Originally Posted by andrasz
(Post 10464613)
Thruster763, the SSJ was certified to EASA standards, so on paper at least it met those same requirements.
These are my personal views and my not reflect those of my employer. |
Originally Posted by DDDriver
(Post 10464644)
BBC confirming (for what that’s worth) lightning strike. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-48174169 They also quote an Aeroflot source confirming that everyone was off within 55 seconds then embed a video which shows people departing the aircraft long after that time. The usual rubbish reporting I’m afraid, which even the normally reliable BBC isn’t immune from! 😡 |
Originally Posted by Speed of Sound
(Post 10464671)
...The usual rubbish reporting I’m afraid, which even the normally reliable BBC isn’t immune from!
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Originally Posted by Thruster763
(Post 10464602)
No, one would not. It is a certification requirement that this does not happen in a survivable accident see FAR/CS 25.963 (d)
https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/def...nt%2021%29.pdf The BA38 crash would have be a different story if the B777 had not met theis requirement better. Its tanks dd of course have far less fuel in them, but there was no significant leakage. Look at Section 1.1 of the official report: After the aircraft came to rest there was a significant fuel leak from the engines. [...] Fuel continued to leak from the engine fuel pipes until the spar valves were manually closed The relevant part of CS.25 is 25.963 (d): Fuel tanks must, so far as it is practicable, be designed, located and installed so that no fuel is released in or near the fuselage or near the engines in quantities sufficient to start a serious fire in otherwise survivable emergency landing conditions, and: [...] (5) Fuel tank installations must be such that the tanks will not rupture as a result of an engine pylon or engine mount or landing gear, tearing away as specified in CS 25.721(a) and (c). However, it could be argued based on this accident, that it violated this certification specification, because quite clearly "quantities sufficient to start a serious fire" did leak in an evidently otherwise survivable emergency landing. Bernd |
Originally Posted by Thruster763
(Post 10464398)
Only practical answer is to stop cabin baggage bigger than will go under a seat, enforce it 100% and remove the ovehead bins. The airlines are never going to do this though.
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Changing cabin baggage standards and weights would require all airlines operating the same route to agree. It would require agreements around the world. It will not happen. The Pax want to pay less money and airlines facilitate that for them. Nothing will change - unless you can PROVE that cabin bags in evac cause MUTLIPLE deaths.
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Originally Posted by bsieker
(Post 10464695)
Not sure about that "far less fuel" on board, because 6,750 kg of fuel did leak, and it was probably sheer luck that it did not ignite. To be precise, the fuel apparently did not leak from the tanks, but from the engine fuel pipe, until it was manually shut off. But almost 7 tonnes is quite a lot.
Look at Section 1.1 of the official report: It should also be noted that the SuperJet is EASA-certified according to CS.25. As far as I can tell, Ireland-based "CityJet" was (past tense) the only European operator, and there are currently none operating it under an EASA type certificate. The relevant part of CS.25 is 25.963 (d): An associated paragraph in the AMC (acceptable means of compliance) has been revoked, however, so I don't know how that is typically tested. At any rate, the regulator must at one point have been satisfied that compliance with 25.963 was achieved. However, it could be argued based on this accident, that it violated this certification specification, because quite clearly "quantities sufficient to start a serious fire" did leak in an evidently otherwise survivable emergency landing. Bernd These are my own opinions and my not reflect those of my employer (part of my day job includes fuel tank/system certification). |
Originally Posted by PAXboy
(Post 10464704)
Changing cabin baggage standards and weights would require all airlines operating the same route to agree. It would require agreements around the world. It will not happen. The Pax want to pay less money and airlines facilitate that for them. Nothing will change - unless you can PROVE that cabin bags in evac cause MUTLIPLE deaths.
ANO should be amend to state that pax attempting to retrieve, or who succeed in exiting the cabin accompanied by, cabin baggage during an emergency evacuation will be subject to criminal proceedings, which may result in a fine and/or custodial sentence. If I had a loved one perish in such circumstances, and saw footage of at least one individual lumbering across the tarmac with a bag which appeared to be of max weight/dimensions, as can be seen the footage of this incident, I'd be looking to "have words". |
Lightning in Europe at this time
I don't remember seeing this cited before - but it is a useful site that shows lightning activity and hope that it will add to the background knowledge of this discussion.
lightningmaps .org / blitzortung /europe/index.php?bo_page=archive&bo_map=0&lang=en&bo_year=2019&bo_m onth=05&bo_day=05&bo_hour_from=16&bo_hour_range=4&bo_animati on=1#bo_arch_strikes_maps_form I probably haven't the rights to post the full URL so split so you can use it with minimal effort - just remove the spaces. |
Would it be too much to ask that those who wish to endlessly discuss passenger evacuation - with or without bags - start their own, dedicated thread? This happens every :mad:ing time there is a crash with an evacuation - and the discussion never changes. Those of us who simply want to discuss the accident and the where/why/how end up having to sort through dozens or even hundreds of posts about people evacuating with their carry-on bags...:ugh:
Now, back to your regularly schedule program :E I'm not sure comparisons to BA38 are particularly apt - that was basically a normal touchdown that happened to occur short of the runway with the gear coming off because they sank in the mud - not the high G vertical hit that this appears to have been. If we assume that a lightning strike did take out multiple electrical systems, this is really worrisome. As I posted earlier, lightning is designed for and the technologies involved are fairly mature. While it can do localized damage at the attach/detach points, it should never take down essential or critical electrical systems. Further, even with FBW and FADEC common place since the mid 1980s, I can't think of a single case where a lightning strike did take down such a system. This could point to a build quality issue (lightning protection is highly dependent on the integrity of bonding and grounding - a single high resistance electrical connection (and we're talking mili-ohms here) can ruin a systems lightning protection. Maintaining those low resistance bonds on aging aircraft is a big concern - but the Superjet hasn't been around long enough for that to be a likely issue. Or, it could point to a problem with the existing standards, in which thousands of in-service aircraft could be at risk. |
It's such a strange accident, it will be very interesting to see the official report when it's all done.
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Originally Posted by tdracer
(Post 10464782)
<SNIP>
I'm not sure comparisons to BA38 are particularly apt - that was basically a normal touchdown that happened to occur short of the runway with the gear coming off because they sank in the mud - not the high G vertical hit that this appears to have been. If we assume that a lightning strike did take out multiple electrical systems, this is really worrisome. As I posted earlier, lightning is designed for and the technologies involved are fairly mature. While it can do localized damage at the attach/detach points, it should never take down essential or critical electrical systems. Further, even with FBW and FADEC common place since the mid 1980s, I can't think of a single case where a lightning strike did take down such a system. This could point to a build quality issue (lightning protection is highly dependent on the integrity of bonding and grounding - a single high resistance electrical connection (and we're talking mili-ohms here) can ruin a systems lightning protection. Maintaining those low resistance bonds on aging aircraft is a big concern - but the Superjet hasn't been around long enough for that to be a likely issue. Or, it could point to a problem with the existing standards, in which thousands of in-service aircraft could be at risk. These are my own opinions and may not reflect those of my employer). |
My OH and I dutifully take one hold bag on our annual jollies to Tenerife. We’ve only just worked out we could split it into two cabin bags and save fifty quid. Airlines financially incentivising cabin baggage in this way creates a risk. Has anyone assessed that risk properly? |
Originally Posted by rab-k
(Post 10464760)
ANO should be amend to state that pax attempting to retrieve, or who succeed in exiting the cabin accompanied by, cabin baggage during an emergency evacuation will be subject to criminal proceedings, which may result in a fine and/or custodial sentence.
. I was. And I did not react in the way I thought I would. And I have never been able to work out why because my reaction was totally NOT what I would have expected of myself. And I was very, very lucky to survive it. Some amount of bulls****ers on this thread. |
Originally Posted by rab-k
(Post 10464760)
ANO should be amend to state that pax attempting to retrieve, or who succeed in exiting the cabin accompanied by, cabin baggage during an emergency evacuation will be subject to criminal proceedings, which may result in a fine and/or custodial sentence.
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Like it or not, cabin baggage appears to have been an issue for at least some of the pax which for them turned this accident from survivable to non-survivable. This is an aspect that will be addressed by the accident investigators because they are required to do so by Annex 13.
IMO, the investigation needs to look primarily at why the approach became unstable, why the hard landing led to fuel tank rupture, and why so many pax died. It is apparent from some of the video evidence that the hull breach from the extrenal fire occurred quite early (+50 secs?) - you can see smoke issuing from the top of the forward doors while there are still people coming down the slides - which means that those at the rear of the aircraft would have rapidly been in an unsurvivable cabin environment. There is also a 6-7 second hiatus in pax flow from the forward right slide which ends with someone carrying a large bag; that delay will have costs lives. I am strongly of the opinion that central locking for for the overheads is the only way to go. It certainly stands more chance of success than trying to persuade airlines to stop permitting cabin baggage, which is not necessary. Once people learn the overheads will only be released once on stand, they will be less likely to try to retrieve items, and if they try they will soon be moved on. If they are not locked it only takes one person to open them before others follow suit, and that will impede the escape of those behind them, whether from the time delay or from a newly introduced trip hazard. How much more evidence do we need for change, and how many more will have to die before something is done? Now let's add seat pitch into the mix. The FAA and EASA have refused to rule on seat pitch, the FAA claiming that the low pitches being considered (27"/608cm) would not affect someone's ability to leave their seat quickly. That is worth thinking about as an official position, because even the most cursory examination would show that you reach a physical limit at some point. And what about seating density? All exits are rated for pax flow per 90 seconds, but unless you pay to be in PE or business+ where the pax/metre equation is lowest, you are likely to be up against the limits. |
I fear the brave guy who went back up the slide did so to try to unblock a logjam of struggling bodies and baggage blocking the aisle. For some while before that the egress of pax had become slow and intermittent which bespeaks a difficulty reaching the door at all, and the two items that were all he managed to release that came down the slide look to me more like bags than bodies. He deserves a medal.
The industry must rapidly get to grips with the homicidally irrational behaviour of some pax on evacuation. Locking bins coulld be easily and relatively cheaply retrofitted and would completely solve the baggage problem, in the meantime well publicised prosecutions would not be misplaced at all. I think some people are being far too laissez-faire over such blatantly selfish action that any reasonable person can see is potentially hazardous. It would only take a couple of people stumbling over bags at or before the lobby before others begin scrambling over them and you have an immovable Hillsborough type bottleneck-crush situation. I have little doubt that is what happened here. With no overwing exits anyone caught in or behind that would be inevitably condemned to death. It simply must not be allowed to happen like that. We'll look back at unlocked bins in 20 years time and marvel how they were ever permitted. |
Anybody mentioned smokehoods yet?
34 years since the Manchester accident, smokehoods might have helped a few of the passengers get out. Thoughts?
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Originally Posted by meleagertoo
(Post 10464830)
. . . in the meantime well publicised prosecutions would not be misplaced at all.
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Pax vid of approach to first bounce.
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Originally Posted by Blackfriar
(Post 10464637)
And being just 30 seconds behind, if there had been a fire, the foam cannon would have started before they arrived. Look at the video today, foam everywhere but on the fire for at least 30 seconds.
As for response time, if fire crews were holding in the taxiway around the middle of the runway, and the aircraft ended up at the end of the runway, they had to travel about 2kms to get to it. Assuming an average speed of 80km/hr, which allows for accelerating and decelerating, the time to the aircraft would be 1 min 30 secs following clearance to enter the runway. If the average speed was 70km/hr, the time taken would be 1:43. And unlike the very controlled video being used for comparison, in an actual fire crews have to slow down to assess the situation and quickly decide on and coordinate a first response strategy under extreme stress. This was probably the fire crew's first real life-threatening passenger aircraft fire, and odds are it will be their last, such is the life of airport fire crews. So perhaps don't presume so much. |
Originally Posted by PAXboy
(Post 10464704)
Changing cabin baggage standards and weights would require all airlines operating the same route to agree. It would require agreements around the world. It will not happen. The Pax want to pay less money and airlines facilitate that for them. Nothing will change - unless you can PROVE that cabin bags in evac cause MUTLIPLE deaths.
Add in that Manufacturers retro fit a central locking system on overheads that locks when landing gear down in flight and only released after that by cabin crew at gate. |
Sorry to add one more comment about baggage. I haven't flown for years now but I remember 30-40 years ago the size standard was enforced, at least at my local airport CYYZ. There was a metal rectangle representing the width and height of the space under the seat and, if your hand baggage couldn't pass through it, you had to check it in to the baggage hold, even directly from the departure gate. Was that not universally enforced at that time?
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Originally Posted by OldnGrounded
(Post 10464853)
They would be entirely misplaced, as well as ineffective. Attempting to criminalize undesirable behavior in a life-threatening emergency is a fool's errand.What's more, any such prosecution would be unlikely in the extreme to result in conviction. Defense counsel and experts in behavioral psychology would eviscerate the prosecution and the chances of convincing jurors to convict would be negligible at best.
They will forget about this event, just like they forgot about children that died due to lack of actions of fire crews (coincidentally, well, not really) when a mall burnt down completely in Kemerovo about a year ago... 60 people died, including 37 children. |
That's one heck of a bounce. How about a go-around, followed very quickly by a change of mind?
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Originally Posted by OldnGrounded
(Post 10464853)
They would be entirely misplaced, as well as ineffective. Attempting to criminalize undesirable behavior in a life-threatening emergency is a fool's errand.What's more, any such prosecution would be unlikely in the extreme to result in conviction. Defense counsel and experts in behavioral psychology would eviscerate the prosecution and the chances of convincing jurors to convict would be negligible at best.
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Originally Posted by dmwalker
(Post 10464870)
Sorry to add one more comment about baggage. I haven't flown for years now but I remember 30-40 years ago the size standard was enforced, at least at my local airport CYYZ. There was a metal rectangle representing the width and height of the space under the seat and, if your hand baggage couldn't pass through it, you had to check it in to the baggage hold, even directly from the departure gate. Was that not universally enforced at that time?
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Originally Posted by Interested Passenger
(Post 10464787)
the only way to make a lot of connecting flights is to use the overhead.
Complete BS. I fly internationally on 4 leg itineraries regularly. It is entirely possible to check baggage and have it make all your flights. |
the approach seems relatively uneventful as far as it can be judged by in-flight recording but I agree that the bounce is pretty severe. Difficult to form an opinion until de FDR data becomes available. |
Originally Posted by atakacs
(Post 10464902)
the approach seems relatively uneventful as far as it can be judged by in-flight recording but I agree that the bounce is pretty severe. Difficult to form an opinion until de FDR data becomes available. |
Originally Posted by Herod
(Post 10464876)
That's one heck of a bounce. How about a go-around, followed very quickly by a change of mind?
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The British Airtours flight that had a somewhat similar evacuation issue shows some interesting results when survivor seat locations are calculated as shown on the Wiki page for thes flight BA 28M. An analysis afterwards appeared to show that some people were frozen in their seats while some clambered over the backs of seats and pushed their way out.
Some people 8, 9 and 10 rows behind the over wing exits managed to get out OK whereas some people just two rows away did not. It was suggested at the time that some people had a "survival at any cost" reaction.... which just goes to support what you are saying, one never knows how one might react in such a situation |
Originally Posted by Airways B
(Post 10464857)
Pax vid of approach to first bounce.
That was a very hard touchdown indeed! Does the video suggest a botched landing due to being forced to land in an uncomfortable "mode", with the prior issues (lightening strike?) only a secondary contributing factor? |
This video posted by the Guardian appears to show (at least to me) the engines were producing significant thrust as the aircraft traveled down the runway on fire. I wonder if the PF engaged TOGA after the first bounce. The view starts at 0:15.
There's also a brief shot in the video that appears to show part of the left MLG punched through the wing. |
Originally Posted by vanHorck
(Post 10464916)
That was a very hard touchdown indeed!
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Since this thread started, hundreds of thousands of passengers have flown and arrived safely with their cabin bags. There's an old saying that hard cases make bad law. Jumping around demanding changes to baggage configuration on the basis of one accident is not rational in the hard-headed world of commercial aviation. One could equally argue that rear-facing seats would similarly improve survival statistics - that's not going to happen either. As ever, the times of maximum danger for SLF are the journeys to and from the airport. Life's a risky old business.
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I haven’t read the entire thread because of the carry-on (or should I say carrion) warriors. One question: Is the main gear somewhere behind the wreckage or still attached to the plane? |
Originally Posted by Iron Bar
(Post 10464040)
Boeing and Airbus main wheels are designed to detach and not penetrate fuel tanks, if overloaded or stressed beyond limits. Do Sukhoi have similar design?? Ryanair at CIA and BA 777 at LHR both had U/C through wings |
Look at the pictures for signs of the gear through the fuel tanks in the wings
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Originally Posted by lomapaseo
(Post 10464948)
Look at the pictures for signs of the gear through the fuel tanks in the wings
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