Korean Air B747 (Stansted crash) report out
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Hi all,
My understanding, in addition to all the situational awareness problems that were happening during the initial/final moments of this flight, is that the Flight Engineer was the ONLY one that actually knew what going on.
The report I read, stated that the FE called out, repeatedly, "Attitude - Attitude - Attitude ......." all the way to the ground contact, exactly what he is supposed to do, apparently the FO was quite busy with flight path (above the ground) following, ie, departure SID, and comms with the controlling authority, to respond!!
And......er...in my aviation career so far, Avtur IS flammible, if it was inflammable, I would have a real job starting the engines!!!
Cheers
My understanding, in addition to all the situational awareness problems that were happening during the initial/final moments of this flight, is that the Flight Engineer was the ONLY one that actually knew what going on.
The report I read, stated that the FE called out, repeatedly, "Attitude - Attitude - Attitude ......." all the way to the ground contact, exactly what he is supposed to do, apparently the FO was quite busy with flight path (above the ground) following, ie, departure SID, and comms with the controlling authority, to respond!!
And......er...in my aviation career so far, Avtur IS flammible, if it was inflammable, I would have a real job starting the engines!!!
Cheers
Supercalifragilistic
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Off topic - just 314 words?
To take the BBC Online story as an example, that journalist had just 314 words
Did the journalist really have just 314 words?
You make realistic points about how much "joe public" would actually be interested or motivated to read on this subject. So I agree that to engage the reader the journalist needed to boil the story down, get the news up front et cetera however the article under discussion was online!
Obvoulsy (As you know!) print editorial space is dictated by advertising space and cover price so there is more pressure on word count. But online the marginal cost of additional copy is basically the time take to reseach and write it.
I think this is a case of a journalist having this story on a long list of stuff to be covered and doing a fairly bog standard "air disaster report write up" - scan the report then write a reminder of remind people when and where it happened, highlight simply digested major causes, move on to next story.
Just the sort of copy that gets up the nose of professionals in any industry that know of or can see more complex issues below the surface of a rushed and over simplified news report, but as you say it's what the punters like!
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Dear Memetic
You ask:
“Did the journalist really have just 314 words?”
The answer is: possibly
You are correct that text written for an online publication is not in itself hindered by space constraints (as much of the verbiage hereabouts testifies), yet often in these multitasking days ‘copy’ is re-used in print and broadcast media too – especially when the employer is as big as the BBC. Hence a need to ‘keep it tight’ still applies.
In any case good journalism will always be defined in part by an ability to convey the maximum amount of information in the minimum number of words. (How am I doing?)
Also, as you probably realise, I used the example of the BBC’s online news story linked at the start of this thread partly because it was accessible, but also to illustrate a wider point about brevity…not that I’m sure it was understood by all. A better example might have been taken from a newspaper, I grant you.
Hope this adds to the great pot of understanding, and that the vast vat of deliberate, diversionary and debasing misunderstanding be drained by an equal amount.
Daniel (still in the lions’ den) Coughlan
“Did the journalist really have just 314 words?”
The answer is: possibly
You are correct that text written for an online publication is not in itself hindered by space constraints (as much of the verbiage hereabouts testifies), yet often in these multitasking days ‘copy’ is re-used in print and broadcast media too – especially when the employer is as big as the BBC. Hence a need to ‘keep it tight’ still applies.
In any case good journalism will always be defined in part by an ability to convey the maximum amount of information in the minimum number of words. (How am I doing?)
Also, as you probably realise, I used the example of the BBC’s online news story linked at the start of this thread partly because it was accessible, but also to illustrate a wider point about brevity…not that I’m sure it was understood by all. A better example might have been taken from a newspaper, I grant you.
Hope this adds to the great pot of understanding, and that the vast vat of deliberate, diversionary and debasing misunderstanding be drained by an equal amount.
Daniel (still in the lions’ den) Coughlan
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Yeah. Well, anyrate, just going on the evidence so far, we don't have to look too hard at this one to see where the blame should end up. On the desk of UK ATC for one, for requiring crews to do things other than fly the airplane when operating close to the ground at night. And for another, on the desk of whichever committee of neophytes ordered the installation and use of those time and attention consuming idiotic and dangerous zillion decimal VHF tuning heads.
Don't think so? Obvious. Captain flying, head full of the departure. Horizon locks up. Airplane wanders off in roll, as it will. FE calls the bank display error; captain doesn't register; FO, meantime, head down in the VHF set, concentrating on changing the numbers.
Boom.
Don't think so? Obvious. Captain flying, head full of the departure. Horizon locks up. Airplane wanders off in roll, as it will. FE calls the bank display error; captain doesn't register; FO, meantime, head down in the VHF set, concentrating on changing the numbers.
Boom.
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JAFA - that's why all heavy commercial flights are two, sometimes three, crew - one to fly the aircraft, one to handle the radios, set flaps, retract gear, and in three man ops to monitor the engines. True, ATC will require a frequency change, but even in the 172 I fly this can be set to be the push of a button to the next frequency. The erroneous ADI output seems to be the issue here.
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Mike: Jeppesen/AERAD plates will include departure frequencies on many SIDs (certainly those associated with major airports) and if not printed on the plate, ATC will give the freq as part of the clearance. London Control freqs ARE on the Stansted plates.
In my opinion, the issue with the FO is not so much that he had a lot to do but that he did not appear prioritise those tasks successfully. The frequency change to London will often clash with a turn on a SID, thrust reduction or flap retraction procedures or maybe even a level off. This is unfortunate but is a simple fact of life and as such has to be dealt with.
Priorities are always: Aviation, Navigation, Communication, Adminstration. The flying of the aeroplane in accordance with the standard flight profiles (attitudes, speeds, acceleration etc) coupled with following the SID take care of numbers 1 and 2 priority - AND ATC MUST WAIT THEIR TURN! In fact, there is a strong arguement to suggest that priorities 1 and 2 are infact inseperable when operating commercial aeroplanes under IFR - but comms and paperwork are always lower priorities.
You will hear cries of "but you must talk to London ASAP or you are not being controlled" but this is tosh (and I have this first hand from controllers there). The reasons are obvious if you think about it - what do you do if you lose comms? You follow the cleared departure and level off at the assigned altitude/Flight Level. This is what the controller is expecting you to do and he will be expecting you to be following that departure until he (or she of course) hears you check in and then tells you otherwise.
So, if you have to delay ATC check-in 10, 20, 30 seconds while you get the Captain to put his flight path right, then you do just that. ATC will still be there - but you opportunity to correct a flightpath error may not.
I get the impression that the FO was head down and distracted by the comms and was unduly pre-occupied with matters other than monitoring the performance of the aeroplane and the Captain, which is to FO's primary duty. If he had been paying more attaention to what the Captain was doing and had joined the FE in making "Attitude" calls or even taking control (I know from experience that this takes some nerve!) then the accident may well have been avoided. It does appear from the report, however, that the Captain was behaving in an autocratic and "superior" manner towards the FO, making (quote) "derogatory" comments towards him.
The following passage from the accident report is telling, I think:
Ultimately, it was not a "maintenance error" but an "aircrew error". The aeroplane was serviceable apart from a single instrument and there were two other instruments (more if you count the performance instruments such as HSI etc) telling the crew what was REALLY going on. The Captain appears to have belittled his FO to the extent that the chap was unwilling to question the Captain's performance and it is (speculation here) likely that the Captain would have been unreceptive to that questioning, anyway.
It bears a striking resemblance to the performance of Captain Keys in the BA Trident crash at Staines in the 70's - 25 years of lessons unlearned, it would appear.
In my opinion, the issue with the FO is not so much that he had a lot to do but that he did not appear prioritise those tasks successfully. The frequency change to London will often clash with a turn on a SID, thrust reduction or flap retraction procedures or maybe even a level off. This is unfortunate but is a simple fact of life and as such has to be dealt with.
Priorities are always: Aviation, Navigation, Communication, Adminstration. The flying of the aeroplane in accordance with the standard flight profiles (attitudes, speeds, acceleration etc) coupled with following the SID take care of numbers 1 and 2 priority - AND ATC MUST WAIT THEIR TURN! In fact, there is a strong arguement to suggest that priorities 1 and 2 are infact inseperable when operating commercial aeroplanes under IFR - but comms and paperwork are always lower priorities.
You will hear cries of "but you must talk to London ASAP or you are not being controlled" but this is tosh (and I have this first hand from controllers there). The reasons are obvious if you think about it - what do you do if you lose comms? You follow the cleared departure and level off at the assigned altitude/Flight Level. This is what the controller is expecting you to do and he will be expecting you to be following that departure until he (or she of course) hears you check in and then tells you otherwise.
So, if you have to delay ATC check-in 10, 20, 30 seconds while you get the Captain to put his flight path right, then you do just that. ATC will still be there - but you opportunity to correct a flightpath error may not.
I get the impression that the FO was head down and distracted by the comms and was unduly pre-occupied with matters other than monitoring the performance of the aeroplane and the Captain, which is to FO's primary duty. If he had been paying more attaention to what the Captain was doing and had joined the FE in making "Attitude" calls or even taking control (I know from experience that this takes some nerve!) then the accident may well have been avoided. It does appear from the report, however, that the Captain was behaving in an autocratic and "superior" manner towards the FO, making (quote) "derogatory" comments towards him.
The following passage from the accident report is telling, I think:
In May 1999, a survey of KAL flight crews was conducted by the University of Texas Department of Psychology, through the consulting project. Over 550 pilots and flight engineers participated, in what was called the Flight Management Attitudes Questionnaire (FMAQ), responding to questions regarding 'Command Structure'. They were asked to detail their level of agreement to the following statements:
1. Juniors should not question the captain unless there is a threat to safety.
2. First Officers should never assume command of the aircraft.
3. Captains should take control/fly in emergencies.
Responses regarding these statements were then combined to form a composite score, from which was measured the differences in attitudes toward command. These were then compared to the results from sixteen other national airlines in which identical surveys had been conducted. The results showed, among other things, that KAL flight crews as a whole preferred the 'captain-centered' methodology of flight deck operation, with a relatively greater reliance on the captain.
1. Juniors should not question the captain unless there is a threat to safety.
2. First Officers should never assume command of the aircraft.
3. Captains should take control/fly in emergencies.
Responses regarding these statements were then combined to form a composite score, from which was measured the differences in attitudes toward command. These were then compared to the results from sixteen other national airlines in which identical surveys had been conducted. The results showed, among other things, that KAL flight crews as a whole preferred the 'captain-centered' methodology of flight deck operation, with a relatively greater reliance on the captain.
It bears a striking resemblance to the performance of Captain Keys in the BA Trident crash at Staines in the 70's - 25 years of lessons unlearned, it would appear.
Last edited by moggie; 5th Aug 2003 at 19:59.
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Mike - your question refered to UK SIDs, though, and anyway, at STN the freq is published.
Bottom line, though, is that it still boils down to the fact poor MCC/CRM/prioritisation that caused this wholly avoidable crash.
The sad thing was that when I heard about the accident on the news my first though was not "RIP chaps" or some such but "KAL - what a surprise!"
Bottom line, though, is that it still boils down to the fact poor MCC/CRM/prioritisation that caused this wholly avoidable crash.
The sad thing was that when I heard about the accident on the news my first though was not "RIP chaps" or some such but "KAL - what a surprise!"
