Well because the biggest market was airlines flying the 737 who pilots already had a 737 type rating like Southwest, Ryanair etc for starters.

Methinks our Antipodean mate has been on the XXXX. :)

I wonder if sometime ago, in a committee room in Chicago a conversation like this occurred:

"OK fellas, we are having some problems certifying our new jet. Apparently there is this ridiculous certification requirement that stick force must not decrease when approaching the stall. Clearly this situation won't happen in real life but we need a solution to keep the regulators happy. Since no ones ever going to use it and the regulators arn't too sharp these days it doesn't have to be too clever but it REALLY needs to be cheap. We have taken loads of orders for this jet and if we change too many things it will cost money"

Now then BUBBA, whats this MCAS you were thinking of............

If it's an AOA failure that's causing these problems does anyone know the failure rate of these vanes ?

And who makes them ?

I had a similar mischievous though. VW diesel engines and emission testing was my analogy.

not true, flap retracton at Addis is 1000 above airfield elevation, or 8625 amsl

As far as I know, the 737 acc altitude is 1500' AAL, so flap retraction will be even higher up. I can't find any exemptions to NADP1/2 in the aerodrome information. Am I missing something?

all I have to say is that I will wait for the final report of the accident. please don't start blame the airplane or the manufactures. the MAX is not a new plane that fall from the stars and none know how to fly. is a 737ng with new engines and some new software for more efficiency and safety. all the others thing is the same and a pilot with a 737ng type rating can fly the airplane. as aviation experts said there is no only one thing ( MCAS ) that will cause a accident.

The various grounding decisions are a mystery to me. Last night, a pair of Smartwings 737Max aircraft failed to complete their flights to Prague. One diverted into Tunis while the other returned from Turkish air space to its origin in Dubai. I made the assumption then that this maybe because they were not going to be allowed into European air space. Now, this morning, I see another Smartwings 737Max en route from Vilnius to Prague.
I also noticed that despite the ban from Indian air space, there was more than one Spicejet 737Max in and around India and this morning there was another couple of them heading for Indian airports, including 1 domestic flight. When is a ban not a ban?

Not correct - you need to look at the directives that have been issued by each specific State or bloc, relating both to the aircraft type and to use of the States' airspace by those types.

The EASA ban allows for 3 re-positioning flights, without passengers, to allow the planes to be in a position to work on any modifications required.

The EASA restriction, as I noted several posts back, does not apply to positioning flights back to base, only to commercial services.

I don't think Smart Wings operates VNO-PRG and even if they did, the flight number (TVS420P) is a giveaway that it's positioning empty.

Ok this could be a dumb non pilot question in which case the mods can deal with is but here goes. There had been a lot of talk about the MCAS software design and its possible limitations. But just as pilots need to get hours in the simulator doesn't the software itself have to do the same thing? Ie: would mcas have had to endure endless hours of simulator training with real people testing its limits?

To restore confidence in the aircraft - what?

Three AOA sensors inputting to MCAS two of which must agree.

Limitation to the forward trim provided by MCAS?

They would do it for me. How difficult/expensive to fit/retrofit.

Probably not correct - it seems that they landed in Ankara instead
https://www.flightradar24.com/data/f...s1201#1fc767d2

Prob just a software upgrade. FCC A & B should have a crosstalk bus between the 2. Boeing boffins are probably working on a solution now in order to ensure a single sensor failure does not impact safe aircraft operating envelopes. Both sensors will prob be voted/compared if they weren't previously, or the MCAS deactivated.

Single sensor inputs compared over crosstalk buses between aircraft system computers (redundancies) for the purpose of voting/comparison have often been used in the past. Not sure why single AOA inputs to the FCC were not voted in the first place (if this is the case).