thread drift with your "off beat" comments.

To me, a likely scenario with this event is:

1. The crew at some stage may have extracted laptop speeds and FLEX using ZFW as TOW.
2. The FMGC may well have contained the correct weight data (from the flight plan).
3. The PERF T/O page had the incorrect V speeds from the laptop.
4. The crew rotated at the incorrect (low) Vr to a normal pitch attiude.
5. The aircraft flap configuration and speed was inappropriate for flight.
6. When the aircraft wouldn't become airborne, the pitch attitude was increased and the aircraft had a severe tail stirke with possible multiple contacts.
7. The higher FLEX temperature combined with tailstrike drag contributed to the long ground roll.
8. TOGA thrust was probably selected at some stage.

The crew did a remarkable job in a very dynamic situation. After all, they were expecting the aircraft to fly off after rotating at the Vr speed in the PERF T/O page. They were confronted with a situation about which they had no experience. What would we all do ? I wouldn't like to be there.

There probably is an error component on the part of the crew with respect to cross checking (no idea what the EK checking procedure REALLY is) . But I bet there are much greater systemic issues for which management and the company must take responsibility.

I hope the Australian ATSB is able to overcome Dubai Inc. in arriving at a final report that tackles the difficult and overriding issues of corporate errors and cover ups.

As a final comment, it's probably now worth including SIM sessions that look at this type of event, and also maybe having an idea of what the V speeds should roughly be at heavy weights.

Discussion about V1 > Vr has no place here.

Strobes, no in-depth analysis from me sorry; I don't claim to have superior knowlege on the topic. But I do have a question:

Why isn't there an error message generated when ZFW is used in place of TOW?

The laptop will quite happliy generate (albeit much lower) speeds if the ZFW is entered. The FLEX temperature and configuration may also be very different.

If Vr is reach as no V1 has yet been encountered, then V1=Vr.
Happens many times ... For you on that day too much asphalt for nothing.

I believe both guys were as full back stick they could ...

It all sounds like russian roulette for the PASSENGERS ,,, management telling the pilots how to suck every joule of energy out of every gram of fuel , saving pennies here and dimes there and creating a condition wherin factors lead to increased holes in the cheese model of accident investigation !!!
Put the friggen throttles to MAX take-off power, get off the ground and get climbing early THEN think of saving pennies here and dimes there,,,looks like the cart is ruling the horse NOW !!!

Why was my earlier post deleted? How does some tool think that V1 comes after Vr?, so perhaps the given name was quite appropriate.

I think that your V1 exceeding VR calculation is coming out of performance charts for a certain environmental envelope and maximum certified weights.

If you don't meet these conditions and VR is lower, your V1 is decreased to meet VR.You abort at VR all performance calculations are VOID regardless of V1.

I have seen these charts where our V1 speed would have us airborne and flying almost at V2!

blueloo

Minimum thrust/Maximum reduction depends on several factors including aircraft and engine combination, company preference and regulating authority.

Using one operator's B747-400 for example:-

Fixed Derates of 10% and 20% are available which may then be subject to Assumed Temperature Derates of up to 25%. This gives a maximum reduction of up to 40% from Rated Thrust.

Using 100,000 lb as Rated Thrust makes the sums simple for this example:-

Max Thrust. 100,000 - up to 25% Assumed Temp Reduction = 75,000

10% Derate . 90,000 - up to 25% Assumed Temp Reduction = 67,500

20% Derate . 80,000 - up to 25% Assumed Temp Reduction = 60,000

Oh for a B747-400 with 4 x 100,000 lbs of thrust ! like :mad: off a shovel

You will understand that even on a 4km runway, any significant thrust reduction from that required will fail to accelerate the aircraft sufficiently for normal flight.

Its not just about saving pennies - its about longer engine life, and less exposure to max temps/high egts etc, will hopefully mean less chance of the engine exploding/catastrophic failure on some dark and stormy night at MTOW.

Longer life = pennies

I respectfully disagree, it also pennies here. It means that more parts have to be changed more often to avoid the possibility of exploding/catastrophic failure. The end sum is the number of hours that the engine operates at max trust and take off power

Absolutely - Yes I don't disagree with this. My comment was not meant to discount this.

Don't disagree with this either.

Both points have been mentioned before.

I still however maintain that less exposure to higher egts and more frequent max thrust means less chance (not no chance) of catastrophic (or even partial) engine failure. Yes, it means more frequent part changes and more cost - but in the intervening periods the engine is still exposed to more extremes.

Better not let FrequentSLF see the airlines fuel policy ! That we actually take off with less than full tanks - sometimes half tanks, sometimes quarter tanks!!

Funny:D

This post added a lot to the discussion.
Make sure that you do not confuse pounds with kilos when you refuel and you have installed the right fuel gauge. :(

back to the thread

blueloo

I agree. The fact is that EK will need quite a number of take-offs to recover the money lost to repair the airframe (if will be repaired). Would be interesting to sum up the cost of all tail strikes...I also add that I do not consider myself in danger because of this practice. I am very well aware that anything in the business is driven by the pennies.
The guys in front know what they are doing. However I have a very simple question. If not driven by company policy, would you or not use always max trust?

Sir Richard
 

All very well with the figures but it might be a bit more helpful if you stated what engine type you are referring to ie. RR, GE. or PW, as they are different figures (de-rate percentages) without getting into pedantics.

Cheers

JO

Actually CDRW makes a perfect point about the logic you are using SLF. It's directly analogous, albeit taken to its logical extreme.

Economics are part of life, and in aviation we balance risk vs reward.

I get tired of this old chestnut as well. All very true if you are in your 185 trying to get out of a jungle strip but hardly applicable to airline ops.
To use an extreme example: imagine the runway is fifty miles long. Is it safe to use the intersection halfway down? That would leave twenty five miles. But what about using the runway behind you? Obviously that would be a stupid waste of time and fuel. So in this case all of sane disposition would agree that an intersection departure is appropriate. Now that I have you all in my net, lets start reducing the size of the runway. At some length it will become inappropriate to do an intersection departure. This point will be subjective but for those of us who fly commercially it will be at least a length calculated to provide an adequate margin of safety.
This has nothing to do with the original thread by the way.

I guess would depend on current type..... but no I wouldnt always use max thrust because current aircraft type performs so well, that it would be quite a handful at low weights and max thrust - probably 25+ degrees nose up on takeoff to prevent speed from running away - we operate from low domestic weights ( approx 1hr flights) up to max t/o international flights (10hrs +)

Also a low altitude level of would be fairly uncomfortable for pax from a max thrust takeoff at low weights.

Even with a fairly decent pad/buffer we can get a derated takeoff near the MTOW at times.

No, Wiley you do not have the message right. V1, by definition, is the speed where, if you have a problem you can still stop in the remaining runway available. If you have a long enough runway you will get to Vr before you reach the point beyond which you don't have room to stop. That means that V1 is beyond Vr, but you have already rotated so it doesn't matter. You never really get to V1, except in the air.

I seem to remember this all started when I suggested that intersection takeoffs are not smart because you have discarded some of your safety factor. SOP won't save you in court.

Would you,or not use max thrust -


No. Not if I had the choice. In a lightish weight large jet (certainly with 4 engines), and you were to use max thrust and an outboard engine let go at say 50kts - you would not be able to keep it on the runway - you would go off the side - fact! Full power can increase the risk if it is not required.