Citation needed for 'plagued'

AF447 was more about lack of training than the plane being the problem IMO. No one was in charge of the plane, regardless of what mode it was in.

Planes are more complex, yes, they are also, by any statistic, much much safer than 30-40 years ago. What has changed is the beancounters minimizing training to the fullest extent while the planes are becoming more complex.

Saying the planes are too complicated is reductive and uninformed, just like POTUS.

A message last night from the head of Southwest's pilot union SWAPA (tonight's message might be different):

Quote:

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I have been in numerous conversations today with Southwest Vice President of Flight Operations Captain Alan Kasher, who informed me that the MAX aircraft has 17,000 recordable parameters and Southwest has compiled and analyzed a tremendous amount of data from more than 41,000 flights operated by the 34 MAX aircraft on property, and the data supports Southwest's continued confidence in the airworthiness and safety of the MAX.

I have also had conversations with TWU 556 President Lyn Montgomery, who represents Southwest Flight Attendants, AMFA National President Bret Oestreich, SWAPA Safety Committee and SWAPA Government Affairs Committee members, as well as leaders from other Pilot labor unions. I relayed to them that SWAPA is extremely confident that our entire fleet, including the MAX, is safe based on the facts, intelligence, data, and information we presently have. We fully support Southwest Airlines' decision to continue flying the MAX and the FAA's findings to date.

I will continue to put my family, friends, and loved ones on any Southwest flight and the main reason is you, the Pilots of SWAPA. We have lobbied hard for our training to continue to evolve and improve, and due to having the finest union Training and Standards Committee in the industry, that is occurring.

We now have Extended Envelope Training (EET) in addition to our regular annual training and since SWAPA and others have brought awareness to the MCAS issue, we have additional resources to successfully deal with either a legitimate MCAS triggered event or a faulty triggered MCAS event.

SWAPA also has pushed hard for Angle of Attack (AOA) sensor displays to be put on all our aircraft and those are now being implemented into the fleet. All of these tools, in addition to SWAPA Pilots having the most experience on 737s in the industry, give me no pause that not only are our aircraft safe, but you are the safest 737 operators in the sky.

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https://swaparesources.s3-us-west-2....2_Update_2.pdf

Related - is it known whether MCAS has ever been activated to serve its actual intended purpose?

I'm a little unsure whether that question is rhetorical.

Seriously ? While we all know that pilot error has been involved in a number of accidents, this potential fault in the 737Max shows that the pilots can be the last line of defence if properly trained. The Lion Air accident shows that the previous day the pilots successfully managed a serious computer error and saved all those on board. Unfortunately that is not always the case. The pilots were not successful in saving the AF447 but the aircraft would certainly have crashed anyway if just the computer systems were involved.

And don't forget that most accidents that have happened would also have happened if there were no pilots. Also the case with Lion Air, that plane would have crashed without pilots as well, only sooner. And the day before, the pilots had even saved that plane from the failing automation.

How many times earlier have pilots saved their plane from failing automation? Problem is that those moments never reach the news.

The SWAPA announcement may be overtaken by events.

Following EASA's action, the FAA is going to be under enormous pressure to justify why it is not following suit (assuming it doesn't, though I wouldn't rule out it doing so).

You just need to select and train pilots as it used to be when automation was basic. Good selection and training + technology.= safety. I regularly fly with FOs that should not be even near an airplane. Review all requirement, mandatory testing such a DLR , psychological assessment before accessing to professional pilot training also for selfspomsored.. Truth is training is today a business and quality outside of majors sucks big time.. Stop P2F.paid type ratings and line training. Nowadays the main requirement to become a professional pilot is daddy's wallet..

I openly admit that I am no fan of the way in which EASA works - being overly reliant on rules and law with sometimes peculiar interpretations of that law - but it's strange to see, following rather than leading, its member States' CAAs, that it chooses to issue an AD which appears to fail to meet the legal requirements set out in Commission Regulation No 748/2012 for such documents.

Of course, if evidence shows that the safety level of this aircraft may be compromised I would hope that this would be declared, even if the details of that evidence are not provided. Overall, as others have suggested, this is a situation which is being driven by public opinion (which may include a good many pilots). Those who claim that it's driven by safety I fear may be deluding themselves. I'm not suggesting that it is wrong that these aircraft are being grounded, but actions are hardly being led by the agencies that are established to protect the travelling and innocent ground-dwelling public.

The 737 Max is now the most well known aircraft type ever to Joe public for all the wrong reasons. There was sadly no other option but to ground them at least apart from the U.S where they are still flying for now.

DC10 Sioux City, DHL A300 Bagdad come to mind

Oh, for social media back when the American DC-10 cargo door blew out.

And regarding the Lipstick On A Pig Max, I've never seen so many professionals on social media right here (and you can always pick them out) say that now they would not ride on it. Just look at this thread. It was strong enough after Lion Air ...

Currently the Max -9 has (7) in flight. The Max-8 has (94) in flight.

And very much the Hudson river. That would almost guaranteed been a loss of all passengers, and very possibly a significant number on the ground too.

EASA says "no":
https://www.easa.europa.eu/newsroom-...rations-europe

While there is not yet sufficient information to draw a clear link between the ET accident that is the subject of this thread and MCAS I am deeply troubled by the amount of misinformation regarding MCAS that is being spread here. Reluctantly I offer the explanation below without any suggestion that this system contributed to the tragedy in Ethiopia this last weekend. The truth will be revealed by the recorder data and the full investigation. I strongly implore those who do not know MCAS details to stop providing incorrect information here or anywhere else. Posing questions is fine, but please do not state as fact that about which you are not sufficiently knowledgeable.

MCAS Operation Clarification

MCAS is triggered when all of the following are true:
A. Sensed AOA exceeds a flight condition based activation threshold
B. Flaps are fully retracted (i.e., up)
C. Autopilot is not engaged

When triggered, MCAS commands nose down stabilizer as a function of how much AOA has exceeded the activation threshold and the current Mach number. For large exceedence of the MCAS activation AOA threshold, MCAS will command 2.5 degrees of stabilizer at low Mach number but less than 1/3rd of that at cruise Mach number (gradual Mach number based schedule between). For a lesser exceedence of the MCAS activation AOA threshold the size of the stabilizer increment will be proportionally less. MCAS stabilizer command will be stopped immediately upon pilot activation of pitch trim. (Pilot trim input also serves as MCAS reset - see next paragraph.)

Once MCAS has commanded one increment of stabilizer motion, it will not command more until it has been reset. MCAS is reset if any of the following occur:
1. Pilot makes a manual trim command. (MCAS will not re-activate until there have been 5 continuous seconds without pilot trim command.)
2. AOA drops below MCAS activation threshold and MCAS has run stabilizer in the airplane nose up direction taking out the increment of airplane nose down command it inserted earlier.
3. Autopilot is engaged and then disengaged.

Without pilot trim input, MCAS will not run the stab more than one increment (up to 2.5 degrees) unless MCAS is reset via either 2 or 3 above.

Talk of MCAS running the stabilizer for 10 seconds, pausing for 5 seconds, and then running it again repeatedly without pilot trim input are patently incorrect.

And some seem to have difficulty finding someone to make a decision where to park the static display:


https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....56c15d501b.jpg

FCENG

so you are 1000 feet and MCAS dials 2.5degrees nose down WHAT DO YOU DO?

Wrong on all counts.
a. The 737 is not a computer controlled aircraft by any stretch of the imagination. It is the original fly-by-wire aircraft (yup - 5mm steel cables).
b. The Indonesian, Ethiopian(?), A320, A340, and many other incidents demonstrate that the pilots were NOT able to be the last line of defence. Quite the reverse.
c. AF447 could easily have been saved by computer software. If Normal-law drops out because of input errors, the aircraft defaults to Alternate-law, which is a basic control system running on attitude and power. It would take Airbus a couple of years to knock up this new Alternate-law, which assumed no pilot assistance.
d. The Sioux DC10 crash was easily flown with a computer (just on engines, with no flight controls). They knocked up that new software inside a year.

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Fairly simple in computer terms. Do remember that the 737 is not a computer-driven aircraft at all. It has some auto-systems that have been hastily (and inadvisably) bolted onto an aircraft that is no more complex than a Cessna 152 (same type of flight-control system). As mentioned above, on a computer controlled aircraft, if Normal-law drops out because of input errors, the aircraft defaults to Alternate-law -- which is a basic control system running on attitude and power. It would take Airbus a couple of years to knock up this new Alternate-law, which assumed no pilot assistance.

Silver