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To board the MAX, or not to board - That is the question
We are all keenly interested in what the FDR and CVR will show from this second accident.
Either they will show:
The 37 has enjoyed an extraordinary run of success since its inauguration, but the latest engineering efforts seem to have pushed an initially robust and exemplary design into fragile behavior . |
Originally Posted by JumpJumpJump
(Post 10414350)
https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....cc4faa7bf4.jpg
737 max fleet grounded by Gol in Brazil. They use their Max fleet for direct flights from Brazil to Florida.... Routes suspended, though imagine that they will be frantically working out how to honour current schedule with a fuel stop added in either the north of Brazil or the Caribbean |
Gotta agree! In great VMC conditions - as reported - even the very worst of pilots should surely be able to maintain some semblance of the old Straight and Level. Seems inconceivable to me that even if this Max had the same airspeed/attitude problems as the last one that crashed, the pilots couldn't have controlled it? Something else going gone here I suspect! A bad start to 2019! |
Clearly the MCAS situation - even if this accident doesn't turn out to be rooted in MCAS - is a strong indicator. Now, 60 years later, we seem to have turned 180 degrees in our thinking. As little as I understand MCAS, it is clear, at least to me, that it is a computer controlled solution to aerodynamic instability inherent in the design. While computerized aerodynamic stabilization of inherently unstable new designs may be the trajectory of future, to apply it as a fix as we push 50 year old designs to new limits may prove to be a mistake. |
Originally Posted by Buster15
(Post 10413857)
Easily the most sensible and correct post I have read so far.
Speculation is just that. All will be revealed in good time. Without reading 500 odd posts, do we know who was PF? The experienced Captain or the inexperienced Co-PIlot? Steep expereince difference don't you think? |
Interesting details/analysis by a control guru which **may** help explanation of which sensor does what and how
https://www.satcom.guru/2018/11/737-...n-command.html Obviously put together after LionAir . . Peter was Boeing avionics supervisor for 767 and 747-400 data link recording, data link reporting, and satellite communications. He was an FAA designated engineering representative (DER) for ACARS, satellite communications, DFDAU, DFDR, ACMS and printers. Peter was lead engineer for Thrust Management System (757, 767, 747-400), also supervisor for satellite communications for 777, and was manager of terminal-area projects (GLS, MLS, enhanced vision). |
The crew reported problems with air speed indications. Does that invalidate the reported 383kt speed?
It does seem a high speed for less than 6 minutes after takeoff and at low altitude. Is it even credible? |
Originally Posted by CONSO
(Post 10414532)
Interesting details/analysis by a control guru which **may** help explanation of which sensor does what and how
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Interesting piece from Slate:
"Boeing’s either going to have to come up with a very convincing fix for whatever caused these two crashes, or think about starting over with a fresh sheet of paper.". https://slate.com/technology/2019/03...e-737-max.html |
Interesting yes, but if they can write this with a straight face... "Malaysia Airlines, which the public viewed with misgivings after it lost two 777s in less than five months in 2014. Though it bore no obvious responsibility for either incident—one was shot down by Russia, the second was hijacked..." how deep will the rest of it be?
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Captain was Pilot Flying. Addis is a "Capt only" Airport
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737 MAX stabilizer cutout switches are guarded. With the guards in their normal, closed positions the switches are forced into the position that provides normal operation of the stabilizer. To cutout the stabilizer motor (i.e., disable electric trim from any source) the guards must be raised and the switches moved to the position that is only possible with the guards raised. Guarded switches of this sort provide two very strong levels of safety. First they make it very difficult/impossible to toggle the switch inadvertently as the guard must be raised before the switch can be toggled. Second they make the polarity of the switch very clear as normal operation position is the only one possible with the guard closed.
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Originally Posted by Etudiant
The crew reported problems with air speed indications. Does that invalidate the reported 383kt speed?
It does seem a high speed for less than 6 minutes after takeoff and at low altitude. Is it even credible? Done a low-level level-off recently? |
Originally Posted by MD80767 Driver
(Post 10414552)
Captain was Pilot Flying. Addis is a "Capt only" Airport
ADD is certainly NOT Cat C or Captain Only in most companies. |
Originally Posted by oldoberon
(Post 10414497)
lancs said " From the Lion Air thread, I believe MCAS cycles between the 2 AOAs between each flight..""..
If the system uses 1 &2 on alternate flights both are wired in, I would think it is relatively simple to put a 1-2 switch in the cockpit but it is only active when the red light / HUD shows there is a difference, that could possibly immediately allow crew to rectify problem Oldoberon |
What is the source for the above statement? There is no information in the current B738M AOM that tells crews that the "MCAS cycles between the left AoA and the right AoA sensor". |
Originally Posted by Cows getting bigger
(Post 10413942)
Some rough working assumptions (probably overly optimistic): 350 aircraft In service for 2 years, each aircraft available 340 days/yr, 5 sectors/day. Total number of departures: approx 1.2m giving a fatal accident rate of 1.67 per million flights. In comparison using figures up to 2017: Banderantie - 3.07. (Ouch!) Concorde - 11.36 (indicative of very low numbers in service and utilisation) F28 - 1.65 A310 - 1.34 B747 (early models) 1.02 B747 (-400 onwards) - 0.06 B737 (all models) - 0.28 A320 series - 0.11 |
Originally Posted by MD80767 Driver
(Post 10414552)
Captain was Pilot Flying. Addis is a "Capt only" Airport
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Originally Posted by Dee Vee
(Post 10414490)
https://www.reuters.com/article/ethi...-idUSL1N20Z01K Just wow... Begs the question, how long have they known about the issues??? Was the aircraft pushed out too early to "meet schedule" and increase profit? |
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